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CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

SECTION V

RELIGIONS OF INDIA AND IRAN

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS

I HAVE been asked by the Organizing Committee to give you to-day some account of what has been accomplished during the last two or three years—since the last Congress in fact—in the history of the development of religious belief in Iran and India. I should myself have preferred to choose for discussion in this address some one point in the history of those beliefs. The attempt to deal with the whole subject must of necessity resolve itself more or less into a bibliographical list. And such lists are apt to be of interest mainly to those who hear themselves mentioned in them. To every one else the meagreness of the result it will be possible to lay before you, may seem little more than a confession of failure in a field of work so important and so vast. But obedience to orders is the first duty of one called to such a post as I have the honour, for the time, to fill; and I will do my best.

And first as to Iran. I had applied for assistance on this part of the subject to the American scholar (so welcome at all our Congresses), who is an acknowledged master of it. Unfortunately Professor Williams Jackson is detained in New York. But he has been good enough to send some notes[1] which have arrived just in time, and which I will now read to you. He says:—

'The field of Iran has continued to be worked by a small but devoted band of scholars, and has yielded a harvest worthy of their activity.

'First among the books which have been published since the Basel Congress, although bearing the date of that year, may be mentioned a memorial volume of *Avesta, Pahlavi, and Ancient Persian Studies* in honour of the late Parsi High Priest, Dastur Peshotanji Sanjana, of Bombay. In this book are contained sixteen different articles con-

[1] These notes were hastily written and were not destined for publication; but in order to facilitate the early appearance of this volume, Prof. Jackson has kindly sanctioned their inclusion here.

tributed by European savants and illustrating various phases of the religion of ancient Iran. It is to be hoped that the continuation of the work by a second series containing the contributions of Parsi scholars themselves may follow, as originally planned.

'To the year 1905 belongs the sketch of the ancient Persian religion by Lehmann, in Chantepie de la Saussaye's manual of the history of religion; and a useful English translation of Tiele's *Religion of the Iranian Peoples*, by Nariman, in the *Indian Antiquary*; while a popular sketch of *The Teachings of Zoroaster and the Philosophy of the Parsi Religion* was compiled for the Wisdom of the East Series, by Kapadia, himself a Parsi. A convenient summary of the Iranian religion, *Die iranische Religion*, in German, was contributed to Hinneberg's series in 1906 by the distinguished Indologist Hermann Oldenberg.

'During the past three years the veteran scholar, Mills, of Oxford, has continued ever actively to publish in the various journals of Europe, America, and also of India, the results of his Pahlavi studies and his researches in the Zoroastrian Gathas. In addition to these, in a special volume *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achaemenids, and Israel*, he has emphasized the rôle played by Iran in influencing the faith of other lands; and in another book, entitled *Avesta Eschatology*, he has drawn comparisons between certain Zoroastrian tenets and the ideas in the Biblical books of Daniel and the Revelation.

'Of special interest, and appearing in this present year, is a series of translations from the Avesta by Geldner, under the title *Die zoroastrische Religion*, and forming a part of the religious manuals edited by Bertholet of Basel. Some interesting selections from the Avesta, especially from the Gathas, have been rendered into English verse by the Right Rev. L. C. Casartelli, of Manchester, in his *Flowers from an Eastern Garden* (1907). Among the most sympathetic and even enthusiastic treatments of the Zoroastrian religion is that comprised in a book entitled *Zarathushtra and Zarathushtrianism in the Avesta*, by Rustamji Sanjani, Deputy High Priest of the Parsis, which was published at Leipzig in 1908. Some Zoroastrian material, especially a study of "Zoroaster and Euclid", will be found in the *Cama Masonic Jubilee Volume*, edited, in 1907, by the indefatigable Parsi worker, Jivanji Jamshedji Modi, of Bombay.

'Certain aspects of the religion of Iran, with reference especially to Mithraism, have received attention from Cumont, the well-known authority on that subject, and from Usener in an article on "Sol Invictus" in *Rheinisches Museum*, N.F. 60. iv. 465–91, as well as at

the hands of other students; and there have been a number of valuable articles on Sufiism, and on the subject of Babism and Bahaism, that religious movement which is assuming ever-increasing importance.

'Of the most signal value and importance, however, have been the additions to our knowledge of Manichaeism made during the past three years by the publication of some of the remarkable discoveries made at Turfan in Chinese Turkestan by Grünwedel, Huth, and Le Coq. These are of inestimable value, as there have been unearthed among the sand-buried ruins large portions of the long-lost Bible of Mani, the Shāpurakān, as well as his Evangelion and Epistles, together with fragments of Manichaean hymns, prayers, and treatises in cosmology; and above all some sections of the New Testament translated into Pahlavi, the language of the Sasanian or Middle Persian Empire. The scholarly world is under special obligations to the learned Berlin professor, F. W. K. Müller, who has made a number of these fragments accessible in translation in the Proceedings of the Berlin Academy of Sciences; and Salemann has done some supplementary work in the same line by editing a few similar fragments that are preserved in the University library at St. Petersburg. When all the fragments unearthed by the Berlin expedition have been published, we may look for remarkable additions to the sphere of our knowledge regarding the religious movements following the rise of Manichaeism in the third century of the Christian era.

'In so brief and cursory a sketch as this must be, it is impossible to mention various contributions in the learned journals by such workers as Gray, Reichelt, Freiman, Wilhelm, Meillet, Blochet, Carnoy, and a score of others, including a younger generation of Parsi scholars in India, whose special magazine, *Zartoshti*, is devoted to the publication of articles relating to their faith. But enough has been brought forward above to prove that the activity has been unceasing and that there has been no falling off of the interest in the work which has for its aim the elucidation of the various phases, ancient and modern, of the religion that belongs to the Land of the Lion and the Sun.'

So far Professor Williams Jackson's notes. I would add that that distinguished and prolific scholar has also himself completed, for Geiger and Kuhn's *Grundriss*, his own summary of the Iranian religion; and that there is also much that relates to Zoroaster and to Zoroastrianism, as it exists to-day in Iran, in his *Persia Past and Present*, which appeared two years ago.

Secondly as to India. We have had no treatises on the whole subject, but several of great importance and interest on special points or branches of it. To begin with the Veda. Professor Bloomfield has published his *Vedic Religion*, which enables us to compare the matured opinion of another scholar with the standard works of Professor Oldenberg on the same subject, and of Professor Hillebrandt on Vedic Mythology. Oldenberg has given us a volume on *Veda-Forschung*, in which he incidentally defends his own conclusions. Professor Caland of Utrecht has published an important monograph on magic in India entitled *Altindische Zauberei*, and in collaboration with Victor Henry of Paris, whose premature death we deplore, has finished vol. i of the detailed study on the Vedic sacrifice, entitled *Agniṣṭoma*; and finally Professor Bloomfield has brought out the splendid volume containing his *Vedic Concordance*, which will be so great an assistance and delight to all future students in this field.

I am sorry there is nothing to report on the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads. One of our most pressing needs is a historically accurate English translation of these works. The numerous versions we have err, one and all, in putting into these ancient, vague, and mystic poems the more precise terms and ideas of Śankara's commentaries written fifteen centuries or more afterwards. We may admire this jump backwards through the centuries as an acrobatic feat of intellectual agility—even more marvellous than that which places the Śānkhya Kārikā of Iśvara Kṛiṣṇa, with the commentary of Gauḍapāda included in a neat parcel, on the lap of the mythical sage Kapila in his lonely hermitage on the slopes of the Himālaya. Such anachronisms are the bane of our studies.

The Pali Text Society has continued its publication of the materials for the next stage in the history of religious belief in India. It has brought out an index volume to the Saṃyutta, compiled by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Mr. Arnold Taylor's edition of the *Paṭisambhidā*, Mrs. Rhys Davids's editions of the *Vibhanga* and of one portion of the *Paṭṭhāna*, and the beginning of a complete edition of the *Commentary on the Dhammapada* by Professor Norman. The Society has now very nearly completed its editions of the original texts, and has made substantial progress in its editions of the commentaries upon them. Professor Windisch has contributed the only serious attempt to utilize the now available materials by his masterly monograph, *Buddha's Geburt*, in which he compares all the ancient forms of the legends connected with this event and traces their growth and history.

Of the earliest Jain literature we have only Professor Barnett's translations of two texts issued by the Royal Asiatic Society. M. Guerinot has brought also a detailed bibliography of all the work done in Europe to throw light on this interesting belief.

For the later Mahāyāna Buddhism, the history of which is still so great a mystery, the Russian Academy has continued (though, alas, not so rapidly as we hoped) its publication of the texts that alone can furnish a solution of the problem. Professor Poussin has gone on with his important edition of the *Madhyamaka Vṛitti*, and Professor Speyer has carried on further his edition of the *Avadāna Śataka*, and the late Professor Bendall published his edition of the *Subhāsita Saṃgraha*. Professor Poussin has also given us elsewhere his translation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, and Professors Takakusu and Sylvain Lévi and M. Huber have contributed valuable materials to the elucidation of various points in the origin and history of this school of thought, so influential in India from the time of Kanishka onwards.

For the early texts of Hinduism, which in their present state may belong to the same period, we have Professor Garbe's new translation of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. He has prefixed a most interesting and ingenious introduction, discussing the history of the poem itself, and of the Bhāgavatas, whose manual of devotion it undoubtedly was. His conclusions are, of course, in the absence of the necessary data, hypothetical. But they will be generally accepted as, for the time at least, the best working hypothesis. Professor Barnett and Professor Deussen have also given us new versions of this enigmatical poem, the latter being included in his *Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhārata*, which has just been brought out in collaboration with Dr. Otto Strauss, a new and valued recruit to our studies. The same scholar, Professor Deussen, has also completed the first volume of his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, the volume concluding his survey of philosophy in India. In this work, also, he is generous with his versions of the more important texts, and the two will be a mine of good material for future students. Professor Oltramare, of Geneva, is devoting a large and valuable work, entitled *L'Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, to a discussion of the same subject, and the first volume has been issued in the *Annales du Musée Guimet*.

Of works dealing with mediaeval and modern Hinduism, Professor Thibaut has completed his version of the standard commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtras by the issue of his translation of

Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāshya. It is especially important, as giving us the views of a foremost leader of the modern representatives of the ancient Bhāgavatas; as showing how greatly the power and influence of theistic rather than pantheistic thought in India has been underestimated; and, incidentally, as exemplifying how widely Indian theologians differed in their interpretation of the relation between their two hypotheses, God and the soul.

Professor Jacobi has given us a translation of the *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, a mediaeval work on Jain philosophy; and Professor Hultsch has continued his studies in Indian logic by the translation, with notes, of the *Tarkakaumudī*. Dr. W. Jahn has published the text and translation into German of the *Saura Purāṇa*. Several works on the existing conditions of religious life among the Hindus have also appeared. The most important are two volumes by Mr. J. C. Oman on *Mystics, Ascetics, and Saints of India*, and *Brahmins, Theists, and Muslims in India*. On the former of these is based Dr. Richard Schmidt's volume, *Fakire und Fakirentum*, in which a translation of a modern Yoga manual, the *Geraṇḍa Saṃhitā*, has also been included.

I am afraid I have wearied you with this list, which might, however, have been made much longer, had I included articles in the Journals, or works of a lower standard. But I crave permission to detain you still a few minutes with some general observations upon it.

In the first place, the work done is confined almost exclusively to the editing or translating of the materials for our studies. There is no comparative study of religious beliefs in general, and very little treatment of a historical kind even within the limits of India. But this is a stage through which we have to pass. And it is better so. Generalizations before the facts are collected are apt to be unstable, and worse than useless, in so far as they occupy the ground with false expressions, and take years to rectify.

Secondly, you will have observed the very great part played in the production of these works by our various organizations—the *Sacred Books of the East*, the *Annales du Musée Guimet*, the Pali Text Society, the Harvard Oriental Series, and the various Academies and learned Societies. Without the aid of such organizations it is often impossible to find the funds necessary for printing the works and (what is of equal importance) of paying the authors. Without the certainty that their labour will result in publication, scholars are chary of undertaking arduous tasks. The incentive of being asked

to contribute a work to such a series is often the spur which is required even then to begin the work. Other objects are supported in an increasing degree by organizations. Why should scholarship lag behind? Let us wholeheartedly support any effort to supply also for our work this now indispensable aid.

I began with deploring the meagreness of the results we are able to show. The very writing of the paper has shown me that I was, in a certain sense, wrong. Meagre—yes; in comparison with the scope of the work to be done. But not so meagre that we may not, with good reason, harbour good hope for the future. These very Congresses are a great help. We have always respected learning; we learn in them to respect persons. We learn the advantage of wider views, of the capacity of overlooking at one and the same time a large number of facts, some of them outside our own special pursuits. We begin to realize the solidarity of our studies, and to see that we are standing at the dawn of a new era when our studies, steadied by criticism and widened by the uprising of larger and deeper questions, shall attract in still greater measure the passionate patience of scholars, shall secure the attention of the cultured world, and even—though that will probably come the last—shall be awarded a place in the curriculum of our ancient universities.

2

WHAT TO LEARN FROM VEDIC MYTHOLOGY

By A. HILLEBRANDT

Whoever has the honour to address you on Vedic mythology in Oxford cannot but feel the inspiration of a man who has done more than anybody else to place the Veda in the foreground of research, and to assign to it the prominent rank which it has held for so long in the history of religions; I refer to the honoured name of Max Müller. I know very well that the actual results of his mythological investigations are but limited, and that his method of inquiry is now antiquated. But I feel bound to say that his memory has not passed and never will pass from the annals of our science, which owes its life and lustre to him, whose poetical intuition grasped the importance of these studies, and whose diligence laid the corner-stone of our edifice. His position cannot be shaken, even though we admit the severe criticism passed on many of his views. The confidence in etymology as a guide through the darkness of mythological questions belongs to the past; the lofty tower of comparative mythology has nearly fallen to the ground; neither the goddess of dawn nor the thunderstorm plays an important part in the imagination of primitive man. But the history of science owes its progress to errors as well as to real discoveries. Successful explorers are often indebted to their predecessors, not only for what they have done, but even for what they have failed to do, since the chance of right guidance is facilitated by limiting the possibilities of error.

It was a time full of hopes and ideas, when men like Max Müller and Kuhn endeavoured to create, by the side of comparative grammar, the science of the comparative mythology of Aryan nations. I know that attacks have come, not only from the anthropological school, which is more flourishing to-day than ever, but also from our own ranks, where faith has diminished in Max Müller's tenet, 'nomina numina,' since etymology is no longer regarded as the key to mythology. But is the position, therefore, undermined, which the Vedic literature once occupied as one of the foremost sources of mythological knowledge? Does Vedic literature deserve to be less valued and less studied than before?

I wish to lay before you the reasons why I even now adhere to the idea that the Veda has something to say; that, in spite of the great

progress due to ethnologists, it has lost nothing of its original charm and importance.

We are indebted for the Vedic songs and prose to the poets and Ṛṣis of ancient India, who composed their hymns for the solemn sacrifices of the kings and nobles of the time, and for the praise of the gods worshipped by their patrons. But this sort of literary refinement need not necessarily militate against the genuineness and spontaneity of its character. Priests and kings were not strangers to the people; they stood above, but not outside their subjects; and we may fairly assume that the hymns did reflect the opinions, not only of the higher, but also of the lower classes, and the popular traditions of the different ages. If the Ṛgveda contains the religion of the upper classes, then the religion of the upper classes has drawn upon popular sources.

It has been suggested by two great scholars that an almost insatiable love of wealth and unmistakable signs of immoral life testify to an already highly advanced state of Vedic society. I am unable to admit this. Sins like these are not the dark side of civilization alone. The idea that immorality and avarice were less known to primitive ages, and that they increased with the rise of civilization, is a survival of the old romantic legend, fostered by religious authorities, that the beginning of mankind was a bright dawn. Ethnography has failed to discover this dawn anywhere, and indeed gives evidence to the contrary.[1] Sensuality and immorality were in primitive ages naturally less detested than later, and took root even in divine service and ritual. Morality gains ground *pari passu* with the advance of civilization and religion.

I also believe that the love of kine on the part of those ancient herdsmen and cattle-breeders, whose poets call gods and kings 'bulls', and choose their similes from pasture grounds and agricultural life, is quite compatible with a primitive state of society.

The tribe of the Dinkas, for instance, in the heart of Africa, has never been thought representative of civilization; but it is to them that we must turn our eyes in order to find an analogy. 'Their chief desire,' Dr. Schweinfurth says, 'is to acquire and possess cows; nay, in some respects there is a real cult addressed to them, and whatever proceeds from kine is considered pure and noble; . . . it is more the delight in material property which makes the cow the object of this

[1] To quote an example: G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-Africas*, says (p. 307, of the Koi-koin): 'Sittliche Grundsätze für seine Handlungsweisen zu suchen, fällt durchschnittlich Niemandem ein. Wenn nicht die Furcht vor Strafe die Leute zurückhält, etwas Schlechtes auszuführen, die Stimme des Gewissens dürfte selten stark genug dazu sein. Lüge, Diebstahl und Sinnlichkeit sind deshalb als weitere Laster dieser Stämme anzuführen.'

kind of homage. Their cattle are dearer to them than a wife or child.'[1]

It is also not without interest to read what the missionary Albert Kropf says of the Xosa Kafirs, whose 'greatest passion and worship is the breeding of cows. . . . They feast their eyes on the cattle with such delight that their minds dwell on them by day and night. They sing and praise their qualities . . . "Ox," "bull," or "cow" have become titles of respect for strong and liberal people . . .'[2]

This is nearly the same state of things as in Vedic times. If we remember that ancient India had neither temples nor images of its gods, that its liturgies are full of reminiscences of savage life, and are often an immediate expression of it, we are fully justified in upholding the idea that the Veda is not far removed from a very primitive state of society, and can teach useful lessons on the history of primitive religions.

The Veda, it is true, does not contain anything like Indo-European religion; the names of its gods and goddesses generally give no clue as to the original meaning of their bearers; nevertheless, it remains an almost unique book, or rather unique literature. It is needless to speak here of the valuable services rendered by ethnology to the study of the history and psychology of religions; the work on *Primitive Culture*, by our Honorary President, Mr. Tylor, would convince even the sceptic. Ethnography has spread out before us a great mass of material, collected from all parts of the world, which allows us an insight into the beliefs and customs of lower races. In the light of anthropological evidence, philologists are sometimes able to find a meaning where all other means of interpretation are denied. But, on the other hand, it cannot replace the Vedic literature, because this latter not only represents a short *history* of religion and of religions, but also permits us to follow through centuries the current of religious thought from one point to another; we can thus cast a glance into the historical development of mythology in times uninfected by influences other than those which sprang from Indian soil, from the Indian climate, from the Indian mind itself. This may seem to some a matter of course; but it needs emphasis, since in many quarters it has almost been forgotten. We can follow the changes brought about in the nature and conception of single gods, and can see how earthly foes, in the memory of later generations, are turned into demons or how ancestors receive godlike characters. The process of mythological evolution never stands still; the migration of tribes, the influence of a new home and another climate, the mighty force of

[1] *Im Herzen von Africa*, i. 175.

[2] I owe the reference (as also that in the foregoing note) to Schurtz, *Urgeschichte der Kultur*, p. 248.

single personalities, the transmission of ideas from generation to generation, and the unceasing restlessness of the human mind, are the factors that weigh upon mythological phenomena and change their natural aspect. Here the Veda is irreplaceable. Let me adduce a few examples.

Indra, the great warrior and slayer of Vṛtra, occupies an almost central position in many parts of the Ṛgveda, standing in the zenith of his power. But we can follow his decline. Inherited from a prehistoric period, from a more northern home, where the combat of the sun-god with the demon of winter had its natural purport, he begins to fade away under the subtropical sky of India, and to become a subordinate of Viṣṇu, who, from the inferior position, as it seems, of a dwarf-god, ascends the sky and becomes the highest deity in later ages. In the Ṛgveda he is but loosely and artificially connected with Indra's heroic deeds; probably because the zeal of some worshippers tried to interweave his fate with that of his superior rival. But later the scene has entirely changed. In the Mahābhārata Viṣṇu is Indra's superior, and the latter, frightened by the power of his old adversary, seeks his assistance; Buddhism has turned him, as Rhys Davids says, into a passably good Buddhist, anxious to serve the new great ruler of the earth. While Indra, though still glorified by the halo of a *devarāj*, is in fact nothing more than a godling living upon the past, his enemy Vṛtra, in whom the Ṛgveda finds nothing amiable or pious, becomes a true Brahman and, as a penitent sinner, enters Viṣṇu's highest place; in the Buddhist literature he has almost entirely disappeared from the scene.

Another example is offered by Varuṇa. Though in the Veda only loosely (and certainly not more than other gods) connected with the sea, he becomes later on lord of the ocean. The Ṛgveda has not yet bereft him of his luminous insignia, but has developed him into the ruler over right and wrong, into the defender of the law. He has gained the mastery over his old co-partner Mitra, who, while shining in full glory in the West, has lost his importance in the East, and disappears in the rays of his companion. But Varuṇa also is forced to give way before higher authorities. It has correctly been asserted that in the Ṛgveda he enjoys but the last moment of his full fame; the gloomy and somewhat mischievous personification of the moon-god, comprehensible in a climate where the reign of winter coincides with the ascension of the moon, may have been felt incompatible with the lovely moonlight of India, cherished by all the poets. He has to surrender his power to Indra, who, in his turn, is dethroned by Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa. It is interesting to see how the Indian priests and ritualists, facing the rivalry between Indra and Varuṇa, tried to make a compromise with both of them, and directed hymns and oblations to an

artificial duality, Indra-Varuṇa, which, like other *flores arte facti*, has never gained firm ground in Indian mythology.

The facts are different in the case of Yama and the two heavenly dogs. Yama, the son of an old sun-god, Vivasvat, had been changed into a god of death, and entirely lost his original meaning; which is recognizable to us only by means of some inferior traits which the course of time was unable to efface. If Bloomfield is right—and I believe he is—in explaining the two heavenly dogs as the sun and moon, their connexion in popular and universal belief with the son of the sun-god was only made possible by the utter oblivion into which the original character of Yama and its genealogy had fallen.

I have as yet only quoted gods who belong to successive periods, and who allow us, by the different characters which they assume therein, a glance into the acting forces of mythology.

But the Ṛgveda itself contains no less interesting examples. Its several Maṇḍalas, as is well known, represent the religious inheritance of centuries, and can, by careful examination of their contents, give a clear idea of the effect which time and place have upon the transformation of ideas. May I here refer you to an illustration—important, as it seems to me—which I gave in the first volume of my Vedic Mythology ?

There is a well-known hymn in the tenth Maṇḍala of the Ṛgveda (x. 108) containing a dialogue between the Paṇis and Saramā, the heavenly bitch sent by Indra across the Rasā to reclaim the stolen cattle. No doubt the Paṇis are therein considered as a class of demons abiding on the distant shore of a mythical river; the cows are rays of light or, as some say, a synonym of clouds.

We stand here upon pure mythological ground. The question arises what sort of demons the Paṇis originally were. Some scholars are of opinion that by that name we are to understand a class of deceitful and avaricious tradesmen, basing this view on a merely fictitious etymology which connects the name of Paṇi with the Sanskrit verb *paṇ*; others think that the word occurs with considerably greater frequency in the sense of 'niggard', especially with regard to sacrificial gifts, and that from this signification it developed the mythological meaning of demons similar to those who primarily withheld the treasures of heaven.[1]

I do not think that either of these explanations holds good.

It seems to me that all passages containing the word Paṇi ought first to be classified according to the Maṇḍalas in which they occur; they will thus be subjected to a more individualizing procedure which will help us to realize the relative difference of age, scene of action, and the other circumstances of the several Maṇḍalas.

[1] Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, s.v. Paṇi.

Now the first fact to strike the eye of the statistical observer is the great difference between the individual Maṇḍalas in frequency of reference to the name of Paṇi: it occurs but once in II and III, twice in V and IX, thrice in IV, but twelve times in Maṇḍala VI, thus giving evidence of the close contact into which the composers of its hymns or their forefathers came with the Paṇis, and impelling us to consult the songs of the Bhāradvājas first for the true character of the Paṇis. By following this indication we soon perceive that the sixth book reveals to us a chapter of real history. We seem to hear the clamour of arms re-echoed by the songs of the priestly bards of the Bhāradvāja clan, and feel ourselves transferred into the midst of border-wars raging between Indian tribes and their predatory neighbours.

To the authors of the sixth Maṇḍala the Paṇis do not yet appear in the light of mythical beings seen in the dim twilight of uncontrollable traditions, but as men of undoubted reality, as hated adversaries worthy only to be slain in battle. Thus we read in VI. 20. 4: 'By hundreds, O Indra, fell the Paṇis, in the struggle for life, for the benefit of Kavi Daśoṇi'; or VI. 51. 14: 'Knock down the greedy Paṇi; a wolf is he'; or VI. 45. 31: 'Bṛbu trod upon the broadest head of the Paṇis.'

We here encounter a name, which, as far as I know, occurs only once in other works of Vedic literature. Among the benefactors who bestowed liberal gifts on a son of the Bhāradvāja clan there is, in the Śaṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra, a Bṛbu enumerated who bears the surname *takṣan*, which apparently does not mean 'carpenter', but a warrior of the house of Takṣan, calling to our mind the name of Takṣaśilā, the once celebrated city in the Panjāb, which, in my opinion, owed its origin to the dynasty or the clan of the Takṣans. It was probably one of their ancestors who in the above-mentioned verse is reported to have been victorious over the Paṇis, over 'the biggest head' of the Paṇis.

The battlefield lay on the banks of the river Sarasvatī, by which name we are here to understand, not the holy Sersutī in the Madhyadeśa, but, as I have shown elsewhere, the river known to the Greeks as Arachotos, and to the inhabitants of Iran as Haraquaiti. This is confirmed by an interesting passage in the sixth book, praising the liberality shown to Bhāradvāja by Abhyāvartin Cāyamāna of the Pārthavas (VI. 27. 8). There is no need to doubt that *pārthava* here means anything else than the inhabitants or the royal house of Parthia, who were served by one of the sons of the Bhāradvāja employed as a religious official. By subjecting in this manner the book of the Bhāradvājas to an individualizing examination we obtain a vivid picture of the joys and sorrows, of the hopes and fears, of a little clan

encamping on the banks of the Haraquaiti, in the fertile districts of Arachosia, far away from their Indian brothers, who settled in the sacred middle-land and, in course of time, transformed the hostile tribe of Paṇis into a band of evil spirits hovering on the banks of the once historical, now mythical, river Rasā.

The Maruts are, without doubt, storm-gods; but a careful inquiry into all circumstances leads us to discover the reason of their deification in ancestor-worship which changed the name of an Indian clan into that of storm-gods, thus adding a new trait to the Vedic pantheon. Not all families advanced as far. The Aṅgiras and Bhṛgus were also Indian families or clans; but they were not changed into storm-gods, but continued to live in the memory of later times as pious sacrificers, who by the austerity of their vows or the excellency of their performances found the way to heaven.

It is these glances at the *development* of mythological phenomena which form a characteristic feature of Vedic mythology, and secure for it, independently of ethnology, a prominent place among all sources of mythological research.

But there is another lesson to be learned in addition to this. We are often told by philologists and others that primitive mankind has but small interest in the heavenly phenomena and cares but little for the movements and influence of the celestial bodies on their daily life, their whole interests being absorbed by the occurrences of the surrounding nature. This point of view, to which also Eduard Meyer has lent his weighty authority,[1] is scarcely intelligible, and owes, I believe, its origin to Dr. Mannhardt, who has been the first to duly appreciate the importance of the lower gods in mythology, but also to overestimate their priority. Wandering tribes, herdsmen, agriculturists are, more than anybody else, induced and obliged to observe the phenomena of the sky, as indeed all those living in the country are naturally inclined to do. We cannot, I think, draw a line of temporal demarcation between the classes of higher and lower gods or advocate the priority of either of them. All dates given by Vedic texts are unfavourable to the idea shared by the Mannhardt school. One cannot object that the Veda reflects the notion of an already advanced state of religious feeling; even if we take that for granted, how are we to dispose of the almost unanimous opinion of ethnography in discovering nature-gods in all stages of primitive belief? But I think that even in that respect the Veda only mirrors the state of a rather early time. I know very well that modern Vedic mythology, and especially my own writings, have been gravely charged by some of my colleagues with excess of sun and moon finding, and I have been censured on account of my bias for these particular phenomena.

[1] *Geschichte des Altertums*, I³, 1, 112.

I am far from being biased for any particular interpretation. I should be more afraid if my opinions were also contradicted by ethnography; but I am glad to find in these very works an unexpected helper and ally. An examination of the works of Tylor and Brinton and others will convince any one of the great influence of the celestial bodies on the development of mythology. Andrew Lang proclaims the abundance of poetical nature-myths.[1] Dr. Ehrenreich, in an interesting study on *Götter und Heilbringer*, quite lately gave expression to the idea—strongly defended also by Dr. Siecke—that the chief, perhaps the only ingredients of primary myths, are the motions of the sun and moon, their rising and setting, their seeming flight or enforced meeting, &c.; that primitive myth always moves in a very narrow circle and treats everywhere the same or closely related materials; and that the traditional materials, especially those which come from primitive races of to-day, bear the stamp of natural mythology.[2]

I have tried to account for the multitude of luminary deities proceeding from the same natural phenomenon by the assumption that in Vedic mythology the gods of different tribes and different times are amalgamated—gods who had formerly been conceived under other circumstances and who, by the rivulets of family traditions, were carried down to the great reservoir which we call Vedic mythology. In bringing forward this opinion I feel myself supported again by the encouraging hand of ethnography. Dr. Schurtz, reflecting on the great numbers of luminary deities and heroes in all mythologies, puts forward the explanation that in every district, in every place, there arose local deities, which were retained as separate gods when the tribal individualities were absorbed into a greater community,[3] and thereby confirms the conclusion to which I have been led by a different and merely philological way.

It is unfortunate for Vedic mythology that the ideas formed by great scholars of the past after a preliminary study of the materials —intelligible and pardonable in the earlier days of our science—still weigh on the views of the later generation; which is unwilling to grant to mythology the privilege of being a science in itself, which no Yāska and no Sāyaṇa can teach. It is unfortunate too that our great predecessors discovered fairies, demons, and cows in the cloudy sky, where there are none, and that they overestimated the influence of dawn, lightning, and the thunderstorm. We often, for instance, hear repeated the story of the thunder-god, who slew the demon of drought, who withheld from mankind the heavenly cows, i.e. the fertilizing rain, and other explanations of threadbare quality. Almost all our

[1] *Modern Mythology*, pp. 133, 135.
[2] *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, 1906, pp. 552, 553 sq.
[3] *Urgeschichte der Kultur*, p. 580.

handbooks are teeming with antiquated views. Dr. Ehrenreich justly remarks that cloud-formations or dawn are not phenomena which would make the same impression everywhere and therefore require corresponding interpretations; and further that the cases in which a personification of clouds can be observed are very scarce. In fact, I can discover no cloud-demons in the Ṛgveda and only a moderate influence of the dawn. The splendid phenomenon of Uṣas owes its apotheosis more to its connexion with the New-Year festival than to the reappearance of the daylight.

But still more disastrous than the reverence for the views of our predecessors has been the confidence placed in the wisdom and the authority of Indian commentators like Yāska and Sāyaṇa. I was glad recently to find a passage in Bloomfield's *Religion of the Veda* (p. 91), wherein the author says with regard to Yāska: 'Many years' occupation with the writings of this worthy, whose sense and erudition are valued much by the Hindus, as well as by Western scholars, have not increased my belief in his authority or decreased my faith in the infinite possibilities of his ineptitude.' This holds good also with respect to Sāyaṇa. No doubt we find in his volumes much that is worthy of our consideration, and ought not to be overlooked; but, in mythological matters, he has 'clouded' our insight and barred our progress. The dim notion that an excellent Sanskrit scholar and diligent compiler of mediaeval India must at the same time be a safe guide through the intricacies of a mythology representing the conceptions of long past ages, has biased our method and infected its soberness. We must try to get rid of him, as also of the now fashionable superstition that the ancient herdsmen and settlers of India knew but little of the sun, nothing of the moon, but were otherwise much more ingenious than they themselves would have claimed to be. The multitude of their gods betrays not an equal richness of ideas, but only a richness of what I would call mythological synonyms. By removing, little by little, the heaps of sand that have accumulated around the Veda in the course of more than thirty centuries we may perhaps succeed in making this Indian fountain flow again, thus gaining access to the oldest source not only of Indian but also of ethnographical antiquity.

3

ÜBER DIE CHRONOLOGIE DER UPANISHAD TEXTE

VON P. DEUSSEN

DIE Upanishad's des Veda fanden bei ihrem ersten Bekanntwerden im Abendlande durch den *Oupnekhat* des Anquetil du Perron eine geteilte Aufnahme. Einige wenige, wie Schopenhauer, Schelling und andere bewunderten den Tiefsinn einzelner Aussprüche; viele fanden in ihnen nur einen Wust widersprechender Gedanken; die meisten schenkten ihnen überhaupt keine Beachtung. Dieses Verhältnis änderte sich auch nicht wesentlich, seitdem die Originaltexte durch Roer, Cowell u. a. bekannt wurden, und in diesen selbst wie noch viel mehr in Max Müller verdiente Übersetzer fanden. Denn auch jetzt trat noch nicht genugsam hervor, dass wir in den Upanishad's die Zeugnisse einer philosophischen Entwicklung besitzen, welche sich wohl durch ein halbes Jahrtausend hinziehen mag, und zu deren Rekonstruktion die vorliegenden Texte ausreichende Materialien darbieten.

Schon auf den ersten Blick zerlegt sich die Gesamtheit der Upanishadlitteratur in drei Gruppen, welche drei verschiedenen, auf einander folgenden Perioden angehören müssen. Die erste und älteste dieser Gruppen wird gebildet durch die alten Prosa-Upanishad's, welche, in der schwerfälligen Prosa der alten Brāhmaṇa-Texte, Allegorien, Reflexionen und Legenden in buntem Durcheinander enthalten. Es sind ihrer fünf: Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittirīya, Aitareya und Kaushītaki; und wenn auch diese alle teils ältere, teils jüngere Texte enthalten, so lehrt doch eine genaue Vergleichung der in ihnen vorkommenden parallelen Stücke, welche bald kürzer, bald länger und mitunter in wörtlicher Übereinstimmung denselben Gegenstand behandeln, dass im ganzen und grossen die oben angegebene Reihenfolge dieselbe ist, in welcher diese Texte in vielfacher Abhängigkeit von einander entstanden sein müssen; so dass Bṛihadāraṇyaka, von späteren Zusätzen abgesehen, die ältesten, Kaushītaki die jüngsten Texte enthält. Eine zweite Gruppe wird gebildet durch eine Reihe von Upanishad's in Versen. Die Ātmanlehre, welche wir in der ersten Gruppe noch nach ihrer Genesis beobachten konnten, erscheint hier völlig gefestigt. Das flüssige Gold der alten Prosa-Upanishad's ist zu festen Münzen geprägt, welche von Hand zu Hand gehen, und durch den Gebrauch hier und da schon als abgegriffen erscheinen. Dieselben Verse begegnen uns wieder und wieder in den verschiedenen Upanishad's, nicht überall mit richtigem Verständnisse verwendet; an die Stelle des in den alten Prosa-Upanishad's vorherrschenden

tastenden Suchens und Forschens ist vielfach ein pathetischer Predigerton getreten, welcher sich fertiger Resultate freut, ohne dieselben überall nach ihrem vollen Werte zu verstehen. Auch innerhalb dieser Gruppe lässt sich durch Vergleichung der Parallelen, und der verschiedenen Art ihrer Verwendung, eine chronologische Abfolge ermitteln. Auf der Grenze steht die noch halb in Prosa vorliegende Kena-Upanishad. Ihr folgen Kāṭhaka, Īçā, Çvetāçvatara und Muṇḍaka, wobei auch hier die genannte Reihenfolge, von manchen übergreifenden Stücken abgesehen, die historische sein dürfte.

Eine dritte Gruppe von Upanishad's, bestehend aus Praçna, Maitrāyaṇīya und Māṇḍūkya redet wieder in Prosa, aber in einer Prosa, welche sich von dem naiven und unbeholfenen Brāhmaṇa-Stile der alten Prosa-Upanishad's merklich unterscheidet, und in seiner gewundenen Künstlichkeit schon an die Prosa der indischen Romane und Kommentare erinnert. Die noch späteren Atharva-Upanishad's, wie sie teils den Yoga und Sannyāsa verherrlichen, teils çivaitischen und vishṇuitischen Charakter an sich tragen, können wir hier ausser Betracht lassen, da der orthodoxe, namentlich durch Çaṅkara vertretene Vedānta sie nicht zu kennen, oder doch nicht anzuerkennen, scheint.

Ist diese Reihenfolge, welche sich auf eine eingehende Vergleichung der verschiedenen Texte stützt, und ein vielfaches Übergreifen derselben nicht ausschliesst, auch nur im wesentlichsten auf einer historischen Aufeinanderfolge beruhend, so entrollen uns die Upanishad's das Bild einer grossen philosophischen Entwicklung, welche beginnt mit einem kühnen und schroffen Idealismus, und von diesem durch die Stufen des Pantheismus, Kosmogonismus und Theismus schliesslich zum Atheismus des späteren Sāṅkhyam, und endlich zum Apsychismus des jüngeren Buddhismus, führt. Somit bietet die indische Philosophie das Schauspiel einer stufenweise zunehmenden Degeneration, welche bedingt wird durch das Bestreben, das ursprünglich metaphysisch Gedachte mehr und mehr mit empirischen Formen zu umkleiden, und dadurch gewissermassen zu verfälschen. Wir wollen versuchen, die genannten Stufen der Reihe nach in der Kürze zu charakterisieren.

1. *Idealismus.*

Sprachliche wie sachliche Gründe treten dafür ein, dass die ältesten Texte der Upanishad-Litteratur in den Stücken in *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, 1–4 zu finden sind, welche sich an den Namen des Yājñavalkya knüpfen, und diesen, wer er auch immer gewesen sein mag, in vertraulichen Zwiegesprächen und öffentlichen Disputationen als den Lehrer der echten Weisheit erscheinen lassen. Drei Sätze sind es, in deren Darlegung die mannigfachen Reden des Yājñavalkya kulminieren:

1. Der Ātman allein hat wahre Realität, alles andere in der Welt

ist nur real, sofern es im Ātman, d. h. im Bewusstsein vorhanden ist; nicht um des Gatten willen ist der Gatte lieb, sondern um des Ātman willen ist der Gatte lieb; ebenso steht es mit Gattin, Söhnen, Reichtum, Brahmanenstand, Kriegerstand, mit Göttern, Veden und Welten; sie alle sind nur um des Ātman willen lieb, d. h. sie existieren für uns nur, sofern sie einen Teil des Ātman, des Selbstes, des Bewusstseins bilden. Diese Auffassung wird bestätigt durch die unmittelbar folgenden Worte *Bṛih. Up.* 2, 4, 5: 'Den Ātman fürwahr soll man sehen, soll man hören, soll man verstehen, soll man überdenken, o Maitreyī; fürwahr, wer den Ātman gesehen, gehört, verstanden und erkannt hat, von dem wird diese ganze Welt gewusst.'

2. Wie schon aus dieser Stelle hervorgeht, ist der Ātman das Subjekt des Erkennens in uns. Er ist 'der aus Erkenntnis bestehende (vijñānamaya), im Herzen innerlich leuchtende Geist' (*Bṛih.* 4, 3, 7 sq.), ist das Licht, welches leuchtet, wenn Sonne, Mond, Sterne und Feuer erloschen sind (*Bṛih.* 4, 3, 2–6), ist das 'Licht der Lichter' (*Bṛih.* 4, 4, 16), dem alles nachglänzt, von dessen Glanze diese ganze Welt erglänzt.

3. Als solcher, als das Subjekt des Erkennens in uns, ist und bleibt der Ātman selbst unerkennbar: 'Nicht sehen kannst du den Seher des Sehens, nicht hören kannst du den Hörer des Hörens, nicht verstehen kannst du den Versteher des Verstehens, nicht erkennen kannst du den Erkenner des Erkennens' (*Bṛih.* 3, 4, 2). 'Denn wo eine Zweiheit gleichsam ist, da sieht einer den andern, hört einer den andern, erkennt einer den andern; wo aber einem alles zum eigenen Selbste geworden ist, wie sollte er da irgend wen sehen, wie sollte er da irgend wen hören, wie sollte er da irgend wen erkennen? Durch welchen er dieses alles erkennt, wie sollte er das erkennen, wie sollte er doch den Erkenner erkennen?'

Diese drei Sätze, welche die Weisheit des Yājñavalkya *in nuce* enthalten, sind die Grundlagen eines Systems des rücksichtslosesten Idealismus, und wurden als solche aus der Verdunkelung, in welche sie durch die folgende Entwicklung geraten waren, durch Çaṅkara hervorgezogen; sie bilden bei ihm die Fundamentalsätze seiner esoterischen Lehre, oder, wie er sagt, der höheren Wissenschaft (parā vidyā), welche in der Theologie die Unerkennbarkeit des Brahman, in der Kosmologie die Nichtrealität der Welt ausser Brahman und in der Psychologie die Identität des Brahman mit dem Ātman lehrt. Zum Vergleiche mit diesem Idealismus des Yājñavalkya bietet sich auf griechischem Boden der nicht weniger excentrische, die Realität der Aussenwelt leugnende Idealismus des Parmenides dar, aber wie dieser in Griechenland, so fand der Gedanke des Yājñavalkya in Indien zunächst kein volles Verständnis. Wie Parmenides von Zenon, so wurde die Lehre des Yājñavalkya in der nachfolgenden Entwicklung empirisch umgedeutet und dadurch verdorben.

2. *Pantheismus.*

Die Realität der Aussenwelt drängte sich dem Bewusstsein zu stark auf, als dass man sie mit Yājñavalkya hätte leugnen können. Anderseits musste man versuchen, mit ihr und neben ihr die Gedanken des grossen Lehrers festzuhalten. Es geschah in der Weise, dass man sagte: Die Welt ist real und doch ist der Ātman das allein Reale, denn die Welt ist eben der Ātman. Auf diesem Standpunkte stehen die zahlreichen Texte, welche den Ātman als das unendlich Kleine in uns mit der Welt als dem unendlich Grossen ausser uns identificieren. Vorwiegend tritt dieses Bestreben hervor in der Chāndogya-Upanishad. Es genügt, an ihre Worte zu erinnern: 'Dieser ist meine Seele im innern Herzen, kleiner als ein Reiskorn oder Gerstenkorn oder Senfkorn oder Hirsekorn oder eines Hirsekornes Kern,—dieser ist meine Seele im innern Herzen, grösser als die Erde, grösser als der Luftraum, grösser als der Himmel, grösser als diese Welten' (*Chānd.* 3, 14, 3).

3. *Kosmogonismus.*

Diese Gleichung: Welt = Ātman, so oft sie auch in allen möglichen Variationen wiederholt wurde, war und blieb doch sehr undurchsichtig. So ging man dazu über, an die Stelle dieser unverständlichen Identität die empirisch leichter zu fassende Causalität zu setzen, und zu sagen: Der Ātman ist die Ursache und die Welt seine Wirkung, wodurch man einen Anschluss an die altvedischen Kosmogonien gewann, daher wir diese Entwicklungsstufe als Kosmogonismus bezeichnet haben. Auch auf ihr bleibt es der in uns unmittelbar zum Bewusstsein kommende individuelle Ātman, welcher die Welt schafft und dann als individuelle Seele in diese seine Schöpfung eingeht: 'Er begehrte, ich will vieles sein, will mich fortpflanzen, da schuf er diese ganze Welt, was irgend vorhanden ist. Nachdem er sie geschaffen, ging er in dieselbe ein,' wie die Taittirīya-Upanishad (2, 6) sagt. Neben und nach ihr ist als Hauptvertreterin dieses Standpunktes die Aitareya-Upanishad zu betrachten, welche als Ṛigveda-Upanishad vom Purushahymnus (*Ṛigv.* x, 90) ausgeht, um seine Anschauungen der Ātmanlehre unterzuordnen. Dem entsprechend ist der Purusha nicht mehr das Urprinzip, sondern der Ātman schafft den Purusha, aus diesem die Welthüter, lässt diese, damit sie Nahrung geniessen können, in den von ihm geschaffenen Menschen einfahren und spricht sodann: 'Wie könnte dieses [Menschengefüge] ohne mich bestehen. Und er erwog: Auf welchem Wege soll ich in dasselbe eingehen? Da spaltete er hier den Scheitel und ging durch diese Pforte hinein' (*Ait. Up.* 1, 3, 11).

4. *Theismus.*

Im weiteren Verlaufe vollzog sich eine Scheidung zwischen dem Ātman, welcher die Welten schafft, und dem Ātman, welcher als individuelle Seele in die von ihm geschaffene Welt eingeht. Diese Scheidung, vorbereitet durch Stellen wie *Bṛih.* 4, 4, 22: 'Hier, inwendig im Herzen ist ein Raum, darin liegt er, der Herr des Weltalls, der Gebieter des Weltalls, der Fürst des Weltalls,' vollzog sich deutlich und immer deutlicher von *Kāṭhaka*, 3, 1 an: 'Zwei Trinker der Vergeltung ihrer Werke droben im Jenseits fuhren in die Höhle; Schatten und Licht nennt sie, wer Brahman's kundig.' Der höchste Ātman ist hier das Licht, der individuelle Ātman nur sein Schatten. Sofort stellt sich aber auch hier wie auf biblischem Gebiete als unvermeidliche Consequenz des Theismus die Prädestination ein; *Kāṭh.* 2, 23 (= *Muṇḍ.* 3, 2, 3): 'Nur wen er wählt, von dem wird er begriffen, ihm macht der Ātman offenbar sein Wesen.' Das Hauptdenkmal dieses Theismus ist die Çvetāçvatara-Upanishad, nur dass durch die auf ihr erreichte Stufe des Theismus noch alle jene früheren Stufen des Idealismus, Pantheismus und Kosmogonismus durchschimmern; denn in der Religion beharrt neben dem Neuen das Alte, weil es auf geheiligter Überlieferung beruht, und wie das neue Testament nicht mit dem alten aufräumen darf, so auf dem Gebiete des Veda jede neue Entwicklungstufe nicht mit den vorhergehenden; das abgestorbene Alte erhält sich, und das Neue baut sich zwischen seinen Ruinen an, wodurch das Ganze immer bunter, widerspruchsvoller und philosophisch unverständlicher wird. Ihren Theismus proklamiert die Çvetāçvatara-Upanishad, wenn sie anknüpfend an den umgedeuteten Vers *Ṛigveda* 1, 164, 20 sagt (*Çvet.* 4, 6–7 = *Muṇḍ.* 3, 1, 1–2):

'Zwei schön beflügelte, verbundne Freunde
Umarmen einen und denselben Baum;
Einer von ihnen speist die süsse Beere,
Der andre schaut, nicht essend, nur herab.

Zu solchem Baum der Geist herabgesunken
In seiner Ohnmacht grämt sich wahnbefangen;
Doch wenn er ehrt und schaut des andern Allmacht
Und Majestät, dann weicht von ihm sein Kummer.'

5. *Atheismus.*

Auf dem Standpunkte des Theismus stand der materiellen Welt nicht mehr der in uns unmittelbar sich bezeugende Ātman gegenüber, sondern dieser eine Ātman hatte sich gespalten in den einen weltschaffenden höchsten Ātman und in eine Vielheit individueller, von ihm abhängiger Seelen oder Purusha's. Diese Spaltung führte notwendig zum Absterben des einen der beiden Zweige, zum Aufgeben des

höchsten Ātman. Nachdem er nicht mehr durch die individuelle Seele, welche sein natürlicher Nährboden gewesen war, beglaubigt wurde, war er überhaupt nicht mehr hinreichend beglaubigt, um nicht von dem rücksichtslos fortschreitenden Realismus über Bord geworfen zu werden. Dies geschah auf nachvedischem Boden durch das Sāṅkhya-System, welchem nach Beseitigung des höchsten Ātman, des Īçvara, nur noch die materielle Natur als Prakṛiti, und in sie verstrickt eine Vielheit individueller Purusha's übrig geblieben war. Dieser Dualismus der Sāṅkhyalehre ist philosophisch nur zu begreifen als das letzte Resultat der von uns geschilderten, stufenweise zunehmenden Degeneration. Vergebens sucht das Yogasystem, indem es sich auf dem Atheismus des Sāṅkhyam aufbaut, den Īçvara wieder einzuführen. Er gewinnt auf diesem Boden kein rechtes Leben und steht da als ein dem System eingefügtes, künstliches Glied, welches in den Zusammenhang des Systems ebensowenig eingreift, wie die Götter bei Epikur oder der Gott des englischen Deismus.

6. *Apsychismus.*

Ein weiterer und letzter Schritt auf dieser Bahn bestand darin, dass nicht nur der Īçvara, die höchste Seele, sondern auch der Purusha, die individuelle Seele geleugnet wurde, und diesen Schritt tat einerseits der Materialismus der Cārvāka's, anderseits, wenn nicht schon Buddha selbst, so doch der spätere Buddhismus, wenn er den ganzen Menschen als eine Verflechtung der fünf Skandha's oder Äste, rūpam, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra's und vijñānam (Körperlichkeit, Gefühl, Wahrnehmung, Strebungen und Gesamtbewusstsein) betrachtete, welche durch Zeugung und Geburt sich verbinden und mit dem Tode unwiederbringlich auseinander fahren.

7. *Die Reformation des Çaṅkara.*

Was für die christliche Religion Luther, das war für die indische der grosse Reformator Çaṅkara (geb. A. D. 788), welcher das Sāṅkhyam wie den Buddhismus rücksichtslos und mit einer an Luther erinnernden Heftigkeit bekämpfte, zurückgriff auf den alten Idealismus des Yājñavalkya und dessen drei Hauptsätze zur Grundlage der von ihm so genannten höheren Wissenschaft (parā vidyā) machte, während er neben ihr die verschiedenen realistischen Modifikationen dieses Idealismus, soweit sie schon auf dem Boden der zwölf älteren, von ihm allein anerkannten Upanishad's sich vorfinden, als niedere Wissenschaft (aparā vidyā) bestehen liess und aus einer Anpassung der göttlichen Vedaoffenbarung an die Fassungskraft der Menge zu begreifen suchte.

So entstand das grosse, philosophisch-theologische System des Çaṅkara, welches noch heute in Indien seine Herrschaft behauptet.

ON THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY AND RELIGIOUS IMPORTANCE OF EASTERN, PARTICULARLY INDIAN, LAWBOOKS

By JULIUS JOLLY

The legal literature of Eastern nations mostly forms part of their Sacred Books, and the labours of scholars in that field may therefore justly claim the attention of those interested in the History of Religions. Now a distinguished Italian jurist, Dr. Giuseppe Mazzarella, has lately put forth a remarkable scheme for collecting and translating the whole body of Eastern law-books. Starting from the fact that the peoples of the East possess quite a number of very comprehensive systems of law, the records of which would fill many volumes in print, he points out that European scholars have only just made a beginning in studying this vast literature. The majority of Oriental works on law has never been translated; of others the existing versions are unsatisfactory. What is more, there exists hardly any co-operation between the two sets of workers in that field, the jurists and ethnologists on one hand, the philologists and Orientalists on the other hand. The philologists, whose attention is entirely absorbed by the peculiar philological difficulties besetting the study of these ancient texts, are not sufficiently acquainted with the institutions and usages of the East, to be able to form a correct estimate of Eastern law, and to translate Eastern law-books in a thoroughly satisfactory manner. The jurists and ethnologists are apt to fall into many mistakes, owing to their insufficient knowledge of the ancient and modern languages of the East.

In order to remedy this evil, it is proposed by Dr. Mazzarella that philologists and jurists should henceforth work in concert. Their common efforts would have to be directed to a full investigation of the following sixteen systems of law, the Indian, the Burmese, the Siamese, the Annamitic, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Corean, the Kalmuk, the Kirghiz, the Malayo-Javanese, the Balinese, the Malakay (this I suspect to be a misprint), the Babylonian and Assyrian, the Hebrew, the Egyptian, the Mohammedan, in the order in which they are mentioned. These numerous systems of law may be arranged in four principal groups, consisting of (1) Indian, (2) Indo-Chinese with Malay, (3) Chinese-Japanese, (4) Semitic.

The co-operation of the jurist with the Orientalist would have to take place in this way, that the former would first translate the texts

as literally as possible. Thereupon, the jurist or ethnologist would have to examine the work done by the Orientalist, and to suggest alterations, both as to the legal phraseology, which would have to agree with the legal terms current among the civilized nations of modern Europe, and as to the contents. The philologist would then go back to his work, revising his translation, and supplying annotations to it.

The organization of these labours would have to be entrusted to an international committee, with Berlin for its seat. At Berlin there exists the International Society of Comparative Jurisprudence, which might take the lead in this movement. Moreover, says the Italian scholar, the study of ancient Eastern languages flourishes in Germany to an extent hardly paralleled anywhere else, so that German scholars would be likely to give more help in this matter than those of any other country. This is what Dr. Mazzarella has to say on the question of organization. He does not decide, however, which particular language should be chosen for the proposed translations of Eastern law-books. He seems to think, either that all of them should be in German, or that the translator should be at liberty to choose between English, German, and French.

Coming to the financial question, it is suggested that either the learned societies of different European countries should each contribute something towards the expense of printing the translations, or that the governments of these countries should do so. It is pointed out that the surprising development of European colonies in the East, and the equally rapid growth of commercial relations with Eastern nations, render it eminently desirable for Europeans to obtain a better insight into the legal institutions of Eastern countries than has been hitherto possessed by them. Eighteen European states have recently combined to defray the heavy expense of taking photographs for a large-sized map of the sky, with a catalogue of stars. Might not a similar coalition take place for the purpose of translating the law-books of the East. Or the great academies and other learned societies of Europe might form an alliance towards the same end.

Such are the main points of the remarkable scheme proposed by the Italian jurist, which deserves the attention of students of religion as well as of lawyers and Orientalists. Whether it will be so easy to realize his proposals as he seems to think, is another question. Thus it is by no means certain that the suggested co-operation of Orientalists and jurists would lead to the desired result. A student of Eastern law who does not know Eastern languages, will always feel rather helpless, and it is not likely that he will be able to give any useful advice to an Oriental scholar engaged in the same study. I should say that Dr. Mazzarella has not done sufficient justice to the laborious and somewhat dry but necessary work of learning an ancient language

and interpreting ancient texts, sifting every passage, and carefully examining every word, before arriving at a final translation. It is not till all this preliminary work has been accomplished, that the student of comparative jurisprudence will get sufficient material to work upon, and will be placed in a position to supply new thoughts and standpoints to the Orientalist.

Secondly, it would be very difficult to interest the governments or even the leading learned societies of Europe sufficiently in a scheme of this kind to obtain their support, the expense to be incurred being likely to prove very considerable; although it must be admitted that those translations of ancient Indian law-books, which have been published here in Oxford, in the Sacred Books of the East, have been a financial success and have sold very well.

This brings me to a third point, namely, that those literary productions of ancient Eastern nations, which are connected with their religion, appeal indeed to a very large circle of students, and even to the general reader. If, then, we want to secure the support of outsiders for a work of this kind, we must not overlook the essentially religious character of Eastern law, and must try to obtain the assistance of students of Eastern religions in the first place.

Last, but not least, though, being a German myself, I rejoice in Dr. Mazzarella's suggestion that the proposed new undertaking should have its centre in Germany, I cannot help thinking that England, with her vast and manifold interests in the East, would be far fitter than Germany to take the lead in this matter, and that most if not all of the translations should be written in English.

It is a remarkable coincidence, that a scheme closely analogous to that proposed by Mazzarella has recently been started by an Indian law scholar, Govind Das of Benares; only that his scheme is confined to the department of Indian law. The name of Govind Das is well known to students of Indian law as that of the editor of two important Sanskrit law-books, *Bālaṃbhaṭṭī* and *Viramitrodaya*. His opinion regarding the study and exposition of Indian law is given in a private letter, addressed to myself, of January 22 of the current year; and it will be hardly considered an indiscretion, I hope, if I try to give you the purport of his views on the subject.

Govind Das agrees with Dr. Mazzarella in proposing to establish an international committee or syndicate of experts, to whom the task of expounding Sanskrit law is to be entrusted, and in suggesting the co-operation of Orientalists and students of ancient law. Thus it is his idea that the international committee to be established should have as president myself as a German Sanskritist, with a jurist as joint-editor. The several parts of Indian law are to be divided between the experts, but no single chapter done by any one of these experts

shall be considered complete, till it has been revised by two other experts, one of whom should always be a Hindu, if possible. Each chapter of the proposed new work on Indian law would, therefore, pass through the hands of three workers in that field, besides those of the joint editors; which somewhat complicated process would ensure a high degree of exactness and authority for the work resulting from the labours of all these men. First of all, the modern law would be treated in a number of sections, much as has been done in that useful work, the *Vyavastha Chandrika*, of the late Shama Charan Sarkar. The principal Sanskrit manuals of law, such as the *Mayūkha*, *Viramitrodaya*, and *Balambhaṭṭi*, might serve as a basis for that part. Each section is to be followed by a commentary, giving a full account of the history of the institutions and legal theories discussed in the section, and of the attitude of the several Indian schools of law towards them. The different doctrines held in these schools of law are mostly based on a difference in interpretation of the early texts on law. It should be indicated in the commentary how far these discrepancies might be reconciled, and what improvements might be suggested from the standpoint of modern law in Europe. Legal procedure, as described in the Sanskrit law-books, would also come in for a separate treatment, but owing to its supersession by modern rules of procedure, it has an historical value only, and may be reserved for an appendix. A work by Greenidge published in Oxford, on *Legal Procedure in Rome in the time of Cicero*, might serve as a model for this part of the book.

It will be seen from the foregoing remarks, that what is intended here is not a mere collection of translations, but a complete cyclopaedia of Indian law. Such a cyclopaedia, of course, would be a very bulky work, consisting of three or four volumes, at least, somewhat similar in size and plan to the vast German cyclopaedias of Roman law. A work of this description might be expected to meet a want long felt, and to be equally useful and important to the antiquarian, to the student of comparative jurisprudence, to the professional lawyer, and, above all, to the codifier, who would find in it all the materials ready to hand for a codification of what is called the Hindu law. Such legislation, according to Govind Das, is very desirable and necessary, because the old national laws and usages of the people of India are in danger of being swept away by a judge-made law. Govind Das complains of the ignorance of Sanskrit law which prevails among Indian judges; and he agrees with Mazzarella in regarding the hitherto existing translations of Sanskrit law-books as unsatisfactory and insufficient.

These observations of a learned and patriotic Hindu certainly claim more than a passing notice. It is true that they are open to much the same objections as the Italian scheme, though the fact of their belonging

to a narrower sphere would seem to render their realization far easier. It appears eminently desirable that the proposed encyclopaedia of Indian law should be written, and that Indian and European scholars should join in preparing it.

I may now pass to the principal object of my paper. May I take the liberty of directing your attention to a literary undertaking, on which I am myself engaged? It is a far less ambitious one than the two schemes of which I gave you some account just now. My work is to be called *Ancient Law in India*. It is to contain a brief history of Indian law, in one volume. As you may gather from the title, it is to be in English. This, in spite of what has been said by Dr. Mazzarella, seems to me the proper language to be used in a work dealing with the old laws and customs of an English dependency, such as India is. The number of those interested in ancient Indian law is not very great, and they live for the most part in England or India. Of course, it is not easy for Germans to write in English, and I shall have to claim the indulgence of my readers for my faulty style. As regards the contents of my work, I need hardly mention that I am not going to enter into competition with the writers of manuals of the Hindu law, as it is administered in the courts of the present day. The modern case law has been frequently treated by a host of distinguished writers in England and India, down to Dr. Trevelyan, the Reader in Indian Law at this University, whose valuable work on Indian family law has only just been published. Some of these works contain interesting hints on the history of the institutions to which they refer, notably inheritance and adoption; others are short text-books for the guidance of the practical lawyer. But there is not in existence a single work, in the English language, covering the whole ground of Indian legal history; though other parts of the history of civilization in India have been treated very fully in English works, e.g. political history, numismatics, art, the history of Sanskrit literature generally, the history of Buddhism, and so on. The highly developed legislation and jurisprudence of the Indian people is quite important and interesting enough in itself, I think, to form the subject of a separate historical treatise. Their laws may be said to possess a special importance and value for the student of religion, because in India law and religion are even more closely connected than in other Eastern countries. This will appear more clearly, if I try to give you some account of the plan of my work.

Turning, then, to the several parts of the Indian law, it seems clear that in an historical book legal procedure should be discussed in the first place. It is impossible to arrive at a real insight into the working of the ancient legal rules in India, without having some knowledge of the Indian law of evidence, and of their judicial procedure. The law-

of evidence includes the administration of ordeals, which were considered one of the principal kinds of evidence. This shows how closely the taking of evidence was connected with religion. The deities were believed to take a prominent part in the proceedings of a court of justice, and to be anxious to establish the guilt or innocence of the parties in a cause, giving as it were a religious sanction to proceedings-at-law.

In the same way the exercise of jurisdiction by the king or his judge was regarded as a sacred function. An offender duly punished was supposed to go to heaven ; one released was thought to throw his own guilt on the king who had pardoned him. We have only to look at the code of Manu, to find that punishment, called *daṇḍa*, was extolled in the most exaggerated manner, and raised to the rank of a deity. In the Sanskrit law-books, as in all primitive legislation, criminal law forms the central part. Though this criminal law, like the native law of evidence, has long been superseded by a penal code of European origin, its historical importance cannot easily be overrated. No doubt it is an iniquitous law, written by Brahmans for Brahmans, and exhibiting in every way their pretensions and arrogance. Thus it is an established principle with these Brahman jurists, that no Brahman shall ever be subject to corporal chastisement.

Besides a full penal code, the Sanskrit law-books contain an elaborate system of religious penances for the expiation of sins. These so-called *Prāyaścittas* have retained to the present day an important place in the religious and social system of the Hindus, even after the entire disappearance of their criminal law with its barbarous punishments. The accurate performance of the prescribed forms of atonement is enforced by caste assemblies, and those who refuse to conform to their dictates are liable to be degraded from their caste. In ancient times punishment for crime seems to have been frequently combined with loss of caste, and the offenders had to perform a penance, in order to obtain readmission into their caste.

The family law is closely connected with religious ideas. Thus the entire law of inheritance has been said to be a spiritual bargain, in which the right of succession is made to depend on the due performance of funeral offerings to a deceased ancestor or relative. Adoption, again, is regarded as a religious duty, because it ensures the performance of the obsequies to his father by the adopted son where there is no natural-born son to perform them. Marriage is viewed as a sacrament, and the husband is said to receive his wife from the gods.

In the law of debt we meet with the well-known custom of Sitting in *Dharna*, which occurs as *Ācarita* or *Prāya* in the Sanskrit law-books. Under this custom, a Brahman creditor might compel an obstinate debtor either to pay his debt, or to charge himself with the atrocious

crime of killing a Brahman. Another essentially religious notion in the Indian law of debt is this, that a recalcitrant debtor will be reborn in his creditor's house as his slave. Here the characteristic Indian doctrine of transmigration comes in.

In the title of law which is called Concerns among Partners, the code of Manu has an elaborate discussion of the method of dividing the sacrificial fees between the officiating priests at a sacrifice. So in the rules regarding the rights and constitution of societies, religious corporations are specially considered. These religious castes and brotherhoods were largely endowed by kings and private persons, and the law of religious endowments and perpetuities has, therefore, reached a high stage of development in India. Thus in the title of Resumption of Gifts the gifts meant are principally charitable gifts. These gifts or endowments occur again in the Law of Inheritance as one of the kinds of impartible property, their impartibility 'arising as much from the fundamental idea of their not being private, as from a desire to maintain the uninterrupted use of the same for private purposes'.[1]

Royal grants are also mentioned in the Law of Limitation, where it is said that villages thus granted shall not be subject to the ordinary period of prescription. Thus if the villages have been appropriated by a stranger, and have been held by him and his descendants down to the third generation even, the original donee or his descendants may recover them on producing the royal charter by which they were granted. It appears probable that a large portion of the Indian soil had thus become, at an early period, the property of religious institutions. Various other gifts to Brahmans, in expiation of an offence committed, such as causing the death of various animals, are mentioned among the Prāyaścittas, or religious penances. Charity in general is particularly recommended as an atonement for guilt. Thus Gautama mentions divers gifts as one of the means for expiating sinful acts. Manu refers to almsgiving in the same connexion. Āpastamba declares charity to be the only mode of expiation open to Śūdras, because they may neither read the Veda, nor sacrifice, nor practise austerities. In the introductory chapter of his code, Manu declares charity alone to be the prevailing virtue in the present age of sin, the *Kaliyuga*. Another lawgiver, Yama, states charity to be the special duty or virtue to be practised by householders. And a third, Vyāsa, asserts the charitable man to be the real miser, because he does not leave his wealth even after death, i.e. he derives benefit from his property even in a future world. Mediaeval Sanskrit literature abounds in special treatises on the subject of *Dānam* (charitable gifts), some of them, as

[1] See Sarasvati's volume of Tagore Law Lectures on the *Hindu Law of Endowments*, 1897, p. 39, from which some of the following illustrations also have been taken.

Hemādri's *Dānakhaṇḍam*, of vast size. It is true that charity belongs to the religious rather than to the secular law. But, as you all know, the line between ecclesiastical and secular law has never been drawn in India, and the law-books, such as the code of Manu, are manuals of religion as well as of law. It is no matter of surprise, therefore, that the religious element, as shown before, makes its appearance even in those parts of the secular law where you would least expect it.

For further details I may be allowed to refer you to my book which I hope to publish in Oxford. Let me conclude by briefly referring to the subject of administration, which will also be treated in my book.

The essentially theocratic character of Indian administration, as described in the Brahmanical codes, is shown by the recommendations to appoint none but Brahmans as ministers and judges, to levy no taxes on Brahmans, to make grants of landed property to them and to inflict capital punishment on the forgers of such grants. Nor were these mere theories, as the course of Indian history shows. Thus under Mahratta rule, which may be designated as a Brahmanical revival, administration had entirely passed into the hands of the Brahmans.

5

FAITH AND REASON IN BUDDHISM

By L. de la VALLÉE POUSSIN

It would be interesting, both from a psychological and historical point of view, to examine the relations of authority and reason, of spontaneous adhesion and critical inquiry—let us say of faith and 'libre examen'—in the founding of belief and the development of religious doctrines. This matter is most suitable to a Congress held in Oxford; for no one has treated it with greater genius and more vivid interest than Newman. It deserves the attention also of Indian scholars, for India has much to teach us here as elsewhere.

India teaches us that it is rather difficult and arbitrary to distinguish between faith and reason, reason and faith. Firstly, we all know well that tradition, i.e. authority, is a considerable factor in what is generally called reason. Nāgārjuna, the great Buddhist doctor, does not argue as Śaṅkara does; and if we venture to compare the Orient with the Occident, the Brahman Vamadeo, under the able pen of Sir Alfred Lyall, has given enough hints to enable us to measure what an abyss separates Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Kant. Principles of evidence are not the same on the rivers

Gangā,—Seine, Spree, and Isis. There is much faith contained in a rationalistic certitude.

And, moreover, a believer is not to be found who does not rely also upon reason. You know the Christian saying, 'non crederem nisi viderem esse credendum.' Pascal, who is sometimes styled a mystic, emphatically admits that religion is absurd if it be against reason, and to quote his words, he considers faith as the supreme act of reason, as the climax of the reasonable use of our dialectical powers.

In India, Śaṅkara admits that the Veda, i.e. Upanishads, teach us doctrines which cannot be discovered by human minds; but these doctrines, when known, convince even the most prejudiced. Scripture, that is, is evident of itself (svataḥ pramānaṃ), and the school gives faith a place in the very 'cadres' of reason and logic. Thus, if there is much faith in the adhesion to rational truth, there is still more reason and dialectic in the adhesion to revealed truths.

I should be glad to have enough time as well as philosophical insight and historical information, to trace in the history of Buddhism the conflicting lines of thought upon the numerous points of doctrine afforded by tradition, and the very exacting, frequently very peculiar, genius of the various schools. Buddhism offers a favourable field for such an inquiry. We can here examine firstly, let us say, 'in anima vili,' problems which require the exercise of much prudence in the domain of our own belief. I do not say that errors in the interpretation of Buddhistic lore and history are without significance, nor that the 'droit de se tromper' is to be denied to Christian scholars, provided they do not claim infallibility, or proclaim too emphatically the soundness of the so-called scientific method. From another point of view, since Buddhism was at the same time a faith in revealed truths, and a philosophical institution, and since also the Buddhists themselves were lacking in a real strength of mind, there resulted from this a certain complication and confusion of thought and doctrine, which it is the aim of this paper to analyse and explain.

The common opinion which has found its way into the manuals, but which depends upon the assertions of such eminent scholars as Edmund Hardy and Professor R. Pischel, is that Buddhism is not a creed; that a Buddhist's convictions are not based on the authority of the Teacher or of the Book; and that alone of its kind, Buddhism is an altogether philosophical religion. Much can be said, as we shall see, in support of this view. But, in fact, documents and theories point to two conflicting statements: the old Buddhism pretends, and rightly, to be a creed. But it admits the principle of 'libre examen'; still more, it considers critical inquiry as the one key to the comprehension of truth. On the other hand, if Buddhism lays much stress

on observation and deduction, it states also that intuition, mystic insight, and trances are the only way to 'a right view' and to salvation.

Buddhism is a faith and creed, a respectful and close adhesion to the word of the one Omniscient, who speaks truth and knows by himself. Innumerable are the documents, ancient and modern, which establish this point. According to his disciples Buddha alone knows everything, and he knows especially the truths of salvation which he himself has discovered, understood, and realized, without any external help. Whosoever looks elsewhere for any religious or mundane information is mad. I may here refer to the pleasant story in the Dialogues of Buddha, translated by Rhys Davids, of a certain monk who was anxious to know where the world and elements cease. Aided by his mystic faculties he went up to the heaven of Brahmā, the highest god. Brahmā, of course, was not able to give him an answer, and rather politely sent him back to Buddha: 'You have a Buddha to question and you come hither! Go down. Question the Teacher and believe what he will say.' And the Teacher could not refrain from some irony: 'You went to Brahmā's heaven to get cosmological knowledge, and now you are back at my feet. Just so the sailors have birds to explore the waste: as long as they do not find "terra firma", so long do they come back to the ship.'

The one to be relied upon is the 'teacher of Gods and men'; for Brahmans and philosophers see and discuss but fragments of the truth. A king of former days had a clever artifice to show them their ignorance. By his order all those born blind in the city were led round an elephant; whereupon each of them, according to the part of the animal he touched, declared the elephant to be a water-pot (the head), a basket (the ears), a pillar (the legs), a pestle (the tail), &c. The blind men disputed thus, and the allegory is obvious: 'Such are the men said to be clever: they only see one side of the shield.' Human wisdom always falls short in some point. To be saved one must refer to the Omniscient.

Faith, according to the Buddhist theory of salvation, is not the highest power or virtue—intuition or insight, as we shall see, holds the first rank—but it is 'the root of the correct view'. Before meditating upon or comprehending truths, it is necessary to hear them and to believe them. All Buddhists and saints are sons of Buddha because they are born of his word. Even the saints who are styled *Pratyekabuddhas* (Solitary Buddhas), who appear during the unfortunate periods in which Buddha's law is no more preached and his church has perished, do not, as one might guess, conquer truths by themselves, but have heard the law from some Buddha in one of their former births (Candrakīrti). Faith is highly meritorious because the word of the teacher is hard, difficult both to understand and to

believe. Śākyamuni, as is well known, did not at once resolve to preach the truths he had discovered—fearing, it is said, that his labour would be tedious and vain, or, according to another exegesis, that his revelation would lead to the perdition of those it was intended to save: for 'the Law saves the believer and destroys the unbeliever'. Faith purifies the soul, suppresses or diminishes concupiscence, doubt, hatred, sloth, and pride, as a miraculous gem purifies turbid water; owing to faith we can go through the river of existence to the shore of nirvāṇa without fear or danger. Even so, folk who know neither ford nor guide stand helpless on a river's bank; but Buddha is a 'ford-maker' (tīrthaṃkara). He knows everything that is necessary for salvation and all else. He alone is called the Omniscient, the one who knows the nature of everything (sarvākārajña). In some cases we men can ascertain the truthfulness of his words; in many others we must say 'I confess that by faith', or 'Buddha knows and I do not know'. Hence, in Sanskrit Buddhism at least, springs the distinction, very clear, if not always explicitly declared, between the domain of experience or reason and the domain of faith. 'One must meditate and understand those points of doctrine which are intelligible, one must accept and confess others while saying: "that is within Buddha's reach, not within mine."' In fact the doctrines and facts declared to be incomprehensible are numerous. Even according to Candrakīrti it is impossible to scrutinize the retribution of acts (the *Karma*-doctrine) without falling into heresy: Buddha has forbidden any inquiry into the matter. The so-called Pāli school is no less formal in the matter of faith, as is sufficiently proved by the line in the Mahā-va*ṁ*śa (xvii), quoted by Gogerly—

> evam acintiyā buddhā buddhadharmā acintiyā
> acintiyesu pasannānaṃ vipāko hoti acintiyo.

'The Buddhas are incomprehensible (or beyond conception), the qualities of a Buddha are incomprehensible and the fruits of faith (or love), to those who have faith in these incomprehensibles, are also incomprehensible.' Buddha's word is to be believed without inquiry; even more than this, it is not permissible to adapt it to personal views. The uninterrupted tradition of teachers and disciples ascertains (according to Buddhists, of course) what truly is Buddha's word. In the same way, 'For the understanding of the Law, Buddhas themselves and Buddha's sons, Śāradvatīputra at the head, give the rule' (Abhidharmakośa). And the teachers of the Great Vehicle who made anew the doctrine of salvation and preached a confessedly deutero-canonical literature, who could not therefore rely on the literature of the oldest schools, nevertheless maintained that 'every truth in this actual age of the world comes from our Buddha, Śākyamuni; and in

the former and latter ages, Buddhas of the past and the future have been and will be the unique lamps of the world. The apocalypses of the Great Vehicle are old, if lately revealed. Śākyamuni himself preached them, if not to men, to gods or goblins. Maitreya, taught by Śākyamuni, and now reigning in the Tushita's heaven, teaches them to illuminated doctors.' And the authority of Nāgārjuna, the supposed founder of the Mahāyāna school, and almost certainly the chief of the Mādhyamikas, depends upon a prophecy of Śākyamuni recorded in the Laṅkāvatāra and elsewhere: 'After five centuries my disciple Ānanda (the well-beloved disciple) will be reborn in Southern India. He will be the man called Nāgārjuna. He will understand and make others understand the profound and true meaning of my teaching.' Briefly, as expressed by the pious King Aśoka, 'All that the Lord Buddha has said is well said.' This formula is old. One finds in the Aṅguttara, the most mechanical and least readable of the canonical compilations, one of those pleasant similes which are a comfort to Buddhist scholars. It happened that Indra met some monks and, admiring their discourses, said: 'That is indeed good. How have you learned these excellent things? From Buddha or by personal insight?' The monks replied: 'When one sees folk in the vicinity of a large granary carrying grain, one in a basket, another in his robe, and another in his hands, is it really difficult to guess whence the grain has been taken? In the same way all that is well spoken, every good word (subhāsitam) has been said by the Lord Buddha.'

There are many documents to the same purport. They show beyond question that Buddhism is a faith and creed: as declared in the Divyāvadāna, 'the sky will fall with the moon and stars, earth with its mountains and forests ascend, oceans will be dried up, but the Lords Buddhas speak not wrongly.'

But let us note that if it is sometimes possible to ascertain some character or tenet of Buddhism, it is by no means impossible to ascertain the contrary. Buddha requires spontaneous adhesion to his word, but he is not satisfied until his disciples recognize, by rational and experimental evidence, the truth of his word. Buddhists are indeed believers and traditionalists, but the history of the schools also shows clearly that they are rationalists and modernists. It is well known that carnal desire or *kāmarāga* is the chief obstacle to the salvation of laymen; on the contrary the monks often sin by heresy (dṛṣṭi), and that is worse (Abhidharmakośa).

According to the Buddhist school of logic (Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣa: known from Tibetan) there is a saying of Buddha which puts beyond doubt the orthodoxy of the logicians: 'One must not accept my Law from reverence, but first try it as gold is tried by fire.' And the fire of logic is here qualified to point out much śyāmikā! Śākyamuni

frequently works miracles, absurd enough sometimes according to our standard; but he is not in the least an 'extrinsequist', faith must come from the inside, not from without. Miracles can indeed rejoice and fortify the believer, but unbelievers will say that they are contrived by magic.

Buddha boasts of not teaching as an authoritative master, as Brahmans do; his tenets, he declares, are followed by argument (and Kumārila will prove that this method is highly objectionable, and much can be said in favour of his criticism). Buddha's tenets cannot be distinguished from the proofs which force themselves into the mind and heart of the hearers. In fact Śākyamuni deserves the eulogy he gives himself to his 'miraculous teaching'; the true miracles being the miracle of preaching, the demonstrative and converting power of his view of life and salvation. In a great number of the so-called discourses (or rather dialogues), the Master plays the rôle of a dialectician, let us say of a sophist. He rarely assumes the 'prophetic mood'. He has controversies with his disciples, with Brahmans, with the wisest men or chiefs of rival sects. He proceeds by queries and a 'reductio ad absurdum'. He leads his antagonist whither he wishes without enforcing his opinion by any extraneous help, wherefore he has often been compared with Socrates. His standard of truth seems to be the very disposition of his auditor. In a word Buddha aims at a conclusive avowal of spontaneous adhesion. 'If ye now know thus, and see thus, O monks, will ye then say: "We respect the Master, and out of reverence for the Master do we thus speak"?'—'That we shall not, O sire.' . . . 'What ye speak, O disciples, is it not even that which ye have yourselves known, yourselves seen, yourselves realized?' —'It is, sire.'

As Professor H. Oldenberg, from whom I borrow this quotation with many others, excellently observed, 'Buddha does not liberate men but he teaches them how to liberate themselves as he has liberated himself. Men adhere to his preaching of the truth, not because it comes from him, but because, aroused by his word, a personal knowledge of what he preaches arises in the light of their minds.'

Nevertheless, we cannot help showing contradictions which are essential to an understanding of what Buddhism really is. Śākyamuni has said: 'If, when the Lord is roaring in the assemblies with the roaring of a lion, any one ventures to think or say, "Gautama does not possess any superhuman power, still less insight into absolute truth, his law is built up with and rests upon dialectics, and is accompanied by inquiry or experience, made up of individual surmises"; if any one ventures to think or speak in this way and does not change his mind or his words, he will be thrown into the infernal abysses.'

This sophist, or dialectician, sometimes fulminates against un-

believers, and he possesses as complete a security in controversy as he does in uttering his anathemas, a fact which is not chiefly due to his being conscious of the perfect clearness of his ideas. Adherence is given to his demonstrations, but not primarily because they are logically or experimentally true. We must recognize that Buddhism—i.e. Buddha's institution, points to an exclusively practical end, viz. liberation from desire for the obtaining of liberation from suffering. And if the teacher is sure that he is right, it is because he knows, by personal experience, the efficacy of his doctrine. During the marvellous night of the Enlightenment, ascending from a low stage of meditation to the highest, Śākyamuni, whilst he understood, in their sequence, suffering, its origin, end, and mode of disappearance, was also aware of the progressive elimination of his faculty of desire. The law he reveals and the discipline he recognizes are as true as they are efficacious, since they have been a cause of purification for him himself.

In the same way, if disciples believe, this is owing to their having verified the fact that Gautama Śākyamuni is really 'one free from desire' (vītarāga), 'liberated' (mukta), 'enlightened' (buddha). When he teaches doctrines—'difficult to see or grasp, doctrines beyond investigation'—the Master owes his mastery to his moral fascination. He is pure; no one, as he himself declares, in a perfectly matter-of-fact fashion and without any pride, can find fault with him. He has manifestly done away with any root of affection, hatred, or intellectual delusion, which could blind him and make him say 'I see', when he sees not, or 'I know', when he knows not. He embodies perfectly the ideal type of 'Freedom from desire'. Therefore he declares truth, being Law incarnate. He has himself been liberated from passion by his law, therefore his law is to be believed and will free us too. Philosophers often maintain that freedom from desire involves omniscience. In any case there is a definition of Buddha's omniscience, given through Brahmanic sources, which should be noted. 'Does Buddha know by name all the insects? We are not interested in this point. But he knows the truths of salvation.'

We touch here a rather important point in the doctrinal development of Buddhism, one of those 'mouvements tournants' which can transform the genius of a system without changing its formulas. Formerly it was understood that 'all that Buddha has said is well said'. Buddha is the great granary whence, according to our ability, we shall take grain with a basket, in our robe, or in our hands. On the other hand the law is, so to speak, established by internal evidence, and by its usefulness for practical purposes; it seems therefore to be all the more indisputable. But usefulness and internal evidence—which characterize Buddha's law amidst all other systems—can also be

viewed as criteria of authenticity and rules of exegesis; and such indeed was the outcome in this case.

There are, it is true, comprehensive formulas which are really orthodox, as for instance, 'The well-said word (subhāṣita), the word of Buddha, is the word conveyed from teacher to disciple from the beginning—the word to be found in the Discourses, in the disciplinary book, which is not contrary to the truth of salvation.' But often the traditionalist point of view does not remain in the foreground: 'The well-said word is endowed with four characters: well-said, and not ill-said, leading to salvation and not antagonistic to it, agreeable and not disagreeable, true and not false (Suttanipāta).' And in a deutero-canonical book 'The teaching of all Buddhas is distinguished by four features; useful and not harmful, leading to salvation and not contrary to it, abolishing passion and not increasing it, nourishing love of nirvāṇa and not love of existence,... any one who thus teaches must be looked upon as a Buddha, as a teacher. Why so? Because everything well-said has been said by Buddha.' It is the very formula that Aśoka had written on rock, that the pious monks had used in reply to Indra: but the meaning is not the same; nay it is just the contrary. Buddha alone teaches truth, Buddha is always truthful, therefore anything true is Buddha's word, what seems to us to be good and true, that same is Buddha's word. Tradition can be erroneous, but internal evidence gives us the key to ascertain what really has been said and how that must be understood. This manner of settling doctrinal problems is not so precisely worded in the Little Vehicle's literature, but it is ancient and well agrees with the general aspect of the Good Law. Buddha's institute is not a *darśana*, a philosophical system, but a *yāna*, a vehicle, or *mārga*, a road to salvation, a method leading to nirvāṇa, a therapeutic of desire, i.e. of the sole obstacle to nirvāṇa. The teacher who is often styled the Great Physician, has no objection to employing, according to the case, remedies of every kind, i.e. contradictory statements on the 'thing in itself', on the ego, and on nirvāṇa. It is not certain even that he has said all within his knowledge on these obscure questions; nay, we are frequently cautioned by him that his sayings must not be taken literally, but according to the intention. Hence sprang the principle of the 'twofold teaching', a principle which opened a way among Buddhists and Buddhist scholars for far-reaching diversity of views. Every one has a right to make, out of the rich Buddhistic lore, any system which he may believe the more appropriate to the end, the more reasonable or probable. Let us not forget that a therapeutic is necessarily pragmatic or utilitarian. Concerning the road of salvation, for instance, Śākyamuni designed an excellent method of meditative and virtuous life, rather independent of metaphysical tenets. But it cannot, at

the same time, be denied that all the rules of living, all the metaphysical theories, all the trances which diminish desire and develop dislike for existence, are useful; they agree with Buddha's design, they are in conformity with the truth of salvation; therefore they have been preached by Buddha—and the Buddhist Tāntrikas, really Śāktas or Śivaites, had some rights to a claim of orthodoxy.

It is asked then: What really is the meaning of such and such a phrase in the Scriptures? Evidently it is not permissible to 'stop at the letter or at the syllables', as do the unintelligent who content themselves with reading Sūtras and hope to obtain salvation by pure repetition—ancestors indeed of the Tibetans who have prayer-wheels moved by the wind. Ill understood, the Law kills, as a serpent does when wrongly grasped. One must penetrate the text and comprehend not only the meaning of the words but the intention of the teacher too. In this task caution is necessary. The wording ought to be respected. It is a sin to accuse a preacher of putting away literal knowledge, of adhering to the letter or adapting it according to the case, of destroying some Sūtra by another Sūtra, or some stanza by another stanza. Such methods of inquiry have a flavour of heterodoxy, and it is forbidden to accuse one's neighbour of heterodoxy whether rightly or wrongly. Accordingly, the letter of the Scripture must be respected. But Buddha himself has enforced the duty of understanding the law; he has said that the 'resource' is to be found in the meaning, not in the wording, and that there are some Sūtras with a perfect, categorical, and explicit meaning, and others imperfect, spoken only with a particular or temporary purpose.

How, then, are we to distinguish them? Tradition and context can of course be decisive; but here the standard of truth is not the authority of any individual but the *Dharma*, the Law, the truth of salvation or, according to another source, the logical fitness or rational evidence. 'One must not rely upon any one's opinion; nor say, Such is the opinion of a presbyter (sthavira), of Buddha, or of the Church; one must not abandon truth in itself; one must be autonomous' (Bodhisattvabhūmi). Autonomous? But is not this equivalent to saying that we could substitute our own personal views for the doctrines taught by Buddha and worked out by the Church? That would be heresy—not an altogether capital sin—and schism, the crime of Devadatta, more heinous perhaps than his efforts to murder the teacher; we should be like the sceptical monk condemned by Buddha: 'With his thoughts full of desire doth he boast of surpassing the teacher?' If it is necessary to be autonomous and to rely only upon truth, and not upon the word of any individual, it is because a choice must be made among contradictory statements. This choice will practically appear to be enforced by tradition or by Buddha himself. There are,

in fact, scriptural declarations for ascertaining the relative value, or even denying the authenticity, of some parts of the Scriptures: 'Some monks piously give their hearing and adhesion to texts made by poets, poetical, literary, exoteric, promulgated by disciples . . . which lead to the neglect of the texts promulgated by Buddha, profound in meaning, supramundane, treating of the doctrine of the void or nothingness.'

There is no need to say that the advocates of the poetical and exoteric books, who find fault with the doctrine of the void, will not admit such statements as authentic. As a matter of fact one rarely meets, in the controversial literature, disputes concerning the authenticity of the texts alluded to by the doctors; but such moderation may be due to the controversial rule that arguments must be admitted by the antagonist, if any success is to be won. Thus we read sometimes that this or that text is common to the traditions of all sects.

The autonomy of the disciple is to be understood from another point of view. There are texts enough praising the merit of faith, and scholastic lists have a class of saints 'who are liberated by faith'. But, on the whole, pious adhesion to the sacred word is said to be of no avail. Necessary indeed as the gate of salvation, faith alone is not sufficient. To 'possess' truth, to make truth ours and to be transformed by truth, an autonomous, free, and deliberate conviction is wanted that does not rely upon others. Intellectual assent still more will not do. Holiness cannot be conquered by purely intellectual processes. The 'resource' is not *vijñāna*, discursive intelligence, but *jñāna*, insight or intuition; and this, not because *jñāna* discovers new truths or new aspects of truth believed and understood, but because the aim of the Buddhist discipline is essentially practical. An example will make that clear. Whosoever understands the 'truth of suffering' under its fourfold aspect will acknowledge the falsehood of vulgar notions, and will see pleasure and existence as transitory and painful; but he will not destroy his innate desire of pleasure, his thirst after existence. What is to be gained is a profound and efficacious feeling of the miseries of life, of the impurity of the body, of universal nothingness, to such a degree that the ascetic should see a woman as she really is, as a skeleton furnished with nerves and flesh, as an illusion made up of carnal desire. Mind will thus be freed from love, hatred, and from every passion. Thirst for sensual pleasures being eradicated, there remains thirst after existence and thirst after non-existence, both implying a contradiction to the supreme quietude which leads to nirvāṇa, and is nirvāṇa itself. It is evident that, to extinguish the fire of desire, one must extirpate the very idea of being and of non-being, and that for such a task intellectual knowledge is

only a preliminary. As it destroys wrong ideas about self and suffering, or rather as it shows the falseness of these wrong ideas, the view (darśana) of the noble truths is styled 'conversion' or 'access to the path'. But the superior degrees of wisdom up to Arhatship or holiness can only be reached by 'meditation,' 'absorptions,' 'trances,' 'concentrations' (samādhi, dhyāna, samāpatti), by a very intricate system of Yoga, where much stress is laid on hypnotical 'recettes'. In such exercises intelligible notions fall into the background.

The chief characteristics of Buddhism have their origin or, to be more accurate, their explanation in its being a therapeutic, a method with a practical end (passionlessness), with practical ways thereto, including coma and 'looking at the nose end'. Thus we can account for contradictions otherwise inexplicable. Buddhism is contradiction itself. It adheres to the Brahmanical dogma of *Karman* (retribution of acts in a future birth), but doubts or denies the existence of a soul, without which a retribution of acts is not only 'beyond conception' but even absurd. It teaches that Buddha is a teacher merely, and can only help his fellow men by preaching; nevertheless it describes the strength of benevolence through which Buddha converts whom he will. It affirms that a man reaps as he has sown, but enforces the rule of giving charities for the welfare of the dead. It could not forget that Śākyamuni had been a man, but nevertheless endowed him with every attribute of the supreme divinity. And we have seen that it has been no happier in making out a comprehensive theory of the relations between faith, reason, and intuition.

It is easy, and by no means inexact, to say that Buddhists are wanting in that strength of mind which results in the co-ordination of views. One might say that Buddhists have pondered and deliberated upon a number of conflicting, clever, often profound, theoretical views borrowed from all sides, or discovered by themselves; one might also add the observation that they had neither Aristotle nor Descartes as teachers, but the paradoxical authors of the Upanishads, the masters of Yoga, and this perplexing Śākyamuni, whose monstrous jest, 'Everything is void,' has proved so disastrous. He was, nevertheless, a very great man.

But, on the whole, to do justice to Buddhism, let us note that the contradictions are confined (Tāntrism, of course, being set on one side) to the ideological domain, and do open out many practical roads to nirvāṇa; for where principles are antagonistic, practices can be superimposed and co-ordinated. Mystics sink into non-intellectual meditations and happily reach the end. Rationalists, by dialectical processes, reduce the soul and universe to a void, and are 'liberated' from existence through the conviction of nothingness. The simple of heart

simply believe in the word of Buddha, in his qualities, in his miraculous power of salvation, and 'belief in the incomprehensibles brings to them incomprehensible fruits'. All obtain calm, 'desirelessness' (vītarāgatva), i.e. nirvāṇa here and hereafter. And I doubt if there is a Buddhist, I mean an enlightened one, who is not something of a mystic, of a rationalist, and of a believer.

6

KNOWLEDGE AND INTUITION IN BUDDHISM

By C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS. (Abstract)

In formulating their rejection of Ātmanism, the early Buddhists made use of one of several current classifications of bodily and mental constituents, to wit, the fivefold skandha theory. This is put forward as an exhaustive division of the human being considered as a unit in the universe of sense-experience, and it is held to be logically incompatible with any theory of a co-inhering ātman as at that time conceived. Their theory of knowledge based on the skandha doctrine is Sensationalistic or Experientialist. And from their standpoint of religious values the skandhas were rated very low indeed.

On the other hand, the Intuitionist or Rationalist element of cognition, represented elsewhere by concepts of *nous*, intellectus, reason, *prajñā*, or other variously conceived activities of the Psyche or Ātman, is retained and upheld by the Buddhists in their concept of *paññā*. This term, defined in the Abhidhamma Pitaka by its synonyms and metaphors, is, in the Dīgha Nikāya, resolved into several modes of intuition or insight. And from their standpoint of religious values, it stands supreme as the highest function of the human intelligence, while its *nidus*—the soul—was cut from under it.

How did they relate it to the doctrine of knowledge by way of skandha function? The Canon and the Visuddhi Magga reveal no consciousness of antinomy, but a varying effort to classify *paññā* under one of the skandhas. In the Sutta Pitaka it is allied to the *viññāṇakkhandha*. In the Abhidhamma it is placed under the skandha of sankhāras; and the Kathā Vatthu refutes a heretical theory which would have classed one mode of *paññā*—the Dibba-Cakkhu or Heavenly-Eye—under the *rūpakkhandha*. The maturer thought of Buddhaghosa's day (fifth century A.D.) regarded the *saññākkhandha*, the *viññāṇakkhandha* and *paññā*, as, respectively, simple and more complex modes of human intellection.

It is possible that the last-named view was a just interpretation of the older view. Like Christianity, Buddhism was a doctrine of Regeneration, in which a 'new life' involved the 'putting on' of a new mind. The skandha theory was concerned with the factors of human intelligence viewed as a product of, and engaged upon, this world of sense-experience. But for those whose faces were set towards the highest, there was needed an evolutionary classification of faculties expanding under the influence of fresh ideals and altered training. The regenerate were, as Sāriputta said, to analyse *viññāṇa*, but to cultivate *paññā*. The static concept of the Five Aggregates (Khandhā) was superseded by a dynamic nomenclature of faculty, force, potency, method, paths, summed up in the Thirty-seven Bodhipakkhiyā Dhammas, or conditions appertaining to Enlightenment.

Buddhism, as one exponent among many, of the ascetic traditions of India and the world, might deprecate the content and activities of sense-cognition. But its logic, in correlating a dis-ātmanized *paññā* with the despised skandhas, reveals the latent conviction that in the evolution and expansion of sense-born cognition stood the ladder by which mankind had slowly climbed to the wider view.

7

THE MONOTHEISTIC RELIGION OF ANCIENT INDIA, AND ITS DESCENDANT THE MODERN HINDU DOCTRINE OF FAITH

By G. A. GRIERSON. (Abstract)

Two views are current at the present day regarding modern Hinduism. According to some it is pantheism, with no personal God, and with a salvation consisting in absorption and loss of identity in the Pantheos. According to others it is a mixture of polytheism and fetishism. Neither of these is an accurate description. Pantheism is professed only by a few learned men. The polytheism and fetishism exist, but they are an external surface superstition concealing the religion really believed.

Nearly all modern Hindus are either Shivites or Vishnuites. The latter are in the great majority. There are at least 150 millions of them. The present paper deals only with Vishnuites, and when the Hindu religion is mentioned, it is to be understood as referring only to their form of belief. The worship of Śiva is not touched. Vishnuism is essentially a monotheistic religion.

We find traces of monotheism in the Vedas, but they soon disappear

from Brahmanical literature, and the literary religion which succeeded that of the Vedas was a form of pantheism.

The migration of the Aryans into India was a long process, extending over many generations. The earlier comers were separated from the later ones by differences of customs, of language, and of religion. Disputes among them settled down into the overlordship of those Aryans who occupied the country known as the *Madhyadeśa*, or 'Midland', i.e. that part of India which lies near the modern Delhi and to its immediate north. In the Midland the Brahman caste gradually secured the monopoly of those priestly functions which had hitherto been practised by the warrior caste as well as by the priest; and it was here that this pantheism grew up over the still popular monotheism of the lower classes.

The word 'Midland' suggests the idea of an 'Outland', also inhabited by Aryans, encircling the Midland on the east, south, and west. It has long been recognized that these Aryans of the Outland were not so thoroughly subjected to the religious influence of the Brahmans as their kindred of the Midland. Here the thinkers belonged, not to the Brahman, but to the warrior caste, to whose learning witness is borne even in contemporary Brahmanical writings. Here, during the thousand years that preceded our era, the leading spirits of the warrior caste thought out their monotheism.

It is probable that this monotheism was a development of the ancient Indo-Eranian sun-worship. All the legends dealing with the origin of the religion are connected with that luminary. It was communicated to mankind by him. Rāma, the greatest incarnation of the one God, was by human origin a descendant of the sun. Sugrīva, his chief ally, was a son of the sun. Draupadī, one of the forty-two 'friends' of the deity, is the subject of many stories, but the only one sufficiently important to be recorded in the chief book of the sect is connected with the sun. The father-in-law of Kṛṣṇa, another incarnation, was a worshipper of the sun. Yājñavalkya, one of the earliest heretics in Brahmanical lore, refused to worship with 'miserable Brahmans', and 'acting in *bhakti*', departed and worshipped the sun, who gave him a new Veda. With this he went to King Janaka, a man of the warrior caste, Rāma's father-in-law and a frequently mentioned teacher of this monotheism, and converted him. In the eschatology of the religion, the first stage in the progress of the released soul is to the sun. In the later forms of the development of the religion the one God is identified with Viṣṇu, an ancient Vedic sun-god, and at the present day the sun is commonly given the very title which was the name given to the deity by the founder of the religion.

The researches of Bhandarkar and Garbe have thrown much light on the development of this religion. Its founder as a monotheistic

doctrine was Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva, a member of the warrior caste and an inhabitant of the Outland. He taught that the one Supreme Being, whom he named 'Bhagavat', or the Adorable, was infinite, eternal, and full of grace, and that salvation consisted in a perpetual life of conscious bliss near him. Before the fourth century B.C. his followers, who were called 'Bhāgavatas', had deified their founder and had identified him with the Adorable.

In accordance with the general tendency of religious thought in India, this worship of the Adorable was at an early date combined with the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system of philosophy. This system was originally atheistic, but the alliance with the Bhāgavatas resulted in the philosophy adopting the idea of a god and in the religion receiving an esoteric philosophy. This brings us down to the end of the first stage of the development of Bhagavatism.

The second stage commences about three centuries before our era. Buddhism had become powerful, and the Brahmans of the Midland were compelled to enlist the Bhāgavatas on their side in the struggle with this purely atheistical creed. In order to secure the Bhāgavatas as allies they admitted the monotheism of the warrior Outland caste to be orthodox, and identified the Adorable as a form of the sun-god Viṣṇu, long worshipped by the polytheistic lower orders of the Midland. The process was carried on exactly as we see Brahmanism extending its frontiers at the present day. Local and tribal gods are admitted to the Brahmanical pantheon, and the distinction of being members of the warrior caste is conferred upon the new adherents.

The Bhāgavatas fell more and more under the influence of the Brahmans, and sometimes even identified the Brahmans' Pantheos with their Adorable, but on the whole they remained monotheists and believers in a personal god, although the esoteric philosophy which they had borrowed from Sāṅkhya-Yoga became much mixed with pantheistic ideas. We see this development in its earlier stages in the Bhagavad Gītā, a work which first came into being during the two centuries before our era, and received its final shape during the two centuries that followed it. Later stages of this development are shown in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata and in the Bhāgavata Puraṇa.

In the ninth century A.D. Śaṅkara systematized the old pantheism of the Midland, and in doing so attacked the Bhāgavata monotheism. The attack was met by two lines of defence. Some Bhāgavata doctors remained true to the old alliance with pantheism, and contented themselves with combating Śaṅkara's arguments only so far as they were incompatible with *their* interpretation of the old pantheistic teaching. Others broke the old alliance, and returned definitely to Sāṅkhya-Yoga, declaring that Śaṅkara's teaching was but Buddhist

atheism in disguise. The struggle culminated in the twelfth century, in which a great wave of Bhagavatism swept over the whole of India; and this has since held its own as the religion of the mass of the people. Numerous sects have arisen, mainly based on the two lines of defence above given, but all have remained true to the tenets of Bhagavatism as finally fixed at that time. These are :—

(1) There is only one God—the Adorable—the creator of all things out of matter which has proceeded from Himself. He created numerous subordinate deities to carry out His will, but in His special grace, as occasion requires, He becomes Himself incarnate to relieve the world from sin or His followers from trouble. *India thus owes to the Bhāgavatas the idea of the fatherhood of God.*

(2) To this Adorable, and to Him alone, the believer must adopt the attitude known as *bhakti*, or devotional faith. This is a special characteristic of the religion, and to it *India owes the idea of faith in a personal God.*

(3) Each soul is an emanation from the Adored. Once emitted, it exists for ever, and is liable, according to the universal Indian belief, to transmigration. The perpetual round of birth and rebirth is broken only by this *bhakti*, not by works, or by knowledge. When so released, the soul lives for ever in perpetual bliss at the feet of the Adored. *India owes the belief in the immortality of the soul to the Bhāgavatas.*

(4) The Adored, in His graciousness, makes no distinction between soul and soul. Salvation is not the prerogative of the learned, or of the higher castes. The institution of caste may be useful for social welfare, but in His sight all men are equal. *From the fatherhood of God proceeds the brotherhood of man, and this, again, India owes to the Bhāgavatas.*

The belief in numerous subordinate deities—the polytheism and fetishism which is a prominent feature in the Hinduism of the present day—is not inconsistent with this monotheism. The subordinate deities were all created by the Adorable for specific duties, and are finite. Adoration may be paid to them, but it is *dulia*, not *latria*. *Latria* is payable to the Adorable alone. Even the unlearned peasantry keep the distinction quite clear. For salvation—for release from transmigration—*latria* directed to the Adorable is the only way. The *dulia* paid to the lower deities can only have temporal results. The polytheism and the fetishism serve only for the daily needs of the material world. They may provide food, they may protect from sickness or other ills, they may even make life more happy in some future birth; but they cannot give that 'release' for which their follower longs. That is given, and the craving which every soul feels for communion with a personal God is satisfied, by *bhakti*, by devotional faith in the Adorable alone. In a country where, as in India, the

majority of the people are poor and ignorant, the material often overshadows the spiritual; but the very poorest recognizes—even if he thinks them too high for him—the truth of the doctrines concerning the One Supreme which have descended to him from the Bhāgavatas.

8

SOME NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE RELIGION OF LOVE IN INDIA

By L. D. BARNETT. (Abstract)

Bhakti, the worship of a personal deity in a spirit of love, is not due to Christian influences, but represents a force which has been active in Hindu religion from very early times. Early Upanishads contain ideas of the kind which are, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the epistemological side of their doctrine, and can only be understood as echoes of contemporary theistic movements; and these utterances are, in essentials, quite in harmony with the fundamental doctrines of the *bhakta* churches, as in them the Brahma-Atmā (Sach-chid-ānanda) is conceived in almost the same mode as the Supreme Deity of the *bhaktas*. Hence Rāmānuja could build up a complete theology of *bhakti* on the basis of the Upanishads without doing violence to them.

The Śvetāśvatara Upanishad (not, however, a very early work) takes the final step in this direction by demanding as requisite for spiritual enlightenment equal *bhakti* for the *deva* (personal deity), and for the *guru* (religious teacher, representing the deity on earth). This is typical of the regular *bhakti*-cult. *Bhakti* means literally 'service' of a *bhagavān*, which signifies originally any 'lord' and finally 'Our Lord'. The *bhakta* churches, when they first appear distinctly on the horizon of history, all bear this character: they are devoted to the emotional worship of a *bhagavān*, who is an historical or epico-historical person conceived either as such (e.g. Kṛishṇa in the older legends, or Buddha), or as the incarnation of some earlier and purely mythical deity, usually Vishṇu, with an increasing tendency to worship the earthly teacher representing him.

The principles of *bhakti* are occasionally visible in the Buddhism of the Hīna-yāna, and are very prominent in the Mahā-yāna, which was mature before the Christian era.

The legends concerning Kṛishṇa-Vāsudeva, which are the chief field of *bhakti*, seem to be for the most part homogeneous and long ante-

cedent to the Christian era. The worship of the bambino Kṛishṇa may perhaps have been stimulated by Christian influences. In the older parts of the Mahā-bhārata Kṛishṇa is merely a legendary hero; in the second stratum, the basis of the present recension of the epos, he is the Supreme incarnate as an earthly prince. The period of this latter recension seems to lie between the fourth and the first centuries B.C. The chief doctrine implied in it is embodied in the Bhagavad-gītā, and the leading churches maintaining it are the Sātvatas, Bhāgavatas, and Pāñcharātras, many of whose ancient scriptures are still extant, and demand critical study. Much of it was codified in the theology of Rāmānuja (twelfth century A.D.), whose theory of *vyūhas* is essentially the same as that propounded in the Mahā-bhārata, which again appears to be based upon an Upanishadic idea. This theory shows a fundamental trait of *bhakti*—the elevation of originally epic heroes (Saṅkarshaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, Vāsudeva) to a place in a spiritual hierarchy, where they are worshipped with an emotional cult. Traces of the same process are manifest in the inscription of Ghasundi (c. 250 B.C.).

Book x of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, in which the epic Vāsudeva is ranked with the purely mythical Vishṇu and Nārāyaṇa, has no chronological value, as it is a *khila-kāṇḍa*, and is ignored in the recension of the south. Even as an Upanishad, it is regarded with suspicion by southern pandits, who in their editions of the 108 Upanishads relegate it to an appendix.

9

THE VEDIC MAHĀVRATA

By A. BERRIEDALE KEITH

It is now nearly twenty years since Professor Hillebrandt published his striking study[1] of the Vedic Mahāvrata and enunciated the view that in that rite there existed an Indian parallel to the customs—some still surviving—which have marked Midsummer Eve (June 23) and Midsummer Day in Europe. Since that date much material has been collected, and the customs themselves have been made to serve as part of the foundation of Dr. Frazer's great construction, the theory of religion expounded in *The Golden Bough* and *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*; so that it may be not without interest again to examine the ancient Vedic records of the Mahāvrata, and the conclusions derived thence by Professor Hillebrandt.

[1] *Roman. Forsch.* v. 299 sq.

The Mahāvrata is a rite performed on the second last day of the Gavāmayana Sattra, a year-long rite, and in the ritual texts it is associated with the end of the year. But it is clear that at the same time it is the beginning of the new year as well, and that the Caturviṃśa day, the second day in the reckoning of the Gavāmayana Sattra is really only the Mahāvrata in a new form, and that the differentiation is merely a piece of sacerdotal manipulation. Corresponding to the Mahāvrata as the end or beginning of the Sattra is the Viṣuvant day as the middle, but in the ritual that day is—as compared with the Mahāvrata—of little or no account.

But in the opinion of Prof. Hillebrandt this state of affairs is not primitive, and the day which under the title of Viṣuvant is of so little importance, was originally the Mahāvrata day, falling at the summer solstice, and being celebrated with rites which can only be understood if considered as midsummer customs. Now it is certain that the Mahāvrata in the ritual texts is placed at the winter solstice. The Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa,[1] for example, explicitly says it occurs at the moment when the sun, after going South for six months, stops as it is about to start for the North. The only question possible is whether there are any traces in these texts of another dating.

The first trace of another view has been found in the notice in the Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa,[2] that the Mahāvrata should be placed in the middle of the year, i.e. at the summer solstice. Of this it is sufficient to remark that the view is not even accepted in the Brāhmaṇa, and that it is characteristic of that and similar Brāhmaṇas to make every conceivable sort of suggestion before arriving at a conclusion, so that it is not even possible to say that any Brāhmaṇical school—much less the people—ever reckoned the Mahāvrata at the summer solstice.

More important is the second piece of evidence. The Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra[3] attributes to the Mahāvrata three Sāmans, the Bṛhat, the Mahādivākīrtya, and the Rathaṃtara; and Prof. Hillebrandt has shown that, on the whole, though by no means universally, the Bṛhat is made up of hymns and verses to Indra, the Mahādivākīrtya of hymns and verses to Sūrya. Now there is the testimony of the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā[4] and the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa[5] that the Viṣuvant is specially connected with the Mahādivākīrtya; and it is therefore conjectured that the presence of that Sāman in the Mahāvrata is merely the result of 'contamination' of the rites, and that originally to the Mahāvrata and the Viṣuvant respectively belonged the Bṛhat and the Mahādivākīrtya Sāmans, connected the one with Indra, the other with Sūrya. Now prayers to Sūrya are most naturally connected with the efforts required at the winter solstice to rescue the sun from destruction and death,

[1] xix. 3. [2] iv. 10, 3. Cf. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, i. 2, 6.
[3] xi. 13. [4] iv. 8, 10. [5] i. 2, 3, 1.

while Indra's season is the breaking of the monsoon about the summer solstice, when he overcomes Vṛtra, the demon of drought, and, as the Aitareya Āraṇyaka[1] has it, waxes great. A further support for this argument is derived from the third of the Sāmans assigned to the Mahāvrata by Śāṅkhāyana, the Rathaṃtara. That Sāman, it is held, was originally—in place of the Mahādivākīrtya—the Sāman of the Viṣuvant; and as it evidently is connected with the sun, its very name—wheel-impelling—reminding us of the wheels used in Schleswig at the winter solstice as sun-spells—we have another argument for the connexion of the Viṣuvant with the winter sun, and of the Mahāvrata with the summer solstice.

The hypothetical character of the argument is obvious, but it may be well to examine it in detail. In the first place it should be noted that the Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra[2] sets only the Mahādivākīrtya Sāman in connexion with the Mahāvrata. Prof. Hillebrandt meets this by regarding the Āśvalāyana version as the later; but Dr. Friedländer[3] and I[4] have adduced a good deal of evidence to prove that the Śāṅkhāyana ritual generally is of a more elaborate and artificial type than that of the Āśvalāyana, and that the relation in time of the works is the reverse of that accepted by him. It is therefore very difficult to find any support for the connexion of the Bṛhat and Mahāvrata to the exclusion of the Mahādivākīrtya, which alone is ascribed by both the authorities to the Mahāvrata. Nor again are there two Sāmans precisely to be ascribed to Indra and Sūrya respectively. In the case of the Rathaṃtara there is no evidence whatever for its association with the Viṣuvant, save the conjecture that it originally took the place of the Mahādivākīrtya, a conjecture neither plausible nor supported by any evidence.

Secondly, even if we granted the truth of all these hypotheses as to the connexion of the Sāmans, we could not accept the cogency of the arguments derived from the supposed connexion of Indra and the Mahāvrata, and Sūrya and the Viṣuvant. It is, on the face of it, obvious that it is at least as natural to find Sūrya celebrated at the summer as at the winter solstice; and the Schleswig use of the wheel at the winter solstice is at least balanced by the similar use of a wheel at midsummer both in France and Germany, which is practised even at the present day, and which, according to a mediaeval writer was one of the three great features of the midsummer festival.[5] In the case of Indra, we can now quote Prof. Hillebrandt against himself, for

[1] i. 1, 1.

[2] viii. 6. The Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, xxv. 4, mentions that both the Bṛhat and Mahādivākīrtya were by some assigned to the Viṣuvant.

[3] Mahāvrata, pp. 9 sq.

[4] Aitareya Āraṇyaka, pp. 30 sq.

[5] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, ii. 260 sq.

he has in his *Vedische Mythologie*[1] abandoned the view that Indra's foe, Vṛtra, is a drought demon and now finds in him the winter. It is not necessary here to discuss in detail how far this view, which converts Indra into a sun-god, is an accurate representation of the facts of the Ṛgveda as it stands. It is sufficient for our purpose to accept the view of Weber that the conflict of the sun and winter is Indo-European or at least Indo-Iranian, and that that conflict is inseparably confused and combined with the later and more specially Indian conception—naturally adopted under the climatic conditions of Hindustan—of a conflict between the drought and the thunderer.

The further arguments[2] in favour of Prof. Hillebrandt's theory may be dismissed more briefly. The third ground brought forward by him is the fact that the Viṣuvant stands in the middle of a period of twenty-one days, with which he compares a period of three weeks, apparently dating from the beginning of December, of which obscure traces are found in German mythology. But no stress can be laid on the argument; for the period of twenty-one days has no special value in the Vedic ritual, and is merely one of various groupings, while not only is the Germanic parallel extremely obscure, but in any case the period evidently lies before the winter solstice, whereas the Viṣuvant is preceded by and followed by ten days on either side. The next argument is derived from the fact that, according to one theory mentioned in the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa, the Mahāvrata would have fallen in the month Taiṣa. Now that month derives its name from the asterism Tiṣya, which is equated with the Avestan Tistrya,[3] and that again with Sirius; and as Sirius is the sign of the heat of summer, it is argued that we have a further ground for placing the Mahāvrata in the summer. But putting aside the serious doubt as to the proposed identifications on phonetic grounds, there remains the fact that there is not the slightest evidence that Taiṣa was ever to the Vedic Indians a summer month. The asterism Tiṣya in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā[4] holds the same position to the others as Puṣya in the Atharvaveda[5] list; and the commentators on the passages where Taiṣa as a name of a month is found, concur in equating it with Pauṣa; and Prof. Hillebrandt himself admits that in all probability the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa already held this view.

These four arguments exhaust the substance of Prof. Hillebrandt's theory, since he lays, very naturally, no stress on the various allegorical plays on the Sāmans and on their connexion with the length of the day,

[1] iii. 162 sqq.; cf. *J. R. A. S.*, 1908, pp. 883 sq.

[2] I pass by, of course, the argument from the *Ekāṣṭakā* as mother of Indra, recalled in *Vedische Mythologie*, iii. 198, n. 2.

[3] Cf. Weber, *Altiran. Sternnamen*, p. 15; Zimmer, *Altind. Leben*, p. 355.

[4] iv. 4, 10.

[5] xix. 7.

&c., examples of which he adduces and explains by his theory just as little satisfactorily as on the ordinary view. It remains to be seen whether the actual rites throw any light on the season at which they are held.

The chief characteristic of the rite is that the litany, the Mahad Uktha, is conceived as arranged in bird-form, and this again is due to the view that the altar and the sacred fire are also in bird shape.[1] There can be no doubt that this bird is the sun-bird, for the ritual address[2] contains the word *garutman* 'winged,' which is in the Ṛgveda[3] itself the appellation of the sun-bird. Both the fire (Agni) and the sun are formally worshipped by the sacrificer. Nor can there be any doubt as to the sun-character of the swing which is set up and solemnly pushed from East to West and across by the priests. Already in the Ṛgveda the sun is described as the golden swing in heaven,[4] and the direction of the motion is extremely significant. Moreover, one of the formulae accompanying the bringing of the swing into contact with the ground is 'the great has united with the great', this being explained as Agni—here clearly in his celestial form—with the earth.[5] Still more significant is a fight between an Ārya, normally a Vaiśya, and a Śūdra for a round white skin, which is won by the Ārya and used by him to strike down his vanquished rival. The old tradition[6]—probably already found in a Brāhmaṇa—equates the skin and the sun; and, like all the other details as yet mentioned, the picture suits admirably the conception of the rite as an attempt to stimulate the sun at the winter solstice both by worship and by magic. The movement of the swing stimulates its motion; the Ārya rescues it from the hostile powers which threaten to extinguish its light. At the summer solstice in India neither act is so natural or proper.

In this connexion can also be explained the use of the drum by the priest, and of various musical instruments—a long list of names of these instruments is given, made up of rare popular words—by women, whose presence and activity are characteristic of the popular character of the ritual. These noises may perfectly well have been designed—like the gong at Dodona—merely to drive away all evil demons[7] and at once to protect the sun and those present at the rite from their onslaught,

[1] This is the unquestionably older version, that of the Aitareya. Śāṅkhāyana presupposes a human form of the fire and hymn; cf. Friedländer, op. cit., p. 10.

[2] See Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka, i. 8; Aitareya Āraṇyaka, v. 1, 5, with Sāyaṇa's note.

[3] Cf. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 39.

[4] vii. 87, 5.

[5] Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka, i. 5.

[6] Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, p. 88, n. 4.

[7] Cf. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*², pp. 164 sq.; Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, pp. 40 sq.

and the noise of the musical instruments was reinforced by the voices of Adhvaryus, the sacrificing priests. No doubt the use of the drum is quite in keeping with the conception of its being an imitation of thunder, and so an effort to strengthen Indra as thunderer against the demon of drought; but the explanation here offered is at least as plausible and accounts more satisfactorily for the other noises used.

Less characteristic is another part of the rite. The service was accompanied by a running string of remarks indicative of praise and dispraise by two persons appointed for that purpose. This is one of the less well authenticated marks of the ritual, and may reasonably be considered as less primitive. On the other hand, even the briefest of the versions, that of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, mentions the *brahmacāripuṃścalyoḥ saṃpravāda*, a contest in ritual αἰσχρολογία between a hetaera and a Brahmin student vowed to chastity. Various theories have been advanced to explain such instances of αἰσχρολογία in ritual. The simplest perhaps is that it is merely another means of demon-scaring[1]; but the evidence for this view is hardly convincing, and it seems best to regard it here—as in the Thesmophoria[2]—as undoubtedly calculated to promote the fertility of beings and the earth. This view is probably rendered certain by a further custom, merely referred to in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka[3] in the curt words *bhūtānāṃ ca maithunam*, and by a singular example of priestly or general moral progress repudiated as *purāṇam utsannam* in the Śāṅkhāyana, but described fully in the other Sūtra accounts.[4] This rite must[5] be compared with cases of the ἱερὸς γάμος, and brought into connexion with the union of Fire and Earth already mentioned as symbolized by the touching of the earth by the swing. For the rite—strange as it evidently seemed to the Brahmins—was performed by an Āryan, bald-headed by preference, with a Śūdra woman, and was a solemn part of the ritual; probably originally the place of the Śūdra was taken by an Āryan woman, and the rite was at once an earthly counterpart of the union of Fire and Earth, and a powerful spell to promote human fruitfulness, as the union of Fire and Earth brought forth the crops.

It is true that another explanation can be offered of these facts if they are regarded as happening at midsummer. Dr. Frazer[6] quotes

[1] Cf. Campbell, *Ind. Ant.*, xxiv. 263 sq.

[2] Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, iii. 104.

[3] v. 1, 5.

[4] The plural in the Aitareya suggests that the ritual there contemplated involved the union of more pairs than one, representing the diverse sides of animal life.

[5] This assumes that in the Greek ἱερὸς γάμος we see the refined form of an older rite in which a real marriage took place, not of course as a mere symbolism (cf. Farnell, op. cit., i. 184 sq.), but as a magic spell to produce fertility. At the same time the Vedic rite shows clearly the parallelism of human and divine activity.

[6] *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], pp. 208, 209.

both May and Midsummer pairs as representative of the spirit of vegetation in its reproductive capacity; and some of the features of the ritual above described could also be adapted to that explanation. The drumming might be a thunder magic, as in a case at Dorpat in Russia, cited by Dr. Frazer.[1] And this theory may be further supported by features of the ritual not yet mentioned. Maidens with water-pitchers dance round a fire singing—in one version—'The cows smell pleasantly: here is sweet drink! The cows smell with sweet odours—sweet drink! The cows are mothers of butter—sweet drink! May they increase amongst us—sweet drink! The cows we would here bathe—sweet drink!' As they dance they strike their right thighs with their right hands or, according to Hiraṇyakeśin, beat the ground with their right feet, and their dance is *pradakṣiṇam*, following the sun's motion.[2] Finally they cast the contents of their pitchers into the Mārjālīya fire. With such a dance may, of course, be compared the dance of the 'Sweethearts of St. John' and others on St. John's Eve in Sardinia, or the dance of the Oraons and Mundas of Bengal (a non-Āryan people) round the Karma tree.[3] Nor can there be any doubt that the rite is essentially a rain spell of a common type, and it is possible that the ceremonial beating of the thighs may be a remnant[4] of a more serious effort to expel evil influences and promote fertility. But granting all this, there is still no cogent reason for transferring the time to midsummer, the rains which it is clearly sought to invoke may, as Prof. Oldenberg[5] has pointed out, quite as well be the winter rains, necessary for the production of the spring crops, which, as we have independent evidence,[6] were already reaped in early Vedic times; and the connexion of sun with rain spells would seem a most natural conjunction, the combined influence of both heat and rain being essential for the production of the crop. Prof. Hillebrandt uses, however, the fact that the water is ultimately poured upon the fire as a piece of evidence in favour of the midsummer date. In his view the act symbolizes the extinction of the burning heat of the summer by the rain of the monsoon, and is a spell to bring down the rains. But this view seems to be somewhat far-fetched. For it must be noted that *de facto* there is no hint in any of our texts that the fire is extinguished by the water, and indeed no one familiar with the ritual would expect that a sacred fire should be so summarily disposed of; so that

[1] *Golden Bough*, i. 13.

[2] This is the real sense of *pradakṣiṇam*, see Caland and Henry, *L'Agniṣṭoma*, p. xxxvii.

[3] Dr. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], pp. 198 sq.

[4] Cf. the rite of the Lupercalia and the Thesmophoria, Farnell, op. cit., iii. 104.

[5] *Religion des Veda*, p. 445. Cf. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, iii. 200.

[6] Taittirīya Saṃhitā, vii. 2, 10, 1 sq.

—unless we assume that the original practice has been obliterated by priestly developments—the magic spell would hardly be successful as a spell, if in fact it fails to accomplish even its proximate purpose, the quenching of the terrestrial fire. If a symbolical explanation must be found it would seem preferable to take the union of water with the fire as denoting the κρᾶσις of the wet and warm elements to bring forth the harvest. Or, more simply, the rite may be regarded as a water-spell in the dashing of the water over the fire, the fire being chosen as the receptacle simply because it is the natural place in which all offerings are made; and the song of the maidens shows that the water they carried was regarded as more than water, as *madhu*, and a suitable drink for the god, Āditya, who is clearly intended to drink it, as is shown conclusively, e.g. in the Aitareya version.

So far we have found in the rite no trace of the feature which is so characteristic of all midsummer festivals, the animal or human representative of the corn-spirit or vegetation-spirit, and Prof. Hillebrandt does not seek to find any such phenomenon in the Mahāvrata. But it is only fair to note the evidence which might be adduced for that view. The Mahāvrata is by no means a bloodless sacrifice. There fall to be offered either one beast to be sacrificed to Indra and Agni or eleven animals; and in either case there is an additional sacrifice of a bull to Indra or to Prajāpati, and in the former case of a goat to Prajāpati.[1] Now the skin of the sacrificial animal was removed and used to form the drum (*bhūmidundubhi*) on which, with the tail of the victim, the priest made solemn music. With this usage may, of course, be compared the legend of the skin of Marsyas and of other sacred skins, like the Aegis, collected by Dr. Frazer.[2] But it is clear that the skin might equally well be regarded as the natural means of making a drum; nor need we be anxious to deny that the skin may have seemed particularly effectual for its purpose, because it had come from an animal which by sacrifice had come into close contact with divinity and in a sense itself was not without a share in the divine.[3] More obscure is another rite mentioned in all the sources. To the left of the Āgnīdhra priest were placed two posts on which was hung up as a target a completely round skin; or, according to Lāṭyāyana, two skins, one for the chief archer, and the other for any others who were good shots.

[1] Also in the Aitareya a bull to Viśvakarman. The details vary; cf. Friedländer, op. cit., p. 30.

[2] *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], pp. 242 sq. For the Aegis, cf. Farnell, op. cit., i. 100; for the peculiar magic potentialities of the tail—as the home of the vegetation spirit—cf. Frazer, *Golden Bough*, i. 408; ii. 3, 42; Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, pp. 246, 247.

[3] For other examples of this idea in Vedic religion, cf. *J. R. A. S.*, 1907, pp. 938 sq.

At one point in the ceremony, the king, or a Rājput, mounted his chariot and driving round the Vedi pierced the skin with three arrows, taking care, however, that he left the arrows sticking in the skin.

The exact meaning of the ritual is by no means clear. It may be compared with the Lapp ritual;[1] after slaying a bear—with ceremonies intended to deprecate the wrath of the ghost and of the bear tribe—they hung its skin on a post and women blindfolded shot arrows at it; a custom cited by Dr. Frazer in illustration of the myth of the death of Balder and the blindness of Höder, who slew him. But the parallel is hardly close or cogent in the present case. There is no element of blindness; the archer is the best bowman available, and the skin is nowhere stated to have been that of one of the sacrificial animals; on the contrary it is described by Āpastamba[2] as a 'dry' skin; and further there is absolutely no trace in the ritual as preserved of any treatment of the animal as other than a mere sacrificial victim under the 'gift' theory of sacrifice, which notoriously is the only one accepted by the Brāhmaṇic texts.[3] If, therefore, there were ever in the rite a vegetation-spirit, it has left no trace on the Brāhmaṇical working over of the ritual.

Nevertheless the rite remains difficult to explain conclusively. The bow and the three arrows remind us of the ritual of the Rājasūya,[4] in which the king shoots three arrows at the princes of his family as a token of his superiority. The similarity of the practices suggests that the action is hostile rather than an act of sympathetic magic; otherwise we might have compared the shooting of the arrows with the custom of the Ojibways in firing fire-tipped arrows to rekindle the expiring light of the sun in eclipse, or the practice of throwing blazing discs shaped like suns in the air in the midsummer rites.[5] But there is no hint here of fire-tipped arrows, and it is probably simplest and best to consider that the arrows are used to pierce the sky and bring down the rain. The round shape of the target can hardly be used against that view, for, though round—and therefore so far like the sun—it is not claimed to have been white, nor is even its roundness mentioned in most of the authorities. Nor indeed is there any difficulty in regarding the sky as circular, since even in the Ṛgveda it is compared to a wheel and to a bowl, while the earth itself, its counterpart, is described as circular.[6] The question, however, still remains, why the arrows are not allowed to go right through the skin; and the most

[1] Frazer, op. cit., ii. 360, n. 3.
[2] Cited in Sāyaṇa on Aitareya Āraṇyaka, v. 1, 5.
[3] Cf. Caland and Henry, op. cit., App. iii.
[4] Hillebrandt, *Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, p. 145.
[5] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, i. 22; ii. 268.
[6] Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 9.

plausible answer is perhaps that it was desired to keep open the rents in order that the rain might continue to fall, just as a hunter might desire that his arrow should remain fixed in the body of his prey, draining it of blood and strength.

So far then the ritual shows itself compounded of fire and water spells, and consistently its end is marked by both characteristics; for the Aitareya[1] tells us that the swing is carried away for a ceremonial bath, and the material of the seats of the officiating priests is burnt. The former bathing is clearly a rain spell, and as the swing represents the sun, we may if we like press the rite to yield a symbolism of the union of sun and rain; the burning is to be compared with the bonfires and illuminations found alike on Christmas day[2] and at Midsummer.

Comparatively little of the old sacrificial ritual has survived to the present day in India; but it is not uninteresting to note that in the worship of Kṛṣṇa, who unites, it seems most probable, in himself the attributes of sun-god (Viṣṇu) and a vegetation-spirit, perhaps non-Āryan, are found, on January 12 and 13, rites which include sun and fertility magic; and that later, on the 14th of the light half of Phālguna takes place a *dolāyatrā*, in which the image of Kṛṣṇa is swung to and fro.[3] Moreover, in Southern India—long the chief home of Brāhmaṇism—in January, when the sun enters the tropic of Capricorn, there is celebrated the feast of Pongol, in which bonfires are made in every street and lane, and young people leap over the fire or pile on fresh fuel. The fire is an offering to Sūrya or to Agni (the identification is parallel with that of Āditya and Agni in the Mahāvrata) and is purposed to awake him to gladden the earth with his heat and light.[4] The parallel to the Mahāvrata is striking. The solemn dance of the maidens round the fire is a substitute for the less formal leap over the fire, and leaves little doubt that in the Mahāvrata we have no priestly transfer to another season of a midsummer rite, but a genuine adoption in the Brāhmaṇical ritual of a midwinter rite essentially popular. Nor indeed is it likely that a rite so important as to force the Brahmins to admit women as participators and actors in it could have been artificially altered in date.

[1] v. 3, 2.
[2] Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], pp. 254 sq.
[3] Cf. Wilson, *Works*, ii. 216 sq.; 225 sq.
[4] Glover, *J. R. A. S.*, 1870, pp. 96 sq.

10

THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF THE JAINAS

By H. JACOBI

All who approach Jain philosophy will be under the impression that it is a mass of philosophical tenets not upheld by one central idea, and they will wonder what could have given currency to what appears to us an unsystematical system. I myself have held, and given expression to, this opinion, but I have now learned to look at Jain philosophy in a different light. It has, I think, a metaphysical basis of its own, which secured it a distinct position apart from the rival systems both of the Brahmans and of the Buddhists. This is the subject on which I would engage your attention for a short space of time.

Jainism, at least in its final form, which was given it by its last prophet the twenty-fourth Tīrthakara Mahāvīra, took its rise, as is well known, in that part of Eastern India where in an earlier period, according to the Upaniṣads, Yājñavalkya had taught the doctrine of Brahman and Ātman, as the permanent and absolute Being, and where Mahāvīra's contemporary and rival, Gotama the Buddha, was preaching his Law, which insisted on the transitoriness of all things. Jainism, therefore, had to take a definite position with reference to each of these mutually exclusive doctrines ; and these it will be necessary to define more explicitly.

The one great Truth which the authors of the Upaniṣads thought to have discovered, and which they are never weary of exalting, is that, underlying and upholding from within all things, physical as well as psychical, there is one absolute permanent Being, without change and with none other like it. The relation between this absolute Being and existent matter has not clearly been made out by the authors of the Upaniṣads, but all unprejudiced readers will agree that they looked on the phenomenal world as real. On this point the different schools of Vedāntins arrived at different conclusions, which, however, need not detain us here.

In opposition to this Brahmanical doctrine of absolute and permanent Being, Buddha taught that all things are transitory ; indeed his dying words were, that all things that are produced must perish. The principal heresy, according to the Buddhists, is the *Ātmavāda*, i.e. the belief that permanent Being is at the bottom of all things ; they are, as we should say, but phenomena, or as Buddha expressed

it, *dharmas*; there is no *dharmin*, no permanent substance of which the dharmas could be said to be attributes.

Thus the Brahmans and the Buddhists entertained opposite opinions on the problem of Being because they approached it from two different points of view. The Brahmans exclusively followed the dictates of pure reason which forces us to regard Being as permanent, absolute, and uniform; the Buddhists, on the other hand, were just as one-sided in following the teaching of common experience according to which existence is but a succession of originating and perishing. Either view, the *a priori* view of the Brahmans, and the *a posteriori* view of the Buddhists, is beset with many difficulties when we are called upon to employ it in explanation of the state of things as presented to us by our consciousness; difficulties which cannot be overcome without a strong faith in the paramount truth of the principle adopted.

The position taken by the Jainas towards the problem of Being is as follows. Being, they contend, is joined to production, continuation, and destruction (*sad utpāda-dhrauvya-vināśa-yuktam*), and they call their theory the theory of indefiniteness (*anekāntavāda*), in contradistinction to the theory of permanency (*nityavāda*) of the Vedāntists, and to the theory of transitoriness (*vināśavāda*) of the Buddhists. Their opinion comes to this. Existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter; which matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish.

The Jain theory of Being appears thus to be merely the statement of the common-sense view, and it would be hard to believe that great importance was attached to it. Still it is regarded as the metaphysical basis of their philosophy. Its significance comes out more clearly when we regard it in relation to the doctrines of *Syādvāda*, and of the *Nayas*.

Syādvāda is frequently used as a synonym of *Jainapravacana* (e.g. at a later date in the title of a well-known exposition of the Jain philosophy entitled *Syādvāda-Mañjarī*); and it is much boasted of as the saving truth leading out of the labyrinth of sophisms. The idea underlying the *Syādvāda* is briefly this. Since the nature of Being is intrinsically indefinite and made up of the contradictory attributes of originating, continuance, and perishing, any proposition about an existing thing must, somehow, reflect the indefiniteness of Being, i.e. any metaphysical proposition is right from one point of view, and the contrary proposition is also right from another. There

are, according to this doctrine, seven forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word *syāt*, e.g. *syād asti sarvam*, *syād nāsti sarvam*. *Syāt* means 'may be', and is explained by *kathaṃcit*, which in this connexion may be translated 'somehow'. The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti*, and indicates the indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam*). For example, we say, a jar is somehow, i.e. it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow, if we mean thereby that it exists as a cloth or the like.

The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption made by the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (*asti*) and 'is not' (*nāsti*). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*); for existent and non-existent (*sat* and *asat*) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a coexistence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. These three predicates variously combined make up the seven propositions or *saptabhangas* of the Syādvāda. I shall not abuse your patience by discussing this doctrine at length; it is enough to have shown that it is an outcome of the theory of indefiniteness of Being (*anekāntavāda*), and to have reminded you that the Jainas believe the Syādvāda to be the key to the solution of all metaphysical questions.

The doctrine of the Nayas which I mentioned before is, as it were, the logical complement to the Syādvāda. The nayas are ways of expressing the nature of things: all these ways of judgement are, according to the Jainas, one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are seven nayas, four referring to concepts, and three to words. The reason for this variety is that Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins believe, but is of a complicated nature; therefore, every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we needs must go astray.

There is nothing in all this which sounds deeply speculative; on the contrary, the Jain theory of Being seems to be a vindication of common-sense against the paradoxical speculations of the Upaniṣads. It is also, but not primarily, directed against the Buddhistic tenet of the transitoriness of all that exists. We cannot, however, say that it expressly and consciously combats the Buddhistic view, or that it was formulated in order to combat it. And this agrees well with the historical facts, that Mahāvīra came long after the original Upaniṣads, but was a contemporary of Buddha. He was obliged, therefore, to frame his system so as to exclude the principles of Brahmanical speculation, but his position was a different one with regard to the newly proclaimed system of Buddha.

I have not yet touched on the relation between Jain philosophy on the one hand and Sānkhya-Yoga on the other. We may expect a greater community of ideas between these systems, since both originated in the same class of religious men, viz. the ascetics known as the Śramaṇas, or, to use the more modern term, Yogins. As regards the practice of asceticism, the methods and the aim of Yoga, it has long been proved that the Yoga of Brahmans, Jainas, and Bauddhas are closely related to each other, and there can be no doubt that they have all developed from the same source. But I am now concerned only with those philosophical ideas which have a connexion with ascetic practice and form the justification thereof.

Now the Sānkhya view as to the problem of Being is clearly a kind of compromise between the theory of the Upaniṣads and what we may call the common-sense view. The Sānkhyas adopt the former with regard to the souls or *puruṣas* which are permanent and without change. They adopt the latter when assigning to matter or Prakṛti its character of unceasing change. The Sānkhyas contend that all things besides the souls or *puruṣas* are products of the one Prakṛti or primaeval matter, and similarly the Jainas teach that practically all things besides the souls or *jīvas* are made up of matter or *pudgala*, which is of only one kind and is able to develop into everything. It will thus be seen that the Sānkhyas and Jainas are at one with regard to the nature of matter; in their opinion matter is something which may become anything. This opinion, it may be remarked, seems to be the most primitive one; not only was it entertained by the ancients, but also it underlies the universal belief of transformation occurring in the natural course of things or produced by sorcery and spells. This is a point I wish to make, that the Sānkhyas and Jainas started from the same conception of matter, but worked it out on different lines. The Sānkhyas teach that the products of Prakṛti are evolved in a fixed order, from the most subtle and spiritual one (*Buddhi*) down to the gross elements, and this order is always reproduced in the successive creations and dissolutions of the world. The Jainas, on the other hand, do not admit such a fixed order of development of matter (*pudgala*), but believe that the universe is eternal and of a permanent structure. According to them matter is atomic, and all material changes are really going on in the atoms and their combinations. A curious feature of their atomic theory is that the atoms are either in a gross condition or in a subtle one, and that innumerable subtle atoms take up the space of one gross atom. The bearing of this theory on their psychology I shall now proceed to point out. But I must premise that the Jainas do not recognize a psychical apparatus of such a complex nature as the Sānkhyas in their tenet concerning Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Manas, and the Indriyas. The Jaina

opinion is much cruder, and comes briefly to this. According to the merit or demerit of a person, atoms of a peculiar subtle form, which we will call *karma* matter, invade his soul or *jīva*, filling and defiling it, and obstructing its innate faculties. The Jainas are quite outspoken on this point, and explicitly say that *karman* is made up of matter, *paudgalikaṃ karma*. This must be understood literally, not as a metaphor, as will be seen from the following illustrations. The soul or *jīva* is extremely light, and by itself it has a tendency to move upwards (*ūrdhvagaurava*), but it is kept down by the karma matter with which it is filled. But when it is entirely purged of karma matter, at Nirvāṇa, it goes upwards in a straight line to the top of the universe, the domicile of the released souls. To take another example. The karma matter within a soul may assume different conditions. It may be turbulent, as mud in water which is being stirred; or it may be inactive, as mud in water when it has settled at the bottom of a basin; or it may be completely neutralized as when the clear water is poured off after the mud has been precipitated. Here again it is evident that karma is regarded as a substance or matter, though of an infinitely more subtle nature than the impurities of water referred to in the illustration. As a third instance I will refer to the six *Leśyās* or complexions of the souls, ranging from deepest black to shining white, colours which we common mortals cannot perceive with our eyes. This doctrine was shared also by the *Ājīvikas*, on whom Dr. Hoernle[1] has thrown so much light. These colours of the soul are produced on it by the karman which acts as a colouring substance. Here also the material nature of karman is quite obvious.

To return from this digression, the karma matter that enters the soul is transformed into eight different kinds of karman, about which I shall have to say a word presently. This change of the one substance into eight varieties of karman is likened to the transformation of food consumed at one meal into the several fluids of the body. The karma matter thus transformed and assimilated builds up a subtle body, which invests the soul and accompanies it on all its transmigrations, till it enters Nirvāṇa and goes up to the top of the universe. This subtle body or *kārmaṇaśarīra* is obviously the Jain counterpart of the *sūkṣmaśarīra* or *lingaśarīra* of the Sānkhyas.[2] In order to understand the functions of this subtle body or kārmaṇaśarīra, we must take a summary view of the eight kinds of karman of which it is composed. The first and second (*jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśaṇāvaraṇīya*) obstruct knowledge and faith, which are innate faculties of the soul or *jīva*; the third (*mohanīya*) causes delusion, especially

[1] *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. i. pp. 259 sq.

[2] The Jainas recognize four different subtle bodies; see *Tattvārth.*, ii. 37 sq.

the affections and passions; the fourth (*vedanīya*) results in pleasure and pain; the fifth (*āyuṣka*) assigns the length of life to the person in his present birth; the sixth (*nāma*) furnishes him with all that belongs to him as an individual; the seventh (*gotra*) makes him a member of the class or genus which he is to belong to; the eighth (*antarāya*) produces hindrances to the realization of his virtues and powers. Each of these eight kinds of karman endures for a certain period, of varying length, within which it must take its proper effect. Then it is expelled from the soul, a process which is called *nirjarā*. The opposite process, the influx of karman into the soul, is called *āsrava*, a term well known to students of Buddhism. The occasions for āsrava are the actions of the body and mind (*yoga*); they open as it were an inlet for karma matter to invade the soul. If that soul is in a state of iniquity, i.e. if the person under consideration does not possess right faith, or does not keep the commandments (*vrata*), or is careless in his conduct, or does not subdue his passions, then, in all these cases, singly or collectively, especially under the influence of the passions, the soul must retain the karma matter, or, as the Jainas say, binds it (*bandha*). But the influx of karma matter or āsrava can be prevented; this is called the stopping or *saṃvara*.

These primitive notions the Jainas have worked out into a philosophical superstructure, which serves just as well as that of the Sānkhyas (but on different lines) to explain the problems of mundane existence and to teach the way of salvation. In order to make this clear I must add a few more details.

Saṃvara is effected, i.e. the influx of karma is prevented, by the observance of peculiar rules of conduct, by restraint of body, speech, and mind, by strict morality, by religious reflections, by indifference to things pleasant or unpleasant, &c. The most effective means, however, is the practice of austerities (*tapas*), which has this advantage over the other means, that it not only prevents karma from accumulating, but also consumes the accumulated karma. Tapas, therefore, produces also nirjarā and leads to Nirvāṇa; it is the chief means of salvation, as might be expected in a religion of ascetics. The denotation of the word 'tapas' in Jainism is somewhat different from its usual meaning. There is tapas of the body (*bāhya tapas*) and tapas of the mind (*abhyantara tapas*). The former consists in fasting, or eating scanty and tasteless food, in want of comfort and in mortification of the flesh. The mental tapas contains various items, as confession of sins and penance, monastic duties, obedience, modesty, self-restraint and meditation (*dhyāna*). I wish to lay stress on the fact that in the course of asceticism taught by the Jainas meditation is only one of many steps leading to the ultimate goal. Though Nirvāṇa is immediately preceded by the two purest stages

of meditation, yet all other parts of tapas appear of equal importance. We shall see the significance of this fact more clearly, when we compare the Jaina tapas with what corresponds to it in Sānkhya-Yoga. Their Yoga contains some of the varieties of Jaina tapas; but they are regarded as inferior to meditation or contemplation. Indeed the whole Yoga centres in contemplation; all other ascetic practices are subordinate and subservient to contemplation—*dharanā, dhyāna* and *samādhi*. This is but natural in a system which makes the reaching of the *summum bonum* dependent on *jñāna*, knowledge. The theory of the evolution of Prakṛti, beginning with Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Manas, appears, to my mind, to have been invented in order to explain the efficiency of contemplation for acquiring supernatural powers and for liberating the soul. Sānkhya-Yoga is a philosophical system of ascetics; but their asceticism has been much refined and has become spiritualized in a high degree. The asceticism of the Jainas is of a more original character; it chiefly aims at the purging of the soul from the impurities of karman. Jainism may have refined the asceticism then current in India; it certainly rejected many extravagances, such as the voluntary inflicting of pains; but it did not alter its character as a whole. It perpetuated an older or more original phase of asceticism than the Brahmanical Yoga, and carries us back to an older stratum of religious life in which we can still detect relics of primitive speculation in the shape of such crude notions as I have had occasion to mention in the course of my paper.

In conclusion I shall shortly touch on the third current of Indian philosophical speculation, viz. the philosophy of the Pandits which is represented to us by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. This philosophy may be characterized as an attempt to register, to define, and to arrange in systematic order the concepts and general notions which are the common possession of all who spoke the Sanskrit language. Such a philosophy had some attraction for the Jainas who, as we have seen, always sided with common-sense views, and in fact many Jainas have written on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. But at the time when the Jain system was framed, the Pandit, as we know him in later times, had probably not yet become distinguished from the Vedic scholar or theologian; it is almost certain that there was as yet no class of persons who could be called Pandits, and consequently their philosophy also was wanting. And the tradition of the Jainas themselves says as much; for according to them the Vaiśeṣika system was founded by Chaluya Rohagutta, originally a Jaina and pupil of Mahāgīri, eighth Sthavira after Mahāvīra. Thus we have no occasion to inquire into the relation between this system and Jainism. But it may be mentioned that the atomic theory which is a marked feature of the Vaiśeṣika, is already taught in outline by the Jainas.

As regards the Nyāya system, it is almost certainly later than Jainism; for the dialectics and logic of the Jainas are of a very primitive character, and appear entirely unconnected with the greatly advanced doctrines of the Naiyāyikas.

In conclusion let me assert my conviction that Jainism is an original system, quite distinct and independent from all others; and that, therefore, it is of great importance for the study of philosophical thought and religious life in ancient India.

11

Extrait de l'Étude de M. H. Camerlynck sur *le Nirvana*.—Au commencement du XIXe siècle des traducteurs français ont cru que le mot Nirvana, dont la racine signifie extinction, par exemple, d'un feu ou d'une lumière, avait pour objet d'enseigner le matérialisme. Ils ont été jusqu'à écrire que le Bouddhisme, c'est-à-dire la morale de Çakia-mouny, était une religion sans dieu, sans songer que ce grand philosophe, né dans le Brahmanisme, et élevé dans le même milieu, avait toujours évité les questions dogmatiques, et avait encore moins songé à renier sa foi. En prenant le Nirvana pour base de ces prédications il ne faisait qu'appliquer le Brahmanisme dans ce qu'il avait de plus compréhensible pour les populations.

Aussi les protestations s'élevèrent chez nous contre Burnouf et Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, et dès 1856 M. T. B. Obry se fit le protagoniste de la réaction. En 1865 M. Weber, et Max Müller (1869) se rangèrent au même avis, et depuis de nombreux explorateurs, savants, et évêques mêmes, ont confirmé la thèse du spiritualisme indien et bouddhique. En résumé le Nirvana n'a pas été présenté par le Bouddha comme étant transformé, c'est celui d'avant lui dont il a parlé. Il n'a formulé aucune critique des croyances asiatiques. Le culte des ancêtres et les transmigrations des âmes sont d'ailleurs les meilleures preuves de la spiritualité des religions locales. Ces transmigrations, on le sait, avaient pour effet de soumettre les mauvais à des conditions nouvelles de souffrance et d'humiliation, ils purgeaient les peines auxquelles ils avaient échappés dans la vie terrestre, tant qu'ils n'étaient point parvenus à la perfection morale et l'obtention des joies et du repos complet du Nirvana. Le Nirvana n'est donc pas l'extinction complète; il n'a que celle que nous donnons mêmes en disant de nos morts, qu'ils se sont éteints dans la paix du Seigneur qui recueille les âmes.

12

PSYCHOLOGIE RELIGIEUSE ET BOUDDHISME

PAR PAUL OLTRAMARE. (RÉSUMÉ)

UNE originalité du bouddhisme, c'est l'attention que ses écrivains ont prêtée à l'action psychologique des idées et des faits religieux, et aux signes extérieurs de cette action. En dehors de nombreuses observations occasionnelles qu'on rencontre dans des textes de toute époque et de tout genre, certaines théories importantes ont un caractère psychologique plutôt qu'ontologique. La théorie des *skandha*, par exemple, n'est pas tant l'analyse des éléments dont sont formés les objets connus que l'exposé de ce qui se passe dans le sujet connaisseur. On peut, en outre, tirer de la littérature religieuse des descriptions suffisamment complètes de phénomènes psychologiques. Il est fâcheux sans doute que, vite hiératisées par la tradition scolastique, elles aient pris un aspect schématique et stéréotypé ; elles n'en gardent pas moins une valeur documentaire qu'on aurait tort de négliger.

Nous passerons rapidement en revue les trois phénomènes caractéristiques qui ont particulièrement sollicité l'attention des psychologues : la conversion, la prière, l'extase mystique.

Conversion. De nombreux textes nous montrent comment on s'est représenté ce qui se passe dans l'âme de celui qui ' se met en marche vers l'éveil '. Voir, par example, *Majjh. Nik.*, vol. i, pp. 378 sqq. (Upāli), pp. 495 sq. (Vacchagotta); p. 510 (Māgandiya). Les héros de ces récits, sur la seule impression morale que leur ont faite les discours du Bouddha, commencent par mettre leur confiance dans le maître ; quand ils ont confessé leur foi, le Bouddha leur donne l'instruction morale ; enfin, dès qu'il leur voit un cœur bien préparé, il leur communique la doctrine proprement dite. Donc, la foi d'abord ; l'enseignement ensuite. Ce n'est pas tant parce que le Bouddha prêche la vérité que le fidèle acquiesce et croit ; c'est parce qu'il a donné son cœur que la parole du Bouddha lui apparaît vraie et salutaire.

C'est là le type qui s'est fixé dans l'église. Mais nous savons bien que toutes les conversions ne sont pas causées par l'exemple ou par la parole d'autrui. Une expérience vécue, un accident même fortuit peut produire dans un esprit un choc moral et déterminer une vocation religieuse. La légende et l'histoire connaissent fort bien ces cas. On appelle *saṁvega*, commotion, l'ébranlement qui fait que l'on se tourne vers les idées de salut. Les ' quatre rencontres ' présentent,

sous forme mythique, la série des saṁvega qui arrachèrent Siddhārtha à sa vie de plaisir. C'est aussi un saṁvega qui a fait d'Aśoka un bouddhiste.

Que la conversion soit amenée par une sorte de contagion morale, ou qu'elle vienne des expériences de la vie, elle transforme du tout au tout celui en qui elle se produit.

Prière. Le culte qu'on rend au Bouddha a pour effet de renouveler sans cesse chez l'homme pieux le 'processus' psychologique de la conversion et de l'illumination. Il doit, non pas provoquer chez l'être qui en est l'objet un sentiment favorable à son adorateur, mais éveiller chez celui-ci une bonne pensée, une disposition d'esprit salutaire. Comme Nāgasena l'explique à Milinda (*Mil. P.*, pp. 95 sqq.), ce n'est pas une raison parce que le Bouddha est entré dans son nirvāṇa, pour que l'hommage qui lui est offert, ne conserve pas sa bienfaisance tout entière. Le Bouddha a été comme un grand vent qui éteint la fièvre dont les hommes sont consumés. En l'absence de vent, on se sert d'éventails qui produisent une brise légère. Tel le bien qu'on ressent du culte présenté aux reliques et aux joyaux, alors même que, mort, le Tathāgata est insensible à toute offrande. Le culte est donc une intussusception d'idées salutaires.

États mystiques. Affranchi de la domination des sens, le saint acquiert une faculté illimitée de vision et d'action qui se manifeste dans les *dhyāna*. Le dhyāna est un phénomène complexe d'exaltation psychique dans lequel les théologiens, tributaires pour toute cette théorie de leurs devanciers brahmaniques, ont reconnu une série de phases distinctes. Bien qu'une phraséologie faussement précise voile les descriptions qu'ils font des phénomènes de trance, il est aisé de reconnaître que, par les dhyāna, l'homme religieux, soustrait à l'influence du monde contingent, voit sa personnalité s'agrandir infiniment jusqu'à ce qu'elle se confonde — temporairement — avec l'absolu.

Cette tendance psychologique donne au bouddhisme un caractère tout particulier. A s'en tenir aux faits qui viennent d'être rappelés, on constate que l'homme ne saurait appartenir à cette religion sans un acte formel de volonté. La conversion est considérée comme une orientation nouvelle donnée à la vie. La genèse du salut est présentée comme spirituelle et tout à fait personnelle ; elle est, de plus, lente et successive.

De là, pour le bouddhisme, plusieurs conséquences importantes. J'en signale une ou deux.

Religion personnelle et intérieure, le bouddhisme vise à pénétrer la vie entière de ceux qui le confessent. Il laisse par conséquent tomber la distinction du sacré et du profane, qui coupe l'existence des individus et des sociétés en deux parties tranchées. En même temps, il se désin-

téresse de la société comme telle, et ne connaît plus guère la notion de tabou ; il ne croit pas à la contagion du sacrilège.

La doctrine et la discipline sont nécessaires pour nettoyer soit l'esprit, soit le cœur ; mais elles ne sont pas les vraies ouvrières de la sainteté et du salut.

Il faut faire l'expérience personnelle de la vie religieuse. L'obéissance à une tradition, à une autorité n'a pas de valeur par elle-même. Pour arriver à la connaissance, il faut l'enseignement, mais cet enseignement doit être corroboré, assimilé par la réflexion. Appuyées l'une sur l'autre, la confiance que l'on met en la parole d'un maître et la recherche patiente de la vérité, éliminent l'individualisme sans garantie, et le dogmatisme traditionnaliste. Comment l'enseignement et le travail personnel s'associent pour l'élaboration de la connaissance, le Bouddha l'a expliqué au jeune brahmane mis en scène dans *Majjh. Nik.*, vol. ii, pp. 171 sqq.

Le bouddhisme ' psychologique ' n'est nullement tout le bouddhisme. Cette religion n'a d'ailleurs pas attiré que des penseurs solitaires et contemplatifs. Elle a fait sentir son action à des foules composées d'éléments venus de tous les coins de l'horizon intellectuel, social et moral. Elle a conquis ces masses parce qu'elle leur a offert des règles et des croyances très positives, et qu'elle a posé l'existence d'êtres dont l'intervention est efficace pour l'élaboration du salut. Dans cette autre orientation du bouddhisme, les motifs psychologiques prennent la forme de mythes et deviennent objectifs ; exemples : les quatre rencontres ; le mal personnifié en Māra. Ici la prière est exaucée du dehors, et les états mystiques mettent l'homme en communion avec des êtres surhumains.

' Psychologique,' le bouddhisme continue les anciennes Upaniṣads, qui, elles aussi, enseignaient une méthode de salut individuelle et intérieure. Il diffère des Upaniṣads, en ce qu'il n'est ni ésotérique ni intellectualiste. Religion, il veut transformer la vie de l'individu, sans se préoccuper du milieu d'où sort cet individu.

' Populaire,' le bouddhisme voisine avec les religions qu'on comprend sous le nom d'hindouisme. Comme il a dû présenter ce caractère, dès qu'il a reçu des laïques, c'est-à-dire dès l'origine, il n'y a pas lieu de chercher laquelle des deux orientations du bouddhisme a précédé l'autre. Ce qui est certain, c'est qu'à la fois psychologique et populaire, il donnait satisfaction à des aspirations très divergentes. Ce fut là sans doute une des causes de son succès.

13

THE RELATIONS OF ART AND RELIGION IN INDIA

By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY.[1] (Abstract)

Three outstanding phases of the relation of art to religion are recognizable: art in the service of religion (religious art); art rejected by religion (asceticism); and art despised by religion (puritanism). The first two of these positions are properly characteristic of Hinduism and Buddhism, the third of Islam. The possibility of reconciling the two first is found in the fact that Hinduism does not seek to lay down for all men, or for all parts of a man's life, the same course of action, or point to one only method of spiritual progress and means of salvation.

Indian art is essentially religious and aims at the intimation of Divinity. But the Infinite and Unconditioned cannot be expressed in finite terms; hence the religious art of India is concerned with the representation of personal divinities. For most men the love and service of a personal deity is their religion; and it is their faith that Indian religious art expresses. These are the true citizens, for whom art is an aid to and a means of spiritual progress; 'fine art' an intimation of the Infinite; the 'lesser arts' a witness that man does not live by bread alone. True asceticism, on the other hand, is a search for a reality beyond conditioned life.

Turning to the actual religious art of India, we find that it expresses in concrete imagery ideas that belong to the transcendental and mystic aspects of religion. Indian religious art contrasts thus with Greek, which corresponds only to the Olympian aspect of Greek religion. There are many Greek statues that may be either athletes or Apollos. In Indian religious art, on the contrary, the human form is used not for the sake of its own perfection, but to express transcendental conceptions; the ideal, non-human, and sometimes grotesque character of Hindu images is always deliberate and intentional. Nature is a veil, not a revelation; art is to be something more than a mere imitation of this *māyā*.

Almost the whole philosophy of Indian art is summed up in the verse of Sukrācārya's *Sukranītisāra*, which enjoins upon the imager the method of meditation:

'In order that the form of an image may be brought fully and clearly before the mind, the image maker should meditate; and his

[1] See also A. K. Coomaraswamy, *The Aims of Indian Art*, Campden, 1908.

success will be in proportion to his meditation. No other way—not indeed seeing the object itself—will achieve his purpose.'

The method of concentration in religious devotion upon the mental image of an Ishṭa Devatā, or patron deity, is identical with the method of evoking and defining mental images practised by the imager or painter.

This is illustrated by the comparison of Dhyāna *mantrams* with verses from the technical books of imagers (*Silpa śāstras*).

The use of images in worship is generally misunderstood by students who belong to more or less puritanical religions. The Hindu view, not unlike the Catholic, is somewhat as follows: Except for those whose heart is set on an immediate realization of a non-māyic, unconditioned state of existence as subject without object, images are of value as a centre of thought. Images obviously made with hands are often less likely to create misconceptions than purely mental concepts of divinity—they are more, or at least not less, obviously symbols, and are thus less liable to be regarded as an adequate representation of the Infinite. The educated image worshipper knows that the very name of God, and the attribution of qualities to Him, are limitations imposed by his own intellect; still more that the form of the image is not really the form of the god, but only analogous with a coloured glass held before the sun.

Religious symbolism in Indian art is of two kinds; the concrete symbolism of attributes, and the symbolism of gesture, sex, and physical peculiarities. The symbolism of gesture includes the various positions of the hands known as *mudrās*; of physical peculiarities the third eye of Śiva or the elephant head of Ganeṣa are instances. The subject of sex-symbolism is generally misinterpreted; but, in fact, this imagery drawn from the deepest emotional experiences is a proof both of the power and truth of the art and the religion. India has not feared either to use sex-symbols in its religious art, or to see in sex itself an intimation of the Infinite.[1]

The *lingam* is not properly an instance of sex-symbolism; it is probably not of phallic origin, but derived from the stūpa, and is now regarded as the highest emblem of Śiva, because the least anthropomorphic. True sex-symbolism in Indian art or literature assumes two main forms: the conception of the relation of the soul to God expressed in terms of the passionate adoration of a woman for her lover; and the representation of the energic power (*śakti*) of a divinity as a feminine divinity.

With regard to the use of sex-symbolism in Indian art there may be quoted here the words used by Sir Monier Williams in referring to the presence of words of erotic significance in his Sanskrit Dictionary: 'in

[1] *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, 4. 3. 21; also 1. 4. 3–4.

India the relation between the sexes is regarded as a sacred mystery, and is never held to be suggestive of improper or indecent ideas.' As much could not be said of Europe.

Indian religious art is often, but by no means always, beautiful; it may also be terrible or grotesque. Personal gods are aspects of a pantheistic Divinity, upon whom 'all this universe is strung as gems upon a thread'. But nature is not always smiling; she is concerned not less with death than life. As there are three *guṇas* or qualities in nature, *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, images are also classified into three, *sattvik*, *rajasik*, and *tamasik*.

But it is best to study the relation between religion and art from actual examples. The seated Buddha may be selected as an example of one of the traditional conceptions of Indian religious art. Here conventionality and tradition are commonly held to fetter artistic imagination. But it is a modern error to associate imaginative intensity only with novelty. For, to the nameless artists who wrought the religious sculptures of India, the aim was not to prove their own cleverness, but to retell the great thing itself, which meant so much to them, and which it was given to them continually to re-express. As regards the Buddha, it is not true, as is sometimes said, that there is no development, in the sense that the work of different epochs is quite uncharacterized. But it is true that the conception remains throughout almost identical. This is an expression of the fact that the Indian ideal has not changed. What is this ideal so passionately desired? It is one-pointedness, same-sightedness, control; little by little to rein in, not merely the sense, but the mind. Only by constant labour and passionlessness is this peace to be attained. What is the attitude of mind and body of one that seeks it? He shall be seated like the image; for that posture once acquired, is one of perfect bodily equipoise: 'so shall he sit that is under the rule, given over unto Me. In this wise the *yogi* . . . comes to the peace that ends in *nirvāna* and that abides in Me.' How then should the greatest of India's teachers be represented otherwise than in this posture that is in India associated with every striving after the great Ideal?

One other point connected with statues of the Buddha may be referred to. It relates to the statues of Dhyāni Buddhas. The earthly mortal Buddha is sometimes regarded as merely a projection or partial incarnation (*aṃsah*) of a pure and glorious being functioning on some finer, more ideal plane. A statue of a Dhyāni Buddha stands for this pure being, not merely for the man as he appeared on earth. The idea belongs to the Hindu conception of partial incarnation. Such conceptions were not unknown to the founders of the great traditions of Indian art; and it is this fact which gives so much depth and seriousness not merely to their work, but even to the last monuments

of the tradition. For if it is true that the conception of the seated Buddha is one into which the genius of the greatest artist may be poured without any lack of room for its complete expansion, it is also true that this *motif* even in a shapeless or grotesque form remains for those whose spiritual heritage it is, a well understood symbol of eternal things. In the same way, by a study of other typical examples of Indian religious art, the relation of art and religion in India may be understood.

This paper is thus an elementary study of the religious psychology of Indian art. Certain conclusions may be drawn. In the first place, the proper study of Indian art has hardly yet begun. By a proper study is meant not merely a close study of the weak and relatively unimportant semi-classic style of North-west India in the first few centuries after Christ, but a study of the development of the Indian ideal and its emancipation from foreign formulae unsuited to its expression. True Indian art is as little understood in the West to-day, as Indian philosophy and literature a hundred years ago. This is illustrated by a recent pronouncement of no less eminent an archaeologist than Mr. Vincent Smith: 'After A.D. 300 Indian sculpture properly so called hardly deserves to be reckoned as art.' Such a statement is only to be paralleled with Lord Macaulay's famous dictum upon the value of Oriental literature.

It remains to be seen what value will be set upon Indian art in the West, and what influence it will have upon Western art, when it is as well known to artists as Japanese art is even at the present day. That influence should result in some real application of psychological principles in the consideration of the aims and purpose of art, and in the education of artists.

At present the education of Western artists is an education merely in technique; the imagination is left to take care of itself, so long as the imitative powers are fully developed. Now if there is one thing which distinguishes the true artist from other men, it is not a knowledge of anatomy or a capacity for the meticulous imitation of nature, but it is the power of mental vision, of visualization, literally 'imagination'. Instead of being taught by meditation and concentration to cultivate this power, the Western student's whole time is taken up with copying things that are set before his physical eyes. The true Indian artist, on the other hand, who does not regard the reproduction of still life as the aim of art, is taught by memory work and practice in visualization to form a definite and perfect mental picture before he begins to draw or carve at all; his whole endeavour is to cultivate the power of mind-seeing. It is in this respect that Western art has most to learn from India.

Further, the distinction between naturalism and idealism in art is one that is fundamentally religious. Religion, for India, is much more

a metaphysic than a dogma; and it is the lack of a metaphysic in modern Western materialistic culture, and in the surviving realism of Semitic theology, that makes it possible for the Western artist now to find sufficient satisfaction in the imitation of beautiful appearances, and a sufficient aim for art in the giving of pleasure.

It is not, however, possible for the greatest art to flourish, if men can believe in nothing more real and more eternal than the external face of nature. The true world of art is not the phenomenal world about us, but an ideal world of the imagination.

Finally, as regards the future of art in India, two tendencies are apparent to-day, one inspired by the technical achievements of the modern West, the other a reaction towards the spiritual idealism of the East. If the greatest art is always both National and Religious—and how empty any other art must be!—it is in the latter tendency alone that we can trace the germ of a new and greater Indian art, that shall fulfil and not destroy the past.

14

In a Paper entitled *Two Problems relating to the History of Indian Religions*, Mr. Mazumdar maintained that for a correct interpretation of the Vedas it was necessary in the first place to consider the birth-place of the religion which is dimly shadowed forth therein: arguments were adduced to prove that the pre-historic Aryans formed their culture-group in India. Secondly, the question was raised as to the date and circumstances in which the Vedas were compiled as Saṃhitas; from certain references in the Vedas themselves it seemed that in early Hindu civilization the Vedic Religion lost its influence with the cultured classes, and that these compilations were collections of Mantras made by the priestly clans, with spiritual interpretations added. Thus their *raison d'être* was the effort on the part of the priests to revive faith in the early cult.

15

BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS ART

By A. A. MACDONELL. (Abstract)

Owing to the total lack of works of a historical character from the rise of Indian literature to the Muhammadan conquest (c. A.D. 1000), we are largely dependent on archaeology in its various branches for the reconstruction of the external history of Indian religions. Though Indian religion can be traced back in literature to so early a date as

c. 1500 B.C., it did not begin to express itself in the form of structural and plastic art till a comparatively late period. None of the architectural or sculptural antiquities which survive in India can, with one exception, be dated earlier than 260 B.C. That exception is a brick stūpa or relic mound at Piprahwa on the Nepal frontier, which was explored ten years ago and has with probability been assigned to 450 B.C. The history of Indian art really begins with the reign of Aśoka (272–231 B.C.), who spent a great part of his life in promoting the interests of Buddhism by inscribing many edicts and erecting vast numbers of stūpas to commemorate the founder of the faith in every part of India.

The history of Buddhistic religious art in India extends over more than nine centuries and may be divided into three roughly equal periods. The earliest reaches from 260 B.C. to A.D. 50. The monuments which survive in India from this period are almost exclusively the work of Buddhists. It was the Buddhists who introduced the use of stone in architecture at the commencement of this period. The Buddhists were, in fact, the first who built with stone in India. For some centuries earlier the architectural use of brick had been known, as is proved by the stūpa of Piprahwa. But the ornamental buildings of the pre-Aśokan age must have been built of wood, like the modern palaces of Burma, only the substructure being made of brick. The whole history of Indian architecture points to previous construction in wood, the stone monuments being to a large extent imitations of wooden models.

The second and, as far as Buddhist sculpture is concerned, best period extends roughly from A.D. 50–350. The third period (A.D. 350–650) is noteworthy chiefly for what it produced in the way of pictorial art.

The remains of Buddhist art in India may be grouped under the three heads of architectural, sculptural, and pictorial. Sculpture and painting practically always appear in connexion with architecture, and invariably in the service of religion. Buddhist paintings survive only in two groups of caves in Western India.

A. Early Buddhist architecture may be divided into three main groups: (1) Stūpas or relic mounds, (2) Chaityas or places of worship, (3) Vihāras or dwellings for the monks.

1. The stūpa is a dome-shaped structure, being a development of the low burial mound in which baked bricks were substituted for earth with a view to durability. They were erected by the Buddhists as monuments enclosing relics of Buddha or of Buddhist saints. Some, however, were only commemorative of important events or miracles connected with the history of Buddha. The best representative of

this form of structure is the large stūpa at Sānchi in Central India, dating probably from the third century B.C. From a substructure consisting of a low circular drum, rises a hemispherical dome, which is surrounded by a procession path forming the upper rim of the drum. On the top of the dome is a box-like structure called a *tee* (a Burmese word) surmounted by an umbrella. The stūpa itself is surrounded by a massive stone railing, with gates on four sides, enclosing a procession path. Both the rails and the gates are unmistakable imitations of wooden models. The gateways (Sansk. *toraṇa*) were introduced into China and Japan along with Buddhist architecture from India.

The earliest stūpas were proportionately very low. Thus the height of the Piprahwa stūpa is only one-fifth of its diameter. As time went on the relative height increased. The Sānchi stūpa is half as high as it is wide. In the stūpa at Sārnāth, near Benares, the height is considerably greater than the diameter. In other words, the stūpa shows a tendency to assume the shape of a tower. Concurrently the tee also became elongated, as may be seen in chronologically successive specimens in the rock-cut temples. The combined elongation is well represented by a stūpa found in Cambodia. The next step is a further elongation of the tee with a corresponding diminution of the stūpa itself. This is well illustrated by an example found in Nepal. Here, too, the thirteen umbrellas of the tee (which in Indian rock-cut and model stone specimens vary from three to nine) have assumed the form of roofs. In Burma the process goes still further, hardly anything but the tee being left. The final step is reached in China, where the tee is practically all that remains.

The stūpa became to the early Buddhists the religious edifice *par excellence*, and was the sacred object always set up by them for worship in their temples.

2. The chaityas were the counterpart of Christian churches, not only in form but in use. Till recently only rock-cut specimens to the number of about thirty were known in India. These enable us to understand what the interiors at least of these structures were like. The typical chaitya consists of a nave and side aisles terminating in an apse. The pillars separating the nave from the aisles are continued round the apse, under which is the rock-cut stūpa. The roof of the chaitya is semicircular. Over the doorway is a gallery, above which is a large window shaped like a horseshoe and lighting the stūpa. The outward appearance of the structural chaitya was for a long time somewhat conjectural, but recent discoveries in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies have supplied the necessary evidence. The excavation of the rock-cut chaityas extended from 260 B.C. to about A.D. 600, and the development of their style can be followed step by

step throughout these nine centuries. The earliest examples clearly imitate wooden originals. As we pass to the latest specimens, we can clearly trace progress towards lithic construction on the one hand, and degeneracy in cult on the other. By the fifth century A.D. all trace of woodwork has disappeared. The rail ornament so common in the earlier caves has vanished, while the horseshoe window-heads employed as a decoration on the façade are dwarfed. A striking change is the fact that figure sculpture has superseded the plainer architectural forms of the earlier caves. The greatest change, however, is the introduction of figures of Buddha in all his attitudes. Only ordinary mortals are sculptured in the earlier caves, while Buddha never appears. Now he is even the object of worship, his image being placed in front of the stūpa itself, which alone was adored in the older chaityas. In the large chaitya at Ellora, which dates from about A.D. 600, the stūpa has a frontispiece making it square on this side and containing a seated figure of Buddha. In the latest chaitya cave found in India (at Kholvi), the stūpa is no longer solid, but is hollowed out into a cell in which an image of Buddha is placed. This marks the last step in the development of the Buddhist chaitya and furnishes a transition to the later Jain and Hindu temples.

3. The Buddhist vihāras or monasteries survive only in rock-cut specimens, of which there are about 900 in India. They consisted of a hall, generally square, surrounded by a number of sleeping cubicles and provided with a verandah in front. About forty of the extant vihāras appear to have been excavated before the Christian era. In the earliest period there were at first no pillars in the hall, but at the end of the first century B.C. four pillars supporting the ceiling begin to be introduced. There is as yet no figure sculpture. The only ornament consists of horseshoe arches and the Buddhist rail as a string-course with an occasional pilaster. In the second period the number of pillars was first increased to twelve, then twenty, then twenty-four, and finally twenty-eight, while a sanctuary containing a figure of Buddha was introduced in the back wall. In the third period, the sanctuaries become more elaborate, till finally, about A.D. 700, the whole plan and sculpture of the vihāras become indistinguishable from those of the Hindus. This transition is most clearly seen at Ellora.

B. We now come to Buddhist religious art as represented by sculpture. In the first period (260 B.C. to A.D. 50), the Buddhist cult, following the doctrine of the Hīnayāna or the Lesser Vehicle, had no worship of Buddha; of whom no sculpture in any of his conventional attitudes can be dated earlier than about the end of the first century A.D. Reverence was paid during this early period to relics, stūpas, Bo-trees, footprints of Buddha, and to sacred symbols such as the triśūl or trident,

and the wheel of the law. The sculptures appear on the railings and gateways of stūpas, on monolith columns, on the pillars and façades of chaityas and the walls of vihāras. The most ancient railings are perfectly plain. But they soon began to be adorned with bosses, panels, and friezes. Then the railing at Barhat (200–150 B.C.) is covered in every part with bas-reliefs which are practically an illustrated treatise on Buddhist mythology. Similarly, the entire surface of the gateways at Sānchi is occupied by sculptures in relief. The finest specimen of a carved column is the Aśoka pillar of Sārnath, the capital of which is reeded and bell-shaped in Persepolitan style, and surmounted by beautifully carved lions. Little in the way of figure sculpture occurs in the early caves. It is noteworthy that from 200 B.C. onwards reliefs representing Lakshmī, the Hindu goddess of fortune, are found in every part of India. The sculpture of this early period of Buddhist art, though the details of real life which it represents are always purely Indian, shows clear traces of both Persian and Greek influence.

The history of the second period (A.D. 50–350) begins in the extreme north-west of India, the ancient province of Gandhāra, at the time when the Mahāyāna school was introduced by Nāgārjuna. Here we are confronted with a new epoch; for representations of Buddha and of Bodhisattvas (future Buddhas) suddenly appear in the monasteries of this district in the first century A.D. It is characteristic of this new phase of Buddhism that the monks have been ousted from their cells by images of Buddha and that these images are always adorned with a nimbus. The figure of Buddha supplied a centre for groups of sculpture, as that of Christ in Christian works of art. In this region was created the type of Buddha which spread from here to other parts of India and was finally diffused over the Buddhist world. This Gandhāra art was evidently produced under Hellenistic influence through contact with the Roman empire, being closely related to the art of the Antonine period. Thus the Corinthian pillars containing diminutive figures of Buddha in the foliage found here are clearly copied from Roman models.

In this second period there was another school of Buddhistic art which flourished in Southern India at Amarāvatī on the Kistna river. It is represented by the great rail belonging to a stūpa dating from the end of the second century A.D. The rail is covered with sculpture, which is extraordinarily elaborate and of great beauty of detail. This school seems to derive its inspiration from Alexandrine art.

In the third and decadent period the Buddhists used images as freely as the Hindus. The characteristic feature of Hindu sculpture, which represents the gods with several heads and arms, now made its way into Buddhist art. Thus in one of the late Buddhist caves at

Kanheri, the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara appears with eleven heads. The mediaeval Buddhist statues of Behar are found to be so similar to those in the Hindu temples, that skilled archaeologists are often unable to distinguish them.

C. What remains of Buddhist pictorial art belongs to the third period and is limited to the frescoes found in two of the western groups of caves, those at Ajanta and Bagh. The paintings at Bagh have not been copied or minutely described. Traces of the painting survive on the ceilings, walls, and pillars of thirteen caves at Ajanta. The oldest frescoes here belong to the end of the second century A.D. A second group dates from about A.D. 350–550, appearing on the pillars of one of the caves and comprising pictures of Buddha with drapery and nimbus in the style of the Gandhāra school. The most important series of paintings is the latest. The subjects are almost entirely confined to Buddhist mythology and legend. One painting represents the Temptation of Buddha; another the landing and coronation of a Buddhist king in Ceylon; a third scene, remarkable for its pathos, depicts a dying princess. The purpose of all these paintings was the edification of pious Buddhists. The foreign influence which is evident in them was probably that of the Sassanian art of Persia.

16

GREEK INFLUENCES ON THE RELIGIOUS ART OF NORTH INDIA

By P. GARDNER. (Abstract)

I almost regret that we did not at this Congress constitute a tenth section which should deal with the relations between the various religions of the world and art. It is a vast and a profoundly interesting subject, and one which has been much neglected on the whole, more especially in England, where the courses of religion and art have lain somewhat apart.

I think it undeniable that polytheism has a closer relation to art than monotheism. I must, however, emphasize the fact that I am using the word art in a somewhat technical way, and excluding from it music, poetry, and even architecture. Speaking of plastic and pictorial art my thesis is certainly true. The great polytheistic religions of the ancient world, of Assyria, of Egypt, and above all of Greece, have left us splendid treasures in sculpture and painting.

Of the great monotheistic religions of the modern world, two, Judaism and Mohammedanism, repudiate the representation of living things in art; and Christianity itself, though of course it does not prohibit religious art, and makes terms with it in all lands, yet finds it not easy to develop an art really suitable to it. Where Christianity is more materialist and approaches nearer to polytheism, it is better represented in art. Where it is more spiritual, it has usually been on terms of hostility, or at all events on terms of indifference, towards art. Early Christianity had no art of its own, but simply borrowed types from heathen religions, figures of the ram-bearing shepherd, of Orpheus, and the like. It turned Victories into angels, and developed representations of the eucharistic feast out of sepulchral banquets. Only by degrees did Christian art develop out of heathen representations a series of types of its own, which it handed down to our ancestors of the Middle Ages. These of course had merit: but at present I have no time to speak either of their merits or demerits.

Considerations such as these prepare us for the phenomena of early Buddhist plastic art in India. As a religion, Buddhism is even less well adapted to the arts of painting and of sculpture than is Christianity; more pessimistic, more contemptuous of the body, more ascetic. In the primitive story of Gautama and his teaching there is no element which is adapted to plastic art; the face of the religion is turned away from the beauty of the visible world towards self-control and towards conduct.

In fact a very close parallel may be drawn, as in other fields, so in the history of art, between the phenomena of early Christianity and those of Buddhism. It was the apocryphal legends of Christianity, the story of the Virgin Mother, the tales of the Saints, which after a while gave rise to what may fairly be called a Christian art, with new subjects and some power of development. So it is the growth of legend about the founder of Buddhism, and his acquisition of colleagues in the Buddhahood, about Bodhisattvas and demons, which gave an opportunity for the growth of a specifically Buddhist art.

The Buddhist religion during the three centuries before, and the three centuries after, our era found two kinds or species of art in India, and worked upon both with different results. In India itself it found in possession of the field an art which was native, which, if containing some elements borrowed from Assyria and Persia, yet in the main reflected the Indian character and ideas. This is the art of Aśoka, of Udaigiri, of Bharhut, of Buddhagayā, of Sānchi, and later of Amarāvatī. It shows clearly that in development native Indian art was at the time as far advanced as that of Europe, though it is infinitely inferior to it in taste and beauty.

It certainly is a curious fact that we have no specimen of native Indian art earlier than the latter part of the third century B.C. It was probably of wood, and other perishable materials. But there can be no doubt that Indian art had an earlier history. The art of Aśoka is a mature art: in some respects more mature than the Greek art of the time, though of course far inferior to it, at least in our eyes. It has been observed that the religion of the Vedas is too vague and spiritual to be suited to plastic art. No doubt there is truth in this saying. But already, as we can prove, at the beginning of the Christian era, many of the gods of Hinduism, Indra, Śiva, Skanda, and others were thought of in bodily shape. Art had doubtless grown to meet religion. On this side, then, it was a Hindu or Brahmanic art from which Buddhism took the elements with which it started.

I shall not treat of this purely native art of India; but confine my remarks to a special field, the art of the Kabul Valley, especially of the district of Gandhāra. Here Buddhism had to do, not with a native art, but with one remarkably mixed, and compounded of various elements. On the whole the art of Gandhāra is at a far higher level than that of central North India; the forms are far more dignified, the attitudes nobler, the drapery far superior. The art of Gandhāra has a special interest for us, because it was mainly this which influenced China and the north. And to us Hellenes it has a great attraction because it is full of the influence of Greece, that is to say, of later Hellenistic Greece. I have heard it spoken of as a branch of Hellenistic art: this is going too far, but it is an exaggeration of the truth. It is my chief purpose on this occasion to make it clear, so far as is possible in the few minutes accorded to me, of what kind the Hellenistic influence on the art of Gandhāra really is.

There is one way, and one way only, whereby we may trace the gradual working of the influence of Western Art in the Kabul Valley; and that way is by means of the coins of Greek and Scythic kings who bore sway there for four or five centuries after 200 B.C. These kings are scarcely mentioned in history. But their coins must have been very abundant, and are still found in great numbers. And to a numismatist they tell their story very clearly. What they prove is that during those four or five centuries there was a *continuous* civilization in the region, although various races held from time to time the hegemony. That civilization was a strangely compound one. It had Greek elements, perhaps a Greek basis; but it was overlaid with Iranian and Indian elements, and Buddhism was, at all events after the second century A.D., the ruling spiritual force in it. If I show you a few groups of coins in successive periods, I shall be

able, far better than in any amount of discussion, to make clear its phases.[1]

The one point on which I wish to insist is that we have in these coins a contemporary record of the growth of a civilization. It is true that little remains save the coins to mirror its gradual development. We have a few statues of Greek deities from Kabul, and a good many engraved gems. But speaking generally the works of art and architecture in this region down to the second century A.D. have perished; after that we have, as will presently appear, considerable remains in stone. But there can be no doubt that there existed in the Kabul valley, contemporary with the half-Greek civilizations of Syria and Arabia and Parthia, a semi-Hellenistic culture. People have said that Greek civilization died out in North India, and that the coins of Kanishka and Huvishka represent a stream of fresh influence from Rome. One considerable authority told me that he thought it likely that the source of it was the soldiers of Crassus captured by the Parthians and settled in inner Asia. This is a romance. It is true that Roman gold of the early emperors went from Alexandria to the mouths of the Indus and thence inland. It may be that it was from the Roman *aurei* that the kings of the Yueh Chi took the notion of a gold coinage; for the coins of Alexander the Great had probably by that time disappeared. But there is no trace of copying the types of the Roman coins. The types of the Scythic kings are strikingly and aggressively original. They prove not only the existence in their dominions of a most remarkable eclectic Pantheon, but they prove that there were artists among them possessed of great skill, and that Greek was in some degree still understood, holding probably a position like that which Norman French held in this country at one time.

In the whole history of art I know of no more astonishing phenomenon than the sudden appearance upon the coins of the Tartar kings of a vast series of types of deities, indicating an extensive selection of deities from all the neighbouring peoples. The syncretism of religions at Rome offers the nearest parallel; and this was an almost contemporary phenomenon. We are told that Severus Alexander, who reigned A.D. 222–235, had a *lararium* in which stood figures of Abraham, Orpheus, Apollonius of Tyana and Christ. This was not a mere imperial craze, for among the people the same mixture of cults pre-

[1] Instances selected from the British Museum *Catalogue of the Coins of Greek and Scythic Kings of India*:

Pl. IV, 4–10. Agathocles.
Pl. XVI, 1–9. Maues.
Pl. XXII, 1–9. Coins of Parthian kings.
Pl. XXV, 7–14. Kadphises.
Pl. XXVI. Kanishka.
Pl. XXVIII. Huvishka.

vailed. The coins of contemporary Parthia also show us a curious mixture of Iranian and Greek cults. In both these cases, though there were abundant deities, yet really the object of worship was the king or emperor. There are indications on the coins of Kanishka and Huvishka, flames arising from the king's shoulders, the nimbus round his head, and the like, which seem to show that he after all was the centre of worship, rather than any deities.

But Kanishka embraced Buddhism. How did that agree with the imperial worship? Buddhism seems in modern days to go well enough in China and Japan with various Pagan cults, and particularly with the worship of the imperial house. The Buddhism of these kings must have been very superficial.

Buddhism, during these centuries, came in, prevailed, decayed, and disappeared. From the diaries of Chinese pilgrims we know that it was still strong in the Kabul valley in the fifth century A. D.; in the seventh it was almost gone.

The Indo-Scythic dynasty of North India was in the fourth century overpowered and supplanted by that of the Guptas, a native race with Hindu religion. The plentiful gold coinage of the Gupta kings bears scarcely a trace of Greek influence: it is essentially Indian in character. After this date the Greek influence, whether in letters or art, spread no further into India, and died away in the Kabul valley. The only direction in which it spread further was towards China and the north. In Khotan Dr. Stein has found plaster figures which can clearly be affiliated to the art of Gandhāra: and to any eye used to art the mediaeval and modern works of China and Japan show in the treatment of the human form, though not in other respects, traces of Greek influence.

Let us next turn to the extant sculpture of Gandhāra and the neighbouring district. And first we must mention two or three figures, for there are but two or three of them, which represent Greek deities unalloyed. These are exactly parallel to the figures on coins of the Greek kings. A figure of Athena, for example, in the museum at Lahore, is exactly parallel to the Athena on the coins of King Azes at the beginning of the Christian era. It is not a work of pure Greek art; it is not imported; but it shows exactly the style in which the artists of North-West India worked at the time. Besides this there have come down to us a figure of Herakles slaying a snake-legged giant, figures of Silenus and the like: scanty remains, but enough to show that the art of the Greek and Scythic kings was not confined to coins, but spread into sculpture also.

But the great mass of the Gandhāra sculpture is of later date; and it is exclusively Buddhist, used for the decoration of topes and sacred places.

It has been discussed by various writers; perhaps best by Mr. Vincent Smith and Herr Grünwedel. Mr. Smith makes a careful attempt to determine its date; and after passing in review all the evidence fixes on A. D. 250–450 as its period. I think that some of it is earlier. But it is so confused in our museums, even the places whence it comes being often not recorded, that it is scarcely possible to treat it scientifically.

In an excellent paper published in 1890 Mr. Smith observes that the influence it shows is that of Roman rather than Greek art. Mr. Smith, as he tells me himself, would now modify this view. The fact is that we must carefully distinguish two things (which I must observe are much confused in Wickhoff's work on Roman Art), art which is Roman and art of the Roman age. That the sculpture in Gandhāra belongs to the age of the Roman Empire is beyond doubt. But art in the Roman Age is still predominantly Greek. I am obliged, by want of time, to be dogmatic; but in saying this I have the support of the most learned authority on the subject, Mr. Strzygowski. Art in the time of the Antonines, and still more in the time of the Severan Emperors, depends not on Rome, but on Alexandria, Antioch, Pergamon and other great Hellenistic cities. The types of the deities at Rome are purely Greek. The ideal sculpture of Roman age in the galleries of modern Rome is almost purely Greek. Even the great historic monuments of Roman victory and achievement are mainly Greek. The arch of Trajan at Beneventum, the finest monument of Imperial times, is mainly Greek. In the reign of Hadrian Greek art prevailed more and more. We have of late learned that the Pantheon of Rome, which had long passed as an example of Roman architecture, was built by a Greek of Asia Minor. From the age of Caesar to that of the Severi great Hellenistic cities like Antioch and Alexandria were centres whence the influences of Hellenism spread both east and west, veneering the native populations with a thin crust of Greek language and science and art. The more powerful nationalities, Rome, Egypt, Persia, translated the influence into their own religious and artistic forms.

The sculpture of Gandhāra is a gradual translation of Hellenistic art into the style of India. Sometimes the figures are almost purely Greek; sometimes they are half Greek and half Indian; sometimes the Indian element is overpowering. I will give one or two instances of each kind of mixture, taken mainly from the museum at Lahore and the British Museum.[1]

Perhaps the best subject in which to trace the amalgamation of Greek and Indian art is the representations of the person of Buddha.

[1] Instances selected from Burgess, *Gandhara Sculptures*:
Mainly Greek, Pl. IV, 2; XVII, 1; XXVI.
Mixed Greek and Indian, XIX, 3; XII, 1; XIII, 2.

In the earlier Aśokan art, Buddha does not appear even in Buddhist scenes. We may compare the very early Christian art, in which Christ appears only in the person of Orpheus or the ram-bearing shepherd. But the creation of the type of Buddha belongs to the art of Gandhāra, and that type is essentially Greek. The moustache is a barbarous addition; but the Indian artists seem to have felt that the simple severity of a Greek type suited their master better than the figures loaded with ornament, in which they usually rejoice, and which they use even for the Bodhisattvas.

I fear that I must stop, before touching more than the hem of the subject. The art of early India is of great interest, and it is a matter for some shame to Englishmen that not only has its study been neglected, but that, at all events until the proconsulate of Lord Curzon, its monuments have been destroyed and dispersed in the most reckless way. What I have tried to show, however imperfectly, is that it is a contemporary mirror of remarkable religious changes and development, and worthy of preservation alike from a national and a historic point of view.

17

In a *Note on some Sermons of Early Buddhist Missionaries* Mr. W. A. De Silva described the Buddhist missions which are mentioned in chap. XII of the *Mahavaṁsa* as being sent to Kasmira-Gandhara (the lower Kabul valley), Mahisamandala (Mysore), Vanavasi (Northern Kanara), Aparantika (North-west Coast), Maharatta (the Deccan), Suvannabhumi (Pegu), and Lanka (Ceylon); and showed the skill of the various *Teras* (preachers) in adapting their discourses to the capacity and environment of their hearers, whom they taught through what was already familiar to them in their own early beliefs.

18

THE KALKI AVATĀRA OF VIṢṆU

By H. C. NORMAN (Abstract).

The doctrine of the Avatāras of Viṣṇu is one of the most firmly established tenets of Hinduism, and the fundamental text uttered in the Bhagavadgītā by Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa (iv. 7, 8), 'As often as there is a decline of virtue and an insurrection of vice and injustice in the world, I make myself evident; and thus I appear from age to age

for the preservation of the just, the destruction of the wicked, and the establishment of virtue' is universally accepted as gospel throughout Hindustan. The Indian origin of the doctrine, whatever other influences may have shaped its final development, has been demonstrated by Prof. Macdonell. Not only do we find in the Vedas the germs of the Avatāra-theory: the sixth Maṇḍala tells us that it was for man in distress (*mānave bādhitāya*) that Viṣṇu thrice traversed the earthly spaces. Weber's assertion (*Indische Studien*, ii) of a Christian origin for the Avatāras is unsupported by definite proofs. When he says that 'Kalki, especially, with his white horse, can hardly be an Indian invention, as he directly contradicts the Yuga-system, which requires, or is supposed to require, a destruction of the world at the end of each Kali-yuga, but can be excellently explained from the ideas of the Gnostics, &c.', his suggestions may be in the future shown to be facts, but it seems safest to take the doctrine as Indian, until clear proof to the contrary be adduced.

In the Itihāsas and Purāṇas we find as a rule a stereotyped system of ten Avatāras, ending with Buddha and Kalki. The Garuda Purāṇa, however, after enumerating twenty-two, ending with the same two, adds that 'his Avatāras are innumerable'. In other Purāṇas the figures go as high as twenty-four and twenty-eight, but all close with Kalki. This manifestation has peculiar interest, for it has still to take place. In a fantastic old work, Maurice's *Ancient History of Hindustan*, we are told that 'the Calci hero appears leading a white horse, richly caparisoned, adorned with jewels, and furnished with wings, possibly to mark the rapid flight of time. The horse is represented as standing not on terrestrial but aetherial ground, on three feet only, holding up without intermission the right foreleg, with which, say the Brahmins, when he stamps with fury upon the earth, the present period shall close, and the dissolution of nature take place.' (Compare the statements of the Abbé Dubois.)

Turning to the Itihāsas and Purāṇas we find in the Mahābhārata that 'the twice-born one, Kalki Viṣṇuyaśas by name, impelled by Time, shall rise up of mighty courage and valour, being born in the fair house of a Brāhmaṇa in the village of Sambhala. He shall traverse the earth, ever taking his delight in the slaughter of the Dasyus'. The Viṣṇu and Bhāgavata Purāṇas say that his father will be called Viṣṇuyaśas. But the fullest account is to be found in the Purāṇa (or rather Upapurāṇa) specially devoted to the subject (Sanskrit text edited by Paṇḍita Baladeva Prasāda Miśra). The work is called *anubhāgavata*, which would point to its being a sequel to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. At the end it is said to contain 6,100 ślokas; addition gives only 1,318; possibly it has been cut down from a larger work. The Purāṇa was first of all told by Brahmā to Nārada, through whom it was transmitted

to Vyāsa, and was ultimately recounted to the sages headed by Śaunaka in the Naimiṣa forest. The events, though future, are related in the past.

After Kṛṣṇa's departure to Vaikuṇṭha, Kali begins to extend his power and influence, and religious and moral decline advances rapidly. The Brahmins follow after bad doctrines and neglect the sacrifices; the limit of human life is lowered to sixteen years; every kind of social disorder sets in. The name of Kṛṣṇa is forgotten, the caste distinctions are neglected, the worship of Viṣṇu ceases, and the gods unfed go in a body to Brahmā with their complaint. Following the usual precedent, Brahmā supplicates Viṣṇu, who agrees to be born for the destruction of Kali and the salvation of the world. Accordingly he is born in Sambhalagrāma as the son of a Brahmin named Viṣṇuyaśas, with four arms, which he reduces to two. Various sages, headed by Paraśurāma come to visit him, and *Kalkiṃ kalkavināśārtham āvirbhūtaṃ vidur budhāḥ*. The young Kalki is brought up in the usual way under Paraśurāma, who at last tells him that he is the Avatāra of Viṣṇu, and predicts his future conquest of the earth. Kalki then praises Śiva and receives from him 'a winged horse going whither it listeth and multiform (*gārudam aśvaṃ kāmagaṃ bahurūpiṇaṃ*) and a parrot all-knowing', also 'a terrible sword with jewelled handle and of great lustre'. Śiva also tells him that mankind will proclaim him skilled in all the Śāstras and the use of all weapons, consummate in knowledge of the four Vedas, and a vanquisher of all beings. Kalki then rides away with his gifts, and after giving his own people the news, goes off and converts Visākhayupa, king of the city of Māhiṣmati. The parrot then artfully praises Ceylon, its king and his daughter Padmā, who is Lakṣmī incarnate, magically preserved for Kalki; who marries her, removes the curse from the wretched aspirants for her hand (they had been turned into women) and returns to begin his world-conquest in earnest.

The first expedition is against the Bauddhas in Kīkaṭa. It may seem strange to find an Avatāra of Viṣṇu marching to subdue those who have been converted by Viṣṇu himself as Buddha; but it must be remembered that from the Paurāṇik point of view Viṣṇu became Buddha in order to confound the minds of men and Asuras, and deprive heretics of the power given them by Vedic knowledge. How far history has gone by the board we can realize from the representation of Suddhodana as the brother of the Jina. A parallel is afforded in the Paurāṇik Nāsiketūpākhyānam, where we find the Naciketas of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad masquerading as Nāsiketu and owing his name to his being born from his mother's nose! The Jina is vanquished in battle, and the Bauddhas then invoke Māyā; which, however, unites with Kalki. Then the wives of the Bauddhas come

to fight, but their weapons admonish them, and they seek refuge in Viṣṇu. After his victory Kalki slays an enormous Rākṣasī and her child, and then goes to Haridvāra, where he meets the two kings Maru and Devāpi. As he is arranging for Maru to reign at Ayodhyā and Devāpi at Hastināpura, a resplendent Brahmacārin comes up, who turns out to be the Kṛta Yuga in a bodily form. All now proceed to march on Viśāsana, Kali's city, and they are joined by Dharma as a Brāhmaṇa. A great battle takes place, and Kali is driven back to his city. Kalki slays two terrible demons, and forces Kali to retire to another continent. Kalki then marches on Bhallāṭa, the city of Saśidhvaja, a Vaiṣṇava himself, who fights in order to win the happiness of being killed by Viṣṇu. Instead of this he carries off Kalki, Kṛta, and Dharma to his own city, and marries Kalki to his daughter Ramā. After a successful march on Kāñcanīpura, Kalki distributes the various kingdoms to his friends and relations, and the golden age sets in. Viṣṇuyaśas retires as an ascetic and dies; his wife thereupon becomes *Satī*. Kalki, after a life of unrestrained pleasure and feasting, is implored by the gods to return; he leaves his kingdom to his four sons and departs from this world; his two wives also become Satī.

The Purāṇa is a strange jumble of featureless character, conventional battles, allegorical ideas, and hymns in praise of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and the Gaṅgā. The hero has nothing but his divinity to distinguish him from the typical prince of a Kāvya. His performance is nothing more than the Digvijaya of a Cakravartirājā. As regards the horse, which has been frequently compared with the white horse in Rev. xix. 11, very little is said about it. We find it once furiously kicking the two demons Koka and Vikoka without slaying them, and it also carried Kalki over to Ceylon to win his bride. Like Kaṇṭhaka, the Buddha's horse, it is only one of the appendages of the Cakravartī, and seems to have most in common with the Horse-Treasure of the Mahāsudassana-Sutta (*Sacred Books of the East*, xi, p. 255).

The Kalki-Purāṇa is apparently not very well known in India, and seems to be an expansion of the short account of Kalki at the end of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, which is the authority generally acknowledged. The romantic details of his career do not represent any real tradition. The work is instructive as showing how a pious Bhāgavata might envisage the coming of the liberator of humanity. Western writers seem to have jumped to the conclusion that Kalki must be the same as the conqueror of the Revelation; but at any rate the Indian account gives us a developed idea of a totally different kind, whatever the germ may be.

The name Kalki is derived from *kalka*, and would mean 'the destroyer of what is foul'. The Marāṭhī variant *kalaṃki* points to the same meaning. Some (for example Ward in his 'Hindoos') derive the word

from Kali and a root *kai* to destroy, but this is not authenticated. The name is thus purely Indian, and furnishes another piece of evidence for the indigenous origin of this Avatāra.

19

SYNCRETISM IN RELIGION AS ILLUSTRATED IN THE HISTORY OF PARSISM

By JAMES HOPE MOULTON

It may, I suppose, be regarded as certain that Syncretism plays a more or less considerable part in all the more highly developed religions. The primitive beliefs of isolated and remote peoples, like their language, their racial type, and their institutions, may be treated as approximately unmixed. But higher culture brings a higher receptivity to ideas which may be found among neighbouring peoples, even though the bias against foreign elements may forbid conscious borrowing. And as soon as conquest brings race mixture, or peaceful settlements of different tribes take place within the same area, the mixture of religious ideas becomes inevitable. A further cause of syncretism in religion is seen in the results of a deliberate propaganda. A great reformer or originator appears, and sweeps the people along into a new faith. But old ideas are not so easily got rid of; and it soon is found that the most deep-seated of them have only changed their form, not their real nature, in being adapted to the new theory. I propose in this paper to examine the leading features of the Mazdayasna, with a view to identify the probable source of each, and the manner of their adaptation for reception into the complex system of Parsi theology and ritual.

We have first to ask what are the elements that contributed to the resultant that we know. Strictly speaking, we ought to begin with a proof that there is syncretism. But it is difficult to imagine any one seriously arguing that Parsism as we see it is a single homogeneous system which issued fully developed from Zarathushtra's brain. We shall prove our thesis best by assuming it as a working hypothesis, applying it in turn to the characteristic elements of the religion, and justifying it by its success in explaining the phenomena.

The three main types of Avestan texts answer broadly to the three forces which have joined in the making of Parsism. Oldest, in essence, though not in actual composition,[1] stand the Yashts, with

[1] I need not turn aside to argue against Darmesteter's paradoxical rearrange-

which may be put the Gāthā Haptanghaitī and the later Yasna. This is obviously the part of the Avesta where we find the closest material correspondence with the Veda. Here come the great majority of the divinities and the religious ideas which we recognize as derived from the period of Indo-Iranian unity. Our test for primitive Aryan elements is a fairly easy one—we may put by the further question how many of these go back to Indo-Germanic antiquity. We do not indeed take as primitive everything which we find in our Indian and Persian sources alike. Nāsatya, for instance, does not strike us as *uralt*; and if his name is found in the Avesta (*V.* x. 9, xix. 43) as the title of a fiend, despite the meaning, it is clearly a sign of late anti-Hindu polemic, just as Gaotema (*Yt.* xiii. 16) marks a hostile allusion to Buddhism.[1] But with these few exceptions the coincidence of Veda and Avesta is clear evidence for the pan-Aryan inheritance. There is naturally no corresponding test by which we may recognize what arose on purely Iranian ground, before Zarathushtra came; but, to make our system complete, elements of this class would have to be allowed for. It should be added that the system of Mithraism gives us this unreformed Iranian religion, when stripped (as Professor Cumont reminds me) of its various accretions from Babylonia, and perhaps elsewhere.

So we come to Zarathushtra. For our purpose it does not matter whether he or his immediate disciples composed the Gāthās. They represent his direct teaching; and it would be difficult to find in such remote antiquity[2] clearer signs of one commanding mind showing themselves all over a religious system. There is a note of philosophic abstractness in the peculiar features of Parsism, and it is mainly connected with the material that belongs to the Gāthās alone. It would not surprise us on Indian soil, but in Irān it seems to stand by itself, and is most naturally interpreted by referring it to the thinker to whom parts at least of the Gāthās distinctly profess to belong.[3] To accept this ascription, and allow full weight to the initiative of a powerful and original thinker, as real a Founder as Buddha or Mohammed, seems decidedly the easiest and most reasonable explanation of the facts.

ment. It is hard to believe that its lamented author would have continued to champion it against the consensus of scholarship, had he lived to see how it was received.

[1] Cf. Jackson, *Zoroaster*, pp. 177 sq.

[2] The great weight of the authorities who accept Professor A. V. W. Jackson's plea for the traditional date (7th–6th cent. B. C.) makes me unwilling to hold out for higher antiquity. But I wish we could add another century or two! Jackson himself (*Zoroaster*, p. 172) evidently would like to push the date back a little.

[3] Cf. Geldner in *Enc. Brit.*[9] xxiv. 820.

Last among the Avestan types, and very different from the others, is that which is characteristic of the Vendīdād. In associating the Magi with this element it will be necessary to prolong the preface a little, and ask who the Magi were. We start from the important statement of Herodotus (i. 101) that they were one of the six tribes of the Medes.[1] The mention of Ἀριζαντοί (**Ārīyazantava*[h]) there as a distinct γένος, shows that the other five were not 'Aryan'. They were Aryan in language, however, if we can trust Strabo's statement (p. 724) that the Persians and Medes, Bactrians and Sogdianians were ὁμόγλωττοι παρὰ μικρόν. This, of course, proves nothing as to race. I postulate three strata in the population :—(1) Aryans proper, a relatively small body of immigrant conquerors from the north; (2) people of the Mediterranean stock, who had spoken an Indo-Germanic language from a period lying far beyond our ken, and had invaded Media generations before the Persians; (3) aboriginal tribes, subjugated by the foregoing, and conformed in language to them. To this last division I assign the Magi. The name was not of their own choosing, any more than *Graeci* for the Hellenes, or *Welsh* for the Cymry. The supposed Semitic etymon is rejected by Nöldeke and Bezold, and in form the word strongly recalls others from various Indo-Germanic sources. The old Persian *Magu* exactly answers to the Gothic *magu* 'boy' or 'servant' (cf. our *maid*), Gaulish *Magu-rix*, which may be interpreted by old Irish *mug* 'slave'. Brugmann connects Gothic *mawilô* 'girl', Skt. *mahilā* 'woman', which show that the meaning 'slave' was a derived one: the Avestan *maγava* 'unwedded' points, I think, the same way. But that old Persian early adapted the word in the direction which Germanic and Keltic show, is a very easy assumption; and 'slaves' on the lips of Iranian conquerors may have meant very much what 'Helots' meant from the Spartans addressing the vanquished autochthons. It will be obvious, therefore, why the name is avoided in the Avesta, even in those parts which, on our hypothesis, owe their main impulse to the Magi. Its solitary occurrence (*Ys.* lxv. 7, a prose passage, presumably late) echoes in the compound *moγu-ƒbiš* 'Magus-hater,' the memory of racial hatred which prompted the Μαγοφόνια. That Persian Fifth of November commemorated the last effort of the native population to regain power, an effort which only the genius of Darius availed to frustrate. We may well regard Gaumāta's fellow victims, the expiation of whose 'lie' is recorded on the rock of Behistan, as insurgents in the same cause. Defeated in their struggle for temporal power, the Magi made a more successful bid for spiritual dominion; and

[1] Strabo (p. 727) names Παρεισχορεῖς and Ἀχαιμενίδαι and Μάγοι as inhabiting country between Susa and Persepolis. These are σεμνοῦ τινὸς βίου ζηλωταί: other tribes are λῃστρικοί, and others γεωργικοί (Zoroastrians proper?).

when the religion of Zarathushtra first came to the knowledge of the Greeks it was assumed to be essentially the religion of the Magi.

It will simplify our inquiry if we reverse the chronological order and attempt first to pick out elements in Parsism which may be assigned to Magian sources. Our hypothetical reconstruction prepares us to look out for features of a lower culture and a lower range of thought. A preliminary objection might be raised, that a clan of mere shamans, despised and hated by the superior race who had but lately re-established their political supremacy, would not easily slip into the priesthoods of the higher religion, still less infect this religion with the virus of their own mechanical ritual and lifeless creed. But there are apposite parallels for this seemingly improbable development. Professor J. G. Frazer cites for me the case of the Kurumbas in the Nilgiri Hills. These aboriginals are employed as priests by the Badagas, who dread them intensely, though strong enough to have perpetrated Μαγοφόνια on a large scale when convinced that the Kurumbas were bewitching them. Similarly in New Guinea 'the Motu (immigrants) employ the Koitapu (aborigines) as sorcerers to heal their sick, to give them fine weather, &c. The aboriginals, as such, are believed to have full powers over the elements.' We might, perhaps, compare the Assyrians sending a priest from the deported Israelites to teach their own colonists 'the manner of the God of the land', and so save them from the plague of lions (2 Kings xvii. 25 sq.). Then we may remember that these natives had been living among the people of the higher race for generations; and they must have had abundant opportunity to impress their claim to occult powers upon the more ignorant of their neighbours. The intrusion of the Magi was no sudden change. The *âθravan* and *zaotar* of Zoroastrianism proper held no hereditary office,[1] and the Magian volunteer would at first be welcomed as an expert in ritual by neighbours who knew and dreaded his occult power. In a generation or two a usage might arise which would soon acquire prescriptive right.

Now there are a few scraps of external evidence which will help us to isolate the Magi for examination apart from the Parsi system. They are found in close connexion with Babylon, where a Rab-Mag appears in 587 B.C. (Jer. xxxix. 3, 13), entirely outside Zarathushtrian conditions. There they had high reputation as astrologers and oneiromancers—the two characteristics associated with their name in Matt. ii. 1–12. Neither of these fields of occult lore is allowed to take any prominent place in the Avestan system; while *magic*, which even took its name from these outstanding professors of the art, is frowned upon in the Avesta.[2] Then in Ezek. viii. 16 sq., we find

[1] Geiger cites *Ys.* xi. 6 and x. 15.

[2] Cf. the passages cited by Bartholomae, *Wörterb.* s. vv. *yātav* and *pairikā*.

attributed to men in Jerusalem before the Exile a kind of sun-worship accompanied with the use of the *barsom*. This ritual cannot be Zoroastrian: the date forbids. And though *baresman* is a good Iranian word, it seems to have replaced something quite different expressed by a cognate *bareziš*, Skt. *barhiṣ*, the grass on which the sacrifice was laid: cf. Herod. i. 132 ὑποπάσας ποίην ὡς ἁπαλωτάτην, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ τρίφυλλον, ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔθηκε ὧν πάντα τὰ κρέα.[1] That the *baresman* was developed out of the *barhiṣ* is sufficiently demonstrated by Oldenberg, *Relig. d. Veda*, pp. 342 sq., where the use of the verb *star*, 'to strew', is noted as a survival entirely unsuited for the barsom. It may be observed that in *Yt.* v. 102 Anāhita apparently sits on a *bareziš* in the old Aryan manner.[2] When then we find in Ezekiel the notice of sun-worship joined with the 'holding of the branch to the nose', we most naturally assume the presence of a cultus which is identical with that of Parsism in its later form, but not in its earlier: this reasonably works out as a purely Magian rite, not otherwise known as detached from Parsism. The adoration of the sun is a very obvious link which would facilitate the syncretism. The spirit of the sun cult among inheritors of the old Aryan nature-worship would differ not a little from that of the Median aboriginal cult; and both alike would differ widely from the abstract and mystical sense in which Zarathushtra looked on the resplendent emblem of a deity not formed after the likeness of any sensible object. But for the unthinking crowd it would be quite enough that the sun was adored in all three forms of faith: the subtler differences would be unseen.

There are two very conspicuous usages which the ancients regarded as the distinguishing marks of Magianism. They are brought together in a sentence of Strabo (p. 735) τοὺς δὲ Μάγους οὐ θάπτουσιν, ἀλλ' οἰωνοβρώτους ἐῶσι· τούτους δὲ καὶ μητράσι συνέρχεσθαι πάτριον νενόμισται. It need not be shown that the former was naturalized in Parsism from an early date. The ritual of the *Dakhma* is expounded at length in the Vendīdād, and it is perhaps the one distinguishing mark of the Parsīs which is familiar to the man in the street to-day. But it is assuredly no original feature. Herodotus (i. 140) expressly says that

But there are magical uses traceable in the Avesta, and due, on my theory, to the Magi: thus the use of the feather of the *vārenjina* bird in *Yt.* xiv. 35. Strabo (p. 762) speaks very definitely of the prevalence of magical arts among the Persians in his time.

[1] With this cf. Strabo p. 732 sq. It is noteworthy in this passage that the necessary Magus does not offer the sacrifice. He only recites the θεογονίη or *Yasht*, just as he does in the familiar picture in Avestan MSS., reproduced on the title-page of Geldner's *Avesta—barsom* in right hand, service-book in left.

[2] The passage is not clear enough to base any argument upon, but the *bareziš* there *may* be due to reminiscence.

it was a Magian practice, whereas the Persians covered a body with wax and buried it. Even apart from this notice—characteristic of the remarkable accuracy of Herodotus in his delineation of Persian and Magian religion—we might well have assumed the custom to be no Aryan one, but indigenous in Media. The well-known difficulty as to the tombs of the Achaemenidae is most simply solved by assuming that the Magian rule was not yet adopted by the Persians: there are, of course, ways of getting round it, as Darmesteter showed, but the alternative view is more satisfactory. The same may be said of Cambyses' treatment of the corpse of Amestris (Herod. iii. 16); though really in this case, as in that of Xerxes' profane treatment of the sacred element water (Herod. vii. 35),[1] the character of the royal sinner would make a lapse from orthodoxy not very surprising. There have been Most Christian monarchs whose reputations as *Fidei Defensores* would be seriously imperilled if we were unreasonably particular about correlating faith and practice. Nevertheless the most probable explanation seems to be that the kings were transgressing only Magian orthodoxy, which had not yet entered the religion of the court and nobles of Persia, whatever may have been the case with the popular creed. It is antecedently improbable enough that the Achaemenidae should have yielded spiritual allegiance to Gaumata's kith and kin until time had shrouded their political activity in oblivion; and the only open question is whether we are right in regarding these features as specifically Magian.

Cambyses supplies us with a link with that other question. Herodotus tells us (iii. 31) that he consulted the Persian 'royal judges' whether there was a law permitting a man to marry his sister. Their eminently judicious reply shows that they knew nothing of the Magian law which made this the very crown of good actions; and Herodotus, a century later, records the reply without betraying any consciousness that the Magi stood for the principle which would have suited Cambyses so well. His contemporary Xanthus bears express testimony to the *khvêtuk-das*, attributing it to the Magi.[2] Their successors of Sassanian times belaud the consanguineous marriage in extravagant terms which suggest that they could not easily persuade the Mazdayasnian folk to accept their dicta. It was easier to convince the royal house: thus we find Artaxerxes Mnemon marrying his daughters Atossa and Amestris.[3] The practice was kept out of the Avesta, and modern Parsîs vehemently repudiate it. It seems very clear that this was a wholly Magian element, which never succeeded in attaching itself to Parsism proper.

[1] Of which he repented, to judge from his reverential treatment of the sea at his second venture (vii. 54).

[2] *Ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* iii. 2, 11 (p. 515).

[3] Plutarch, *Artox.* 23.

There is, I believe, another source from which we can deduce some characteristics of Magian religion. In a paper written some eight years ago[1] I argued that we should read the Book of Tobit as an old Median folk-lore story, rewritten by a Jew and adapted for purposes of edification, but without removing characteristic traces of its original conditions. Now it is just the Vendīdād elements of Parsism which show themselves in *Tobit*. The merit of burying the dead answers strikingly in its emphasis to that which it doubtless replaced in the original story, where the hero[2] would accumulate great merit by removing to the *dakhma* a corpse that was polluting the sacred earth. That this is the meaning of the motive in *Tobit* is confirmed by the appearance of the un-Jewish and apparently quite otiose dog: he is, of course, essential for the Magian ritual. The *draona* or 'corpse-cake', rightly recognized by Kohut in iv. 17, is not peculiar to Magianism, but is at any rate not Jewish. Then there are faint traces of the *khvetuk-das*, in the emphasis laid on the duty of marrying within the 'kinship'. Next I call attention to the fiend Asmodaeus. His identity with Aēšma Daēva has long been assumed. Now, though the collocation occurs in the Gāthās, the real prominence of 'the fiend Violence' belongs to the later Avesta; and like most of the other individual fiends he belongs most probably to the Magian stratum. In *Tobit* he is distinctly Lust rather than Hate, though he shows the latter quality as well: he used his characteristic emblem, the 'murderous spear', upon Tobias's predecessors. I need not repeat what I said about the parallels in Avesta and Shah Nameh for the story of the binding of Asmodaeus and the use of the charm which restores Tobit's eyesight. The 'seven angels who stand in the presence' have an obvious parallel in Parsism, and it is the only one which even faintly suggests the non-Magian side. One very important point remains. It was a serious difficulty to me in my first study of *Tobit* that the book has no eschatology. I see now that this is a strong confirmation of the theory I am advocating. The doctrine of immortality is manifestly Zarathushtra's own: what earlier conceptions he built on were assuredly Aryan. It is reasonable to assume that the Magi had no more eschatology than the Babylonians and other native tribes of Western Asia. *Tobit* accordingly falls into line with the rest of our evidence for a Magianism untouched by Aryan religion.

On some such lines as these we may eliminate the Magian elements in the Avesta. That this involves branding the ritual of modern Parsism as essentially alien to the Mazdayasna is an inference I should not draw. The new was assimilated to the old, and homogeneity

[1] *Expository Times*, xi. 257–60.

[2] Necessarily with a companion, or it would have been mortal sin. Presumably Tobit and Tobias were in partnership for this duty.

was achieved in the same way as in other religions which have absorbed a cultus foreign to their original constitution. I am only concerned with origins, and I think we may safely regard the Vendīdād as an accretion historically, however its ritual may have domesticated itself in Parsism of later times. I pass on to the earlier strata, and ask what are the features which we may assign to Zarathushtra himself. We naturally determine these by looking at the Gāthās. We note at once the prominence of the Amesha Spenta. They and Mazda fill the whole field. Their names—especially those of Vohu Mano and Asha Vahishta—are very frequently used in such a way that we cannot feel quite sure whether there is personification or not. It looks as though they were new conceptions in the main, as yet not much more personal than the abstract qualities which a modern minor poet will personify by the easy device of capital letters. If so, they are presumably Zarathushtra's own coinage, a motive for which it is not hard to see. The absence of the Aryan nature-spirits, headed by Mithra, is very significant, when we note that they are back again in the Gātha Haptanghaitī, and fill the Yashts from beginning to end. They cannot have been omitted by accident. Nor were they, I think, merely ignored. The old problem of the difference between the Indian *deva* and the Avestan *daēva* is best solved, I venture to believe, by recognizing Zarathushtra's intention to denounce the Aryan *daivās* as powers of evil.[1] He did not name them, and it was easy for after-generations to forget what he meant, and take the *daēva* to be merely evil spirits of the ordinary kind: formal subordination to Ahura Mazda, as angels of his court, was a simple way of reintroducing them in all their former glory. The prophet had, however, another method of dealing with the divinities whom he was expelling from their thrones. The people were not ready for a pure monotheism. He accordingly surrounded Ahura Mazda with archangels who were too abstract to endanger the essence of his monotheism. They bore the stamp of his own philosophic mind, but they were not strictly his own invention and nothing more. Professor Williams Jackson has shown how the Gāthās retain distinct traces of the Aryan connexion of certain spheres of influence with conceptions which Zarathushtra adapted for his purpose.[2] Thus Aramaiti from Aryan times watched over the Earth, and in the Gāthās she seems to retain this province. She is, nevertheless, a purely abstract idea, the principle of Devotion; and this has existed side by side with the meaning *Earth* from the first. It would seem that Zarathushtra fastened on certain conceptions which lent themselves to his purpose, retained certain harmless features which might help to popularize

[1] This may be combined with the suggestions of Geldner in *Enc. Brit.*[9] l. c.

[2] See the *Grundriss der iran. Philologie*, ii. 636, and references there.

them, and developed the abstract element on which he mainly relied.

If I am right in crediting the reformer himself with those features of Parsism which turn away from Aryan nature-cultus towards a highly abstract and spiritual religious atmosphere, it is natural to ask whether the name and conception of Ahura Mazda himself may not have come from the same source. It is perhaps not possible to dogmatize here, the disturbing feature being the fact that this divine name is the only characteristic of the religion which is conspicuous in the Achaemenian inscriptions. I should very tentatively propose this reconstruction. Assuming as I do that Zarathushtra's date lies well behind the age of Darius, I regard the name Ahura Mazda as his special revelation. The names he got from Aryan antiquity, but the combination and the attributes he attached were his own. It is just the element in a new religion in which the founder is likely to innovate. The Gāthās themselves show us the prophet succeeding mainly with the royal family: the nobles and court may be assumed as following their lead. In that case may not King Vīshtāspa's name have been repeated in a family of the same stock and the same religion, so as to reappear in Darius's father? There may even be a contrast with the names current in the other branch of the Achaemenid house: Cyrus and Cambyses seem to have had old divine names belonging to rivers, the sacredness of which was characteristic of the old Aryan faith—Darius's father is named after the Constantine of Zoroastrianism proper.[1] But this is perhaps fanciful: more to the point is the statement in one form of the Behistan Inscription that Auramazda was 'god of the Aryans', with which we may couple the emphasis Darius lays on the help that Auramazda gives to him in his wars with rebels of a presumably different religion. If so, the Zarathushtrian Reform was in Darius's day almost confined to the court circles. What was the creed of the people?[2] Herodotus (i. 131 sq.) gives us a classical description of the religion of the Persians, which answers with wonderful accuracy to the picture of Indo-Iranian religion as restored by the comparative method. If the 'Aryans' in the Behistan Inscription and the *Ἀριζαντοί* of Herodotus are the highest caste, the royal family and the nobles, we may assume another and larger stratum of the population inheriting Indo-Germanic speech and ideas: in race they may have been related to these 'Aryans' and the native popula-

[1] West's discovery that Darius in 505 B. C. reformed the calendar on Zarathushtrian lines strengthens a suspicion that it is Darius, not Cyrus, with whom the strictly Zoroastrian faith begins in the Achaemenian royal house.

[2] Note Tiele's remark (*Religionsgeschichte*, ii. 33) that Herodotus portrays the religion of the people, the Inscriptions that of the court, the Avesta that of the priests.

tion respectively, much as the Perioeci in Laconia were related to the Spartans and the Helots. Now Herodotus tells us that the Persians worshipped Zeus, τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες. It is generally assumed that he calls the supreme deity 'Zeus' merely from his Greek instinct. But it is at least possible that he heard in Persia a name for the sky-god which sounded so much like 'Zeus', being in fact the same word, that he really believed they used the familiar name.[1] This incidentally explains why the name Ὠρομάσδης (Auramazda) does not appear in Greek writers until another century has passed. In *Yt.* iii. 13 (a metrical passage, presumably ancient) we find *patat̰ dyaoš . . . Anrō Mainyuš*, 'Angra fell *from heaven*': see Bartholomae, s.v. *dyav*. Since *Dyaus* survives in the Veda as a divine name as well as a common noun—just as *dies* and *Diespiter* in Latin—it is antecedently probable that the Iranians still worshipped the ancestral deity by his old name.

There follows the question of Zarathushtra's responsibility for the so-called dualism of the Mazdayasna. Towards this we may note as follows. (1) Characteristic names like Angra Mainyu and Aęšma Daęva, found in the Gāthās, are conceived in the same abstract style as the names of Ahura and the Amesha which we have been crediting to Zarathushtra's own mind. (2) These names do not occur in the Inscriptions, nor do they appear in Greek writers of Achaemenian times. This would seem to show that they were slow in securing a general acceptance. Such an inference would prevent us from assigning them to Aryan antiquity. There is now a rather subtle linguistic phenomenon which I venture to put forward as possibly significant. Whence came the Greek Ἀριμάνιος? Assuredly not from the Avesta, where Angra Mainyu is always not one word but two,[2] and shows a characteristic nasal in the first syllable. Clearly Old Persian is responsible. But this would require **ahramanyuš*, which may indeed be presumed from later forms like *ahraman*. Whence, then, the ι in Greek? Does it not require a *feminine* form **ahrimanyuš*? It seems to me that the conception of the evil spirit as female must have come from an independent source, connected, perhaps, with the thought of the *Druj*, the Parsī Duessa, whose 'bad pre-eminence' throughout the Avesta may well reflect the Aryan antiquity of the fiend Falsehood. If this suggestion is right, we have one among many survivals of the Aryan demon-world. That all three strata of Parsism contribute their quota to the ultimate demonology is antecedently probable. What the Magi gave may be easily

[1] The suggestion occurred to me independently, but it was anticipated by Spiegel, *Eran. Alt.* ii. 190.

[2] The same contrast meets us in Ὠρομάσδης, Ἀσμοδαῖος, Ὠμανός (Vohu Manah, in Cappadocia).

conjectured. The very fact that the exact parallelism of the world of Ahriman with that of Ormazd is left imperfect, strongly suggests their work: it is not the only point, as we have seen, in which the Magi failed to acclimatize their theology entire. The hellish counterparts of the Amesha are but shadowy conceptions, dragged in for the sake of theory, but never really living: the presence of Indra and Nasatya among them, moreover, betrays decidedly a late stage in the development. It is suggestive that Yasht xxii is a fragment: the exquisite picture of the vision of heaven is worked out completely, but something seems to have sealed the lips of that interpolator when he tried to caricature it with a mathematically exact counterpart in hell. The existence in Western Asia of dualistic systems not connected with Parsism is assumed by excellent authorities as supplying a background for Isa. xlv. 7, where Kohut's recognition of anti-Zoroastrian polemic is now rightly abandoned. If the Magi held such a system, we can account for all the real dualism there is in the Avesta. Zarathushtra himself built on the Aryan demonology alone, where the destructive forces of Nature were mainly prominent, and developed especially the ethical conception of Falsehood,[1] characteristic of the people whose supreme virtue was Truth. Earliest of all the world's great thinkers to wrestle with the problem of the origin of Evil, Zarathushtra postulated on this basis a primaeval spirit that 'chose evil in thought, word, and deed',[2] and interpreted life as an incessant strife between Good and Evil, to end in the eternal triumph of Spenta Mainyu and men who take his side.

One special field in which syncretism seems to me apparent is too complex to deal with at the end of this paper. I refer to the conception of the Fravashis, on which I have little to add to my conclusions contained in a paper of six years ago:[3] I summarize them in a line or two. The concept is not Zarathushtra's, for he significantly ignores it in the Gathas. But the ambiguities and inconsistencies which perplex the Avestan doctrine may be helped by recognizing two conceptions of different origins, imperfectly combined. There are the Aryan ancestor-spirits, the Vedic *pitáraḥ*, always plural, who are partly responsible for the fact that the Fravashis are always those 'of the pious': cf. the *Manes*, and the German use of *selig*.[4]

[1] The fact that Germanic (cf. Germ. *Trug*, our *dream*) agrees with the Iranian meaning of the root suggests that Sanskrit (Vedic *druh*) has generalized a word that meant *false* rather than *injurious* from the beginning.

[2] *Ys.* xxx. 5.

[3] *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1902, pp. 514–27.

[4] Geldner (*Enc. Brit.*[9] s. v. Zoroaster) gives another reason, the fact that *fravashi* means 'confession of faith': Justi follows him (in *Grundriss*, ii. 411). But the other may well have been the original reason.

And there is the primitive notion of the External Soul, which may, of course, have been held by Aryans—cf. plentiful Indo-Germanic examples of it in Frazer's *Golden Bough*[1]—but was probably brought into the Parsi system by the Magi.

One other very large subject bearing on my title I must be content only to name—the question of Babylonian influence on Parsism. It will not, I think, add a fourth to the strata here described, and may therefore, be left for the purposes of this inquiry.

20

THE ZOROASTRIAN CODE OF GENTLEHOOD

By NASARVANJI MANECKJI COOPER. (Abstract)

Though I cannot lay claim to the erudition in Zoroastrian lore possessed by some distinguished Parsis unable to come to Europe to attend this Congress, I have felt that, in the absence of a better representative of our race, I could not return a negative answer to requests made to me by many of my co-religionists, and also by European friends of distinction, to speak here as a Zoroastrian on Zoroastrianism. I am proud to speak to this assembly on the subject of the faith which the Parsis have consistently followed in adversity as well as in prosperity, to which they were loyal not only when it was the State religion of the Fatherland, but when loyalty to conviction meant suffering, ending in death or exile; the faith to which they cling amid all the upheavals wrought by the direct contact of West and East in these days. The Parsis of India and the 'Gubrs' of Persia may be but a small remnant compared with the number of followers of Zoroaster two thousand years ago; but they have remained unabsorbed by other races and other faiths. Social habits may be modified to suit the changed conditions of life brought by modern civilization; we may be amenable, in some degree at least, to the transformations now taking place in Indian political conceptions; we may have forsaken, or at least modified, the garb rendered sacrosanct by immemorial custom. But amid these mutations the 'sacred fire' goes not out. First lighted in the pre-historic days when Iran was in the glory of her fame and power, the sacred flame has been handed on without break from generation to generation, from fire-temple to fire-temple, and burns to-day in the land of our origin and the land of our adoption, as also in other

[1] iii. 352–75.

lands whither Parsis have gone, ever being consumed yet not consumed—the symbol both of the indestructibility of the lamp of Truth, and of the eternal authority and rule of its Author. The sacred fire in the Atesh Bahram (holy of holies) in each Parsi temple stands for a lofty conception of the Divine Being and of man's relation to Him.

From the magnitude of the work Zoroastrianism has accomplished in the promotion of human culture (and culture—the moderation and considerateness, and the truth and sincerity of educated men and women in the various relations and concerns of life—being the practical form in which the qualities and reality of our religious faiths manifest themselves), it becomes an interesting inquiry to learn from an examination of such rules of life as are scattered through the religious books of the Zoroastrians or ancient Persians what is the Parsi code of gentlehood. I must pass by the spiritual side of Zoroastrian lore, its insistence upon reverence, thanksgiving, prayer, and praise, as their discussion would be beyond the limits of my task, and must deal only with 'the whole duty of man' in relation to his fellows, as an outcome of those beliefs. This duty was set forth by our Prophet in Three Words which remain unaffected by the mutations of the ages as they pass—

Humata, Hukhta, Hvarshta

—Good Thoughts, Good Words, Good Deeds. Upon these great watchwords the whole ethical system expounded in the Zend-Avesta and other sacred writings is based. In comprehensiveness and reach they compare with the moral standard set by the Hebrew prophet of old: 'And what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' (Mic. vi. 8). Ceremonial purity has its place in Mazdaism, but, as in the intention of the Mosaic law, it is to be secondary and symbolic.

The practical application of the Three Words is not left to the varying standards of differing ages and climes. The moral teaching of which they are the core runs through our sacred writings, and is applied, clearly and decisively, to all our relations of life. The difference between good and evil thoughts and actions is not left in doubt or to be solved by the unaided 'inner light'. Evil actions are enumerated and condemned; while conversely moral virtues are enjoined, and promised both present and future rewards, the latter as a certainty the former as a probability. Virtue is a garment of honour while wickedness is a robe of shame. But the motives with which virtue is practised are not to be those of sordid and calculating self-interest. Intentions, as well as deeds, are weighed by the Almighty, and must be pure to be acceptable with Him. Nor is there to be faithless repining when, in spite of sober and righteous living, the sorrow

and suffering so closely woven in the fabric of life overtakes a worthy man.

I lay some stress upon the spiritual ends and aims of our moral philosophy in order to show that if there be warrant for the complaint that prosperity in these modern days has tended to make the Zoroastrians of Bombay too materialistic, the fact remains that that deadening spirit is expressly reprobated in our sacred literature.

The Domestic Virtues

In passing from the general and abstract to the particular, I cannot do better than begin with family life. Though a man has duties to himself, as the code of Zoroaster fully recognizes, he does not and cannot 'live unto himself alone'. The working out of his moral nature is in the main determined by his conduct towards others with whom he is brought into contact; and those relationships begin in the family and the home. The Western ideals of home life were embodied in all essentials in the religious beliefs of Iran at a time when the Britons were still in the darkness of savagery and idol-worship. In the teachings of the great Prophet of Iran the home is rightly made the centre and nursery of the domestic virtues, the place where 'gentlehood' is cultivated. Zoroastrianism teaches the regulation, not the crucifixion, of natural instincts and appetites. It knows not the philosophy which 'forbids to marry'. On the contrary, the married state is recommended as calculated to promote a religious and virtuous life. Prostitution and sins of lust are unsparingly reprobated, whether committed in the married or single state. Dreadful doom is pronounced upon those who commit sodomy and other unnatural offences. The wife is required to 'obey' her husband, as in the Anglican marriage service; but the whole spirit of our sacred writings, confirmed by what we know of the history of ancient Iran, points to the equality of the wife in social status with her husband, and to perfect liberty of action on her part.

The duties of the husband and father are laid down with minuteness. He has to keep himself in good health and to pay attention to matters of sanitation affecting the health of those belonging to him. On its sanitary side, it may be remarked, the Zoroastrian code is as striking in its wisdom and completeness as the Mosaic law; and many of the so-called 'ceremonial' practices are, in reality, enjoined to promote the physical well-being of the community. The husband must be valiant in protecting and preserving his family from outside violence; and he must be industrious, in order to provide them with the necessaries and comforts of life. The Parsi mother is invariably devoted to her children; and the father is also required by his religion to look

after their spiritual and temporal education. He has to bring them up well prepared to fight the battle of life with perseverance, diligence, honesty, and integrity. It is scarcely necessary to say that in a religion emphasizing the domestic virtues, obedience and love of parents is inculcated.

Business Relationships

The Mazdian Scriptures give no countenance to the false weight or the unjust balance. Rectitude of business dealing is most strictly and expressly enjoined. Included among the most heinous sins is that of the man who 'consumes anything which is received into his custody, and becomes an embezzler'; or who 'commits oppression to make the things of others his own'. Even the too common practice of neglecting to return a loaned article is reprobated; and its non-return after it has been asked for is bluntly denominated as 'robbery'. Industry and thoroughness in business life are again and again inculcated, and as all the world knows have been practised with good effect in modern times in all parts of India. No race of mankind can compare in affluence with the Parsis of Western India in proportion to their numbers, and in the vast majority of cases the wealth of our rich men has been obtained by business enterprise within the last hundred years.

Truthfulness

No attentive reader can fail to notice the frequency with which in our sacred books truth is extolled and falsehood, with its evil brood of slander, malice, envy, and uncharitableness, is condemned. Asked whether living in fear and falsehood is worse than death, the Spirit of Wisdom emphatically answers in the affirmative. The contest between good and evil, truth and falsehood, knows no truce or cessation, and the Zoroastrian is commanded to take an active and diligent share therein.

Benevolence

Our code of 'Gentlehood' does not stop at rectitude: it stirs the heart to pity and the hand to help. Truth, thankfulness, contentment, are placed high in the category of 'ways and motives of good deeds whereby people arrive most at heaven', but the first place therein is given to benevolence. 'The first good work,' said the Spirit of Wisdom, 'is liberality.' It should be noted, however, that in the commendation of one virtue care is taken not to minimize the importance of other worthy qualities.

When the pilgrim fathers of the Indian Parsis landed at Sanjan in Guzerat, they sent a *dastur* to Jadi Rana, the Hindu ruler of the country, seeking permission to settle there. Responding to a demand

from the Raja for information as to their usages and customs, the most learned of the Persians drew up sixteen *ślokas* or distichs, one of which declared: 'We are enjoined to be liberal in our charities and especially in excavating tanks and wells.' In those times of almost exclusive occupation in tillage of the soil this was a very practical and useful form of liberality. In these modern days of industrial development the liberality of the Parsis has taken a wider range. There is no community in the world so well provided for by organized charities and institutions, in proportion to its size, as our own. The communal funds for education, helping the unfortunate or indigent or aged, maintaining *dokhmas* and fire-temples, meeting exceptional calamities, providing hospitals and dispensaries, &c., amount to many lakhs of rupees, all subscribed by freewill offerings from the well-to-do. Affluent Indian Parsis have also been generous towards their co-religionists in Persia, a people physically more robust than ourselves, but poor and misruled. But the Parsis have not confined their benevolence to their own kith and kin. Evidences of public munificence and catholicity of charity abound on every hand in Bombay and other cities in which they dwell. The fame of the munificence and large-hearted benevolence of the first Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy was so world-wide that he was the first Asiatic to receive the freedom of the City of London and to be honoured with a baronetcy of the United Kingdom. 'No matter how distant the land or how different the race of people, his sympathetic heart was always moved by their misfortunes, and his purse was opened in order to relieve them,' and in this respect he has had many successors in the community.

The Treatment of Animals

The spirit of benevolence extends to the brute creation. While recognizing the need for slaughtering animals for human food, the Zoroastrian philosophy prescribes the kinds of animals and birds fit for the purpose, and gives directions as to humane and expeditious methods of killing them. Slaughter for mere pleasure is strongly discountenanced.

Conclusion

Of the duties of citizenship, such as loyalty to the Government and readiness to defend one's country, and indeed of many other virtues inculcated in our Scriptures, I have no time to speak. Anything like an exhaustive enumeration of the practical morality of our sacred literature is impossible within the limits of a single paper; for there seems to be no failing of temper or of conduct to which the children of men are prone that is not dealt with in the searching, if widely scattered, injunctions to Zoroastrianism.

DEMETRIUS GALANOS THE GREEK INDOLOGIST

By J. GENNADIUS

I venture to occupy your attention with the life work of one who, born in Athens, my own native city, repaired at an early age to Constantinople—the seat of the great institution of intellectual activity of the Greeks in the Near East, which I have the honour to represent among you—and thence migrated to India, to end his days in the sacred city of Benares, absorbed in the study of Sanskrit literature, and conforming to the rule of life of the Brahmans.

If the important contributions to the history of religions made by this remarkable man are not very generally known, the reason may perhaps be sought both in the fact that modern Greek literature is only now beginning to be studied abroad, and in the extreme modesty and the retiring disposition of Galanos himself. For, although one of the earliest and ablest pioneers of Indology, he personally laid no claim to any literary achievement, he published nothing during his lifetime, but followed the dictates of true philosophy—not a self-asserting philosophy, practised as some kind of craft, and proclaimed by the working of marvels; but such as Plutarch [1] so pithily defines, after the models of Socrates and Pythagoras and Arcesilaus and Carneades. They did not pass their lives in the elaboration of axioms, nor in the refinement of syllogisms. But they were acknowledged and honoured as philosophers for the wise words they spoke, the lessons they taught, and, above all, for the manner of life they themselves led; thus setting the example of a pure, unselfish, unpretentious, blameless existence, benevolent to all men, tolerant of all things, save wrong of any kind. Such, indeed, was the life of our Demetrius Galanos.

He was born in 1760, the second son of well-to-do Athenian parents. His elder brother had died in childhood; while the third and youngest cultivated the family estates, and named his own son (to whom we shall have occasion to refer again), after their grandfather, Pantoleon. Demetrius, on the other hand, gave early proof of an extraordinary aptitude for letters. The pursuit of letters and the service of the Church were then the only liberal careers open to the best and noblest of the enslaved Greeks. To an affectionate and gentle disposition, Galanos joined an inquiring, reflective, and critical mind; and he

[1] *Of the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander*, i. 4.

soon distinguished himself in the public school of Athens, then under the direction of the renowned Athenian nobleman and philanthropist, Joannes Benizelos,' my own maternal great-great-grandfather. Of this Benizelos it is recorded that, making use of his great influence with the Turkish masters of the city, he obtained permission to visit freely the awful dungeons in which prisoners were left in those days to rot and perish by slow degrees. He read to them the Scriptures, and as no one was allowed to bring them succour, he divested himself, on each visit, of his fresh underwear, and left the dungeon wearing the vermin-infested rags of the wretched prisoners, whose misery he had thus in a measure relieved.

With this example of his beloved master before him, the altruistic tendencies of young Galanos were kindled and confirmed; and his devotion to Greek learning was such that at the age of fourteen he had acquired all that the primitive educational resources of Athens, at that time, could offer him. He was therefore sent to Mesolonghi, where Panagiotes Palamas was then lecturing, and thence to the even more flourishing school in the island of Patmos, under its famous master, the monk Daniel Kerameus.

At the end of six years spent at Patmos, his uncle, Gregory, Bishop of Caesaria, and Primate at that time of the Holy Synod at Constantinople, sent for the young Demetrius, of whose rare attainment and moral qualities he had become cognizant. He urged him to take Holy Orders; but though this step, with the patronage of his influential uncle, would soon have led him to some episcopal see, Galanos declined, being determined, as he said, to devote his life to the study of Greek literature and philosophy. And he remained at Constantinople, eking out a precarious existence by giving lessons in Greek.

The development of Greek trade, the revival of letters among the enslaved Greeks, and the consequent awakening of the national conscience, which prepared and ushered in the War of Liberation of 1821, were then in full activity. Many Greeks had carried their enterprise as far as India; and in Calcutta and Dacca there had already been established small, but flourishing, Greek communities. With characteristic tenacity of national traditions, the members of those communities desired that their children should be brought up in their mother-tongue; and for this purpose Constantine Pantazes, the chief of the Calcutta community and a native of Adrianople, wrote to his correspondent at Constantinople to send out to them a Greek teacher.

This correspondent was a friend of Bishop Gregory, to whom he submitted the request of the Greeks at Calcutta. It was thus that Demetrius Galanos was chosen to carry to the young Greco-Indians the torch of ancestral learning, and to send back to Greece a reflex of the Light of Asia. His first act was to remit to his poor relatives

at Athens the small sum he had managed to save; and he started on his mission, visiting on his way the monastery at Mount Sinai, and continuing his journey by way of Bassorah.

On his arrival at Calcutta in 1786 he lodged with Pantazes; and while teaching the young Greeks their mother-tongue, he devoted his leisure to the study of English, and the mastery of Sanskrit, Persian, and the native idioms of India, in which he soon became so proficient that he was able to enter into intimate converse with Hindus of all races and castes. In seeking to establish close relations with the natives, that which assisted him most was not only his linguistic proficiency and erudition, but the fame which rapidly spread among them of his sterling character, his lofty mind, and the rule of life he had set to himself, living up to the highest ideals of moral purity and rectitude. Both his own countrymen, the Englishmen who came into contact with him, and the erudite Hindus, with whom he loved to discuss philosophical topics, soon learned to look up to him as to a man of extraordinary attainments and rare worth.

His early tendencies, and the more intimate searching investigations which had latterly occupied his mind, finally determined the rest of his life. At the end of the sixth year of his residence in Calcutta, he resigned his post, bade farewell to his Greek friends, deposited his scanty savings with one of them, that the small yearly income might be remitted to him, and retired to Benares, there to devote himself exclusively to the study of Sanskrit literature and Hindu philosophy, adopting the dress of the Brahmans, and strictly conforming to their mode of life. Thus he lived for forty consecutive years, to the day of his death.

But those years were spent, neither in the passivity of mere contemplation, nor in estrangement from what is dearest to human kinship, nor in forgetfulness of fatherland and faith. We shall see that his literary activity marks a most important stage in Indian studies. And in his life we have a unique instance, and an edifying example, of the adoption of Hindu yogaism, without that hardness and arrogance and monastic egotism which tends to view the surrounding world with indifference and contempt—one might almost say with hatred. His human tenderness for his far away kinsmen and compatriots, his burning love for his native city, his perfervid hopes for the liberation of the fatherland, his broad-minded interest in the Orthodox Church, remained to the end unimpaired, fresh, and refreshing. To the last he was in heart and mind a Christian, a European, and a true Hellene.

Of this there can be no more conclusive evidence, no more touching proof, than his letters from Benares, a considerable number of which are still extant, some published; especially those addressed to the

Archimandrite Gregory, Chaplain of the Greek Church at Calcutta, and those written to his nephew Pantoleon Galanos.

The latter he invited to India, intending to return with him to Athens, that he might lie down to his last sleep in the bosom of his native land. Pantoleon arrived at Calcutta and was on the point of starting for Benares when his venerable uncle died, after a short illness. He was buried in the English cemetery at Benares, and the following simple inscription in English may be read over his tomb :

SACRED
TO THE MEMORY OF
DEMETRIUS GALANOS
AN ATHENIAN WHO DIED AT BENARES
IN THE EAST INDIES ON THE 3RD OF MAY 1833
AGED 72 YEARS.

Galanos's bosom friend and Master, the Brahman Satoul Sing, also inscribed over his tomb an epitaph in Hindi, which may be rendered as follows :—

'Woe, a hundred times woe ! Demetrius Galanos has left this world to reside in the eternal abodes. With tears and wailing I have cried out, ah me ! by grief demented. He is gone, alas, the Plato of this age.'

By his will, with the exception of small legacies to his Brahman friends and his Hindu servant, he left the whole of his estate, amounting to some three thousand pounds, to be divided equally between his nephew and the University of Athens, to which institution he bequeathed also his Sanskrit library and all his papers and manuscripts.

These manuscripts may be roughly classed under two headings : (*a*) translations from Sanskrit and Hindustani into Greek ; and (*b*) drafts of several vocabularies and dictionaries, such as Pali-Greek, Persian-Hindi-Greek-English, and Sanskrit-Greek. The most important of these, unpublished, is the last named, containing as it does many words which are there recorded for the first time, culled from Sanskrit works which he first explored. This is the opinion of the eminent Orientalist, Professor Albrecht Weber, who, when in Athens, examined the collection and took extensive notes, which he utilized in supplementing Boehtlingk and Roth's great Sanskrit Dictionary.

The manuscript translations remained for some fourteen years untouched. But in 1841 the Ephore of the National Library, G. Kozakis Typaldos, assisted by the Keeper of Printed Books, G. Apostolides, commenced editing and publishing a series which in 1853, resulted in seven octavo volumes. Neither of the editors was, properly speaking, a Sanskrit scholar ; but they made an *ad hoc* study

of the subject, and they very prudently addressed themselves for advice and guidance to the most eminent German and French Orientalists of that time. They submitted to them portions of the translations in proof, and they invited criticism before publication. They were thus enabled to preface introductions dealing with the subject-matter of each volume. These introductions are of considerable merit and ability. I may here observe that the Greek style adopted by Galanos in his translations, without being stilted or pedantic, is pure and scholarly, and the text is accompanied by footnotes of great value, bearing witness to his erudition and to the frame of mind with which he approached his object in view.

Such, in general lines, is the character of the work. The limited time at my disposal will not allow me to do more than give a very succinct account of the contents of those seven volumes. The first, entitled by the editors, Δημητρίου Γαλανοῦ Ἀθηναίου Ἰνδικῶν μεταφράσεων Πρόδρομος (Forerunner of the Indian translations of Demetrius Galanos, the Athenian), consists of five of the minor, but not the least important, pieces rendered into Greek: (*a*) Ethical sentences and allegories of Batrihari the King; (*b*) Of the same, counsels concerning the vanity of this world; (*c*) Political, economic, and moral precepts, culled from various poets; (*d*) Synopsis of sentences and precepts of Sanakea,[1] the moralist and philosopher; (*e*) Zagannatha Panditaraza's[2] allegories, examples, and similes. Galanos's attachment to the fatherland, and constant solicitude for the welfare of his countrymen, is again attested by the fact that of the translation of Zagannatha, mentioned above, he had sent home in 1830 an earlier copy through the Archbishop of Athens, Neophytus, with the following inscription: 'To the Eminent Signor Joannes Capodistrias, President and Governor of Greece, Demetrius Galanos the Athenian sends, as a present from India, this excellent allegorical manual of Zagannatha the Brahman, translated into Greek for the benefit of the young philologists of the Greek race. From the Holy City of Kassis, known also as Benares.'[3]

The second volume, published in 1847, contains 'The Bālabhārata', or synopsis of the *Mahābhārata*. The third comprises the *Gita*, which Galanos calls Θεσπέσιον Μέλος, a name adopted by Schlegel in

[1] This name is, I believe, variously spelt Çaunakas, Canakjas, Tchanakaya. I have adopted the form in which Galanos has transliterated the Indian names into Greek.

[2] Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja.

[3] Galanos often makes use of the ancient name of the holy city, Κασσή, from its reputed founder (1200 B.C.) Kāsī Rājā (= the resplendent). By an ingenious combination of a Greek synonym, φανεράς, of this adjective with the more recent name Benares, he dates, on October, 1832, ἐκ Φανερασίου. His will, written only three days before his death, is dated ἐκ Βεναρές. But in his translations he generally uses the form Βαρανασή (Vārānasi).

his edition of the poem. The fourth volume is devoted to Kālidāsa's *Raghu-Vaṁsa*. The fifth to the *Itihāsa-Samutchaya*. The sixth embraces the *Hitōpadēśa*; and the seventh the *Durgā*. It was intended that it should also include the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*; but funds were lacking, so that this and a few other translations remain still inedited.

There exists as yet no complete and connected account of the life of Galanos, nor any due appreciation of the published portion of his works—of this unique body of Indian translation done by one man; and the present paper is but a condensed abstract of a more detailed work which I hope will soon appear. It is a remarkable fact that although he lived more than forty-five years in British India and was known to many of the foremost Anglo-Indians of his time, there appears to be no mention of him or of his work in any of the likely English sources of such information. At all events my diligent search has, thus far, revealed none.[1] I need hardly say that outside Greece it is the Germans who, of course, know most about him; while the only French comment I have met with (that of M. Jules Mohl in the *Journal Asiatique* of July, 1846) is noteworthy for statements and appreciations somewhat strange. He makes out Galanos to have been a merchant, and to have forsaken commerce for the life of a Brahman; and he adds:—'Galanos paraît avoir cherché à Bénarès plutôt la sagesse, comme la cherchaient les anciens, que le savoir, comme l'entendent les modernes; et ses manuscrits sont probablement plutôt une curiosité littéraire qu'un secours pour l'érudition.' This was not the opinion of Professor Albert Hoefer, who in the *Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft der Sprache* (1850) takes to task his French *confrère*, and extols the scholarly and conscientious character of Galanos's work. Professor Hoefer had already reviewed the first two volumes in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (vol. i, 1846); and later (vol. xxiii, 1869) Dr. Heinrich Uhle referred to these translations with great praise. In the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* (No. 51 and 52 of 1846) Professor Hoefer compares former attempts with the achievement of Galanos, which he characterizes as a colossal monument of untiring endurance and patient devotion—a work of permanent value and helpfulness to Indologists. Finally, I may adduce the opinion of Professor Theodor Benfey who, in reviewing the Πρόδρομος in the *Göttingische gelehrte*

[1] The only English comment I know of is that mentioned by the Editors who, having sent proofs of the Gīta translation to Mr. Clark, the then Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society, received from him a letter saying that 'in reading the translation he felt as if one soul had been parted in twain and set at the two ends of the world, in Greece and in India, each one meditating on the same great philosophical issues'.

Anzeigen (1846, pp. 1095–1104), says that Galanos's versions now make clear many passages which remained inexplicable riddles for former translators, and render possible, not only the correction of corrupt texts, but the explanation of many parts of Indian mythology and religion, which hitherto were not understood; that this was due to the unrivalled knowledge which Galanos had of the languages and the peoples of India; but more especially to the fact that he had won the intimate friendship and confidence of the Brahmans as no other European had ever done before him, and that he was thus enabled to obtain from them much that was jealously preserved by oral tradition only. Benfey and also Professors A. Weber and Christian Lassen consider Galanos's translation as a great ornament of modern Greek literature; and German critics generally point out the fact that several of these translations were never before attempted in any European language, while of others the original texts were not even known to exist.

But it is not only the faithfulness and excellence of the translations which are so remarkable. Even a casual reader would be struck by the great value of the notes constituting, as they do, a veritable storehouse of Indian lore. They interpret allegories, supply historical data, elucidate mythological traditions; explain the names and the attributes of Indian deities, give parallel passages from Greek philosophers; account for obscure beliefs and popular sayings. Even the terminology of botany and zoology in India is made clear and easily conceivable; and of several passages he gives also a paraphrase, thus investing in a beautiful and lucid Greek form many a mystical passage of Oriental phraseology. And with it all he joins a playful humour, showing that he never succumbed to the dark and oppressive morbidity of Asiatic asceticism. For instance, he writes to his friend, the Orthodox Archimandrite Gregory, who was sailing from Calcutta for Constantinople: 'I pray both the Ocean-Lord Poseidon and the Indian Varuṅa to give thee fair voyage, going and returning.'

As in his correspondence we have a faithful portrayal of the intensely human and lovable side of his nature; so in his notes we see evidence of a well-balanced mind, of a calm judgement, of a rare critical faculty. He is in love with the subject to which he devoted his life. But he has not been enslaved by that love. We do not find in him what we often observe in enthusiastic devotees to some special branch of art or literature, or to the works of some particular author, who gradually lose the faculty of reasoning, and become blind, I had almost said fanatical, worshippers of their idol. Galanos's studies did not overwhelm his judgement: they did not enslave his mind. He remained their master. His early training in the writings and the philosophy of the Greeks, made it possible for him to maintain a critical attitude;

while his clearness of vision enabled him to appreciate to the full all that is lofty and true and beautiful in the literature of India.

He was aware that in that land of abnormal extremes belief in the marvellous and the terrible exercises an irresistible fascination over its inhabitants. He understood that this was mainly due to the physical surroundings. As Buckle says,[1] in comparing Indian with Greek evolution: 'In the great centre of Asiatic civilization the energies of the human race are confined, as it were intimidated, by the surrounding phenomena . . . all teaching Man of his feebleness and his inability to cope with natural forces . . . The tendency of the surrounding phenomena was, in India, to inspire fear; in Greece, to give confidence.' Hence those monstrous and terror-inspiring divinities, which breathe fire and revel in blood. Galanos was aware that besides these disturbing physical conditions the inhabitants of that land had laboured from time immemorial under three fatal circumstances. They had never known liberty: the whole peninsula had repeatedly been overrun and subjugated by alien conquerors. Their political thraldom had been aggravated by an all-pervading sacerdotalism. Finally, they were handicapped by a complex system of castes, which checked progress and made development impossible.

In presence of such conditions a highly trained and cultured intellect like that of Galanos, balanced and fortified on the one hand by an inquiring mind, and on the other by a tolerant and altruistic disposition, could but seek to separate the wheat from the chaff. He discerned and adopted all that was pure in Hindu teaching. But he rejected metaphysical fantasies; he could not regard philosophy from a fantastic and quasi-religious aspect. In philology he was too well grounded to listen with anything but a smile to such puerile derivations as 'Pythagoras from *Buddha-guru*, teacher of knowledge'. Nor could he adhere to irrational theories and extravagant superstitions, such as can be acceptable only to an intelligence absolutely untrained in logic, or to theurgic and divinatory rites, which must ensure the dissent of those who conceive morality aright, and extend goodwill to all men, in all truth, and in all honesty.

Galanos had before him the advice which the upright and judicious Eusebius, the Neo-Platonist, gave to his young pupil and friend Julian, when he related to him the magical and theurgic wonders of the charlatan Maximus: 'Astonished for the nonce by that theatrical miracle-maker, we left. But thou, do not marvel at all, even as I did not; but rather consider how great a matter is purification by means of reason.'

[1] *History of Civilization*, i. 125–7.

The Count Goblet d'Alviella, in his *Ce que l'Inde doit à la Grèce*, has shown to what a remarkable degree the regenerating flame of Ancient Greece had penetrated into the heart of Asia, and influenced the science and art of India. It is the continuity of that Greek tradition, the love of inquiry and enlightenment, which has bequeathed to the learned world the life work of Demetrius Galanos.

SECTION VI

RELIGIONS OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

By SALOMON REINACH

After having duly acknowledged the honour of presiding over this Greco-Roman section of our Congress, it would perhaps be my duty, before we set to work, before we hear and discuss new contributions to our knowledge, to present this audience with a condensed report of the progress of scientific study in Greek and Roman religion since the last Congress held at Basel in 1904. It was, indeed, my intention to do so; but reflection has taught me that if such a *résumé* should be useful, it must be very long, and that, if short, it would only bring to your hearing a series of names and titles, more interesting to the crude bibliographer than to the student of religion and mythology. Only a few weeks ago, Dr. Gruppe, of Berlin, has put together, in a stately volume of 650 pages, the abstract and criticism of the work done in our field from 1898 to 1905. Now, from 1905 to this day, the activity of philologists and archaeologists has been, even more than in the preceding period, devoted to topics of classical mythology and religion; such books as Dr. Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States* (vols. iii and iv), as Dr. Frazer's *Early History of Kingship* and *Adonis*, as Prof. Toutain's *Cultes païens dans l'Empire romain*, as Prof. Cumont's *Religions Orientales*, not to mention many others of importance, cannot possibly be summed up in a few pages, nor appreciated with due regard without a rather full consideration of the general ideas which characterize or underlie their authors' views. So I must be content with submitting to your kind appreciation a few remarks about the actual tendencies of our studies, in the measure in which I feel capable of forming a personal estimate about the huge literature which books and periodicals in many languages are continually pouring forth for our benefit.

It seems to me that it would be very premature to chant a *De Profundis* on the wrecks of the exegetical methods and theories which were flourishing twenty years ago. Though it be evident that the so-called anthropological school is steadily gaining ground and is more sympathetic to younger scholars than any other, the different systems based on euhemerism, on ancestor-worship, on solar and astrological myths, can by no means be considered as discarded.

Prof. Tylor's animistic theory is now, I believe, universally admitted; but the upholders of more recent ones are still engaged in warfare. I have even been struck of late by some symptoms of reaction against the extensive use of anthropological documents and the comparative method on a large scale, which strives to elucidate the problems of Greek and Roman mythology by adducing evidence from the beliefs and customs of savage peoples. Dr. Farnell is decidedly adverse to the idea of Greek totemism; Prof. Toutain seems generally diffident about the admissibility of far-reaching comparisons; even my lamented friend, Prof. Dieterich, in his memoir on the origin of the Greek theatre, which has been published after his untimely death, entered a protest against the use of analogy, as advocated, in the present instance, by Dr. Preuss, and, paraphrasing the credo of the Moslim, wrote that there is but one great god, Dionysos, and one artist superlatively great, Aeschylos. Renan used to speak of what he called the Greek miracle, meaning by that an effort of human genius which had occurred only once in history and remained unparalleled. The anthropological school naturally admits differences in quality, but is not ready to hoist the Greeks, or the Hebrews, or any other people, out of the reach of the laws which preside over the evolution of the human mind. If Dieterich did not proffer such a heresy, he seems at least to have felt some inclination towards it. More than that. In spite of the close parallels supplied by the mediaeval origins of our modern theatre in Europe, which enables us to dispense with Pawnee or Japanese examples, he would not admit that the sufferings of the slain god Dionysos claim any part in the genesis of Greek tragedy. Of course, I do not mean to discuss the views which he has expounded with his usual insight and scholarship; I only note, as a warning against onesidedness, that Dieterich himself, one of the writers who has most strongly vindicated the religious import of Orphism, has sought in a quite different line the explanation of facts which the belief in the high antiquity of Orphic ideas seems readily to supply.

Indeed, it is possible that future inquiry, and a more comprehensive appreciation of the mass of literary work done in the first years of this century, may lead to the conclusion, already hinted at by more than one scholar, that Orphism, as well as totemism, has become a hobby, and an overridden hobby too. Being conscious of having been myself one of the roughriders, I do not yet feel disposed to apologize nor to recant; but what history teaches us about the rapid growth and the no less rapid decline of systems must always be present to our minds when we believe that we have struck the truth

at its very root. *Cadent quae nunc sunt in honore*, said the poet, and he also said, in the same strain, *Multa renascentur*. These last words occur to my memory when I witness the actual revival of the hypotheses on astral mythology, the *Astralmythen*. No doubt, such unscientific stuff as Dupuy's *Origine de tous les cultes* is discredited for ever; but some of Dupuy's favourite ideas are making their way upwards again, in a more scientific habit, of course, though occasionally with not more soberness. The question is rife: what is the bearing of primitive astrology and star-worship on the formation of Oriental and Greek myths? We may, for the moment, answer by a *non liquet*, but it is certain that the learned work of Prof. Bouché-Leclercq on Greek astrology, the publication of forgotten astrological treatises by Prof. Cumont and his admirable lectures at the Collège de France, where the religious importance of astrology has been so forcibly emphasized, cannot fail to make us once more turn our eyes to the starry heavens, after we have, perhaps, dwelt too exclusively on the earthly and psychological elements of cult and myth.

Whatsoever new theories and new moods of thought the near future may hold in store for us, it seems impossible that the well-trodden ground, conquered and explored by the schools of such pioneers as Mannhardt, McLennan, and Robertson Smith, will ever be considered as delusive fairy land and abandoned by science to dilettantism. Facts have been collected, parallels have been traced by thousands, which no evolution of scientific principles can nullify. New facts and parallels may be, and must be, collected, in altogether different provinces of human thought, and give rise to new interpretations which may seem preferable to the former ones; but knowledge added to knowledge is never destructive; the day must come when it will prove constructive and enable us to frame some more complete synthesis, founded on a broader and richer survey of religious facts.

When the scholars of the nineteenth century created the comparative philology of Aryan, Semitic, and Romance languages, their first enthusiasm was content with noting down and heaping up analogies bearing on the vocabulary and syntax of these connected idioms. Then, about 1880, a school began to rise which insisted more upon the differences, the real or apparent irregularities, and strove to account for them by perfecting or remodelling the general principles of inquiry. Something of the same sort is going on just now in the more recently explored dominions of comparative religions and mythologies. As M. Van Gennep has aptly observed, we now possess enormous storehouses of analogies, the famous works of English scholars, such as Mr. Frazer and Mr. Sidney Hartland, being the

best known and the best digested of all. Of course, the treasure is not exhausted, and many more gold nuggets, or, I would say, more twigs of the golden bough, may still be collected in the recesses of folklore and primitive custom; but the hour has come when we must go beyond the analogies and the pleasure their discovery causes us; we must take up the study of differences, which, comparable, in that respect, to the variations of phonetic laws, should, when carefully investigated, give a key to many a delicate lock as yet neglected in the vast storehouse of our knowledge. Even confined to the comparative study of Greek and Roman religions, that more refined or fastidious method leads to new results, by compelling us to distinguish between kindred phenomena which have sometimes been thrown together, and unduly bear what I would call the same label.

I will not detain you any longer with these rather vague considerations about method. The scientific value and soundness of a method becomes apparent by its effects only, and a convincing memoir on a given point enlightens us more than any amount of methodological talk. Such memoirs, we feel sure, are forthcoming during the few hours we are spending together. My part in the chair will be that of an attentive listener, and I am certain that I shall never have to interfere in the course of our associated labour, except to express your recognition to the readers whom we now feel anxious to hear.

2

L'HISTOIRE DES RELIGIONS ET LE TOTÉMISME

PAR J. TOUTAIN

DEPUIS que l'attention des savants a été attirée sur le totémisme et les phénomènes religieux qui se rattachent étroitement à l'organisation sociale des clans totémiques, une méthode nouvelle est née en matière d'histoire des religions. 'Dès le début du XVIIIe siècle,' écrit M. Salomon Reinach, 'les missionnaires français furent frappés de l'importance des totems dans la vie religieuse, sociale et politique des indigènes de l'Amérique du Nord. L'un d'eux, le Jésuite Lafitau, eut même l'idée, vraiment géniale pour l'époque, d'appliquer les faits de totémisme qu'il étudiait chez les Iroquois à l'interprétation d'un type figuré de la mythologie grecque, celui de la Chimère. Pendant les deux premiers tiers du XIXe siècle, missionnaires et voyageurs recueillirent un peu partout des faits analogues à ceux que l'on avait observés au XVIIIe siècle en Amérique. On s'aperçut également que des faits de même ordre avaient été signalés au Pérou dès le XVIe siècle et, bien plus anciennement, par les écrivains de l'antiquité classique, Hérodote, Diodore, Pausanias, Élien, etc. L'auteur de l'ouvrage célèbre sur le mariage primitif, McLennan, proposa en 1869 de reconnaître des survivances des coutumes et des croyances totémiques dans un grand nombre de civilisations antiques et récentes. Il ne fut guère écouté. Vers 1885, la question fut reprise, avec plus de savoir et de critique, par MM. Robertson Smith et Frazer; elle n'a pas cessé depuis d'être à l'ordre du jour de la science, mais plus particulièrement en Angleterre, où MM. Lubbock, Tylor, Herbert Spencer, Andrew Lang, Jevons, Cook, Grant Allen, s'en sont occupés ou s'en occupent encore.'[1] En France, c'est le savant directeur du Musée de Saint-Germain qui s'est consacré, avec une ardeur de néophyte, à la diffusion de cette méthode : il n'hésite pas à la formuler en ces termes : '. . . Partout où les éléments du mythe ou du rite comportent un animal ou un végétal sacré, un dieu ou un héros déchiré ou sacrifié, une mascarade de fidèles, une prohibition alimentaire, le devoir de l'exégète informé est de chercher le mot de l'énigme dans l'arsenal des *tabous* et des *totems*.'[2]

[1] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, i, pp. 9–10.

[2] Id., ibid., p. vii.

I

En quoi exactement consiste cette méthode ? Quelles sont, si l'on peut ainsi parler, les opérations dont elle se compose ?

A. La première opération est un rapprochement comparatif entre un rite grec, latin, égyptien, etc., et une coutume pratiquée soit aujourd'hui encore par certaines tribus australiennes ou africaines, soit au XVIe siècle et plus récemment par telles ou telles populations de l'Amérique précolombienne. On compare ainsi le culte que chacun des nomes de l'antique Égypte rendait à un animal sacré avec les témoignages de respect que telle tribu australienne donne à l'animal qui lui sert de totem ; on compare l'interdiction hébraïque de manger de la chair de porc avec la répugnance que les clans totémiques ont à manger la chair de leurs totems ; on compare les cérémonies des cultes égyptien, grec, romain, où l'on revêtait de la peau d'un animal sacrifié soit la statue, soit les prêtres ou les prêtresses d'une divinité, avec la coutume qu'observent les hommes de certains clans totémiques de se parer tantôt de la dépouille complète de leur totem, tantôt de certains ornements, plumes, cornes, etc., provenant de cet animal ; on compare les procédés divinatoires fondés en Grèce et en Italie sur l'observation des oiseaux avec la croyance répandue chez quelques peuplades océaniennes que les totems annoncent l'avenir aux hommes de leur clan ; on compare les noms propres grecs et romains, dérivés de noms d'animaux, avec l'habitude que les clans totémiques et les individus de ces clans ont de porter le nom de leurs totems, etc., etc. On obtient ainsi une série d'équivalences, d'analogies, plus ou moins exactes, plus ou moins précises, entre tels ou tels rites des religions de l'antiquité classique et tels ou tels usages observés chez les peuples organisés en clans totémiques.

B. On ne se borne pas à constater ces équivalences, ces analogies. On s'efforce de les expliquer. Il est impossible de songer à une transmission directe, s'opérant de peuple à peuple ; il n'y a certainement pas eu emprunt des tribus australiennes aux peuples méditerranéens, ni des peuples méditerranéens aux tribus australiennes. D'autre part, il serait singulièrement téméraire ou paradoxal d'admettre entre les Aruntas de l'Australie et les Grecs, entre les Tlinkits de l'Amérique du Nord et les Italiotes, une communauté primitive comparable à celle des peuples de race aryenne. Si donc il y avait en Égypte, en Syrie, en Grèce, en Italie des rites comparables à ceux qui existent aujourd'hui encore chez diverses peuplades australiennes, on en conclut que les Égyptiens, les habitants de la Syrie, les Grecs, les Italiotes ont passé par la même organisation sociale, l'organisation totémique, et que ces rites sont à l'époque historique des survivances d'une période antérieure, sur laquelle d'ailleurs tout renseignement

fait défaut. Cette conclusion n'est étayée par aucun document, par aucun indice, même le plus minime. Elle est obtenue par la seule déduction. M. S. Reinach proclame très haut le droit pour l'historien des religions d'user de la déduction et de la logique : 'Assurément personne ne soutient plus, avec Hegel, que tout ce qui est rationnel soit réel ; mais il est certain que tout ce qui est réel est rationnel. On peut donc, très légitimement, user de la déduction et de la logique pour reconstruire l'état d'une société qu'on connaît seulement par quelques faits généraux ou par des survivances. C'est ce qui s'appelle faire de la paléontologie sociale. Aussi est-il parfaitement licite de parler du totémisme ou du matriarcat des Grecs ou des Celtes, alors que les Grecs ou les Celtes que nous fait connaître l'histoire n'étaient pas totémistes et ignoraient la filiation utérine.'[1] On se transporte ainsi très aisément par la pensée dans une société totémique, que l'on croit et que l'on affirme avoir précédé, de plus ou moins de siècles, l'organisation sociale des temps historiques chez les peuples riverains ou voisins de la Méditerranée.

C. On ne s'en tient même pas là. On se laisse entraîner à généraliser bien davantage. Outre les faits précis et particuliers, outre les rites bien définis qu'il est possible et intéressant de comparer avec des usages également précis et particuliers, avec des coutumes également bien définies constatées chez tels ou tels clans totémiques, on s'empare, on prétend avoir le droit de s'emparer de tous les cas où un animal, un végétal, même un objet inanimé joue un rôle, tient une place quelconque dans un mythe ou dans un rite religieux. Un totem en effet peut être un animal, un végétal, un objet inanimé. Dès lors le totémisme devient l'explication universelle de tous les détails de la religion et du culte. Sans doute, M. S. Reinach reconnaît que 'le système des tabous et des totems n'est pas une clef bonne à ouvrir toutes les serrures' ; mais nous nous demandons quelles sont les serrures qu'on n'essaiera pas d'ouvrir à l'aide de cette clef, quand nous lisons quelques lignes plus bas cette phrase déjà citée précédemment : '*Partout où les éléments du mythe ou du rite comportent un animal ou un végétal sacré, un dieu ou un héros déchiré ou sacrifié, une mascarade de fidèles, une prohibition alimentaire, le devoir de l'exégète informé est de chercher le mot de l'énigme dans l'arsenal des tabous et des totems.*'

Voilà, si nous ne nous trompons pas, en quoi consiste la méthode nouvelle, que MM. S. Reinach et Durkheim, après les érudits et les savants anglais dont les noms sont mentionnés plus haut, se sont efforcés de mettre en pratique. Il nous semble que cette méthode suppose divers postulats. Ce sont ces postulats qu'il convient d'examiner maintenant. S'ils sont fragiles ou incertains, la méthode elle-même s'écroule avec eux.

[1] S. Reinach, op. cit., p. 84.

II

Le premier, le plus important de ces postulats, celui sur lequel tout le raisonnement repose, peut être ainsi formulé : 'L'organisation en clans totémiques est une forme sociale nécessairement antérieure, dans l'évolution de l'humanité, aux formes sociales qui caractérisaient les peuples de l'antiquité classique.'

Peut-on admettre sans discussion la vérité de ce postulat ? Nous ne le pensons pas. Il n'est nullement certain pour nous que les populations totémiques soient des populations primitives, et non pas des populations dégénérées.

Au début d'un article fort important publié en 1899 dans le *Fortnightly Review* sous le titre *The origin of totemism*, M. Frazer, pour prouver que les Australiens sont bien des primitifs, mentionne l'idée qu'ils se font de la conception : 'Dans l'opinion de ces sauvages,' écrit-il, 'toute conception est ce que nous avons l'habitude d'appeler une immaculée conception ; elle a pour cause l'entrée d'un esprit dans le corps de la mère, indépendamment de toute union sexuelle. Un peuple aussi ignorant de la plus élémentaire des lois naturelles est vraiment au dernier degré de l'échelle parmi les sauvages.'[1] La conclusion de M. Frazer nous semble fort discutable. Quelle idée trouvons-nous à la base de cette croyance australienne ? C'est l'idée de la transmigration du principe vital immatériel, de l'âme. Est-ce là une idée *primitive* ? Et s'il nous plaisait d'opposer hypothèse à hypothèse, ne pourrions-nous pas nous demander si cette idée n'est pas, au contraire, la survivance déformée, l'écho lointain et dénaturé de quelque philosophie spiritualiste ?

Voici encore une autre théorie de M. Frazer. Dans la 2e édition anglaise du *Golden Bough*, ce savant a exprimé sur l'origine du totémisme une opinion qui sans doute paraît avoir été sérieusement ébranlée depuis lors, mais qui n'en est pas moins intéressante pour la question qui nous occupe. La conception fondamentale du totémisme se rattacherait, d'après cette théorie, à l'idée de l'âme extérieure ; le totem serait l'animal, le végétal ou l'objet inanimé dans lequel un individu pourrait déposer son âme, afin de se rendre invulnérable ; et cependant cette âme, ainsi enfermée dans un être ou un objet extérieur et lointain, conserve des relations très étroites avec le corps auquel elle appartient. Si l'être ou l'objet où elle se trouve enfermée subit quelque atteinte, l'individu, à qui elle appartient, souffre ; si cet être ou cet objet est détruit, l'individu meurt.[2] Dans cette hypothèse, le totémisme aurait pour condition nécessaire la croyance à l'existence de l'âme distincte du corps, capable de sortir de ce corps

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, 1899, p. 649.

[2] *Le Rameau d'or*, trad. franç., t. ii, p. 527 et suiv.

tout en continuant à l'animer, et d'exercer sur lui, à quelque distance que ce soit, une action toute-puissante. En vérité, de telles idées sont-elles primitives ? Et n'avons-nous pas le droit de contester l'affirmation d'après laquelle l'organisation sociale, à laquelle elles sont nécessaires, est forcément antérieure, dans l'évolution de l'humanité, à l'organisation sociale des Égyptiens, des Syriens, des Grecs, des Italiotes de l'antiquité classique ?

De ces observations, nous conclurons, non pas que l'organisation totémique correspond à une période de décadence, mais qu'il est téméraire d'en affirmer *a priori* le caractère primitif.

D'autre part possédons-nous des indices concrets qui nous permettent de déterminer au moins approximativement la place de l'organisation totémique dans l'histoire de la civilisation ? Des observations ont-elles été faites qui aient permis de voir dans quel sens, vers quelle forme nouvelle évoluaient les clans totémiques, ou encore de quelle forme sociale ils étaient partis pour aboutir au totémisme ?

Certains clans totémiques, dans l'Amérique du Nord, sont connus, sinon étudiés, depuis près de trois siècles. Il ne semble pas qu'une évolution se soit produite chez ces tribus, qu'il s'y soit marqué une tendance à passer du totémisme à la zoolâtrie ou au thériomorphisme. On dira sans doute que la période d'observation est encore trop courte, et que d'autre part l'influence européenne a fait passer directement maints individus de ces clans totémiques au monothéisme chrétien. Il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que, sur le seul champ d'études un peu étendu que l'on possède, on n'a pu relever aucun indice favorable à la thèse d'après laquelle le totémisme serait une conception religieuse nécessairement antérieure au polythéisme tel qu'il a existé chez la plupart des peuples de l'antiquité classique.

En outre, quelques observations particulières ont été faites, quelques idées personnelles ont été émises qui sont nettement contraires à la thèse totémiste.

La seule population organisée en clans totémiques qui ait été observée scientifiquement est celle des Aruntas de l'Australie centrale. On sait avec quel soin, quel souci d'exactitude et de précision, les usages des Aruntas ont été décrits par MM. Spencer et Gillen.[1] Or il résulte, sans aucune contestation possible, de leurs travaux, que les Aruntas possèdent des traditions suivant lesquelles leurs ancêtres n'observaient aucune des règles totémiques actuellement en vigueur dans cette tribu. Par exemple, chez les clans dont l'Émou est aujourd'hui le totem, les traditions de ces clans représentent les ancêtres comme ayant toujours eu et pratiqué le droit de manger cet animal. De même, la règle de l'exogamie n'était pas observée ; un homme

[1] *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, Londres, 1899.

épousait toujours une femme de son propre clan. Et M. Frazer, après avoir rappelé ces traditions, conclut : 'Ainsi les tribus de l'Australie centrale ont des traditions très nettes, très précises, d'après lesquelles jadis leurs ancêtres tuaient et mangeaient leurs totems, et épousaient toujours des femmes de leur propre clan totémique.'[1] Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon que le totémisme n'existait pas chez les ancêtres des Australiens actuels ? La gravité de ces observations n'a point échappé à M. S. Reinach ; il s'est efforcé d'en détruire l'impression. A propos des traditions recueillies par MM. Spencer et Gillen, il se contente de dire : 'Que valent de pareilles traditions ? Rien ou peu de chose.' En vérité, c'est là faire trop bon marché des documents. M. S. Reinach, qui accorde pleine et entière confiance aux récits des Jésuites du XVIIIe siècle sur l'organisation religieuse et sociale des indigènes de l'Amérique du Nord[2], ne veut tenir aucun compte des traditions que les Aruntas possèdent sur leurs propres ancêtres : est-ce là une méthode vraiment critique et scientifique ? Pour nous, ce qui ressort sans aucun doute des observations faites et des traditions recueillies par MM. Spencer et Gillen, c'est que chez les Australiens, ou du moins dans certaines tribus australiennes, le totémisme est de date récente et que l'organisation proprement totémique y a succédé à des formes sociales où les règles caractéristiques du totémisme n'étaient pas observées. Le totémisme est donc loin d'être un état social primitif.

Cette conclusion n'est-elle pas, dans une certaine mesure, confirmée par l'idée que M. Frazer a développée dans la 2e édition du *Golden Bough* sur l'origine des totems de clans, idée qui dérive d'ailleurs assez nettement de sa théorie, citée plus haut, sur l'origine de la conception totémique elle-même ? D'après M. Frazer, le totem du clan, par suite l'organisation sociale en clans totémiques, ne serait qu'une extension, une généralisation du totem individuel. Dans certaines tribus africaines, chez certains peuples indigènes de l'Amérique, chaque individu se croit protégé spécialement par un animal qu'il appelle son *nagual*, son *idhlozi*, etc.[3] Qu'au lieu de protéger un seul individu, l'animal soit censé protéger un groupe tout entier, le totem individuel se transforme aussitôt en totem de clan. Le clan s'impose à l'égard de cet animal les mêmes devoirs que l'individu à l'égard de son *nagual*, de son *idhlozi*, etc., etc. Ainsi le totémisme proprement dit, le totémisme de clan, serait logiquement et historiquement postérieur au totémisme individuel. Or l'idée, qui se trouve au fond du totémisme individuel, est aisée à retrouver chez les divers peuples de l'antiquité classique : c'est l'idée que chaque individu est placé

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, 1899, p. 655 et suiv.
[2] *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, t. i, p. 9.
[3] *Le Rameau d'or*, trad. franç., t. ii, p. 515 et suiv.

sous la protection d'un être puissant et bienveillant, qui se manifeste le plus souvent sous la forme d'un animal. Le *genius* latin, le δαίμων grec, n'étaient-ils pas en général représentés par un serpent ? Si la théorie de M. Frazer est juste, si vraiment la forme la plus ancienne du totémisme est le totémisme individuel, nous sommes en droit de dire que les Grecs et les Latins ont connu celle-là à l'époque historique, mais qu'ils n'ont point connu le totémisme collectif parce que leur évolution sociale et religieuse s'est faite autrement, dans un autre sens, dans une direction différente.

Mais nous ne voulons rien affirmer en cette matière. Il serait contraire à notre méthode et à notre conception de l'histoire de substituer des affirmations hypothétiques aux affirmations que nous contestons précisément parce qu'elles sont hypothétiques. Nous nous sommes seulement efforcés de montrer que le caractère primitif ou antérieur du totémisme n'est rien moins que prouvé. Il n'est pas non plus certain que les tribus totémiques soient des populations primitives. La vie sauvage qu'elles mènent n'est pas un argument en faveur de cette thèse. Nous avons rencontré en Tunisie, dans les riches plaines qu'arrose la Medjerda, presque sur l'emplacement de villes antiques où s'élevèrent de magnifiques monuments, des indigènes qui ne savaient même pas leur âge. Ils étaient, non point des primitifs, mais bien des dégénérés. Cette décadence ne pourrait-elle pas être également constatée en Asie-Mineure, dans les vallées du Tigre et de l'Euphrate, sur les plateaux mexicains et péruviens ?

Le premier, le plus important des postulats, sur lesquels repose la méthode totémistique, est donc singulièrement fragile. Il n'est pas prouvé que l'organisation totémique soit, dans l'évolution sociale et religieuse de l'humanité, une forme primitive, ou du moins antérieure à la plupart des autres formes aujourd'hui connues. Il n'est pas davantage prouvé que les tribus organisées en clans totémiques soient des populations en enfance ; elles pourraient tout aussi bien être des peuples dégénérés.

III

Mais, même en admettant comme suffisamment solide ce premier postulat, un second postulat en dérive tout aussitôt. Le voici : 'Tous les peuples, dans tous les pays du globe, ont passé par le totémisme.' Sans ce postulat, en effet, il est impossible de considérer comme survivances d'une organisation totémique disparue les mythes et les rites de l'antiquité classique où il est question soit d'un animal, soit d'un végétal sacré. Ce second postulat est-il moins fragile que le premier ? Peut-il se justifier *a priori* ou *a posteriori* en matière religieuse et en matière sociale ?

A priori, il nous semble que ce postulat implique la méconnaissance

d'une des lois les mieux démontrées aujourd'hui de l'évolution historique, à savoir l'influence du milieu, des conditions géographiques sur la vie et l'organisation des groupements humains. Pour affirmer que partout, dans tous les pays du globe, le totémisme a existé comme il existe encore de nos jours dans certaines régions de l'Amérique et en Australie, il faut ne tenir aucun compte de l'action que le milieu a pu et dû exercer sur l'organisation sociale de la vie collective ; il faut admettre que partout cette organisation a passé par les mêmes stades, se succédant dans le même ordre. On concède seulement que l'évolution a été ici plus lente, là plus rapide ; mais on affirme que les Grecs ou leurs ancêtres ont traversé la même phase où les Aruntas sont arrêtés maintenant ; que les populations de l'Italie ont franchi l'étape à laquelle les Peaux-Rouges étaient arrivés au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle ; que les Égyptiens ont connu les mêmes cadres sociaux dans lesquels les Polynésiens étaient hier ou sont encore aujourd'hui confinés. A un fait général mis en lumière grâce à un nombre considérable d'observations concrètes et particulières, on oppose une pure hypothèse, fondée sur une déduction d'apparence logique. Nous estimons qu'un tel raisonnement est non seulement vain, mais même singulièrement dangereux en histoire.

A posteriori, quelques indices précis nous permettent de considérer ce postulat comme insoutenable. Et d'abord, le totémisme est loin d'exister dans toutes les populations sauvages de notre époque. M. Mauss, dont on ne suspectera pas les opinions en cette matière, écrivait en 1900 dans l'*Année Sociologique* : 'Le totémisme, dans ses formes accusées, ne se retrouve, à notre connaissance, que dans une aire géographique restreinte, et il reste que son universalité n'est pas démontrée.'[1] En Afrique, par exemple, il y a très peu de clans totémiques. Par conséquent, il est inexact d'affirmer que tous les peuples ont dû passer par le totémisme, à un moment quelconque de leur évolution sociale et religieuse. Il y a d'autres formes de la pensée religieuse primitive, par exemple le fétichisme et l'animisme.

En second lieu, on connaît suffisamment aujourd'hui le développement social et l'évolution religieuse de la plupart des peuples aryens pour discerner s'ils ont tous passé par les mêmes phases de développement social et religieux. Oserait-on par exemple affirmer que ce développement s'est fait exactement dans les mêmes conditions chez les Germains ou les Scandinaves et chez les Latins, chez les Celtes et chez les Grecs ? Voudrait-on reconstituer l'histoire sociale primitive des populations de la Grèce d'après ce que l'on sait de l'organisation sociale des Gaulois ? Se permettrait-on de combler avec des éléments empruntés à la Germanie les lacunes qui existent encore dans notre connaissance des institutions sociales des plus anciens habitants de

[1] *Année Sociologique*, iv (1899–1900), p. 164.

l'Italie ? Et cependant, s'il est un résultat incontestable de la philologie comparée, c'est la démonstration de l'unité ethnographique, de la parenté originelle des divers peuples aryens. Allons même plus loin : ne sait-on pas combien l'organisation religieuse et sacerdotale de la cité romaine diffère des institutions religieuses et sacerdotales des villes grecques? Bien téméraire paraîtrait l'historien qui voudrait conclure de celle-ci à celle-là. Voilà des faits qui prouvent, à nos yeux, toute la vanité et tout le péril des efforts tentés pour reconstruire, d'après l'état social et religieux des Aruntas et des Peaux-Rouges, la prétendue période totémique des religions de l'antiquité classique.

C'est donc encore un postulat plus que fragile que celui qui admet l'universalité du totémisme. Or ce postulat n'est pas moins nécessaire que le premier à la méthode de paléontologie sociale si ardemment prônée par M. S. Reinach et ses disciples.

IV

Voici, enfin, un troisième postulat, qu'il suffira d'indiquer pour en faire apparaître aussitôt l'importance : 'Le totémisme est un système social et religieux, dont les caractères essentiels sont parfaitement connus.' Il faut en effet admettre ce postulat, pour pouvoir appliquer la méthode chère à M. Reinach : sinon, on conclurait, non pas du connu à l'inconnu, mais de l'inconnu ou tout au moins de l'incertain à l'inconnu.

Ce postulat a-t-il plus de valeur que les précédents ? Il serait paradoxal de le soutenir aujourd'hui, après toutes les discussions et toutes les controverses auxquelles a donné lieu le totémisme. Il nous paraît inutile d'entrer dans le détail de ces discussions et de ces controverses. Qu'il nous suffise de rappeler les interprétations successives que M. Frazer, avec sa conscience et sa bonne foi vraiment admirables, a données de l'origine et de la vraie nature du totémisme; les exégèses savantes et subtiles de MM. Durkheim et S. Reinach ; la théorie récente de M. A. Lang. Signalons enfin la contradiction flagrante entre la croyance le plus généralement admise au caractère primitif du totémisme et l'opinion de Marillier, que le totémisme, loin d'être un point de départ, est plutôt un aboutissement, une sorte d'impasse des concepts religieux ; que, sous sa forme achevée, il est rebelle à tout progrès.[1] Rappelons enfin, pour montrer combien il est prématuré de vouloir, suivant l'expression de M. S. Reinach, 'formuler le Code du Totémisme,' que la première étude vraiment scientifique d'une tribu totémique, l'étude de MM. Spencer et Gillen

[1] *Revue d'histoire des religions*, t. xxxvi, pp. 208 et 321 ; t. xxxvii, pp. 204 et 345.

sur les Aruntas, a suffi pour modifier très sensiblement les idées précédemment exposées et soutenues en matière de totémisme par des juges aussi compétents que M. Frazer. En vain MM. S. Reinach et Durkheim se sont efforcés de prouver que les observations de MM. Spencer et Gillen ne portaient pas aux idées reçues un coup aussi grave qu'il avait paru d'abord. Il n'en demeure pas moins ceci : jusqu'à la publication du livre des deux voyageurs anglais, on admettait 'que le totémisme est caractérisé par deux faits essentiels : 1° Le respect de la vie du totem, qui n'est ni tué ni mangé, sinon dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, où les fidèles communient et s'imprègnent de divinité en le mangeant ; 2° L'exogamie, à savoir la défense pour le porteur d'un totem d'épouser un individu ayant le même totem, c'est-à-dire appartenant au même clan totémique.'[1] Or, chez les Aruntas, tribu totémique, MM. Spencer et Gillen ont constaté que 'n'existent ni le respect de la vie du totem ni l'exogamie des clans'.[2] Ainsi les premières observations poursuivies avec méthode par deux hommes de science ont démontré que deux caractères considérés comme essentiels du totémisme ne l'étaient point ou du moins l'étaient bien moins qu'on ne pensait auparavant.

Les subtilités les plus ingénieuses seront impuissantes à atténuer la portée d'un tel fait. Ce que nous voulons en retenir, c'est qu'il est parfaitement imprudent d'affirmer que le totémisme soit dès maintenant connu avec assez de précision pour fournir une méthode d'exégèse mythologique et religieuse applicable aux cultes de l'antiquité classique. Le terrain est en vérité trop mouvant encore, il a été trop imparfaitement sondé pour qu'un historien conscient des nécessités de sa tâche et de ses devoirs essaye d'y édifier un système d'interprétation. Au total, quel est à l'heure actuelle le bilan réel des études entreprises par maints savants sur le totémisme ? 1° une masse abondante de faits concrets, observés objectivement surtout en Amérique et en Australie ; ces faits sont différents, parfois même contradictoires ; 2° diverses hypothèses explicatives, qui ont varié à mesure que de nouveaux faits venaient s'ajouter aux faits antérieurement connus, et dont aucune ne rend vraiment compte de la totalité des faits observés. Soyons donc prudents ; ne nous évertuons pas, avec ces seuls matériaux, à vouloir forger une clef qui ouvre, non pas même toutes les serrures, mais beaucoup de serrures à la fois.

V

Ainsi les trois postulats, nécessaires à la méthode d'exégèse mythologique fondée sur le totémisme, nous paraissent être fragiles ou

[1] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, t. i, p. 79.
[2] Id., ibid., p. 80.

contestables. On en conclura avec raison que cette méthode elle-même est fort dangereuse. Dès lors, dans l'état actuel de la science, il est préférable, il est sage de l'écarter. Il convient d'étudier les faits totémiques à part ; il faut essayer de reconnaître si le totémisme, au delà des différences, au delà même des contradictions apparentes depuis longtemps signalées, ne se fonde pas sur quelque principe général, mais il sera nécessaire de ne considérer ce problème comme résolu qu'après la découverte d'un principe qui rendra compte, sérieusement et sans entorse, de tous les faits observés. Jusqu'au moment où cette découverte sera faite, tout historien des religions, qui voudra faire œuvre vraiment historique, devra s'abstenir d'expliquer par de prétendues survivances d'un totémisme antérieur les rites et les mythes encore obscurs de l'antiquité classique. La méthode historique a ses exigences, ses rigueurs, ses limites. N'est-il pas remarquable que l'exégèse, fondée sur le totémisme, ait été surtout admise et pratiquée par des philologues, des littérateurs et des philosophes, surtout critiquée par des historiens ?

3

DEFIXIONUM TABELLAE

By F. B. JEVONS

Where gods are believed in, a man may pray to them to grant him his heart's desire ; and, if he has no belief in magic, they are the only resort he can fly to when his desire is something which it is beyond human power to fulfil. But, where there is belief in magic as well as in the gods, the case is different. If the man does not—for whatever reason—like to ask the gods for what he wants, he may have recourse to magic, and by its aid do what he wants done. As a rule, his reason for employing magic rather than appeal to the gods is that the thing he wants is something which the gods disapprove of, for instance, the death of one of their worshippers. When then we come across a practice which is employed by one member of a community with the object of causing death or disaster to another, we may reasonably regard it as magical rather than religious, as operating independently of the gods rather than by their assistance.

Such a practice we come across in the 'defixionum tabellae'. The object of *defixio* is to cause, if not death, then disaster. Its object, therefore, is magical ; and its means and *modus operandi* also are magical. Its apparatus consists of a tablet of lead, inscribed

with the name of the person to be injured, and 'defixed' with a nail. For those who believe in magic the name of a person is, in a way, identical with the person named; just as, by the same confusion of categories, the image of a person is identical with the person imaged. Hence, whatever is done to the image—whether it be a figure drawn on the sand, or a likeness made of wax or of clay—will be felt by the person imaged. Hence, too, whatever is done to the name of the person, when it is written down, will be felt by the person named. When then we find in Attica names written on lead and defixed by a nail, we may be sure that the person named was supposed to be nailed down as effectually as his name was. This is placed beyond doubt by the fact that many of the tablets contain not merely a name defixed by a nail but also the express statement, 'I nail so and so,' e.g. Wuensch, *Defixionum Tabellae*, 66, καταδῶ Εὐάρατον. That in nailing the name of the person the worker of magic was nailing the person named is clear from Wuensch 57 ὄνομα καταδῶ καὶ αὐτόν. And when all the parts of the person named and nailed are enumerated, it is clear that the object of the enumeration is to ensure that the person is nailed down effectually, wholly, and completely. And the object of nailing him down thus tightly could only be to prevent him from doing anything. It might be desired to prevent him from doing anything whatever successfully—καὶ μήποτε αὐτὸς εὖ πράττοι, 64—or to prevent him from doing some particular thing, e.g. from speaking successfully in a lawsuit lying between the person defixing and the person defixed, e.g. 66.

It is this negative or prohibitive quality which is the essential and constant feature in the Attic tablets of defixion. Even in later non-Attic tablets this feature is rarely lost, and never entirely.

In many of the Attic tablets the worker of magic both puts a nail through the tablet and says, 'I nail' the person or the name, καταδῶ Εὐάρατον or ὄνομα καταδῶ. But in some cases he is content with the written declaration that he nails the man, and does not feel it necessary to put an actual nail through the tablet. In principle, of course, the written statement with a nail must be earlier than the written statements which dispense with a nail; for unless there is a nail there is no actual defixio. But we cannot say with regard to any given tablet which has no nail, that it must be later than any tablet with a nail; for the new tendency would not, the moment it first appeared, there and then kill out the old practice. These considerations will also have their weight when we turn to consider the tablets which contain a proper name and nothing more—no *verbum defigendi*. Originally, the worker of magic would inscribe the name on the tablet of lead and then defix it with a nail, saying, but not writing, καταδῶ τὸν δεῖνα. Eighteen of the tablets, containing names and no *verbum defigendi*, which are given by Wuensch, have been

thus actually 'nailed'. But eventually the utterance of the formula over the inscribed name came to be sufficient without actually hammering a real nail into the tablet. Twenty-one of the tablets, containing names and no *verbum defigendi*, which are given by Wuensch, dispense with the nail. But of course they are not all therefore later than those that have a nail. To those recorded by Wuensch must be added fourteen from the Piraeus, and no less than 436 from Euboea, which are given by Audollent (*Defixionum Tabellae*), as containing names but not defixed with a nail. And these 436 are assigned by Lenormant and Bechtel to the fifth century B.C.

In the fourth century B.C. we find tablets containing names and no verb (Aud. 46, 53–59, 60–63, 90) still in use. We also find tablets with no verb, not only containing the name, but also enumerating the members, of the person to be defixed (W. 47–50, 51, 56, 66, 78; Aud. 49, 64–66). Further, however, we find in those tablets which can be assigned to the fourth century B.C. quite a new departure: we find gods invoked (W. 89, 100, 87, 101, 107; Aud. 39, 50). Gods are invoked in seven tablets, or (if we include Aud. 67–69 which may or may not belong to the fourth century) gods are invoked in ten tablets. No gods are invoked in twenty-five tablets.

The deities invoked are Hermes, Ge, Persephone, Hecate; and, if we include the tablets of doubtful date already mentioned, Tethys and the ἀτέλεστοι. Taking first Hermes, Ge, Persephone, and Hecate, we find that the epithet κάτοχος, and once the imperative κατέχετε, is used in connexion with them. About the meaning of κάτοχος there can be little doubt: it is used elsewhere (*C. I.* 538) of the earth, and (Hesych.) of the sepulchral stone, which holds down the dead, and prevents them from returning. In that sense, therefore, as Boeckh (*C. I.* 539) pointed out, it was the function of Ge and Hermes originally to hold down the dead and the dead alone; and it was by extending the original function of these deities from holding down the dead to holding down the living, that the worker of magic brought them into his service, and reinforced his defixion by invoking, for the purpose of holding down the living, the deities who possessed the power of holding down the dead. This combination of magic and religion begins with a juxtaposition of the two formulae, 'I nail them down,' 'do thou hold them down,' Ἑρμῆ κάτοχε κάτεχε (W. 89, 100). The juxtaposition becomes fusion when (in W. 87) the phrase καταδῶ τὸν δεῖνα becomes καταδῶ τὸν δεῖνα πρὸς τὸν κάτοχον Ἑρμῆ. And the magical element disappears from view when the writer of the tablet no longer undertakes to defix his enemy but says (W. 107) Φερίνικος πρὸς τὸν Ἑρμῆν τὸν χθόνιον καταδεδέσθω, or (Aud. 50) prays, Ἑρμῆ κάτοχε καὶ Φερσεφόνη κατέχετε τὸν δεῖνα. All three of these stages of evolution are given side by side in an interesting inscription (Aud.

52) of the third century B.C. which first, in the fashion of the fifth century, enumerates the names simply of the persons defixed, with a nail driven through them; then proceeds to the explicit statement, in the fashion of the fourth century, Κέρκιν καταδῶ καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα τὰ Κέρκιδος; and third, prays to Hermes, Ἑρμῆ χθόνιε, ταῦτα οὕτω κάτεχε.

The reason why those who practised defixion turned to Hermes and Ge before any other gods is clearly to be found, as Boeckh pointed out, in the ambiguity of the epithet κάτοχος, which was already applied to them. But a magician does not usually, in the act of working his magic, pray to the gods; for the simple reason that magic is intended to enable a man to get something which the gods, as gods, cannot approve of. If, therefore, the person who defixed his enemy could, whilst defixing him, invoke the assistance of the gods, it must have been because the prayer which he made was not of such a nature as to be offensive to the gods but was one which they might listen to. Now the object of defixion was to nail down a man so that he could do no injury. And if the person practising defixion was a person fearing to suffer wrong, he might legitimately pray to the gods to defend him, their servant. And that this might be the attitude assumed is clearly shown by W. 98, φίλη Γῆ βοήθει μοι· ἀδικούμενος γὰρ ὑπὸ Εὐρυπτολέμου καὶ Ξενοφῶντος καταδῶ αὐτούς. As a matter of fact, of those Attic tablets which state the reason for the defixion, the majority allege fear of injury as the motive: and the injury feared is generally a threatened lawsuit, whence the persons defixed are so and so καὶ τοὺς συνδίκους or τοὺς κατηγόρους.

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Tablets of this type, however, present us with an unstable relation between magic and religion. I say 'unstable' not on *a priori* grounds, but on the evidence of the inscriptions. On *a priori* grounds, indeed, we might expect that either the religious element would expel the magical, so that the ἐγὼ καταδῶ would disappear, and the prayer, κάτοχε κάτεχε (or some equivalent), would alone remain; or we might expect the magical element to subdue the religious element to its own hue. As a matter of fact, we find both things happening, but the latter eventually triumphant.

Even in a fourth-century tablet (Aud. 50) we find the ἐγὼ καταδῶ dropped altogether and nothing left but the prayer, Ἑρμῆ κάτοχε καὶ Φερσεφόνη κατέχετε. And towards the end of the third century (Aud. 212) or beginning of the second century (Aud. 1–13) we find tablets which are evidently evolved from the defixionis tabella, but which no longer contain either any magic or any defixion. These tablets are evidently evolved from defixionum tabellae: they are written on lead (with the exception of 212), and are intended to put constraint on the person against whom they are directed. But they differ in other and striking respects from defixions; and the differences all point in the same direction. First, whereas in defixions the writer gives in full, and often repeatedly, the name and description of the person defixed, but carefully omits his own name, in these tablets the writer's own name is given in full, but that of the person against whom they are directed is not given. Next, whereas defixionum tabellae were carefully concealed (as the waxen images, κήρινα μιμήματα πεπλασμένα—through which nails or needles were stuck for the purpose of defixion, in the same way that nails were driven through the names inscribed on the defixionum tabellae—were, Plato tells us, *Laws* 933 B, buried εἴτ' ἐπὶ θύραις εἴτ' ἐπὶ τριόδοις εἴτ' ἐπὶ μνήμασι), these tablets, so far from being concealed, were published: they were nailed up in the temple of a deity in order that all men might read them. Those from Cnidus (Aud. 1–13) were discovered by Newton in the

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τέμενος of Demeter by the side of fragments of statues of Demeter, and the inscriptions themselves are addressed to Demeter by name. Newton was undoubtedly right in conjecturing that 'they were probably suspended on walls (τεμένους), as they are pierced with holes at the corners'. With regard to the remaining tablet from Bruttium (Aud. 212), Audollent admits that 'lamminam aeneam, quippe quae vix complicari quiret, non latuisse in sepulchro abditam, sed fuisse luci expositam'; and there can be no doubt it was fastened up in the temple of the goddess referred to in the inscription. The fact then that these tablets were published and not hidden away, and that the author did not conceal his name but proclaimed it, show that these tablets were not magical in intention, or likely to be so regarded; for the worker of magic invariably conceals his traces.

Further, the writers of these tablets do not 'defix' anybody, or use any term equivalent to καταδῶ. They 'devote' some one who has wronged them to the goddess: ἀνατίθημι Δάματρι τὸν δεῖνα—ἀνιεροῖ Ἀντιγόνη Δάματρι—ἀνιεροῖ Ἀρτέμεις Δάματρι. And they publicly 'devote' or 'dedicate' the property which the wrongdoer has appropriated in order that it may become too hot for him to hold: ἀνιαρίζει Κολλύρα ταῖς προπόλοις τᾶς θεῶ τὸ ἱμάτιον τὸ πελλόν, τὸ ἔλαβε . . . καὶ οὐκ ἀποδίδωτι . . . μὴ πρότερον δὲ τὰν ψυχὰν ἀνείη ἔστε ἀνθείη τᾶι θεῶ (Aud. 212). There is in these tablets no magic secretly worked by their authors; the writers do not defix anybody; they do not imagine they have any power to work magic. They rely on the gods to assist them in regaining their rights or in recovering their lost property. These particular tablets from Cnidus belong to the second century, that from Bruttium (Aud. 212) to the third. But they proceed evidently from the same stratum of society as do those of the fourth century B. C., the spelling and grammar of which, as well as the nature of the proper names that occur in them, show that the authors of defixionum tabellae belonged to the same stage of culture as those who even nowadays seek to recover lost property 'by means of the spirits'.

The tablet from Bruttium brings to our attention two further developments in the evolution of the defixionum tabellae. First, the goddess invoked in it is neither one of the original κάτοχοι, nor an Orphic deity, but Juno Lacinia. Next, defixion, which originated in and for long was limited to Attica, is now beginning to reach Italy, thence to pass into the Roman empire. The tablet from Bruttium, and one from Liguria (Aud. 123) belonging to the second century B. C., are both in Greek.

From these tablets, used for the recovery of lost or stolen property, not only defixion in particular but magic generally has wholly evaporated; and, if the religion left in them is of inferior quality, it has at any rate completely ejected the magical element.

Turning now to those tablets which are really defixionum tabellae, but which bear Latin inscriptions and are found in Italy, we find the earliest that can be dated (Aud. 199) belongs to the first century B.C.; and it is generally agreed that the practice of defixion travelled from Greece, where it had been cultivated since the fifth century B.C., to Italy. The Latin defixiones in Italy, being borrowed from the Greek *κατάδεσμοι*, reproduce all the three forms of *καταδέσεις* found in Greece. That is to say, we find leaden tablets, bearing names and no verb, some of which (e.g. Aud. 211) are nailed, and others not (e.g. 130, 131). We find some which are purely magical, i.e. neither contain nor imply any reference to any gods, and in which the Greek *καταδέω* is translated by the Latin *defigo* (e.g. 134, 135). And we find others in which the *καταδῶ πρὸς τὸν κάτοχον θεόν* is translated by 'Dite pater, tibi commendo' (139), or 'dii inferi, vobis commendo' (190), or 'omnes inferis deis deligo' (199). And as the idea that the name of a person is identical with the person named is at the root of the practice of *κατάδεσις* or defixio, we find that the name in Italy as in Greece was thus commended to the gods, e.g. 196 'nomen delatum Naeviae'; and, as it was to the *κάτοχοι* that the Greek was nailed down, so it was to the dii inferi that the Roman victim was commended; and, as the Greek tablets often enumerate every part of the person nailed down, so the Latin tablets (134, 135) enumerate at great length all parts of the anatomy, and state expressly that they are nailed down to the leaden tablet, 'manus digitos' &c., or 'membra omnia,' 'defigo in has tabellas.' The purpose of the defixion or 'commendation' is sometimes stated, e.g. 195 'uti tabescat mando rogo', or the victim is commended in order that he may become 'quomodo mortuos qui istuc sepultus est' (139). In fine, no Latin tablet found in Italy presents us with any deviation from the Greek tablets already described; and these Latin tablets of the normal type extend from the first century B.C. to at least the end of the second century A.D. But during the second century A.D., though not before, a change in the character of these *καταδέσεις* or defixiones begins to manifest itself. In Greek tablets found in Italy (e.g. 198, 208), and in Latin tablets found in the provinces (e.g. 270), we find the magical element dominating the religious, and the magician controlling the deities he addresses. His word of power is *ἐξορκίζω ὑμᾶς* or *adiuro*. And the deities exorcised are numerous and Oriental.

The change which comes over the practice of defixio seems not to be an evolution due to any of the elements originally present in the practice, but to be an extraneous element taken up by defixio from without. And the mind naturally recurs for a parallel to *ἐξορκίζω*, to *τινὲς καὶ τῶν περιερχομένων Ἰουδαίων ἐξορκιστῶν* (Acts xix. 13). They tried *ὀνομάζειν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ*, and a tablet from Puteoli

(208), which bears, as a rubric, the words ἅγιον ὄνομα, shows by its superscription, Σαβαώθ, that it has a Jewish tincture. Possibly it was by some such agency that φιμώθητι (Mark i. 25) in the third century A.D. was not only used in defixions in Syria (Aud. 15, line 24, φιμώσατον δὲ τὰ στόματα πάντων) but had become so common in Cyprus that not only is the phrase used (e.g. 25, line 13, δὸς φιμὸν τῷ Θεοδώρῳ, or 27, line 29, φιμώσατε τοὺς ἀντιδίκους) in defixions, but the defixion itself is repeatedly called τὴν παραθήκην φιμωτικήν (29, line 25), or τοῦδε τοῦ φιμωτικοῦ καταθέματος (28, 16). In defixionum tabellae of this class, the word of power, ἐξορκίζω or *adiuro*, used by the magician to do evil, is that which was used by the strolling Jews of Acts xix to do good. The tabellae in which this word occurs were found in Syria, Cyprus, Africa, and (in Sethian tabellae alone) at Rome. One found in Campania (Aud. 198), and one found in Egypt (38), are Sethian in character. It is evident, therefore, that the formula ἐξορκίζω is of Oriental origin. It is absolutely unknown in Greek and Italian tabellae from the fifth century B.C. to the second century A.D.; and, when it does appear, it appears only in tablets which make mention of Oriental deities. Further, these Oriental tablets have their own line of ancestry, which is different from that of the defixionum tabellae. The Oriental tablets are certainly not descended from the Greek tablets of the fifth century B.C.; and they clearly are descended from Babylonian magic.

The defixionum tabellae which are of Oriental character and of Oriental origin, have, however, one feature which they bear in common with the defixionum tabellae of Greek origin and character; and it is the feature which clearly marks them off from the proceedings both of the strolling Jews of Acts xix, and of the earlier Babylonian magicians. The strolling Jews and the Babylonians used their exorcisms openly, before the face of all men, to do good—to relieve the sufferings of the sick. The authors of the defixionum tabellae, whether Greek or Oriental, practised their art to do injury; they made their tablets in secrecy, they preserved a careful anonymity, and they buried their tablets under door-sills, under crossways, or in sepulchres (Plato, *Laws* 933 B). The characteristic feature, therefore, of the magician, whether Greek or Oriental, is that he does evil and does it in secret; and that characteristic marks him off from the exorcist who uses his power openly and for good. What is common to the two classes of men is that both have power—power to bind down or defix—whom they will. What is distinctive of the two classes is the purpose for which, and the mode in which, each exercises its power. Exercised for the good of the community and in accordance with the will of the gods of the community, this personal power is religious. Exercised for the injury of any member of the community, this personal power is magic.

Such personal power, in itself, is neither religious nor magical: it becomes the one or the other according to the use which the person possessing it puts it to.

And the use he puts it to may be inferred from a simple consideration of the question whether he seeks concealment or not. The defixionum tabellae were concealed (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 69 'reperiebantur solo ac parietibus erutae', Pap. mag. cxxi ver. 458 ἢ ποταμὸν ἢ γῆν ἢ θάλασσαν ἤγουν ἢ θήκην ἢ εἰς φρέαρ); and their concealment testifies to the fact that they were regarded as magical; just as the omission of the names of the writers shows that their authors feared detection. I submit, therefore, that we must regard the defixionum tabellae as magical; and that we cannot agree with Wuensch and Audollent in regarding them as religious.

4

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DIONYSIAC RITES OF SACRIFICE[1]

By L. R. FARNELL. (Abstract)

Legends and records of cult attest the ancient prevalence of the ritual in Dionysiac religion that may be called ὠμοφαγία and σπαραγμός; in which a victim was violently torn to pieces and instantly devoured by the votaries of the God. The legends of Orpheus, Pentheus, the Minyan and Argive women, the Corinthian story of Aktaion, when critically analysed, point to the immolation by rending of a human incarnation of the deity. And the animals upon whom the same ritual was performed, the bull, the goat, and the fawn, were specially those in which the deity was considered to embody himself from time to time. The rite is therefore a savage form of blood-sacrament; those who perform it desire by drinking the hot blood and swallowing the raw flesh to absorb the divine spirit and thus to charge themselves with the divine power. The partakers are his most ardent devotees, and the story of the Titans only arose from a later misunderstanding. The rite was part of the orgiastic ecstasy peculiar to this religion, the object of which was not solely, as Rohde regarded it, the desire of communion with God, but partly also the exaltation of the personal will-power for the working of vegetation-magic. And we must distinguish this sacramental σπαραγμός of the human or animal incarnation of the god from other ritual that might express the annual disappearance or death and return or resurrection of the

[1] The paper was part of the chapter on Dionysiac ritual in vol. v, which will shortly appear, of Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States*.

deity in winter and spring. For we have sufficient evidence for believing that it was trieteric only and was always performed in the winter; and the chief problem is the explanation of the immemorial observance of this trieteric rule. The ordinary explanations are easily shown to be inappropriate; the trieteric σπαραγμός cannot be a mimetic expression of the annual death of the deity of vegetation in the fall of the year; still more unconvincing is the suggestion that it was in some way prompted by the habit of correcting the lunar calendar every other year to harmonize it with the solar; for the Greeks themselves only corrected theirs every eight years, and the trieteric ritual belonged to Thracian savagery. Primitive festivals are usually suggested by the primitive needs of man; and the only thing of importance that happens occasionally every other year in winter among primitive communities is the shifting of land-cultivation, the breaking up of new soil, the old having become exhausted after two crops. At such a time the vegetation-god—the Thracian Dionysos—would be specially called upon to bless and enrich the new tilths, and the Maenads and others who worked the vegetation-magic would have to charge themselves with exceptional potency. They could best attain this by blood-sacrament.

One example at least has been found among primitive tribes of special ritual performed every other year on occasion of the land-shifting; and more may be forthcoming.

5

THE RELIGIOUS ELEMENT IN PLATO

By LEWIS CAMPBELL

Dr. Edward Caird, in his work on *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, has traced the development of Plato's thought in its religious aspect with a completeness which, as he truly says, has been made 'easier since the order of the Platonic dialogues has been approximately determined by linguistic considerations irrespective even of the doctrines taught in them'. The same approximate solution of the problem set by Schleiermacher has been accepted by Dr. Theodor Gomperz in his *Griechische Denker*[1] and previously by W. Lutoslawski in his volume entitled *Plato's Logic*. The order so determined partly coincides with that adopted on different grounds by Professor Henry Jackson, and is followed to some extent by Jowett in his later editions.

[1] See his notes to vol. ii (vol. iii of English translation), *passim*.

It is important that the successive stages in Plato's mental attitude which this order manifests should be generally recognized. For it is still too much the habit of writers on the philosophy of religion to credit Plato with a barren intellectualism or an equally fruitless mysticism. Plato's Platonism, if I may be pardoned the expression, is not a system deduced from one great principle, but a gradually developing theory, setting out from the conversations of Socrates and his search for ethical universals: thence proceeding to the reality of universals, conceived as separable from particulars, of which they are the causes and the prototypes; and again from this crude ontology, enveloped in a haze of imagination, towards a clearly reasoned logic and psychology, in which the ideas, while still objective, are seen as forms of thought, in regular subordination to the supremacy of Mind:—from which point of view a fresh effort is made to realize ultimate truths, and not merely, as Jowett said, to 'connect', but to *apply* them.

From the inspiration of the *Symposium*, the mystical exaltation of the *Phaedo*, and the more comprehensive visions of the *Phaedrus* we are led, through the dry light of the *Parmenides*, towards a more sober but still enthusiastic view,—first in the finely balanced theories of perception and knowledge propounded in the *Theaetetus*, and afterwards, with the help of the Eleatic Stranger, through a critical examination of earlier and contemporary philosophies, to a new and more distinct manner of contemplating the nature of Being, and of the ideas in their mutual relations to one another and to the actual world.

Thus Plato's philosophy, while rising to greater heights of idealism, becomes at the same time more practical. 'Becoming' is no longer despised, but as dominated by Being acquires reality in the form of Production. Sensations are not discarded, but analysed and explained. Opinion is not disregarded, but right Opinion, tested and directed by Reason, is seen to be fruitful in results. Even oratory with a right motive (not ῥητορική but ῥητορεία) has a place assigned to it.[1] Such, in rough outline, is the upward and downward path[2]—upward to the abstract, and then downward to the true concrete—which shapes the curve of Platonic evolution.

Now at every stage in this progress there are two factors present, correlated but not formally connected: the factor of experience and simple reflection and the factor of abstract reasoning. Each varies as the other varies, but the former is not to be strictly interpreted by the latter. Some of Plato's noblest anticipations of truth arise directly from simple reflection on experience.

The purpose of the present paper is to indicate in outline the elements

[1] *Polit.* 304 A; cp. *Legg.* iv. 711 DE.

[2] Compare Heraclitus's ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία.

of ethical emotion concomitant with the dialectic process, the moral and religious atmosphere which accompanies and, as it were, invests each successive phase of Plato's philosophic thought. For in Plato, as I have tried to show in my volume on *Religion in Greek Literature*,[1] morality and religion coincide.

In the short time at my disposal I shall say nothing of Orphic or Pythagorean elements, or of possible echoes of Zoroastrianism; but confine attention to what I conceive to be the original and independent movements of Plato's mind.

I. Even in the small dialogues, where Socrates in pursuance of his Divine mission is searching for ethical principles determined by knowledge, there are flashes of Platonic insight, as in the question: 'Is a thing right because God wills it?' or, 'Does He will it because it is right?'[2] And again, 'If evils were done away, what would happen then?'[3]

In the vivid dramatic portraiture of the *Protagoras*, Socrates maintains the unity of Virtue,[4] and insists that it must have a scientific basis, which for the time is made to depend on a calculation of the amount of pleasure.[5] Protagoras distinguishes between the parts of Virtue and upholds the reality of ordinary civic virtue, depending on habit. In this he supplies the factor of experience, and that Plato attaches importance to his view appears from the statement that an Athenian who found himself amongst savages could not but be aware that he was a civilized human being. The dialogue raises a problem to be partially solved afterwards in the *Meno*, and more successfully in the *Republic*.

Meanwhile philosophic inquiry has risen from single aspects, such as courage or temperance, to the consideration of Virtue as a whole; and from the bare assertion that Virtue is Knowledge to the demand for a science of measurement by which all ethical values may be determined.

Towards the end of the *Meno* there is a distinct allusion to the death of Socrates. But, apart from the Apologia, it is in the *Gorgias* that we feel for the first time the full effect of his master's martyrdom on Plato's mind. The idealized Socrates is seen in irreconcilable controversy with the man of the day. The power of goodness is set over against the mere lust of power.

Not Knowledge now, but Righteousness, is the key-note; and

[1] Longmans, 1898. [2] *Euthyphro* 10 D. [3] *Lysis* 220 E.

[4] Opposition between parts of virtue is admitted in *Polit.* 306 C, *Legg.* xii. 964, cp. vi. 773 C. The guardians of the Laws must have learnt in what sense Virtue is at once one and many (*Legg.* xii. 965 f.).

[5] The comparison of present with past and future (*Theaet.* 186) is already implied.

Pleasure is left out of sight. Justice at all costs is alone the secret of success. And this ethical theme is ratified by the religious thought of future Judgement. It follows that

> Because Right is Right, to follow Right
> Were wisdom in the scorn of Consequence.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, while criticizing the 'paralogisms' of the *Gorgias*, was thrilled by its moral eloquence.

The fact that Greek Philosophy was mainly evolved in terms of thought, while the *nomenclature* of the active elements in human nature was immature, is apt to disguise the large place which the will-power occupies in Plato. Such a word as 'volitional' would have been alien to his vocabulary. Yet in the *Gorgias*, for example, what better has the naked soul to present before her judge than an uncorrupted Will—a life in which that desire of good, which according to the Platonic Socrates is always there, has not been crossed by erring and perverse determinations? In this connexion I may refer to a passage from T. H. Green's *Prolegomena*, quoted in Prof. Muirhead's *Service of the State*, p. 33:—

'The great Greek thinkers' account of the highest form of human good: "It is the will to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure (i.e. to be brave and temperate), if not, as the Greek would have said, in the service of the State, yet in the interest of some form of human society; to take for oneself, and give to others, of those things which admit of being given and taken, not what one is inclined to, but what is due."' (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 276.)

We pass from philosophy militant to philosophy in retreat; from Socrates against the world to Socrates among his friends. In the *Symposium* we already breathe the atmosphere of the Academy. That 'birth in beauty' of which Diotima speaks, is the fruit of intercourse of mind with mind. The goal of aspiration is now the height of contemplation; and it might seem as if this consummation of the intellectual life were barren of practical effect. But (1) not only noble thoughts, but noble endeavours, actions, institutions, laws, form a cardinal stage in the progress towards perfection; (2) the 'ocean of beauty' where the soul finally expatiates, is not felt to be a mere abstraction, but as the immanence of a Divine and immortal nature in all noble and beautiful things; and (3) whatever is vague in Diotima's scheme is rendered definite through the personality of Socrates in the prime of life, whose courage, fortitude, endurance, faithfulness, and absolute purity are set forth in concrete reality side by side with his inexhaustible and unequalled power of contemplation.

Yet another aspect of the idealized Socrates, neither in conflict nor in fruition, but in withdrawal from the world, is presented in the

Phaedo. For the fullness of life we have now the meditation of death. Divinity is seen not as immanent, but as transcendent; the soul not merely partakes of immortality, but is herself immortal. As a proof of continued personal existence the *Phaedo* is acknowledged to be incomplete. It could hardly be otherwise while Plato was still struggling with the half-mythical form of his ideal theory.[1] The sharp opposition between thought and sensible perception is not afterwards maintained. But that the assertion of personal immortality is the outcome of profound conviction is evident from the reply of Socrates to Crito's question, 'How shall we bury you?'[2] 'How you will, if you can find me.' And the conception of the Good as the supreme cause,[3] together with the whole tone of the dialogue, and the final reflection, 'What sort of persons, then, ought we to be?'[4] give assurance of an entire interpenetration of religion with morality. The soul that rises to the gods[5] has been purified by philosophy not only from the illusions of sense and opinion, but from a sensual and unspiritual life.

II. The *Republic* marks the first step in the descent from these heights of abstract speculation towards a concrete embodiment of the ideal, from retired contemplation to active endeavour. The theme of the *Gorgias* is resumed, but in a more genial spirit and with a wider scope. Plato's faith in his ideal inspires fresh hopes for the improvability of mankind. Human life as it is abounds with evils,[6] but if philosophy were but worthily represented, men would accept her guidance.[7]

It would be out of place in this short paper to enlarge on what is so familiar. I must content myself with a few scattered observations:—

1. Justice in the *Gorgias* was individual—the health of the soul. The aloofness of Socrates, there ironically described as the only true course in politics, is the position of the philosopher taking shelter behind a wall while the storm rages.[8] It is now seen that justice is a social principle and can only be realized in a community.

2. The difficulty raised in the *Protagoras* and partially solved in the *Meno*, about ordinary civic virtue, is met through the division of labour between the legislative, administrative, and industrial classes in the state. Thus a place is found for a subordinate excellence, depending not on a self-conscious principle, nor on a divinely implanted instinct, but on willing obedience to the philosophic ruler.

[1] There is an anticipation of the subjective aspect of the ideas in the phraseology of p. 103 B οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει, and in 75 D οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα αὐτὸ ὅ ἔστι.

[2] *Phaed.* 115 C.

[3] *Phaed.* 99 C, not now τὸ καλόν.

[4] *Phaed.* 114 DE.

[5] *Phaed.* 82 BC.

[6] *Rep.* ii. 379 C.

[7] *Rep.* vi. 499 DF.

[8] *Rep.* vi. 496 D; cf. *Gorg.* 521 D.

3. The factor of experience and simple reflection of which I spoke at first is especially prominent in the *Republic*. The remark that a good man cannot harm an enemy [1] is not deduced from the ideas, nor is the fine observation about the difference of the judge from the physician,[2] nor many other such *obiter dicta*. Even the 'types of theology' [3] 'God is good' and 'God is true' belong rather to the strain of simple reflection which accompanies than to the dialectical movement which determines Plato's progress towards systematic thought.

4. As already observed,[4] Plato's ideal is at once theoretical and practical, combining volition with reason. The Form of Good is the meeting-point of 'Will and Idea'. The philosophic nature is courageous, enduring, generous, as well as indefatigable in the pursuit of truth. Nor is the 'father of idealism' indifferent to the 'Pragmatic Test'. What else is implied in the twice-repeated maxim 'The beneficial is the admirable and the holy'? [5]

5. The theory of ideas, as expounded in *Rep.* v–vii, has advanced beyond the position of the *Phaedo*, and is nearly parallel to the teaching of the *Phaedrus*.[6] The ascent to the 'unconditioned' and descent from it through a chain of concepts is closely parallel to the account of generalization and division in the *Phaedrus* (*Rep.* vi. 511, *Phaedr.* 265–6). (1) There is a gradation from the lower to the higher, reaching upwards to the Idea of Good: (2) it is once implied that there is a participation of the ideas in one another [7]: and (3) there is a downward as well as an upward pathway. But, on the other hand, the line of separation between universal and particular, between knowledge and sensible perception, is still sharply drawn, and the 'downward pathway' ends not in actuality but in ideas.[8] Astronomy and Harmony are to be studied independently of any observation of phenomena.[9]

6. Thus in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* Plato anticipates, but is not yet prepared to formulate, that clearer view of the ideas and of dialectic, which he afterwards elaborately wrought out in the *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Philebus*. For, as Matthew Arnold sings:—

> 'Tasks in hours of insight willed
> May be through hours of gloom fulfilled.'

7. Meanwhile the depth of moral and religious emotion which is

[1] *Rep.* i. 335 B. [2] *Rep.* iv. [3] *Rep.* ii. 379 sq.
[4] *Supra*, p. 143. [5] *Rep.* v. 457 B, 458 E.
[6] It has sometimes occurred to me—without yielding to those who would dismember the *Republic*—to suppose that the *Phaedrus* may have been composed during some interval in the preparation of the larger work; when Plato was weary for the time of written dialogue and turned for refreshment to the Academy—the enthusiasm of the teacher having eclipsed the ambition of the writer.
[7] *Rep.* v. 476 A. [8] *Rep.* vi. 511 C. [9] *Rep.* 527 D, 529 B, 531 A sq.

associated with Plato's intellectual ideal breaks forth in many passages, of which the most significant are the Vision of Judgement and the Choice of Lives in Bk. x,[1] and the concluding sentences of Bk. ix[2]—the Pattern in the Heavens. And we may note in passing the concession to Hellenic tradition implied in the reference to Delphi,[3] and in the prayer to Pan and the nymphs with which the *Phaedrus* ends.

III. A crisis in Plato's mental history is revealed in the *Parmenides*. He has become aware that until certain speculative difficulties raised by the earlier philosophies have been removed, and until his own theory of ideas has been developed on purely dialectical lines, his efforts towards the attainment of truth and the improvement of mankind must be unavailing.

Only when the problems treated in the *Parmenides*, centreing in the One and Many, had been fairly and squarely met, could such a reasoned and well-balanced view as that in the *Theaetetus* become possible.

Let any one read consecutively (1) the *locus classicus* in the *Phaedo*,[4] and the corresponding sentences in the *Cratylus*, (2) *Rep.* vi, vii, and the *Phaedrus* side by side; and then turn to the following passage of the *Theaetetus*[5]:—

'What you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing. . . . If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you either through the one or the other organ. . . . How about sound and colour? In the first place you would admit that they both exist . . . and that either of them is different from the other and the same with itself . . . and that both are two and each of them one. . . . You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another. . . . But through what do you perceive all this about them? For neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. . . . What power or instrument will determine the general notions which are common not only to the senses but to all things, and which you call being and not-being, and the rest of them, about which I was just now asking—what organ will you assign for the perception of these? *Theaet.* You are speaking of being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even number and other arithmetical notions. *Socrates.* You follow me excellently: . . . that is precisely what I am asking. *Theaet.* Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is that they have no separate organs, but that the soul, by a power of her own, contemplates the universal in all things. *Socrates.* You have done well in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul

[1] *Rep.* x. 614–21. [2] *Rep.* ix. 592 B. [3] *Rep.* iv. 427 B.
[4] *Phaed.* 100 sq.; *Cratylus* 440.
[5] *Theaet.* 185 A–187 B (Jowett's translation).

views some things by herself and others through bodily organs. . . . To which class would you refer being or essence? For this, of all our notions, is the most universal. *Theaet.* I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself. *Socrates.* And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other? *Theaet.* Yes. *Socrates.* And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil? *Theaet.* These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul also perceives by comparing things past and present with the future. *Socrates.* And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch? . . . But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them. . . . The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.'

Here it is evident—

1. That ideas are no longer 'hypostatized', but seem in true relation to particulars and to the mind itself and in subordination to one another.

2. While still objective, they are no longer regarded as separable entities, but as notions or forms of thought to which the soul attains, not now through reminiscence, but through her inherent logical activity working on the *data* of experience given in perception. They are a sort of 'predicables', under which particular objects are conceived.

3. Whilst ethical universals, 'noble and base,' 'good and evil,' still rank amongst the highest ideas, they no longer form the main constituents of the ideal world—other objects of knowledge, not less important, are being, sameness, difference, unity, and number; which form a class of *summa genera*, or categories. This notion reappears in the image of the aviary (*Theaet.* 197 D). We are evidently on our way towards the dialectical elaboration which is afterwards assigned to the Eleatic Stranger.[1]

4. The senses are no longer held in contempt. Their objects are perceived *through* the bodily senses indeed, but *by* the mind. The analysis of sensible perception here attributed to Protagoras as a theory of knowledge, is Plato's own theory of sensation as such. For it recurs with little change in the *Timaeus*.[2]

5. In place of the old difficulty of unconscious virtue, we have now the puzzle, 'How is false opinion possible?' Right opinion has a higher

[1] Thus the arguments of Ueberweg, who saw clearly the difference between the earlier and later theories, and therefore condemned the Sophist, fall to the ground.

[2] *Tim.* 64 sq.

value than before. Not vice so much as ignorance is now regarded as involuntary.

6. To return to the immediate subject of this paper; the dialectical movement in the *Theaetetus* is accompanied with a deep moral and religious vein. No passage even of the *Phaedo* or *Republic* is more impressive than the solemn digression which Theodorus welcomes as a relief from the strain of abstract thought; where the process of growing like to God, which is the one thing needful, turns, not on the contemplation of the beautiful, but on righteousness with holiness and wisdom combined.

From the *Theaetetus* onwards the figurative and semi-mythical language is to a great extent disused. 'Communion,' 'participation,' &c., now express the relation, not of particular to universal, but of the lower ideas to the higher. There is also a new name for such participation, 'to be affected by'—πεπονθέναι or πάθος ἔχειν.[1] The ἰδέα is a unity at once perceived and stamped by the mind on the particulars composing a genus.[2]

IV. At this point there is evidence of a further 'crisis', or rather of a break in Plato's career both as a thinker and as a man. Although the *Sophist* and *Politicus* form a continuation of the *Theaetetus*, there is a palpable change of style, implying an interval, and an interval in which much has happened. For one thing, the gentle, unforced humour, which still played around the talk of Socrates to Theaetetus has vanished, never to return. The person of Socrates himself is partly withdrawn; and in the *Politicus* especially there is a strain of sadness and even of bitterness that is personal to the writer. Whatever may be the truth about Sicily, the author of this dialogue has evidently, as I said in my edition,[3] some ground of quarrel with mankind.

Plato resumes the dialectical process with a greatly enlarged horizon, and at the same time his thought 'takes a sober colouring from an eye

That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.'

1. Already in the *Theaetetus* we find allusions to philosophical schools which had not emerged when the *Protagoras* was composed. But in the *Sophist* both earlier and contemporary philosophies, his own included, are examined from a wider and more comprehensive point of view, resulting in a new synthesis and constructive theory of knowing and being; while in the *Politicus* the city-states of Hellas far and

[1] *Parm.* 148 A, *Soph.* 245 A.

[2] *Polit.* 258 C ἰδέαν αὐτῇ μίαν ἐπιστρεγίσασθαι ('to stamp upon it one ideal form').

[3] *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato*, with Introduction and Notes, Oxford, 1867.

wide are surveyed with a penetrative glance, condemning the actual statesmen as impostors, and the so-called constitutions, democratic, oligarchic, and monarchical, as hollow frauds, destined to founder in some world-storm (*Polit.* 302 sq., cp. *Legg.* iv. 715 B, 717 B, viii. 332 B).

2. The speculative reasoning of the *Sophist* attained a point of view from which an idealist might be expected to infer the unreality of evil. Very different is Plato's mode of contemplating the actual world. If we compare the calm statement in the *Theaetetus* (176 A) that there must always be something to oppose the good, with the dereliction of the Universe by its Creator till it threatens to fall into the abyss of dissolution (*Polit.* 273 D): or the humorous suggestion that a pig or a baboon may be the 'measure of things' (*Theaet.* 161 C), with the grave classification in which swine and monkeys are congeners of man (*Polit.* 266), and with the description of the actual statesmen as lions, foxes, centaurs, satyrs, and the like (*Polit.* 291), the profound disillusionment implied in the later dialogue (especially if we compare *Rep.* iv. 499 D) becomes apparent.

Plato is sick at heart; but he abates nothing of his endeavour in the cause of human improvement and the advancement of truth. The distance between the Divine and human is increasingly felt, but there is a firm determination to meet existing evils with practical remedies. Plato does not relinquish his ideal; but is determined to bring it to bear upon the actual, if not immediately, yet more and more effectively.

3. Theocracy—i.e. the rule of perfect wisdom over willing subjects—is found to be inapplicable to such a creature as man in such a world as the present: the scientific statesman can only imitate the Divine monarch from afar. And as he cannot always be present with his people, the second-best course, which is ordinarily the best available, is that they should be *made* to live in obedience to Law. Government through law is a necessary compromise between first principles and circumstances. Philosophy cannot dispense with tradition. Thus the ground is laid for the *Laws*, Plato's final legacy to the Hellenic race.

4. Meanwhile, through the reasoning in the *Sophist*, metaphysical theory has undergone an important change. The relativity or intercommunion of ideas, uniting same and other, one and many, motion and rest, has bridged the chasm between being and becoming, and justifies an increasing interest, both theoretical and practical, in processes of all kinds and in production. This descent towards the concrete is signalized by some novelties of expression: (1) the use of γένος = εἶδος, marking the comprehensiveness of the idea (*Phil.* 26 D, &c.; cp. φῦλον in *Polit.* 264 E): (2) the increasing frequency of γένεσις, especially in the plural (*Theaet.* 155 E, *Soph.* 232 C, 234 E, *Polit.* 266 B, 283 D, *Phil.* 28 D, 54 C); (3) the use of πρᾶγμα for an

actual fact or thing (*Soph.* 257 C, 262 D, *Polit.* 278 D). This interest in γένεσις culminates theoretically in the *Timaeus*, and practically in the *Laws*.

5. Two passages of the *Politicus* are peculiarly significant in this connexion, one (272 C) in which scientific inquiry is described as the interrogation of every nature, in order to discover what each has to contribute from its peculiar experience towards the knowledge of the whole; the other (278 D), where the Eleatic Stranger dwells on the difficulty of recognizing universal truths when they are taken out of their abstraction and transferred to the long and complicated 'syllabary' of facts. And it may be noted in passing that in the *Philebus* (64 B), by a concession which readers of the *Republic* could not have foreseen, empirical knowledge is included in that 'bodiless harmony' or spiritual order which is the habitation of the Good. Else how is a man to find his way home?[1] But that there is no abatement of Plato's soaring idealism is clear from several passages which anticipate the subject of the *Philosopher* dialogue (*Soph.* 234, 235, 253 sq.; *Polit.* 284 C).

V. In approaching the subject of Natural Philosophy, from which Socrates had turned away, and in which Plato himself thought it impossible to arrive at certitude (*Tim.* 29 C; cp. *Phil.* 59 A), he again has recourse to a figurative and semi-mythical mode of exposition. This has led interpreters to treat the *Timaeus* as the basis of Plato's so-called 'system'.[2] But such procedure is erroneous and misleading.

1. The *Timaeus* is one of the latest in a series of writings covering half a century, in which the author's views have been subject to continuous change. See, for example, the opinion about diet in *Tim.* 89 C contrasted with *Rep.* iii. 406 A.

2. Some of the chief positions are only intelligible with reference to arguments of which most of the dialogues present no trace. The difficulty of combining Same and Other (35 A) recalls the reasoning of the *Sophist* (258 E), and the concrete or composite substance (οὐσία, ibid.) is a conception only reached in the *Philebus* (28 D, 27 B).

3. The religious tenor of the dialogue is evident, and need not be drawn out here. Two leading thoughts—the motive of the Creator and the notion of Eternity, as distinguished from Time, have left a deep and lasting impress on the European mind.

Plato's religious conceptions have now attained a fixedness which has exposed him to the charge of intolerance. He attaches profound

[1] Cp. *Legg.* xii. 961 E νοῦς μετ' αἰσθήσεων κραθείς, where sensation is not depreciated, as in *Rep.* viii. 546 B.

[2] In earlier times this was partly due to this dialogue having been translated by Cicero.

importance to correctness of belief. And the 'pivot articles' of that belief, referred to with solemn earnestness also in the *Sophist* (265 D) and the *Philebus* (22 C), are (1) the priority of Mind and (2) the supremacy of Divine Reason, commanding even the Idea of Good. To which may be added (3) the Divine nature of the Stars. But there is no relaxation of the bond between Religion and Morality, which is enforced with extreme severity in the tenth book of the *Laws*.

VI. 1. It is sometimes asserted that the Theory of Ideas is entirely absent from the *Laws*. And it is true that Plato has deliberately descended from the ideal height (*αὐτὸ τἀκριβές*, *Polit.* 284 C) in order to provide a compromise which he still hopes may find acceptance in the Hellenic world. But it is right to observe (1) that, like the *Philosopher* dialogue and the completion of the *Critias*, the education of the Nocturnal Council, which should have answered to the higher education in the Republic, is an intention which remains unfulfilled; and (2) that the importance almost pedantically attached to accurate differentiation is a reflection of the dialectical method, recalling the dichotomies of the *Politicus* and *Sophist*. See also the striking remark on generalization (or integration) in *Legg.* xii. 965 C (recalling the language of the *Phaedrus*)—*τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ διαφερόντων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν*, 'Out of the multiplicity of differing objects, to be able to fix the mind on one idea comprehending them all' (also x. 895 D).¶ (3) Ever since the acknowledgement in *Soph.* 248 E that the highest Being cannot be devoid of life and movement, but must involve a vital principle, the 'theory of ideas' has been gradually resolving itself into a conviction of the priority of Mind to Matter and of the Sovereignty of Reason. And these, as already said, are the cardinal doctrines of the *Laws*.

2. The *Laws* at many points recall the earlier dialogues. Thus in speaking of soul or mind as immortal, and the eldest of created things, the argument of the *Phaedrus* where the soul is defined as self-moving or self-determining reappears. And, as in the *Phaedo*, the belief in immortality, however supported, includes the continuation of personal existence. The soul is the self, and departs to another state of being (xii. 959 B, 967 D).[1] And it is observable that in asserting the priority of mind, not intellect alone, but active powers are expressly mentioned (*ἤθη*, *βουλήσεις*, *ἐπιμέλειαι*, 'characters, volitions, beneficent cares,' x. 896 C). Even in the *Timaeus* (81 D), in describing natural death, where the soul delightedly escapes from the burden of the flesh, it seems to be forgotten that, according to another passage (65 A), *delight* belongs to the mortal part of the soul.

[1] The view of the *Symposium*, in which participation of immortality is involved in the continuation of the race, also reappears in *Legg.* v. 721 C.

3. Modern idealists complain that Plato never wholly gets rid of dualism. The evil soul in Bk. x (896 E) is an offence to them. But when the reality of Evil is once accepted as a fact of experience and adopted as a working hypothesis, is there after all much difference between the Universe being left for an aeonian cycle to the guidance of 'inborn desire', till it runs on the verge of ruin, as in *Polit.* 273, and the temporary existence of a spirit of evil, to be ultimately overborne by the good? On this subject I may give myself the pleasure of quoting from the late Dr. Adam's work on *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (p. 466):—

'Plato was too profoundly convinced of the effects of evil, both physical and moral, in the world as it now is, to acquiesce in a pantheistic denial of its existence. He tells us more than once that there is more evil than good in human life: and no one can read the extraordinarily powerful description in the *Republic* of the tyrannical man, the living embodiment of active maleficence and vice, without feeling that moral evil at all events was something more to Plato than merely the absence or privation of good.'

There are passages in the *Laws* which recall the 'pessimism' of the *Politicus*. But it has mellowed into a regretful, half-pitying, half-tolerant consideration for the feebleness of humanity.

It is true that Plato cannot be accused of Pantheism. The Supreme Being, that is one with Divine Reason, is at once immanent and transcendent. (See esp. *Legg.* xii. 957.)

4. But he has travelled a good way from 'Socratism'. This appears especially in the discussion of the voluntary and involuntary in ix. 860. And that last stage of 'ignorance' in which a man says 'Evil, be thou my good' (*Legg.* iii. 689 A) is a condition of which Socrates would have denied the possibility. The place assigned to pleasure in the *Laws* is a sort of compromise between the extreme views of the *Protagoras* and the *Philebus*.

5. In these last efforts for the promotion of truth and the improvement of mankind, Plato in a spirit of accommodation makes large concessions to Hellenic tradition. In this there is here and there a trace of irony, as where he speaks of the gods who exist by custom (*Legg.* xii. 889), or of the heroes who declared themselves sons of God and must surely have known their own parentage (*Tim.* 40 D). But there is a more serious intention in the institution of local and departmental sanctities (*Legg.* v. 738 D), and in the special functions assigned to Ares (viii. 833, xi. 930), Artemis (viii. 833), Demeter and Core (vi. 782), Dionysus (vii. 812), Eileithyia (vi. 784), Hephaestus (xi. 920), Hera (vi. 774), Hestia (viii. 848), and above all to Apollo, whose worship is associated with that of the Sun (xii. 945, 947; also viii. 833).

These matters, however, are not on a par with the worship of the

Heavenly Bodies; still less with the Sovereignty of Divine Reason as forming an element in Plato's personal religion.

6. That Plato, who in the *Republic* left the details of legislation to his philosopher-kings, should in his book of the *Laws* attempt to provide for every conceivable circumstance, and that the author of the scheme of Communism should so impressively dilate upon the dues of domestic piety, need surprise no one who has fully considered the argument of the *Politicus*.

7. It is a fact full of pathetic significance, that in extreme old age, with the consciousness of failing powers (*Legg.* vi. 752 A,[1] 770 A[2]), the author of the *Republic* turned aside from the *Philosopher* dialogue, which should have crowned the metaphysical edifice, and from completing the *Critias*, that was to exhibit the ideal Commonwealth in act,—to transfer the rich outcome of his ripe experience into a body of precepts for the benefit of posterity. Great as was the dialectical movement—immense, and as yet unexhausted, as has been its influence on succeeding philosophies, beginning with Aristotle—it is evident that the ethical and religious impulse, derived primarily from Socrates, lay really at the root of Plato's lifelong endeavour.

Lastly, that, while more than once evincing an esteem for Hippocrates (*Protag.* 311 B, *Phaedrus* 270 C), he should have failed adequately to realize the value of the Coan's method of observation, and that he probably despised Democritus, are facts only too much in accordance with what has happened to great thinkers in other times. The account of Sir Isaac Newton in Hegel's *History of Philosophy* betrays a corresponding blindness.

[1] *ἂν . . . γήρως ἐπικρατῶμεν τό γε τοσοῦτον*, 'if we can so far overcome the infirmity of age.'

[2] *ἡμεῖν δ' ἐν δυσμαῖν τοῦ βίου*, 'while our life is at its setting.'

6

BIRD AND PILLAR WORSHIP IN CONNEXION WITH OURANIAN DIVINITIES

By JANE ELLEN HARRISON

'Thou from the first
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread
Dove-like sat'st brooding on the vast abyss
And madst it pregnant.'

August Fick [1] has told us that the Leleges worshipped Twins and Birds. Into the ethnology of this mysterious and shifting people I do not propose to enter. But I want to ask, and, it may be, in part to answer, the question: Was there in ancient Greece a regular cult of birds? a worship acknowledged, orthodox, well-defined; and, if such a cult existed, what was its significance?

Had I asked the question some five years ago, my answer must have been vague and halting. I might have pointed to sacred birds as attributes of certain divinities, the Eagle of Zeus, the Owl of Athena, the Swan of Apollo. I might have added that in Greek mythology stories of bird-metamorphoses abound. Such are the myths of Tereus, Procne, and Philomela, of Nisos and Skylla, of the Meleagrides, of the Heliades. With these myths were apt to be connected stories of bird paternities; and these bird paternities, I might have noted, had special affinity with Twin divinities, as with Leda and the Swan, the Dioscuri and the Molionidae.[2] Turning to literature, it would have been impossible even then to forget the kingdom of the birds pictured to us by Aristophanes, his reminiscence [3] of olden times, when Zeus was not, and the woodpecker was king. But all this must have seemed matter for poetical fancy, haunting the imagination but scarcely affording precise evidence for definite Bird-cults.

To-day we stand upon firmer ground. On the famous Hagia Triada sarcophagus (Fig. 1) [4] discovered at Phaistos, we have evidence clear and indefeasible that in Minoan days there was a public cultus of birds with regular established ritual.

The scene there depicted explains itself. To the right is a shrine with a sacred tree; in front a low basis; on it a pillar, which in the preceding design was obviously a palm stem. The pillar is surmounted

[1] *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, pp. 113–114. [2] Ibycus, *frag.* 16. [3] Ar. *Av.* 480.
[4] *Revue Biblique*, 1907, p. 342, Fig. 34, M. J. Lagrange; reproduced here by kind permission of MM. J. Gabalda et Cie. I examined the sarcophagus myself five years ago in the Candia Museum, but I was not studying bird-worship at the time, and my remembrance of the character of the bird is vague.

by a double-axe, on which is perched a bird of black colour, possibly a pigeon [1] or, as Dr. Evans suggests, a black woodpecker. In all there are three objects of worship, a trinity of birds surmounting a trinity of double-axes and palms. And, delightful fact, it is clear as day that these birds are no decorative adjuncts but the objects of a definite cult. In the one design three worshippers approach, one with a great lyre, the second with a basket of offerings, while the foremost pours libations into a *situla*. In the second design [2] the action is less clear; but we have in front of the holy bird a basket of fruit, an *oinochoe*, and a small portable altar.

We have then before us clear evidence of the worship of birds. Two of the worshippers are dressed in the skins of some animal, and the robes end in tails. It is tempting to see in these ritual robes feather dresses ending in 'bird'-tails, but Dr. Evans and Professor von Duhn pronounce against this view. It may, however, be worth pointing out that in the bird-worship of Egypt the priestess of a bird-goddess did actually wear a bird robe, as we see in Fig. 2. Here we have the image of a Carthaginian priestess on a sarcophagus found at Bord-el-Djedid.[3] The priestess wears the dress of the Egyptian goddess Isis-Nephthys; her body is hidden by the two wings of the sacred vulture, which enfold the hips and cross in front. The vulture's head appears above the head-dress. The colouring of the feathers is vivid blue; but the colourless reproduction here shown gives but a slight idea of the loveliness of the bird-priestess. In her right hand she holds a bird.

This bird-dress is not a mere curiosity. It is a ritual fact of the first importance. What is the good of dressing up as a bird, unless the bird is a being stronger and holier than yourself, whose divine nature you seek to put on with his feathers?

Phoenicia may seem remote; Ephesus is nearer home. Among the strange and beautiful archaic ivory statuettes found by Mr. Hogarth under the basis of the Artemis statue at Ephesus is that of a priestess (Fig. 3).[4] She carries a sacrificial vessel, while on her head is a huge pole surmounted by a hawk-like bird, evidently to be carried in ritual procession. Was Artemis herself once a bird-goddess?

I return to Crete. Dr. Evans's Dove-Goddess (Fig. 4),[5] which I now place before you, is familiar to all. She was found, it will be remem-

[1] According to Aristotle, the pigeon (*φάττα*) was the largest of the dove species, about the size of a cock, and ashy in colour: Ar. *H. A.* 13, 544 b *μέγιστον* (*τῶν περιστεροειδῶν*) *ἡ φάττα ἐστί*. Cf. *frag.* 271, 1527 (*ap.* Athen. ix. 394 a) *ἀλέκτορος τὸ μέγεθος ἔχει, τὸ χρῶμα σπόδιον*.

[2] Lagrange, op. cit., Fig. 35.

[3] Mabel Moore, *Carthage of the Phoenicians*, 1905; frontispiece in colour, and p. 146: reproduced here by kind permission of Mr. Heinemann.

[4] *Ephesus*, pl. xxii.

[5] *B. S. A.* viii, p. 99, Fig. 56.

bered, in the miniature shrine with the horns of consecration and the double-axes. On the head of the half-anthropomorphic figure is settled a dove, and on the breast of the goddess or priestess it is surely not fanciful to see in the painted decoration her outspread wings.[1]

In like fashion a dove is perched on the head of the gold-leaf goddesses of Mycenae (Fig. 5).[2] The goddess is in fact in both cases only the anthropomorphic form of the ancient dove-surmounted pillar. May I remind you of the painted terra-cotta pillars surmounted by doves, which Dr. Evans has discovered and interpreted (Fig. 6) ?[3]

The worship of birds in Minoan Crete is, we may venture to hope, clearly established. We turn now to our second question : what is its significance ?

The bird is perched upon a pillar. The pillar, as Dr. Evans has clearly shown, and as is evident from the Hagia Triada sarcophagus, stands for a sacred tree. That pillar, that tree, takes human shape as a goddess ; and that goddess is the Great Mother, who, taking divers shapes as Mother and Maid, develops later into Gaia, Rhea, Demeter, Dictynna, Hera, Artemis, Aphrodite, Athena. As Mother Earth she is also Πότνια Θηρῶν, with her lions, her stags, her snakes.

And the bird ? If the tree is of the earth, the bird surely is of the heaven. In the bird brooding upon the pillar we have, I think, the primal form of the marriage of Ouranos and Gaia, of Sky the father with Earth the mother. And of that marriage sprang, as Hesiod[4] has told us, not only mortal man but all the glory of the later gods.

> κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
> οἳ Γῆς τ' ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος

The old lovely anthropomorphism lingers on even to-day : we speak of Mother Earth, and the Church still prays to ' our Father which art in heaven '.

But in the days of Pillar and Bird, anthropomorphism was not yet. The dove was not the attribute or messenger of the divine father ; it was itself the Life-spirit, the Father. Dr. Evans writes as follows :[5]

' The dove is the image of the divine descent and the consequent

[1] The wings were, I believe, first noticed by Mr. A. B. Cook.

[2] Tsountas and Manatt, *Mycenaean Age*, p. 101.

[3] *B. S. A.* viii, p. 29, Fig. 14.

[4] Hesiod, *Theog.* 105.

[5] *J. H. S.* xxi (1901), p. 105 ; *B. S. A.* viii, p. 29. Dr. Evans further points out that when sacred doves appear in their simplest European form, they are generally associated with the sepulchral cult of the spirit of the departed. For instance, the heathen Lombards ornamented their graveposts with the effigy of a dove. See Paul. Diacon. *de Gest. Langob.* This is of much interest in connexion with the fact that on the other side of the Hagia Triada sarcophagus the scene represented may be the cult of a dead man. But into this question I do not propose to enter.

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

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possession of the betylic column by a spiritual being. Among primitive races to-day the spiritual being constantly descends on the tree or stone in the form of a bird.'

Dr. Evans, if I rightly understand him, regards the dove as the divine life entering the lifeless pillar and becoming substantially one with it. I venture on a slight but, I think, not unimportant modification of this view. I regard the conjunction of bird and pillar as the union of two divine lives, male and female; as in fact the primitive form of what later took literary shape and name, and greater precision of sex,[1] as the marriage of Ouranos and Gaia, Father and Mother.

But how is this view[2] to be reconciled with an undoubted fact observed by Mr. Evans? In Aegean lands the dove early became the attribute of not a god but a goddess. Dare we take from Aphrodite the 'doves that drew her', and give them to a man-god, be he ever so Ouranian? And, on the other hand, if the pillar be the vehicle or phytomorphic form of Gaia the Earth-Mother, what becomes of the Oak-Zeus whose branches Mr. Cook has made to shadow all the land?

The explanation is simple and, I trust, convincing. We are all right. In matriarchal lands the stress of parentage is laid on the Mother, and she tends to assimilate the doves, the attributes of the Father. Aphrodite is herself 'Ouranian'. In patriarchal lands the stress is laid on the Father; and at Dodona,[3] not content with his own lawful Ouranian doves, Zeus in true Olympian fashion wrests to himself the Oak-tree of the Earth-Mother.

At this point I should like to draw attention to a class of monuments outside Greek art, in which the bird on the pillar appears as a well-established type; I mean the Babylonian boundary-stones known as *kudurrus*. Of these boundary-stones twenty complete specimens are known and sixteen fragmentary ones. They cover a period from 1350 to 650 B.C., and have recently been collected and discussed in a convenient volume by Drs. Hinke and Hilprecht.[4] I will here only

[1] A language that has ἡ στήλη and ὁ στῦλος may well, as Prof. Gilbert Murray points out to me, indulge in some vagueness as to the sex of a pillar.

[2] This view was held independently of, and prior to me, by Mr. Cook, who expressed it to me in conversation before this paper was cast in final form. My own attention was at the time so exclusively focused on the Ouranian significance of the bird, that, but for this expression, I might never have completely grasped the symbolism of the conjunction of bird and pillar. It is specially satisfactory to me that starting from quite different points—Mr. Cook I believe from Zeus and Oak-worship, and I from the Orphic parentage of Ouranos and Gaia, and the Ouranian symbolism of birds—we should have arrived substantially at the same main conclusion.

[3] *C. R.* xvii (1903), p. 408.

[4] The Babylonian Exped. of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, ed. H. V. Hilprecht; vol. iv by W. J. Hinke, Philadelphia, 1907: *A New Boundary-Stone of Nebuchadnezzar I from Nippur.*

refer to the well-known *kudurru* (Fig. 7)[1] of the time of Nebuchadrezzar, where we have the usual Sun, Moon, and Evening Star, the symbols of various other astral divinities, and among them a bird on a pillar. The instance given is only one out of a series of thirteen.

I am no Orientalist. I bring these monuments forward not to interpret them, but in the confident hope that there will be Oriental scholars present who will read the riddle. Drs. Zimmern and Frank,[2] by a process of exhaustion, conclude that the bird on the pillar is the symbol of Aru-ru. Aru-ru appears in the Gilgamesh story, and is associated with the creation of Ea-bani. Part of her story was transferred to the Eve of our Bible. She seems to be a kind of primal Mother. I shall be grateful to any one who can give me positive evidence of this attribution of the bird and pillar to Aru-ru.

But, it may fairly be asked, is there any evidence that in Minoan and Mycenaean lands divinities of the Sky as well as of the Earth were worshipped? The familiar double-axe is now acknowledged on all hands to be the symbol of the thunderbolt, of Keraunos before he became Zeus-Keraunos. But the double-axe I leave to Dr. Evans and Mr. A. B. Cook. For more direct evidence of astral worship I turn to the famous gold ring from Mycenae (Fig. 8).[3]

Here is the Earth-goddess under her great fruit-bearing tree, while above is all the glory of Ouranos, Sun and Moon, and Milky Way. If it be urged that this is mere scenic background, the evidence of a lentoid seal found in Crete cannot be gainsaid (Fig. 9).[4] Here is a sanctuary, and within or below the sanctuary the crescent moon—the Moon which, as Fick[5] has noted, was worshipped under the form of Endymion by those same Leleges who worshipped birds.

For later evidence, showing the conjunction of birds and astral symbols, we have the familiar coin of Paphos (Fig. 10).[6]

If the astral and Ouranian significance of the dove be counted problematic, there is another bird, the king of birds, who brings instant conviction. The eagle carries the thunderbolt; the thunderbolt *is* the fire-bearing eagle. Peithetairos threatening to destroy the Palace says, quoting Aeschylus:

'This Palace and Amphion's domes I will Reduce to ashes with fire-bearing eagles.'[7]

καταιθαλώσω πυρφόροισιν ἀετοῖς.

[1] Brit. Mus. *Guide to the Babylonian and Assyrian Antiquities*, pl. xi., E. A. Wallis Budge.

[2] *Leipziger Semit. Stud.* ii. 2; *Bilder und Symbole babylonisch-assyrischer Götter*, v. K. Frank, nebst einem Beitrag v. H. Zimmern, 1906, p. 39.

[3] *J. H. S.* (1901), p. 108, Fig. 4.

[4] *J. H. S.* (1901), p. 185, Fig. 59.

[5] *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, p. 112.

[6] Perrot et Chipiez, iii, p. 119.

[7] Ar. *Av.* 1247; Aeschylus, *frag.* 157.

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

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

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C. R. II, p. 158]

Thunder, thunderbolt, and lightning are not distinguished, and further they are not for death and destruction only. Like the Sun they are part of the heavenly fire, the *Aither*, only caught and imprisoned in a black thunder-cloud. As Euripides[1] has it, it is in his Epiphany of thunder and of lightning that Keraunos comes to Keraunia, that the Sky-god weds Semele, the Earth, the 'bride of the bladed Thunder', βροντῇ ἀμφιπύρῳ τοκάδα.

The eagle, then, though he is the thunder-and-lightning bird, is also the Sun-bird (Fig. 11).[2] The design before you is from the roof of a small Phoenician sanctuary. We see before our eyes the metamorphosis of Sun into eagle. It may be urged that this is Phoenician and not Greek imagination. But can we forget that in the heart of Arcadia in the ancient precinct of Zeus Lukaios,[3] that place of uttermost light where neither man nor beast casts a shadow, there was no image of Lukaios the Light-god; only two pillars facing the rising of the Sun, and on them two golden eagles. Aelian[4] tells us that the nestlings of an eagle were exposed to the Sun's rays, to test if they were real eagles, that is, real children of the Sun. If an eagle so much as blinked it was cast out of the paternal nest; but if he never flinched, he was enrolled in the eagle tribe. 'Facing the heavenly fire' (πῦρ τὸ οὐράνιον) was his token and certificate of birth.

M. Salomon Reinach in his brilliant tract *Aietos-Prometheus*[5] has shown, to me convincingly, that Prometheus *was* his own eagle. And who was Prometheus? Who but an elder Zeus, a Sky-god, a Titan, a Fire-bearer, twin-brother of Atlas, with whom he upheld the heavens? We see them at their common labour on the famous Kyrene kylix in the Vatican (Fig. 12).[6] As I have tried to show elsewhere, behind Prometheus is his zoomorphic form, an eagle perched upon a pillar.

Many years ago Dr. Maximilian Mayer in his original book, *Die Giganten*, showed conclusively that these earlier pre-Olympian divinities, these Titans, were sky and sun potencies; were literally *Aitherioi*, *Ouraniones*. Tantalus, Atlas, Prometheus, Sisyphus, and a host of others, are all hypostases of Sun and Sky, and Titan himself—convincing fact—who was he but the Sun-god?[7] Owing to the reaction against an overdriven Sun-mythology, Dr. Mayer's work has never, to my mind, met with the attention it deserved. We have been absorbed of late in the figure of the Mother, Gaia, in her many mani-

[1] Eur. *Hipp.* 559, translated by Professor Gilbert Murray: cf. *Bac.* 3 Σεμέλη λοχευθεῖσ' ἀστραπηφόρῳ πυρί, and frequently.

[2] Bérard, *Cultes Arcadiens*, p. 89. [3] Paus. viii. 30. 2. [4] *De Nat. Anim.* ii. 26.

[5] *Rev. Arch.* 1907, ii, p. 59. [6] Gerhard. *A. V.* ii, pl. 86.

[7] For Titan and Helios at Titane see Kaibel, Δάκτυλοι Ἰδαῖοι, p. 493.

festations, her fertility-rites and the like. But because we bow before the shrine of Gaia, need we disallow the might of Ouranos?

Man is always nearer earth than heaven. The anthropomorphic Olympians were powerless to efface the images or abolish the cults of the Earth-goddesses. But before the human Zeus and the well-nigh superhuman Apollo the old Sky-gods, the Ouranians, Atlas, Prometheus, Titan, and the rest, dwindled and paled. Their bird forms lived on, but mainly in a senseless and fantastic mythology, fit material for the Metamorphoses of an Ovid. Now and again a poet as well as a comedian betrays some haunting remembrance of a bird kingdom divine, in sunlit places:

> Could I take me to some cavern for mine hiding,
> On the hill-tops where the Sun scarce hath trod;
> Or a cloud make the home of mine abiding
> As a Bird among the Bird-Droves of God.

> ἡλιβάτοις ἐνὶ κευθμῶσι γενοίμαν
> ἵνα με πτεροῦσσαν ὄρνιν ἀγέλησιν
> ποταναῖς θεὸς ἐνθείη.[1]

In Greek art the type of the bird on the pillar lived on, its meaning only half understood. A few instances may be cited:

1. First, the owls of Athena on two columns, between them Leto and her twins.[2] In like fashion on Panathenaic vases[3] the cocks of Athena appear.

2. On a vase in the Bibliothèque Nationale[4] a raven on a column seems to mark the locality as Hades. Standing near by is Cerberus. The connexion of the raven and Hades I cannot explain.

3. On coins of Croton[5] we find a great eagle perched on a column; and we remember the white eagle of Pythagoras.[6]

4. On imperial coins of Leucas[7] we have Artemis with her bow, above her head the crescent moon; behind on a high support stands a bird, and we are reminded of the bird-priestesses of Artemis at Ephesus.[8]

[1] Euripides, *Hipp.* 732, trans. Professor Gilbert Murray.

[2] *Élite des Monuments Céram.* ii. pl. 2.

[3] *Mon. d. Inst.* x. See also *Die hellen. Kultur*, Taf. v, p. 150.

[4] Bibl. Nat. *Cat. des Vases Peints*, 269, A. de Ridder, p. 179, Fig. 26.

[5] B. M. *Cat.* Italy, p. 349.

[6] Iambl. *vit. Pyth.* xxviii. 142.

[7] Brit. Mus. *Cat.* Thessaly-Aetolia, p. 179, pl. xxviii, 15 and 16.

[8] The bird, according to the catalogue description stands on a sceptre; but the support, if a sceptre, is unusually high. It is far more likely that the bird is not the eagle of the imperial standard but a zoomorphic form of the goddess. I may note here that I do not propose to discuss the common type of the eagle on the standard, but it tells the same tale of bird divinity. The god was once a bird, the king was once a god. For birds on sceptres see Mr. A. B. Cook, 'European Sky-God,' *Folklore*, xv (1904), pp. 371–390.

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

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5. On a silver patera in the Bibliothèque Nationale[1] we have a Hellenistic Hermes in full human form. Clustered around him are the animals he once was; among them *on a pillar* is a cock—a cock who, we remember, was in Crete the embodiment of the Cretan Vulcan, ϝέλχανος.[2]

In all these scattered instances, which might be multiplied, we have no definite evidence of cultus. It is otherwise with our next example.

6. The design next given (Fig. 13)[3] is from a gem. A woodpecker stands on a post round which is coiled a snake. The snake is of some importance, as marking the chthonic character of post and tree. At the foot is a sacrificial ram. We might hesitate to interpret the scene but for a passage in Denys of Halicarnassus:[4] 'Three hundred stadia further is Tiora called Matiene. Here there is said to have been an oracle of Mars, of great antiquity. It is reported to have been similar in character to the fabled oracle at Dodona, except that whereas at Dodona it was said that a dove, perched on a sacred oak, gave oracles, among the Aborigines the oracles were given by a god-sent bird, called by them Picus (the Greeks name it Dryokolaptes), which appears on a wooden pillar.'

Tiora and Picus, who gave his name to the Picentines, may seem remote from Greece. But Aristophanes, as already noted,[5] remembered the days when Picus was king before Zeus; and, more curious still, according to Suidas,[6] on the tomb of Minos-Zeus in Crete was the inscription, 'Here lieth dead Picus who is also Zeus',

ἐνθάδε κεῖται θανὼν Πῆκος ὁ καὶ Ζεύς.

The old bird-god king of Crete survived in remote aboriginal Tiora. This would add new interest to Dr. Evans's suggestion that the bird on the Hagia Triada sarcophagus is a woodpecker.

Specially interesting is it that Denys sees in the Tioran Oracle-cult an analogy to Dodona. At Ammon and at Dodona was the same cult of sacred birds connected with sacred trees and at Dodona with dove-priestesses (Peleiades).[7] We see the doves of Dodona on an imperial coin of Halicarnassus (Fig. 14).[8] Zeus Askraios, the oak-god, crowned with rays, stands in human form between his oaks on which are perched the doves.

[1] *J. H. S.* 1882, pl. xxii. [2] See A. B. Cook, *C.R.* 1903, p. 413.

[3] Furtwängler, *Ant. Gem.* pl. xxiv. 10, p. 119.

[4] Dion. Hal. *Ant.* i. 14; *C.R.* 1904, p. 375. For association of Picus and tree see also Ovid, *Fasti* iii. 37. [5] Supra p. 154.

[6] s. v. Πῆκος; see A. B. Cook, 'European Sky-God,' *Folklore*, 1904, p. 387.

[7] For the various traditions as to the Peleiades and the supersession of priests by priestesses see Jebb on Soph. *Trach.* 1166, and D'Arcy Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, s. v. Πέλεια.

[8] Brit. Mus. *Cat. Greek Coins*, Caria, p. 111, No. 88. See A. B. Cook, *C.R.* 1903, p. 416, Fig. 10.

And, again, the oak and the doves appear on a bronze coin of Epirus[1] itself.

The doves and oaks of Dodona passed with the Oak-Zeus to Olympia. We see them on a red-figured vase in the British Museum;[2] they frame a picture of the oath-taking of Pelops and Oinomaos. At Ammon it is not a little curious that the fountain of the Sun is known to this day as the Fountain of the Doves.[3]

I venture to go further. Not only at Dodona and Ammon was there a bird-worship of Ouranian significance, but its symbol survived in the great historic centre of Greek religious life, in Delphi. On a votive relief in the Sparta Museum (Fig. 15)[4] we see Apollo and Artemis in human form. Beneath them are the older divinities of Earth and Sky, the omphalos and the eagles. The omphalos is not, I think, the stump of a tree, nor even at first a speaking stone (Ὀμφή). It is simply what the name says, the navel[5] of the Earth-goddess, the Mother thought of anthropomorphically. And on either side are the Ouranian parent-birds, be they eagles or crows or swans,[6] who brought to the Mother life and light. On a Phoenician stele (Fig. 16)[7] in the Bibliothèque Nationale we have the same conjunction, the goddess and the Sky-birds. In the upper part of the design she has taken full human form. Above her is arched the sky, in her hands the sun and moon.

On the well-known coin of Mallos (Fig. 17)[8] in Cilicia, the aniconic Earth-goddess is attended by her two birds, by canting heraldry, half grape-bunches, half-pigeons (οἰνάδες).

And last, in a curious Egyptian design from the Book of Am-Tuat (Fig. 18)[9] we have the black under-world with two Light-birds clinging to it, strangely like in pose to the golden omphalos eagles in the rare electrum stater of Cyzicus reproduced in Fig. 19.[10]

Only a single instance is known to me in which a single bird surmounts the omphalos, a red-figured vase in the Naples Museum.[11]

[1] See A. B. Cook, *C.R.* 1903, p. 408, Fig. 4.

[2] Brit. Mus. *Walters Cat. Vases*, iv. 136.

[3] *C.R.* 1903, p. 403. Herod. ii. 55.

[4] Sparta, *Cat.* 468. *Att. Mitth.* 1887, p. 378, pl. 12.

[5] H. Diels, *Arcana Cerealia*, p. 13, note 5.

[6] For the divers birds see Plut. *de def. orac.* i; Pindar, *Pyth.* iv. 6; Middleton, *J.H.S.* ix, p. 294.

[7] *C. Inscript. Sem.* pl. xlv, No. 183.

[8] Svoronos, *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* 1894, p. 107. D'Arcy Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, s. v. Οἰνάς.

[9] Budge, *Egyptian Heaven and Hell*, i, p. 102; reproduced here by kind permission of Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co.

[10] *Cat. of Greek Coins*, Mysia, pl. viii, no. 7. Similar to these birds are the eagles which perch on an unexplained object on the proto-Corinthian lekythos in the Boston Museum, *Proleg.*[2] p. 382, Fig. 116.

[11] *Annali dell' Inst.* 1865, Tav. d'agg., H.

18

19

Turning finally to literature, it is, I am convinced, on no mere fancy of the comedian but on the actual foundation of ancient bird-cultus, that Cloud-cuckoo-town, Nephelokokkygia, is builded. Did not Zeus himself woo Hera in the form of a cuckoo? The Sky-Father in bird form woos the Earth-Maiden. He wooed her on the mountain Kokkygion near Sparta, and for that, Pausanias[1] says, was a cuckoo perched on Hera's sceptre. The *Birds* of Aristophanes, seen in this new religious light, would well repay detailed examination.[2]

There is, however, one tradition of deep religious import enshrined in the *Birds*, which I cannot pass by, and with which I will conclude. The birds are gods; thus and thus only can and must the world have sprung from an egg.

> In the beginning of Things black-winged Night
> Into the bosom of Erebos dark and deep
> Laid a wind-born Egg.[3]

I venture to translate ὑπηνέμιον not as 'wind-egg' but (as I think) more literally 'wind-born', 'wind-begotten'. The beautiful doctrine of the fatherhood of the wind and the Virgin Birth was Orphic, and is connected with the ancient Attic cult of the wind-gods, the Tritopatores, worshipped by bride and bridegroom before marriage.[4] The World-Egg, looking back to the divine Bird, is Orphic. Orpheus said: 'What time great Chronos fashioned in holy Aether a silver-gleaming Egg.'[5]

The cosmic heavenly Egg lives on in the story of the Tyndaridae and of other twins. The Egg from which the Tyndaridae sprang fell from heaven;[6] and, no doubt in honour of this belief, from the roof of the sanctuary of Hilaira and Phoebe—significant names—an Egg was suspended.[7] Twins and eggs go together, as Dr. Kaibel[8] has observed. Twins and birds, as we have seen, went together in the worship of the Leleges. And it is not a little remarkable that in Orphic doctrine the mystery-god Phanes creeps forth from an egg, twin-natured, arsenothelys.[9]

[1] Paus. ii. 17. 4, ii. 36. 1; cf. Schol. Theocr. xv. 64.

[2] I think, e.g., that it is quite possible that the οἰλοχίται, somewhat odd when connected with the sacrifice of oxen, are natural enough in a bird ritual. Cf. Ar. *Av.* 622 sqq. The umbrella of Prometheus, too, has a new significance when seen as part of the ritual of a Sun and Sky god.

[3] Ar. *Av.* 692. See my *Proleg.*[2] p. 625. The Scholiast, half understanding, says ὑπηνέμια καλεῖται τὰ δίχα συνουσίας καὶ μίξεως. And see Ar. *de Gen. Anim.* iv. p. 765 a, 23.

[4] *Proleg.*[2] p. 179.

[5] Abel, *Orphica, frag.* 53 καὶ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς ἔφεστα δ' ἔτευξε μέγας χρύσεος αἰθέρι δῖον ὠὸν ἀργύφεον.

[6] Plut. *Symp.* ii. 2 a. 2.

[7] Paus. i. xvi. 1.

[8] Kaibel, Δάκτυλοι Ἰδαῖοι, *Nachr. v. d. K. Gesell. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen, philol. hist. Klasse*, 1901, Heft iv, p. 514.

[9] Clemens Rom. *Hom.* vi.

The Orphics, we have long known,[1] revived, among other primitive things, the cult of Gaia, the Earth-Mother. They revived also, we have seen, the egg cosmogony, implying a past bird-worship. Did they know of a Father God, Ouranos, as well as an Earth-Mother? Surely. The evidence is clear and beautiful. On the gold tablet of Petelia[2] the initiated Orphic in Hades will drink of the Water of Memory. The Guardians challenge him. They ask him whence and from whom he comes. He claims no kinship with any Olympian; he looks back to an earlier faith and an auguster parentage: 'I am the child of Earth and of Starry Heaven'

ΓΗC ΠΑΙC ΕΙΜΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΟΥ ΑCΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΟC.

7

THE DAEMON IN STOICISM

By St. George STOCK. (Abstract)

I. What is the Stoic doctrine of the daemon?
II. Whence was it derived?
III. What is its value?

I. The daemon in Epictetus.
The daemon in Marcus Aurelius.

II. The doctrine did not come from the founders of the school, though the need of some such idea was early felt.
Its pragmatic origin.
(i) Philosophical antecedents of the doctrine.
The *Cebetis Tabula* a Stoic production. The daemon there is generic and symbolic, not personal and real.
The daemon in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus.
Plato himself is the source of the Stoic doctrine of the daemon.
The *Phaedo*.
The Vision of Er.
The *Timaeus*.
The doctrine of the Timaeus reappears in Cicero and in Philo.
The *Apology*.
The *Symposium*.
Diogenes Laertius on the Stoics.
View of daemons as 'divine shepherds' in the *Laws* and *Politicus*.
The δαιμόνιον of Socrates.

[1] See my *Proleg.*[3] p. 645.
[2] Ibid. p. 659.

(ii) Its antecedents in popular religion.

The belief in the daemon as a guardian-angel post-Homeric.

Δαίμων in Homer.

Δαίμων in Hesiod.

The Hesiodic account accepted by Plato for purposes of edification.

Derivation of 'daemon'.

Δαίμων in Theognis.

Δαίμων in Pindar.

Duality of the daemon.

The Δαίμων in Menander.

Discussion in the Eudemian Ethics on 'luck'.

The Stoic doctrine of the daemon was a spiritualization or rationalization of the popular notion.

III. Modern psychology is suggestive of a reality about the daemon. But the doctrine, as held by the Stoics, does not demand more than a recognition of conscience.

Its value lies in objectifying the higher to the lower self, and so satisfying the craving for personal religion.

8

DAEMONS IN THE REVIVAL OF PAGANISM

By T. R. GLOVER. (Abstract)

The termination of the Roman Republican period in a century and a half of civil war was followed by a reaction in favour of the restoration of religion. Among the contemporaries of Augustus the political value of religion was recognized, and the view was avowed that belief in immortal gods and the myths of Hades were invented by man for political purposes, and that 'it is for the good of states that men should be deceived in religion'. On the other hand, serious people felt that if Greek speculation ended in disbelief in the divine and carried with it the decay of individual and national character, there was a presumption that truth lay rather with the beliefs of their fathers. Atheistic philosophy had been discredited by human experience.

Greek philosophy, however, had too strong a hold on the minds of men to be eradicated; and in some ways it had done good by its teaching on the nature of the divine. The goodness, grandeur, and unity of the Supreme God, inculcated by the philosophers, had offered too strong a ground of hope and consolation. Eclecticism marks the philosophy of the period—a congenial habit of thinking, which

permitted concession in one direction to be compensated for in another. Thus, when philosophy forced men logically to deny all qualities in the Absolute; when it brought men to conclude that of God nothing could be predicated, but that he is 'away beyond existence' and beyond all communication with the universe; it was obvious that all was over with religion unless men could recover what they here gave away.

The presence of evil in the world required explanation, for it could not be attributed to God. The beauty of the universe and the order of nature forced men to believe in some divine power operative in what they saw; but the Stoic explanation, which was pantheistic, subjected God to change and suffering—and that was unthinkable. There was again the consensus of mankind in favour of belief in gods; and this consensus of mankind, depending on nature, was taken as evidence of the strongest in other cases, and therefore in this. Belief in gods, according to Plutarch, is universal, and it is the foundation and buttress of all social order and law. Yet even in religion there were traces of evil, e.g. human sacrifice; 'tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.' Individual men were conscious of divine revelations in dreams and otherwise.

Thus there was a presumption of some connexion between the universe and the divine, while the difficulties of associating the divine with a Cosmos containing evil, and of conceiving an Absolute which yet had relations, required some solution.

The common solution is given with great clearness and sharpness of outline (and some rhetoric) by Apuleius (about A.D. 190) in his tract *On the God of Socrates*. There are, he says, gods celestial, visible and invisible, the latter eternal and possessed of supreme beatitude in perfect intellect. Their father, lord and author of all things, is beyond human speech and definition; only by abstraction from the body have the sages grasped the conception of God—in a flash in the darkness. But prayer to one so inaccessible is impossible. There are, however, mediating divine powers in the air between aether and earth—daemons, by whom our desires and deserts may reach the gods; and they in return send salvation to men. One Reason makes all things a Cosmos, all the divisions of which are entrusted to ancillary powers.

This view is urged by Celsus against the Christians. The name of the Supreme is immaterial—Most High, Zeus, Adonai or Amun; but all things being allotted to several governors, the will of these governors—angels, daemons, or heroes—should be respected.

Stoic explanations of these deputy gods as natural laws or natural objects (wine, wheat, &c.) Plutarch rejected as atheistic. Such suggestions not merely involved the divine in matter, but identified

them. The Stoic doctrine of the periodic conflagration of the universe meant that these gods would 'melt like wax or tin'; and this was an unholy thought.

Under this hierarchy of gods is a lower order of daemons of mingled nature, immortal like the gods, subject to passion like men, invisible except when they choose to be seen. To abolish the atmosphere between earth and the moon would destroy the unity of the universe, Plutarch says; and similarly if there were no daemons, either there would be no intercourse between gods and men, or 'confusion of everything'. Some men have risen to be daemons, some daemons to be gods; thus the orders of being are linked by natural kindliness.

There is little difference between a daemon and a human soul. The daemon is a soul set free from re-birth; the soul a daemon for the present in a body. Soul meeting soul, 'impressions of the future' are given. The body indeed dulls the power of the soul to receive such impressions; but in sleep, or by means of 'the enthusiastic spirit' exhaled by the earth at Delphi, or of the Egyptian potion called Kyphi, the soul may escape this dulling influence and receive the words of daemons, which 'are borne through all things but only sound for the unruffled nature and the quiet soul'.

Plutarch lays great stress on oracles. If the earth exhales 'the enthusiastic spirit', it is not necessarily physical; Earth is a goddess, according to ancient belief, and daemons are lords and warders of shrines. Delphi has never failed, he says, and the Pythian priestess by her responses has filled the oracle with gifts and offerings and adorned it with beautiful buildings.

There were many shrines beside Delphi, where men sought oracles. Pausanias himself describes how he consulted Trophonius at Lebadea. Strabo says that to sleep in the temple in order to obtain revelation in dreams was an essential feature of Judaism, practised in Jerusalem. It was very common throughout the world. Celsus appeals to the evidence of multitudes who have seen Asklepios at Epidauros—'not a phantom of him, but himself healing men, doing them good and foretelling the future'. Similarly, he says, Trophonius, Amphiaraus, &c., can be seen—'not feigned forms slipping by', like him who deceived the Christians.

Various explanations may be offered for the facts recorded—sleight of hand, hypnotism, credulity, the mystical experience. Lucian's *Philopseudes* ridicules a curious medley of superstitions, many of which are to be found in more serious books. His *Alexander* tells the tale of the successful foundation of a bogus oracle. Celsus, Tertullian, and Marcus Aurelius all speak of extraordinary feats of conjuring and magic often attributed to supernatural agency.

The guardian daemon of the individual man is much in evidence in

the literature of the period, and Menander and Aristotle are cited in its favour. The 'daemonion of Socrates' is the subject of books by Plutarch and Apuleius. This guardian daemon answers to the Latin *genius* (or, in the case of a woman, the *Juno*), to the Persian *fravashi*, to the 'angels' of Peter and of the little children in the New Testament, and to the 'robe' in the Gnostic *Hymn of the Soul*. On the testimony of this daemon depends a man's lot after death. The guardian could be heard in dream and omen, and might even appear in person. Apuleius says the Pythagoreans used to wonder if a man said he had never seen a daemon. Porphyry records how an Egyptian priest sought to see the daemon of Plotinus, and a higher being than he had expected came in response. Plutarch doubted such appearances, but he refers to an Egyptian belief that 'the spirit of a God' could have a child by a mortal woman. Empedocles, Plutarch says, held every man has two daemons; they appear in Hermas as a man's good and bad angels. Basilides the Gnostic is credited with describing man as a sort of Wooden Horse with an army of spirits inside him.

Such words as theolept, lymphatic, enthusiasm, daemoniac, theophorete, testify to the belief that daemons, &c., can occupy human beings. Tertullian speaks of water, in streams, springs, baths, and pipes, being infested by unclean spirits. It was sometimes thought that all sin and uncleanness was their work; perhaps every act was the result of a daemonic influence; marriage and the conception of children were peculiarly liable to this interpretation.

As daemons were of mixed nature, some good and some evil, it was easy to explain the presence of evil in the universe as due to some of them. Even Celsus owns that some daemons are 'bound to blood and smoke and chanting and so forth'. To them, too, Plutarch says, we must assign the origin of revolting ritual and obscene legend in religion, e.g. human sacrifice, and the myths that speak of gods as suffering pain or dishonour.

Thus philosophic paganism found God acquitted of responsibility for evil at once by his remoteness from human contact and by the energies of evil daemons; while by good daemons man was linked to God. Ancient tradition, philosophy, and the evidence of men's ears and eyes in oracle, trance, theolepsy, and the mysteries, proved the truth of this daemon-theory. Yet complaints were heard that the theory and the religion resting on it were cruel and unclean—animal-worship and the hierodule-system continued—and the human mind was dwarfed and paralyzed by the superstition that went with the belief. Fortified as it was, the system broke down—yielding, not to the attack of philosophy or science, but to the ideas and the personality of Jesus of Nazareth.

THE LATIN HISTORY OF THE WORD 'RELIGIO'

By W. WARDE FOWLER

This word, which in its modern form is on every one's lips at this Congress, had a remarkable history in its own Latin speech and literature. That history seems to me to have more than a mere linguistic interest, and I propose in this paper to indicate in outline where that interest lies. Of the much disputed etymology of the word I will only say this: that the question stands now very much as it did in the time of Cicero and Lucretius, who took conflicting views of it. Professor Conway, whose authority is great, tells me that apart from the evidence of usage and the feeling of the Romans themselves, there is nothing to decide whether it is to be connected with *ligare*, to bind, as Lucretius thought, or with *legere*, to string together, arrange, as Cicero believed. His feeling is in favour of Cicero's view, as less prejudiced than that of Lucretius; so is mine. But our feelings are not of much account in such questions, and I may pass on at once to the history of the word.

In Latin literature down to Christian times, *religio* is used in a great variety of senses, and often in most curious and unexpected ones; but all these uses can, I think, be reduced to two main types of meaning, one of which is probably the older, the other derivative. The one reflects the natural feeling of the Latin when face to face with the supernormal or supernatural, before the State with its priesthoods and religious law had intervened to quiet that feeling. The other expresses the attitude of the citizen of a State towards the supernatural, now realizable without fear or doubt in the shape of the recognized deities of his State. I must explain these two uses to begin with.

I. Religio is the feeling of awe, anxiety, doubt, or fear, which is aroused in the mind by something that cannot be explained by a man's experience or by the natural course of cause and effect, and which is therefore referred to the supernatural. This I take to be the original meaning of the word, for the following reasons:—

1. Religio is not a word which has grown out of any State usage, or been rendered technical by priestly law or ritual. It has no part

in the *ius divinum*, like the word *sacrum*: we search for it in vain in the indices to the *Corpus Inscriptionum*, where it would inevitably be found if it were used in a technical or legal sense. In its adjectival form, as applied to times and places, we may also see the results of this non-technical meaning. *Dies religiosi, loca religiosa*, are *not* days and places which are proclaimed as such by the official administrators of the *ius divinum*: they are rather such days and places as man's own feeling, independently of the State and its officials, has made the object of religio. '*Religiosum* stands in contrast with *sacrum* as indicating something about which there is awe, fear, scruple, and which has not been definitely brought within the province of State law, nor handed over to a deity by ritualistic formulae.'[1] If this be so, then we may safely refer the origin of the word to a period when powerful State priesthoods had not as yet, by ritual and routine, soothed down the natural awe which in less perfect social forms man feels when obstructed, astonished, embarrassed, by that which he cannot explain or overcome.

2. That this is the true and the oldest meaning of the word seems also proved by the fact that it survived in this sense throughout Latin literature, and was indeed so used by the ordinary Roman layman. It is familiar to us in a thousand passages. Religio may stand for a doubt or scruple of any kind, or for anything uncanny which creates such doubt or scruple. To illustrate this I may select a single passage from Caesar, as a writer who would be sure to use a word in a sense obvious to every one. In describing the alarm of the soldiers of Q. Cicero when besieged at Aduatuca, he says:—

'Alius castra iam capta pronuntiat, alius deleto exercitu atque imperatore victores barbaros venisse contendit; plerique novas sibi ex loco religiones fingunt, Cottaeque et Titurii calamitatem, qui in eodem occiderint castello, ante oculos ponunt.'[2]

Here Caesar might almost as well have simply written *metus* instead of *religiones*; but he wishes to express not only natural fear and alarm as to what may happen, but that fear accentuated by the sense of something wrong or uncanny, for which the soldiers or their leaders may be responsible—in this case the pitching of a camp in a place which they believed to have been the scene of a former disaster. Let us note that these soldiers were out of reach of the protecting arm of their own ius divinum: they were on foreign soil, ignorant of what supernatural powers might be present there. Their commander-in-chief, it is true, was the chief administrator of that *ius*. Caesar was pontifex maximus: but Caesar was not there, and if he had been, his presence would in those days and in such a place have made little

[1] See a paper by the writer in the *Hibbert Journal* for 1907, p. 847.

[2] *B.G.* 6. 36.

difference. They are in the same position towards the supernatural as their ancestors had been before the State arose, and in describing their alarm Caesar uses the word religio in the same sense in which it had come into use in those primitive ages.

Livy, writing of a pestilence and its moral effects, says that 'non corpora modo affecta tabo, sed animos quoque multiplex religio, et pleraque externa invasit':[1] where by religio he means the feeling of anxiety which took practical shape in the performance of various rites, foreign for the most part. Such examples could be multiplied a hundredfold: and the word came at last to be used for anything that produces a feeling of wonder or even of curiosity, seeing that we do not understand it. Thus Pliny says that there is a religio in men's knees, because we kneel on them to supplicate, and clasp the knees of those from whom we ask mercy;[2] there is something uncanny about that part of the body—something we cannot explain. In the same way he says that no animal is 'religionis capacius' than the mole, because its heart and its teeth are supposed to have some mysterious medicinal powers.[3]

In this way the adjective *religiosus* came to be applied to human beings in a sense not far removed from that of *superstitiosus*, which is, so far as I know, always used of persons addicted to rites or fancies outside the pale of the Roman State-religion. This sense seems to be an early one: it occurs in the fragment of an 'antiquum carmen' quoted by Aulus Gellius:[4] 'Religentem (attentive) esse oportet, religiosus (over-anxious) ne seis.' Lucretius's use of the substantive may also be mentioned in this context: for him *all* that we call religion was superstitious and degrading, and could therefore be properly called by that word which the Romans invariably used to express their doubts, fears, and scruples.

Lastly, before I go on to the second chief meaning of the word, I may mention the significant fact that religio is never personified as a deity, as were Pietas, Sanctitas, and almost all the virtues at one time or another. It is not a virtue: it does not necessarily lead to a definite course of action, and embodies no sense of duty or moral action: it is primarily and essentially a *feeling* to which human nature is liable under certain circumstances. It is not among those qualities by the help of which, to use the interesting language of Cicero, derived from Posidonius and the East, 'datur homini ascensus in caelum,'[5] and which can therefore be made into helpful *numina*: it is not a quality or virtue, but a feeling.

[1] 4. 30. [2] *H. N.* 11. 250. [3] Ibid. 30. 19.
[4] 4. 9. 1; cf. Baehrens, *Fr. Poet. Rom.*, p. 36.
[5] *Leg.* ch. 2. 19.

II. I now come to the second chief sense in which the word is used, and which brings it a step nearer to our own use of it. This sense was mainly due, I think, in Roman literature to Cicero, though it may be far older in common use: and is perhaps the result of the Greek originals, e.g. Posidonius, whom he was following when writing the *de Legibus* and the *de Natura Deorum*, &c.; but this is a point which I must here pass over. From Cicero in any case I can best illustrate this new turn of meaning which the word acquires.

When Cicero was a young man, not yet too learned or philosophical, he defined the word clearly according to its common usage, with an addition of some importance. 'Religio est quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert;'[1] i.e. a *feeling* of awe that inevitably suggests the discovery of the proper rites by which the object of that feeling may be propitiated. But later on in his life, in the second book of the *de Legibus*, which deals with the State religion, he uses the word with much freedom *of the particular cults*, or all of them together, which are the result of the feeling. Thus in 10. 25 'suos deos aut novos aut alienigenas coli, confusionem habet religionum', i.e. private persons may not introduce new cults; for there would in that case be a confusion both of religious feeling and duty. In 10. 23 he calls his own imaginary ius divinum a *constitutio religionum*, a system of religious duties. Thus the word is passing into the sense of the *forms of cult*, as ordered and organized by the State, the feeling, the religio proper, being only aroused when scruple is felt as to the accurate performance of these rites. In 7. 15 we read 'qua mente, qua pietate colat religiones', where it answers almost exactly to religious duties. In 16. 40 he tells how the Athenians consulted the Delphic oracle 'quas potissimum religiones colerent', and the answer was, 'eas quae essent in more maiorum.' Again in 11. 27 we find 'religio Larium', the cult of the Lares. But the feeling which prompts the cult, and which is aroused afresh if it be neglected, is seldom entirely absent. The phrase *religio sepulcrorum* (22. 55) suggests quite as much the feeling as the ritual: and a little further down we are told that the pontifical law of burials 'magnam religionem caerimoniamque declarat'—the word *caerimonia* being necessary to express the ritual following on the feeling. And lastly this word may be used to gather up and express in totality a number of acts of cult, because the same feeling is at the root of them all. Thus in 19. 47 the question is raised whether a pontifex should know the civil law. The answer is, 'quod cum religione coniunctum est: de sacris, de votis, de feriis, de sepulcris,' the pontifex has to do with these matters, which can all be expressed together by the word *religio*.

[1] *De Invent.* 2. 161.

These examples seem to show how the word might pass into the sense in which we still use it; the feeling which prompts us to worship, and also the forms under which we perform that worship. The feeling is common to human nature, civilized or not: that is the original meaning of the word: the worship, organized by a priesthood, is the work of the State—that is the second, or as we may call it, the Ciceronic meaning. And in the same age it is also so used by Lucretius, who includes under it all that was for him the world's evil and folly, i.e. both the feeling and the cult—delusion, myth, superstition, as well as the organized but futile worship of the family and the State. 'Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.'[1] In an age of cosmopolitanism, when the old local character of the cults was disappearing, and in an age of philosophic-religious syncretism when men like Posidonius, Cicero, Varro, and others were thinking and writing about the nature of the gods and kindred questions, a word was wanted to gather up and express all this religious side of human life and experience: it must be a word without a definite technical meaning, and such a word was religio. To take a single example, besides those already quoted from Cicero, there is the famous aphorism which St. Augustine[2] ascribes to Varro: 'expedit falli in religione civitates.'

Thus while religio continues to express the feeling only, or the cult only, if called on to do so by Latin writers, it gains in the Ciceronian age a more comprehensive connotation, as the result of the contemplation of religion by philosophy as a thing apart from itself; and this, as we shall see directly, enabled the early Christian writers, who knew their Cicero well, and modelled their prose on his, to use it in much the same sense as that in which we use it to-day.

Time fails to-day to trace the word in the pre-Christian literature of the early Empire, and to see how it is affected by the finer quasi-religious Stoicism, or again by the Caesar-worship of the day,—the nearest approach in antiquity, as it has been called, to a cosmopolitan religion. So far as I can see, it did not take from either of these sources any new turn or type of meaning. Seneca, for example, has but little use for it; though he was, as Professor Dill has said of him, one of the few heathen moralists who warm moral feeling with the emotion of modern religion, he had little real interest either in the feeling or the cult. If he made himself a religion out of his Stoic principles, it was not one that he could have described by the word *religio*. For him, though tinged by emotion, it was still *sapientia*: he could hardly have assented to the later teaching of Lactantius[3] that *sapientia* and *religio* are inseparably connected. Nor did the worship of the Caesars bring any new turn of mean-

[1] Lucr. 1. 101.

[2] *De Vera Sap.* 4. 3.

[3] *Civ. Dei* 4. 27.

ing: here it could express the cult ('caelestes religiones'[1]), but the feeling at the root of a genuine religious cult was not there to be expressed. This is perhaps significant both of the true meaning of the word, and also of the weak point in Caesar-worship: but I must not now dwell upon it. I will only mention one passage in which Pliny the Younger uses it of the cult of Trajan, because the kind of feeling which it there represents—loyalty and devotion to an individual—is in some sense a new one, and may be a foreshadowing of the Christian use. Pliny writes to Trajan from Bithynia reporting celebrations on the Emperor's birthday: 'Diem . . . debita religione celebravimus, commendantes dis imperii tui auctoribus et vota publica et gaudia.'[2] Here it means the feeling of devotion prompting the vota et gaudia, as well as those acts themselves. There is nothing in it of the old fear, scruple, anxiety: it is the devotion and gratitude which expresses itself in religious festivities.

But there was to be a real change in the meaning of the word, the last but one in its history. The second century A. D. was that in which the competition was keenest between various religious creeds and forms, each with its own vitality, and each clearly marked off from the others. It is no longer a question of religion as a whole contemplated by a critical or a sympathetic philosophy: the question is, which creed and form is to be the true and the victorious religion. Our wonderful word again adapts itself to the situation. Each separate religious system can now be called a religio.[3] The old polytheistic system can now be called *religio Deorum* by the Christian, while his own creed is *religio Dei*. In the Octavius of Minucius Felix, written in the first half of the second century A. D., the word is already used in this sense. His *nostra religio, vera religio*, distinguished from all other *religiones*, is the whole Christian faith and Christian practice as it stood then; the depth of feeling and the acts which give it outward form. The one true religion can be expressed by this word, though it is quite different from anything the word has as yet been called on to mean. In Lactantius, Arnobius, Tertullian, this new sense of the word is to be found on almost every page: but a single noble passage of Lactantius must suffice to illustrate it. 'The heathen sacrifice,' he says, 'and leave all their religio in the temple': thus it is that such *religiones* cannot make men good, or firm in their faith. 'Nostra religio eo firma est et solida et immutabilis, quia mentem ipsam pro sacrificio habet, quia tota in animo colentis est.'[4] *Religio* here is not awe only or cult only, or scruple about details of cult, but a mental devotion capable of building up character. 'The

[1] Tac. *Ann.* I. 14.
[2] *Ep.* 10. 102.
[3] 'e cohorte religionis unus,' Apul. 11. 14, of Isis.
[4] *De Iustitia* 5. 19.

kingdom of God is within you.' It is worth noting that it can now be explained by the word *pietas*, which was not possible in the old days, because *pietas* was a virtue and *religio* was not a virtue but a feeling. Lactantius says that philosophy, 'quae veram religionem, id est summam pietatem, non habet, non est vera sapientia.'[1]

Thus the word has meant successively (1) the natural fear and awe which semi-civilized man feels in the presence of what he cannot explain; (2) the cult by which he strives to propitiate the unseen Powers, together with the scruple he feels if the propitiation is in the least degree imperfect; (3) the whole sphere of worship, together with all belief in the supernatural, as viewed from the standpoint of the philosopher; (4) the competing divisions of that sphere of worship and belief, each being now a *religio*, and the Christian faith being for the Christian the *vera religio*. There is one later stage in the history of the word, which I can only mention here. It suffered a degradation when it was made to mean the monastic life: the life of men who withdrew themselves from a world in which true religion was not. But even in this degraded form it reveals once more its wonderful capacity to express the varying attitude of humanity towards the supernatural. Outside the monasteries—the homes of the *religiosi*—were a thousand fears, fancies, superstitions, which the old Roman might have summed up by his word religio, the anxious fear of the supernatural: inside them, for many ages at least, was still something of the *vera religio* of the early Fathers, the devotion and the ritual combined, the pure life and training, *religio Dei*.

10

SOME POINTS IN THE CULT OF THE HEAVENLY TWINS

By J. RENDEL HARRIS. (Abstract)

The object of this paper is to elucidate some points in the evolution of the Cult of the Heavenly Twins, from a taboo of extraordinary force amongst primaeval savages down to the devotions of sailors in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. As this taboo had originally nothing to do with the sea, it is clear (as might also be deduced from Greek literature and mythology) that the belief in the Twins as patrons

[1] *De Vera Sap.* 4. 3.

of sailors is late; and it may therefore be inferred that they were in charge of travellers on land before they protected seafaring men, and that they were River Saints before they became Sea Saints. There is reason to suppose that they acted as River Saints at Rome under the names of Romulus and Remus, before the arrival of Castor and Pollux, and that like the latter they also went to sea and exercised their virtue in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

The earliest form of Twin Cult makes them children of the sky, or of the thunder or the lightning. Under these latter titles they are found in Palestine. Near Jaffa there is a town which from the earliest times has been named after the Sons of Lightning; probably, therefore, it was a Dioscuric shrine for sailors entering or leaving the dangerous port of Jaffa. A parallel may be made with Barqa in Cyrene, a known centre of Dioscurism, in the neighbourhood of the great Syrtis. The Twins also presided over signalling stations, lighthouses, dangerous straits and harbours, sandbanks, &c.; and there is evidence to show that they survived in Kent, and protected sailors from the Goodwin Sands. From an examination of Kentish wills for two centuries preceding the Reformation, it appears that the chief patron saints of sailors were Nicholas of Myra (who is Poseidon) and Erasmus (who is commonly identified either with St. Helena, i.e. with the sister of the Dioscuri, or with an imagined St. Eremo), to whom must be added the pairs SS. Cosmas and Damian, and SS. Crispin and Crispian, both of which pairs are disguised Dioscuri.

As to the real meaning of St. Erasmo, it may be shown that he is a modification of St. Remo, i.e. of the Roman Twin. It is an interesting fact that the town of San Remo on the Riviera has San Romolo in the neighbourhood, and was originally named Matuta, after the mysterious mother of the Tiber.

To return to the subject of land saints who replace the Twins, some further light may be thrown on the case of Polyeuctes. His connexion with Melitene arose from his belonging to the Fulminate Legion, over which there has been so much controversy. It seems probable that this Legion was under the patronage of the Dioscuri; a circumstance which would explain the traditions about their raising storms and bringing rain.

In conclusion it may be suggested that the episcopal benediction with two fingers was originally a prayer that those blessed might have twin children.

11

THE BAETUL IN DAMASCIUS

By F. C. CONYBEARE

Of the life of Isidorus by Damascius we have only some thirty folio pages of extracts in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius, but what there is makes us long for more. It was clearly a mine of folk-lore, of stirring and often contemporary tales, of demonology strangely mixed with philosophic reflections.

I would direct attention to a passage which contains a fuller description than we have anywhere else in Greek literature of a *Baitulion* or *Baitulos*. In this word has been rightly recognized a graecized form of the Semitic *Bethel* or House of God. In the neighbourhood of Heliupolis in Syria, says Damascius, Isidore saw many such Baetuls, and, according to Photius, he had all sorts of marvels to relate of them. These tales, however, Photius esteemed worthy only of an impious tongue; and he condescends to copy out for his readers but a single one of them. It begins abruptly thus [1]:—

'I saw, says Isidore, the *Baitulos* moving through the air, but sometimes concealed in its vestments, and again at times carried along in the hands of its worshipper and ministrant. And the ministrant's name was Eusebius, who said that he was once overcome suddenly by an unexpected impulse to wander away from the city of Emesa at midnight nearly as far as the hill on which the ancient and famous temple of Athena is built. He quickly reached the foot of the hill, and there halted being wearied with walking. Suddenly he saw a globe of fire leap down from above, and a great lion standing beside the globe. The lion, indeed, immediately vanished, but he himself ran up to the globe when the fire was just being extinguished, and found it to be the Baitulos. And he took it up and asked to which of the gods it belonged; and the Baitulos answered to *Gennaeos* (i. e. the Noble one). Now the natives of Heliupolis worship Gennaeus, and have set up a lion-shaped image of him in the temple of Zeus. The same night, he says, I returned homewards not less than 210 stadia. But Eusebius was not master of the movements of the Baitulos, as other (priests) of theirs. But while he offered petitions and prayers, it answered in oracular responses.

'After the above foolish remarks and many more such, this writer who is on a level with his *baitulia*, describes the stone and its appearance. It was, he says, a full orb, whitish in colour, in diameter a palm's length, though it was sometimes bigger, sometimes smaller, and occasionally purple of aspect. And he pointed out to us letters written on the stone, painted on in the pigment known as Tingibarine (vermilion). And one knocked on a wall, whereupon it gave the inquirer the

[1] Codex No. 242, p. 1062, in ed. of 1633, p. 348 in ed. of 1824.

response he wanted, and uttered a sound of low hissing, which Eusebius interpreted. This empty-headed fellow, then, vamps up these miracles and adds: "I esteemed the Baitulos an object more divine than not. But Isidore insisted that it was rather a matter of demons. For, he said, there is a demon who moves it, though not one of the harmful or over-material sort, yet not one of those that have won their way up to the immaterial kind nor one of the wholly pure sort. And one Baitulos is dedicated to one god, another to another; as he blasphemously says, to the god Kronos, or Zeus, or Helios, or to the others."

We gather then that this sacred stone had originally fallen from heaven and was probably a meteorite. It had a priest all to itself, to wit Eusebius; and it was dressed up in vestments. It was usually carried in the hands of its ministrant, although it could levitate itself. It gave oracles to its priest who regularly prayed to it. The demon that lived in it was one of the benevolent sort, and not of the heavy material kind that roll along the ground, as Origen says, instead of lightly soaring up to heaven.

The stones within which the god had thus taken up his dwelling, were termed by Philo of Byblus (cited in Eusebius of Caesarea, about the year 300) animated stones, λίθοι ἔμψυχοι. The same Philo says that the god Uranus, the son of Elioum 'the most High' and a female named Beruth, had invented them.

Clement of Alexandria, c. 170, ridicules the pagans because they worshipped logs and the stones called smooth (λιπαρούς). Doubtless the constant kissing and caressing and anointing with oil to which these stones were subjected would often make them smooth and bright.

The worship of ancient stones was spread all over the ancient world, and was not confined to the Semitic portion; although we owe to the Jews the picturesque name Bethel or House of God, and Ebenezer or stone of help. Let us examine some of the references made to them.

In Lucian's account of Alexander, the great charlatan of Abônoteichos, we have a brief but eloquent character sketch of one of his victims, by name Rutilianus. This gentleman was in other respects, says Lucian, honourable and good, and he had served his country with distinction in many offices. Yet as regards the gods he was altogether an invalid, or as we should say a crank, and 'gone' upon religion. No tale about the gods was too absurd for his credence, and he could not pass a stone dripping with oil or crowned with a wreath without at once going down on his knees to it and worshipping it. He would stand before it any length of time, praying to it and asking of it blessings. Lucian wrote this about 182, and 125 years later we get in Arnobius's work against the Gentiles or Pagans[1] another capital account of the psychology of the educated pagan's worship of

[1] Bk. I, p. 11 in ed. of 1666.

holy stones. He is enumerating the fetishes which, before he embraced the true religion, he had adored.

'I used to venerate, O what blindness! images just taken out of the furnaces, gods fashioned on anvils with hammers, elephants' bones, fillets of paper painted with pictures and hung up on aged trees; and if I saw a well-lubricated stone, begrimed with olive oil, I would address it with flattering words, as if there were in it a real presence (*uis praesens*), and would ask for blessings of a stock that had no sentience. Moreover, I really inflicted the worst insults on the very gods of whose real existence I had persuaded myself, inasmuch as I believed them to inhabit logs, stones, and bones and other such material objects.'

These words of Arnobius are of quite peculiar interest. The votary begins by addressing his fetish with flattering words. There was to be observed, no doubt, what in diplomatic language we term a protocol in addressing a stock or stone which was overflowing with supernatural power and could bring you good or bad luck. You apologized for disturbing it, and promised to lavish upon it your oil and wine and even the blood of victims. You fondled and caressed it, as an Arunta does his *churinga* or wooden soul-token. And if Arnobius could have digested it, he would, no doubt, have broken off a fragment of his petrine divinity and have swallowed it; for that is the most effective way, after all, of getting into close contact and communion with the spirit which animated it.

This cult of rude stones depicted by Arnobius was no new development in the religion of the Greeks and Romans; for nearly six hundred years before Arnobius, Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus in portraying the character of the superstitious man notes that when he passes a 'Smooth Stone' in one of his walks, he takes his flask and pours some oil over it, prostrates himself and says his prayers to it.

From such stray notices we learn that in the very age when Greek sculpture was in its bloom, and figures of the gods worked by Pheidias and other great artists adorned the public places, the ultra-pious still went about anointing and praying to smooth stones. So in our modern religions the adoration of the aniconic objects survives alongside of the worship of images of the saints. At Pessinus the ancients worshipped a flint as the mother of the gods, which Arnobius says was originally brought from Phrygia, and then presented by King Attalus to the Republic of Rome. It was popularly believed that the defeat of Hannibal was part of the good luck brought by this stone. 'But what man,' writes Arnobius, 'will believe that a stone taken from the earth, moved by no sentience, of sooty colour and black body was the mother of the gods? or who, again, would listen to the tale (for it is the alternative) that the power of any deity dwelt in a bit of flint, within its mass and hidden in its veins?'

The stone in question, he declares, was of no size, and could be carried in a man's hand without effort, was black and dusky in colour and, instead of being smooth, had little corners or angles projecting from it. It was, we gather, let into an image by way of a face, but being rough and unhewn, it gave the figure, he says, in which it was inserted a countenance the reverse of lifelike.

Both Livy (xxvii) and Cicero allude to this story, which in all essential respects resembles the story of many a famous relic in the Middle Ages.

It would seem as if the races that inhabit the earth were once united in a really universal or catholic religion, and that religion the cult of sacred stones or Bethels. In the Old Testament, that wonderful repertory of the myths, religion and folk-lore of the Semites, we have an earlier account of them than any Indo-European documents afford, but in full agreement with the latter. Take, for example, the tale of Jacob. The patriarch 'took one of the stones of the place and put it under his head'. Was not this a primitive form of incubation? for he had his picturesque dream of ladder and angels and of the God of Abraham, and when he 'awaked out of sleep, he said, Surely the Lord is in this place'. And he took the stone that he had put under his head and set it up for a pillar, and poured oil on the top of it, and called it Bethel, or House of God. At a later stage of their religious development the Jews grew ashamed of the cult of stocks and stones, and in the deutero-Isaiah we meet with solemn denunciation of those who poured out drink offerings and offered oblations to the smooth stones in the valleys. Yet at an earlier epoch such practices were an essential part of the worship of Jahveh.

The Baetul of Eusebius was dressed up. Similarly the sacred stone at Delphi was in times of festival dressed in holiday robes after being anointed. Mr. Frazer in his commentary on Pausanias[1] suggests that it was so wrapped up in order to keep it warm, as was a smooth stone in Samoa which was the home of a god named Turia. This was covered with branches, which were renewed when special adoration was given to it. But I do not think we can argue from Samoa to Delphi, and the garments may have had a decorative purpose. The image of the mother of the gods which Elagabalus fetched from Carthage and honoured with a procession through the streets of Rome was probably a rude stone. It was magnificently arrayed in silk vestments for the occasion.

Pausanias relates[2] that all the Greeks of old worshipped unhewn stones, instead of images, and gives many examples of its survival.

Pliny the Elder notes the worship in Syria of Baetuls, which were round black stones of magic power.[3] They were the same as Sotacus, a very old writer about stones and ores, had described. He distin-

[1] v. 355. [2] vii. 22. [3] *Nat. Hist.* xxxvii. 135.

guished black *keraunia*i or Thunder Stones from red ones. The latter were shaped like axes (*securibus*). The former were round and of service for besieging and taking cities and fleets, and were called Baetuli.

The question arises: Why were unhewn stones especially sacred? More than half the holy stones mentioned about Greece by Pausanias are rough unworked stones, and he specially remarks that it was these that *all* the Greeks once adored before they took to images. The sacredness of an aerolite explains itself. It fell from heaven and brought its credentials with it. It obviously needed no trimming; but why should other stones not be trimmed? In India to-day many Hindus prefer a trimmed stone or even a brick as the object of their devotions. They will not take a rough stone that bears no impress of human art. I have often seen a Hindu pick up an old brickbat, set it up on end, draw a circle around it, and proceed to say his prayers to it. Probably several motives operated. We may suppose firstly, that the older the stone, the less likely it was to be worked with tools. And, secondly, the tool did not introduce into it the spirit, *numen*, *orenda*, or *mana*, but might on the contrary disturb the same and occasion it to take flight. The god probably dwelt in some stone or rock which attracted notice by its colour, size, or position; for example, in an erratic block standing solitary on rising ground or in a flat alluvial tract, or in a rock worn smooth and round in a torrent bed, or in a stone with a hole in it ready to receive libations of oil and blood. The great stones of Stonehenge were, I believe, erratic blocks gathered together from the surrounding plain.

In the history of Jacob we have several other examples of stones being set up as pillars, but always without mention of their being wrought. His covenant with Laban[1] was cemented by a stone being thus set up, and on this occasion his brethren also had to gather stones and make a heap, called the Heap of Witness. Such monuments were evidently intended to house the God who was to watch over the agreement and hold each party to the bargain. So Joshua,[2] anxious to hold the people to the observance of the Book of the Law, took a great stone and set it up under the oak—the sacred tree—that was in the holy place. This stone was to be witness, in case the people denied their God. It was to play quite a personal and active rôle, for says the text: 'it has heard all the words of the Lord which He spake unto us.'

In another passage[3] it is expressly laid down that the altar of Jahveh is not to be built of hewn stones: 'for,' so Jahveh is represented as saying, 'if thou lift up thy tool upon it, thou hast polluted it.' Clearly the stone had an antecedent taboo value of its own as part of a site

[1] Gen. xxxi. 45. [2] Joshua xxiv. 26. [3] Exod. xx. 25.

upon which the god had revealed himself. As often as not a stone was anointed not in order to hallow it, but because it was already holy. In a certain place there was 'plenty devil', as the Melanesian savage says; or as Jacob said: 'How dreadful is this place. Surely the Lord is in this place, and I knew it not.' Forthwith a stone is set up for the God to abide in. I know of no Christian Church except the Armenian in which the prohibition of hewn stones is continued. In Armenia, when a site has been chosen, probably because it was traditionally holy beforehand, twelve stones of due size are brought unwrought and unpolished. Beside these a single rock is laid for the altar or fundament of the church, where the future *hema* will be, and four other unwrought stones at the four corners around it. On these stones the bishop then makes the sign of a cross with holy oil, and repeats over each the formula: 'May this stone be blessed, be anointed, and hallowed by (*or* in) the name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.'

I do not think that this rite was merely modelled on the Scriptural passages, where Moses builded an altar under the Mount with twelve pillars round it for the twelve tribes,[1] or where Joshua set up twelve stones in Gilgal taken out of the Jordan.[2] Apart from the fact that these narratives were aetiological, i.e. subsequent explanations in accordance with the religious customs of the age of ancient stone circles, it is probable that the Armenians in the pre-Christian Age had such a rite of founding a temple or shrine, and that what we find in their oldest service books is an attempt to christianize the old rite. If so, we witness a curious and interesting development, namely, the conversion into a Christian Church of the older circle of unwrought sacred stones grouped around a primitive altar. We must not forget that in that country bulls, rams, sheep, and even fowls, are still taken to the church to be sacrificed by the priest and deacon with due religious rites.

In the East the cult of stones, pillars, and trees still flourishes. On Mount Sion at Jerusalem there is a church which Salahadin after the conquest of Jerusalem gave to the Armenians. It is dedicated to St. James, and the Armenians have built a convent around it. The western wall of this church is carried over a large boulder stone, or rather, I should say, is interrupted by an opening to accommodate its presence. This proves that the stone was in its present position before the church was built. Where it projects through the church wall it is smooth and polished with the kisses which Armenian, Syrian, and Greek pilgrims have from time immemorial lavished upon it. Mr. Arthur Evans contributed a remarkable paper six years ago to the *Hellenic Journal* on the 'Survival in Turkish dominions of Tree and

[1] Exod. xxiv. 4. [2] Joshua iv. 20.

Pillar worship'. More recently there appeared in the *Expositor*[1] a paper by the late Samuel Ives Curtiss, entitled 'Survivals of Ancient Semitic Religion in Syrian Centres of Moslem and Christian Influence'.

In our own island we can trace long after the Reformation a cult of stones identical with the ancient cults I have enumerated. As late as the end of the seventeenth century in Orkney the peasants kept round stones with holes in them, and whenever they brewed beer they poured an ἀπαρχή or firstfruits of the new beer into the hole for the Brownie. The kirk opposed the usage; but the women believed that, if they did not do it, the Brownie spoiled the beer. They admitted, however, to an Edinburgh tourist who relates the fact, that although the Brownie spoiled the penny brew, he seldom interfered with the more carefully prepared threepenny brew.

12

In *Le culte du soleil et les sacrifices humains chez les Grecs* the Abbé Fourrière maintained that the cult of the sun had been practised in Greece from an early period, especially in Crete, Laconia, and Arcadia, and was accompanied with human sacrifices. This cult and these sacrifices had been brought over into Greece from Palestine by the emigrant tribe of Dan, who had been compelled to flee from their country at the time when the prophets of Baal had been massacred by Elijah. The worship of the Sun-God Baal had been combined with that of the golden calf of Jeroboam since the reign of Ahab and Jezebel. Traces of this cult-migration may be found in Greek place-names and personal names derived from the root of 'Dan', from the name of the hill of Dan and from the name 'Elias'. The persistence of the cult and the ritual of the emigrant Danites was due to the efforts of the magicians who followed them in their migrations, as is shown by the legends of Kirke and Medea.

[1] 1905, p. 415.

13

THE CRETAN AXE-CULT OUTSIDE CRETE

By A. B. COOK

More than half a century has elapsed since that admirable scholar Longpérier first drew attention to the cult of the axe. He was impressed by the fact, now commonly admitted[1] though still imperfectly understood, that the character used by the ancient Egyptians to denote a god was shaped like an axe (Fig. 1).[2]



Fig. 1.

Why the Egyptians used an axe (if it be an axe) as the determinative of a god, is a question that might be answered in more ways than one. Were we to embark on the discussion of it à propos of our first illustration, we should probably get no further. I must, moreover, content myself with a mere mention of a deeply interesting paper by Professor Newberry just published in the Liverpool *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*.[3] It is here shown that twice in the fifth dynasty a 'priest of the Double-Axe' is recorded, while once in the twenty-sixth dynasty there is an allusion to an Amasis 'priest of HA of the Double Axe'. Professor Newberry justly compares the Minoan cult, of which I shall have more to say.

Longpérier also published an Assyrian cylinder in white agate, which had been brought from Constantinople by a certain M. Cayol (Fig. 2).[4] This shows a priestly personage presenting a fish to a deity who is symbolized by an axe and a knobbed sceptre erected on a high-backed throne. Behind the throne is an *ibex*, above which we see the sun, the moon, and seven stars. If it be asked, Who is the deity thus symbolized by axe and sceptre?—the most probable answer appears

[1] See, however, F. L. Griffith, *Hieroglyphs*, p. 46, Figs. 26, 114.

[2] E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 63.

[3] P. E. Newberry, 'Two Cults of the Old Kingdom,' in *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*, 1908, i. 24 sqq.

[4] G. Schlumberger, *Œuvres de A. de Longpérier*, i. 170.

2

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4

D ☧ M
ET MEMORIAE AETERNAE
FLAVI MAXIMINI
INFANTIS DVLCISSI
5 MI QVI VIXIT ANNIS
· VII · MENS · VII · DIES · XII
FLAVIVS MASCELI
ET MAXIMINIA MARSA
PARENTES FILIO
10 DVLCISSIMO PONEN
DVM CVRAVERVNT
ET SVB ASCIA DE
DICAVERVNT

5

to be, Marduk, the head of the Babylonian pantheon. Marduk was identified with the planet Jupiter, and the fifth tablet of the creation epic represents him, under the name of Nibir, as exercising a control over all the stars and especially as ordering the constellations.[1] True, the symbol of Marduk is a spear more often than an axe. But a cylinder of rock-crystal in the Museum at Florence portrays him with both (Fig. 3).[2]

Another deity who might claim to be represented by an axe is Adad or Ramman—the Rimmon of the Old Testament—who appears on a relief from Malatiyeh :[3] bovine horns project from his head, and in his hands are an axe and a conventional thunderbolt. The adoration of an axe set up as the symbol of a god—whether that god was Marduk or Ramman—lasted on into the Persian period, to judge from such seal-stones as the following (Fig. 4).[4] Pliny states that the Magi practised *axinomantia* or 'divination by means of axes'.[5] Perhaps our intaglio represents a scene from their ritual. However that may be, a worshipper is seen in an attitude of adoration before a vertical axe.

But we have not yet done with Longpérier. He conjectured, though without offering any definite proofs, that in Gaul, too, the axe was at one time an object of veneration. I am disposed to think that here again Longpérier was right; and for the following reasons. Latin tomb-inscriptions from Gallia Lugudunensis are regularly marked with the sign of an axe or chopper, either incised or carved in relief, and end with the formula: 'So-and-so dedicated this monument under the axe' (Fig. 5).[6] The phrase *sub ascia dedicare* has for the last two centuries provoked the curiosity of the learned. Monographs have been devoted to it, and the literature is already large. Most scholars (including Mau[7]) take it to mean that the monument was dedicated before it was finished, being still, so to say, 'under the axe' of the stone-mason. But Otto Hirschfeld, who has edited these inscriptions for the Berlin *Corpus*, records[8] his emphatic opinion that the tombs in question were under the protection of some Gallic divinity symbolized by a sacred axe. And Émile Guimet has adduced certain facts which point clearly in the same direction. For example, at Avignon ten sepulchral urns of stone were found arranged in a circle

[1] M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 434, 459.

[2] J. Menant, *Glyptique Orientale*, ii. 60, Fig. 52.

[3] G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, p. 663, after Layard, *Monuments of Nineveh*, First Series, pl. 65.

[4] J. Menant, *Glyptique Orientale*, ii, pl. 9, 7.

[5] Plin. *N. H.* 30. 14, 36. 142.

[6] *C. I. L.* xiii. 2140.

[7] Mau in *Pauly-Wissowa*, ii. 1522.

[8] Hirschfeld in *C. I. L.* xiii, p. 256.

with a bronze axe in the middle of them,[1] while in some Italian *columbaria* the urns are covered with a tile of marble or terra-cotta on which is the representation of an axe—they are literally *sub ascia*.[2]

A parallel to these Gallic tombstones 'dedicated under the axe' may be found in certain runic tombstones dedicated under, or at least marked with, the hammer of Thor. A good example from Hanning in Denmark was published by Petersen.[3] The parallel suggests that the axe on the Gallic tombs was, like Thor's hammer, the weapon of a thunder-god. But had the Gauls of Gallia Lugudunensis a thunder-god, and did he stand in any relation to an axe? Lucan in a well-known passage mentions together three Gallic deities—Teutates, Esus, and Taranis.[4] Of these the last-named, Taranis, was certainly a god of thunder. All three, as M. Salomon Reinach has proved,[5] appear on the carved altar, which was unearthed at Paris in 1710, beneath the apse of Notre-Dame. We are concerned only with the representation of Esus.[6] This, as M. Reinach showed,[7] occupies two adjoining panels. One panel gives us a bearded god, inscribed ESVS. He is engaged in felling a willow-tree with his uplifted axe. The other panel[8] has a great bull wearing a long saddle-cloth or *dorsuale*. On his head and back are three cranes visible against the foliage of the willow. The inscription above runs TARVOS· TRIGARANVS, 'the Bull with the Three Cranes.' Here, then, in Gallia Lugudunensis we have Esus, an axe-bearing god, closely associated with Taranis, a thunder-god.

M. Reinach[9] with his usual penetration detected a similar scene on an altar found near Trèves in 1895.[10] Again we see a wood-cutter felling a tree, perhaps meant for a willow. On the tree are a bull's head to the left, and three large birds with long beaks to the right. These animals certainly correspond with the bull and the cranes of the Paris altar. But for a further discussion of both monuments I must refer you to M. Reinach's fascinating *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*.

In passing, however, I would venture one suggestion. The odd combination of bull and crane and axe occurs also in the Greek area. When Theseus had slain the Minotaur, the 'Bull of Minos', he instituted at the Keratonian altar in Delos a dance called the *Géranos* or

[1] É. Guimet, *De l'ascia des Égyptiens*, Lyon, 1872, p. 1.
[2] Id., ib., p. 2, pl. 1, 10.
[3] H. Petersen, *Ueber den Gottesdienst*, &c., trans. M. Riess, p. 39, Fig. 1. Cp. P. D. C. de la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 239.
[4] Lucan, i. 444 sqq. [5] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, ii. 172.
[6] A. Bertrand, *La Religion des Gaulois*, p. 360, Fig. 56.
[7] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, i. 233, 238 sq.
[8] A. Bertrand, *La Religion des Gaulois*, p. 351, Fig. 50.
[9] S. Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, i. 234 sqq.
[10] *Bonner Jahrbücher*, 1896, c. 209, Fig. 29 *b*.

'Crane', which imitated the twistings and turnings of the Labyrinth, plausibly regarded as the 'Place of the Double-Axe'.[1]

But—to return to the axes of Gallia Lugudunensis—we have seen that not improbably they represented the weapon of a thunder-god or a lightning-god. Such a conception dies hard. Even nowadays peasants on the farms near Beuvray in Saône-et-Loire, as soon as they hear the first rumblings of thunder and feel the first drops of rain, bring out into the yard and set up near the threshold of their house an iron axe, with its handle against the ground and its blade uppermost, to preserve the place—as they say—from lightning and hail.[2]

Since Longpérier laid down the pen no one has done so much for the elucidation of the axe-cult as Dr. Arthur Evans. His discoveries at Knossos have made the Cretan double-axe notorious. I shall not, therefore, take up your time by recapitulating the evidence from Crete, but rather endeavour to extend it to countries adjacent.

There was in antiquity a consistent tradition to the effect that, when Minos was murdered at Kamikos in Sicily, the Cretans vainly attempted to take the town and were then driven by stress of weather to land in Iapygia. Here they built Hyria and became the Iapygians of Messapia.[3] Iapyx, the eponym of the Iapygians, was said to have been the son of Daidalos.[4] Now in view of this traditional connexion between the Iapygians and the Cretans of the Minoan Age it is interesting to find Athenaeus giving a description of the Iapygians that with curious exactitude suits the Minoans.[5] 'The race of the Iapygians,' he says, 'is derived from Crete. Cretans came to look for Glaukos and settled down here. Their descendants, forgetting the orderly life of the Cretans, reached such a pitch of luxury, and subsequently of insolence, that they were the first to paint their faces, to get front locks and side locks of false hair, to wear flowered robes, and to deem work and labour a disgrace. Ordinary citizens made their houses more magnificent than the temples, while the principal men of the Iapygians, treating the deity with insult, destroyed the statues of the gods out of the temples, and bade them give place to their betters. Wherefore they were struck by fire and bronze from the sky; and the fame of it was spread abroad, for bolts from heaven forged of bronze were long to be seen. And to this very day all their descendants live shaven to the skin and wearing the garb of mourners, in want of all the luxuries that were theirs before.' In this mournful but eminently moral story we note more than one Minoan trait—the painted faces of the Iapygians, their artificial front locks and side locks, their flowered robes, the

[1] Plut. *V. Thes.* 21, *alib.*

[2] P. Sébillot, *Le Folk-Lore de France*, i. 105.

[3] Hdt. 7. 170, Strab. 279, 282; cp. Diod. 4. 79.

[4] Strab. 279, Plin. *N. H.* 3. 102, Solin. 2. 7, Mart. Cap. 642.

[5] Athen. 522 F–523 B.

magnificence of their houses as contrasted with their shrines, and lastly the bolts from heaven forged of bronze, which may fairly be identified with the bronze double-axes of Minoan worship. Those who have qualms about this identification should first consider a narrative told in the same context by Athenaeus.[1] He cites it from Klearchos, the pupil of Aristotle, a most respectable authority. It appears that the Tarentines, having overthrown Karbina, a city of the Iapygians, and exposed the inhabitants of the place to the grossest outrages, were visited by the vengeance of heaven. All who had offended at Karbina were struck by lightning. The Tarentines therefore erected in front of their doors a number of pillars equal to the number of men that failed to return from the expedition into Iapygia. These pillars were, in Klearchos's time, still to be seen before each house in Tarentum; and, when the anniversary of the disaster came round, the Tarentines, instead of lamenting the dead or pouring the customary libations, used to offer sacrifices on the pillars to Zeus *Kataibátes*, the god who descended in the lightning-flash. From this important passage of Athenaeus I would draw two inferences. Firstly, the pillar-cult here mentioned again points in the direction of Minoan Crete, and reinforces my argument about the Minoan character of the Iapygians. Secondly, it would seem that the Tarentine equivalent of the Iapygian god, who hurled fire and bronze bolts from heaven, was Zeus *Kataibátes*. On which showing the Minoan double-axe becomes the weapon of a lightning-god comparable with Zeus.

If the Iapygians of Messapia, as Herodotus termed them,[2] were thus derived from the Cretan followers of Minos, we should expect to find traces of Minoan cult in Apulia. And this, if I am not mistaken, is actually the case. I would invite your attention to the old indigenous pottery of Apulia, on which I think I have detected various Minoan motives. Such pottery is poorly represented in our vase-collections; but I begin with some uncatalogued specimens in the British Museum (Fig. 6). Here is a flat cup with a high handle shaped like a pair of bovine horns. This handle differs from the ordinary *Mondhenkel* or *ansa lunata* of North Italy and Central Europe, because it represents the forehead and eyes of the beast as well as the horns. It has also an additional feature of interest. Between the horns rises an uncertain object. Is it a column? Is it a would-be flower? Or is it rather a stylized form of the double-axe? This double-axe, if such it be, has a tendency to disappear (Fig. 7). In the example before you it has become a mere vestigial object, its stem having perceptibly dwindled. On the next specimen (Fig. 8) the axe has vanished altogether, though the horns remain. That we are on the right track in explaining these

[1] Klearch, *frag.* 9 (*F. H. G.* ii. 306 sq.) *ap.* Athen. 522 D sqq.
[2] Hdt. 7. 170.

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

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

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handles by a reference to Minoan cult appears further from sundry vessels of similar fabric but different shape (Fig. 9). Here we have a handle adorned, not with a pair of horns and an axe between them, but with three baetylic cones grouped together in a manner suggestive of a lotus-bud. Before them stands a priestess with ear-rings, necklace, &c., who appears to be presenting the contents of this remarkable vase. Finally, the body of the vase is painted with decorative bands, including a frieze of birds and a row of ritual horns quite in Minoan style. If time allowed, it would be possible to show that the 'hour-glass' ornament, so characteristic of these local Apulian vases (Fig. 10),[1] is but a derivative of the double-axe.

From Apulia we cross the Adriatic to Epirus, and here too we find a striking parallel to the Cretan axe-cult. It will be remembered that the painted sarcophagus from Hagia Triada in Crete [2] represents a pair of double-axes embedded in two supports of unique design. Professor von Duhn kindly informs me that these supports are apparently pillars or posts covered with leaves—most probably with cypress leaves. If so, they were obviously ritual substitutes for cypress-trees. On either axe is perched a bird. Professor von Duhn takes it to be a raven, Dr. Arthur Evans—perhaps a black woodpecker. When Halbherr's forthcoming publication of the monument reaches Mr. Warde Fowler, our uncertainty will be ended. Anyhow, a priestess dressed in the skin of some animal, probably that of an ox, is pouring a red liquid into a jar visible between them. Now I want you to compare with this scene Philostratos's description of Dodona.[3] 'The golden pigeon,' he says, 'is still upon the oak-tree, she that is wise in sayings and oracles that she utters as from Zeus. And here is set the axe (κεῖται δ' οὗτος ὁ πέλεκυς) left by Hellos the wood-cutter from whom the Helloi of Dodona trace their descent.' Philostratos's description surely tallies in a remarkable way with the Cretan painting. It gives us the sacred tree, the bird, and the axe. Moreover, a miniature double-axe of bronze found at Dodona [4] recalls the miniature votive axes of Crete. And the famous *Peleiádes* or 'Pigeons' of Dodona were by many of the ancients (including Herodotus, Strabo, and Pausanias) [5] believed to be priestesses.

The pigeon on the Dodonaean oak is shown by a bronze coin of

[1] M. Mayer in the *Römische Mittheilungen*, 1897, xii. 206, Fig. 3.

[2] M.-J. Lagrange in the *Revue Biblique*, 1907, p. 342, Fig. 34. A more accurate representation (coloured plates, &c.) of this famous sarcophagus is to appear in the forthcoming number of the *Monumenti Antichi: Accademia de Lincei*.

[3] Philostr. *Im.* 2. 33, 1.

[4] Carapanos, *Dodone et ses ruines*, pl. 54.

[5] Hdt. 2. 55–57, Strab. 7, *frag.* 1, p. 73 (Kramer), Paus. 10. 12. 10, *alib.*

Epirus.[1] The axe left by Hellos the priestly wood-cutter in the sacred tree is nowhere figured on the monuments. But it may, I think, be recognized in a folk-tale heard by J. G. von Hahn at Jannina,[2] close to the site of the ancient Dodona. The relevant part of the folk-tale is as follows: A priest once went into the wood to cut timber, and set about felling a wild pear-tree with his axe. Out of the tree came a she-bear, who consorted with him. The priest left his axe in the tree and departed. The she-bear gave birth to a boy and, when he was old enough, told him that the axe was his father. The child became the strong man of the district, brandished an axe that weighed five hundred pounds, and won for himself half the kingdom.

The incident of the axe left sticking in the sacred tree occurs also in the myth of Erysichthon,[3] and should be compared with various cases of a sword left in a tree by a hero or a god—for instance, the sword left by Orestes in a tree at Rhegion,[4] the sword left in a tree-stump by Fin at Fintra,[5] the sword left by Othin in King Volsung's oak, a tree known as the *barnstokk* or 'child-tree'.[6]

In this connexion we might also cite (Fig. 11)[7] the central pendant of an Etruscan gold necklace. It takes the shape of a palm-tree, on which rests a disk enclosing a decorative double-axe. And, as if to show the connexion between the axe and the thunder-god, a neolithic arrow-head of flint—a 'thunder-stone' in popular parlance—is embedded in the base of the tree.

We next turn to Tenedos, coins of which have a male and female head on the obverse, a double-axe on their reverse side.[8] Dr. Arthur Evans reasonably conjectured that the former was the 'anthropomorphic equivalent' of the latter.[9] My friend Professor Ridgeway has laid stress on the probability that the Tenedian double-axe was a primitive unit of currency.[10] But Professor Ridgeway himself allows that the said axe may also have been a sacred object.[11] I do not know whether the evidence for a definite cult of the double-axe at Tenedos has been fully appreciated. Makarios the paroemiographer says: 'In the island of Tenedos were dedicated two axes, which were worshipped'

[1] Imhoof-Keller, *Tier- und Pflanzenbilder*, pl. 5, 28; *C.R.* 1903, xvii. 408, Fig. 4.

[2] J. G. von Hahn, *Griechische und albanesische Märchen*, ii. 72 sqq., no. 75, 'Das Bärenkind.'

[3] Kallim. *H. Dem.* 60 ἐνὶ δρυσὶ χαλκὸν ἀφέντες.

[4] Varro and Cato *ap.* Prob. *in* Verg. *buc. praef.* p. 348 (Lion).

[5] J. Curtin, *Hero-Tales of Ireland*, p. 485 sq.

[6] E. Magnússon and W. Morris, *Völsunga Saga*, p. 5 sqq.

[7] E. Cartailhac, *La France préhistorique*, p. 6, Fig. 3.

[8] *Brit. Mus. Cat. Gk. Coins*, Troas, &c., p. 94, pl. 17, 13.

[9] A. Evans in the *J. H. S.*, 1901, xxi. 108.

[10] W. Ridgeway, *Origin*, &c., pp. 49 sq., 318 sqq.; *Early Age*, &c., i. 444.

[11] W. Ridgeway, *Origin*, &c., p. 319, n. 2.

(δύο πελέκεις ἀνέκειτο σεβάσμιοι).[1] Apostolios states: 'The Tenedians among their dedicated objects honour a couple of axes' (ἐν ἀναθήμασι τιμῶσι).[2] Apostolios certainly is a very late authority (fifteenth century), but he appears to be copying *verbatim* from Suidas (tenth century)[3] or Photios (ninth century),[4] and they in turn depend upon earlier and more reliable sources. If these allusions to the cult of *two* axes in Tenedos are trustworthy, they form a point of resemblance between Tenedian and Minoan practice. They also explain the *parasemon*, or city-arms of Tenedos—witness an inscription found at Olympia (Fig. 12).[5] The bunch of grapes, which from about 420 B.C. onwards is constantly associated with the double-axe on Tenedian coins, suggests that the axe somehow brought fertility to the vineyards of the island. A rare coin of Tenedos, first published by Canon Greenwell in 1893, emphasizes the same thought (Fig. 13).[6] An *amphora* is placed beside the double-axe, the left handle of the former being attached to the shaft of the latter by means of a fillet. We are reminded of the Cretan sarcophagus, which showed a two-handled jar between a pair of axes and a priestess filling it with a red liquid. A yet rarer coin of Tenedos (Fig. 14)[7] represents the double-axe standing on the uppermost of three steps between two pillars or pillar-like supports. Again we are reminded of the way in which Minoan art depicts a double-axe standing on a stepped base between two baetylic columns;[8] and we may justly conclude that in Tenedos, as in Crete, the double-axe was itself an object of worship. Lenormant[9] supposed that it was the symbol of Dionysos Πέλεκυς, Dionysos the 'Axe', who was worshipped at Pagasaí on the Thessalian coast.[10] But this ingenious view we must not stay to criticize, though a comparison of Dionysos Πέλεκυς with *Paraçu-Rāma*, the 'Axe'-Rama, might prove instructive.

We come now to Lydia. Lydia is the home, if not of the double-axe, at least of the word λάβρυς, which is Lydian for it.[11] Yet in Lydia itself the double-axe has not often been found. A hoard of jewellery discovered in 1878 near Aïdin in Lydia contained numerous double-axes made of thin gold plate and one single axe of a perforated type.[12] More to the point is Plutarch's statement that the λάβρυς was a sacred heirloom of the Lydian kings, which was introduced into Caria about

[1] Makar. 8. 7.
[2] Apostol. 16. 26.
[3] Suid. s. v. Τενέδιος ξυνήγορος.
[4] Phot. *Lex.* s. v. Τενέδιος ξυνήγορος.
[5] *Ausgrabungen zu Olympia*, i, pl. 31. Inscr. of Δαμοκράτηρ . . . Τενέδιορ.
[6] *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1893, p. 89, pl. 7, 15.
[7] *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, 1897, xx. 274 sq., pl. 10, 9.
[8] *Annual of the British School at Athens*, 1901–2, viii. 299, pl. 18, *larnax* from Palaikastro.
[9] F. Lenormant in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dict. Ant.* I. i. 624.
[10] Theopomp. *frag.* 339 (*F. H. G.* i. 332, iv. 643), *ap.* schol. *Il.* 24. 428.
[11] Plut. *Quaest. Gr.* 45.
[12] *B. C. H.* 1879, iii. 129 sq., pl. 5.

700 B.C. and there placed in the hand of Zeus *Labradeus*.[1] This statement is supported by the coin-types of Lydia and Caria. Sometimes, as at Aphrodisias, the λάβρυς appears alone—a divine object bound with a fillet (Fig. 15).[2] At other times the λάβρυς is placed, just as Plutarch said, in the hand of Zeus. So in a primitive *xoanon* at Euromos.[3] And so, too, on the coinage of the Carian satraps in the fourth century B.C.[4] It would be tedious, and indeed superfluous, to discuss the various forms of this Zeus that occur in Asia Minor and Cyprus. But, speaking at Oxford, I cannot refrain from an allusion to one of the *Marmora Oxoniensia*. A small altar (Fig. 16),[5] discovered in a Turkish cemetery between Aphrodisias and Hierapolis, is marked (as you see from Chandler's illustration) with a double-axe, beneath which runs the inscription:

Διὸς Λαβραύν|δου | καὶ Διὸς Μεγίσ|στου (*sic*).

Lastly, I would carry your thoughts from anterior to interior Asia. Mr. Edward Conybeare suggested a few years since that, both in name and in nature, the *labarum* of Constantine was but an adaptation of the pagan λάβρυς.[6] The value of Mr. Conybeare's acute suggestion obviously depends on the possibility of citing, not merely isolated examples of the Constantinian monogram from dates prior to that of Constantine, but rather a connected series of formal links between the λάβρυς and the *labarum*. For this purpose the most fruitful field of research appears to me to be the coinage of the Greek and Scythian kings of Bactria and India, which have been so ably catalogued by Professor Percy Gardner. These rulers placed on their coins monograms of unknown meaning. The following sequence, arranged in chronological order, is taken from specimens of the third, second, and first centuries before our era (Fig. 17).[7] So far as shape is concerned, it does seem feasible to derive Constantine's monogram from the double-axe. Of its component letters X will represent the wings of the axe, while P approximates to an early form of handle (Fig. 18).[8] Nor is there any phonetic difficulty in associating the word *labarum* with the word λάβρυς and its cognates. Nevertheless, till further evidence is available, it would be wise to suspend judgement in the matter.

We have now gone the round of the Mediterranean, and it is time

[1] Plut. *Quaest. Gr.* 45.

[2] *Brit. Mus. Cat. Gk. Coins*, Caria, p. 38 sq., pl. 7, 2.

[3] Ib., p. 100, pl. 17, 8.

[4] Ib., p. 184 sq., pl. 28, 13=Pixodaros.

[5] R. Chandler, *Marmora Oxoniensia*, ii, Fig. 12.

[6] E. Conybeare, *Roman Britain*, London, 1903, p. 228, n. 2.

[7] *Brit. Mus. Cat. Gk. Coins*, Greek and Scythic kings: (2) p. 4, no. 5. (3) p. 16, no. 33. (4) pp. 37 sqq., nos. 1, 2, 17, 18, 19. (5) p. 38, no. 11. (6) p. 52, no. 8. (7) p. 60, nos. 15, 16, 17. (8) W. Lowrie, *Christian Art and Archaeology*, p. 241 *d*.

[8] J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique*, i, 606, Fig. 242, 2, from the *allée couverte* of Gavr'inis (Morbihan).

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

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to gather up our results. I propose, for clearness' sake, to do so in a series of more or less dogmatic propositions. They will at least afford a target to be riddled with critical bullets.

It seems to me, then, that throughout the Aegean and Adriatic area (not to mention localities still further afield) we have to do with a cult of immemorial antiquity—the joint worship of a sky-father and an earth-mother. The former descends from above when the lightning flashes down, and, in old aniconic days, leaves his weapon as a tangible token of himself. The latter ascends from below when vegetation springs up and, at the same early epoch, gives a visible proof of her



FIG. 17.

presence in the sacred tree. Where, as was the case with the sarcophagus from Hagia Triada, we see the axe embedded in the tree-trunk, there we must recognize the union of the sky-father with the earth-mother—a union essential to the fertility of crops and beasts and men. The axe embedded in a tree is the prototype of the axe embedded in a wooden column or a stalactite pillar. Ultimately a double-axe of the usual type is found serving as a symbol of the united deities, the axe-head being the male, the axe-handle the female, element in their union.

This hypothesis implies that axe-head and axe-handle may be regarded as two distinct entities. But students of primitive life (Dr. Frazer will control my assertion) will not be slow to admit that possibility. The megalithic art of Gaul sometimes, as you see, shows

the axe complete. Sometimes it represents the axe-blades separately (Fig. 19).[1] Sometimes, again, we have, not blades unhafted, but hafts unbladed (Fig. 20).[2] The union of blade with haft might well be taken to symbolize the physical union of male with female. On this showing the masculine and feminine heads on the obverse of the Tenedian coins were indeed the 'anthropomorphic equivalent' of the hafted blade on their reverse. Further, from Tenedos it is but a step to Samothrace, where a mysterious triad of deities was worshipped under the names of Ἀξίερος, Ἀξιοκέρσα, and Ἀξιόκερσος. The Greek grammarians assert that these were forms of Demeter, Persephone, and Hades.[3] May we not venture to suppose that Ἀξιόκερσος, 'He who cleaves with the axe,' and Ἀξιοκέρσα, 'She who is cleft with the axe,' are early titles for the Bridegroom and the Bride ? At least the derivation from ἀξίνη 'an axe' and κέρσαι 'to cleave' seems clear enough. Hesychius tells us that κέρσαι means both 'to cleave' and 'to wed'.[4] I may add that an amulet found at Vindonissa and figured by Orelli[5] represents a T-shaped object—a simple modification of the double-axe—the three divisions of the T bearing respectively the names of Ἀξίερος, Ἀξιοκέρσα, and Ἀξιόκερσος, reduced in each case to the significant abbreviation AXI.

The hypothesis that I have sketched may indeed help to clear up various outstanding problems. If, for example, in Minoan times the hafted axe thus denoted the union of male with female, it is possible that there was some such notion underlying the marriage-test proposed by Penelope to the Suitors. The *Odyssey* certainly gives no hint that the contest was anything more than an athletic competition. Nevertheless, athletic competitions in Greece were often serious enough in their origin ; and it may be that in this feature of the story, as in some others (for instance, the tree-bed of Odysseus), the poet is modernizing materials of extremely ancient date. Conceive for a moment that this was so. We have the axe-blades (as at Hagia Triada and probably at Dodona too) fixed into the top of their upright shafts. Have we also (as at Hagia Triada and Dodona) a bird or a woman simulating a bird ? I hesitate to suggest it—but what of Penelope herself ? Πηνέλοψ means a 'wild goose', and wild geese are said to have rescued her from the sea. But *nomen omen.* I will not at this time of day start on a wild-goose chase.

[1] J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique,* i. 605, Fig. 241, from the *allée couverte* of Gavr'inis (Morbihan).

[2] Id., ib., p. 609, Fig. 244, 1 dolmen of the *Table des Marchands* at Locmariaquer (Morbihan).

[3] Mnaseas and Dionysodoros *ap.* schol. Ap. Rhod. 1. 917.

[4] Hesych, κέρσαι· κόψαι, τεμεῖν, κεῖραι, γαμῆσαι and κέρσης· γάμος.

[5] Orelli-Henzen, 440, Roscher, *Lex. Myth.* i. 742.



20

14

NEW LIGHTS ON THE CULT AND SANCTUARIES OF MINOAN CRETE

By ARTHUR J. EVANS. (Abstract)

The views as to the character of the early Cretan and Mycenaean religion put forward in 1900 by the author, in his work on Tree and Pillar Cult, have been remarkably corroborated by the course of more recent discoveries. The main objects of Cult more and more declare themselves as aniconic—sometimes natural objects, as sacred stones, peaks, and trees; or sometimes artificial, as pillars, cones, and obelisks, the sacred Double Axe and apparently even the Cross. But side by side with these we see the actual representations of divinities, either in the engravings of signets and painted designs, or in actual images of clay, faience, or metal, which found their place beside the aniconic objects of Cult in the various shrines. In its leading features, however, the Cult may be described as 'baetylic'.

The main divinity is clearly a Nature Goddess—to whom the male divinity is quite secondary—the true relationship being thus preserved in the Cretan legends of Rhea and Zeus.

Among the 'baetylic' or fetish objects of the Cult the principal in addition to sacred trees and pillars was the Double Axe. An actual scene of worship of a pair of double axes, rising as usual from stepped bases, is now presented to us in the wonderful painted sarcophagus discovered by the Italian Mission at Hagia Triada. There are seen two double axes—significant of a dual Cult—between which a priestess pours a libation, while behind stands another female votary and a youthful priest playing a seven-stringed lyre. The result of the offerings and incantations is visible in the birds—perhaps the sacred black woodpeckers of the Cretan Zeus—settled on the apex of the double axes and indicating the descent into these baetylic objects of the spirits of the divinities. They were charged, as it were, with the godhead by means of the appropriate ritual.

The mass of new material is such that only a summary account of it can be given on the present occasion. A series of actual shrines and their contents have now been discovered; the most perfectly preserved in the Palace of Knossos, and its dependencies; but others have been found by Miss Boyd (now Mrs. Hawes) at Gournia, and by the Italian Mission at Hagia Triada. The images and Cult objects

are seen in their places on ledges at the back of small square cells. Among the figures the snake-holding goddess is the most remarkable. In other cases she is associated with a dove—the serpent symbolizing her chthonic connexions, the bird her celestial attributes. In another case rude limestone concretions of quasi-human form were placed in the shrine, instead of hand-made images.

Besides the shrines were a series of Pillar Rooms which seem to be the crypts of sanctuaries and evidently had themselves religious associations. They were in two cases associated with the bases for the reception of sacred double axes, and stores of ritual vessels were found in contiguous areas. In the 'Little Palace' excavated this year at Knossos, a Pillar Room of this kind has come to light, and its excavation has been heralded by the discovery of vessels, in the form of bulls' heads, apparently intended for libations. One of these is of black steatite with a crystal eye and cameo shell inlaying—an extraordinary work of art.



Thanks to the kindness of Mr. Seager, the American explorer, it is possible to give a representation of a remarkable gold signet ring from Moklos throwing a wholly new light on the Cult of the great Minoan Goddess. The scene represents her 'Advent' from over sea in a bark, the prow of which is formed by her sacred lily, while the stern curves up into a dog's head—the dog being one of her sacred animals. On the vessel, behind the Goddess, is a tree and its small shrine, and she is shown in the act of saluting as the ship comes into harbour, before the gate of a sanctuary. The marine aspect of the Goddess, of which other indications had already appeared, is thus made clear, and curious parallels are suggested with the Syrian Atargatis, the Derketo of Askalon, and certain representations of the shrine of the Paphian goddess in which a harbour with fish appears immediately before it. On a Greco-Roman gem a boat appears at the temple steps.

A great variety of indications show that the West Quarter of the Palace at Knossos was for the most part essentially a sanctuary. The Room of the Throne itself, with its repeated pairs of sacred griffins was probably a kind of Chapter-house or Consistory for the Priest-Kings. It has been possible to restore two panels of miniature wall-paintings found in this Palace region, one of which showed—within the Palace walls—a group of sacred trees, and a dance, perhaps of an orgiastic character—the prototype of the 'Choros of Ariadne'. The other panel exhibited a small temple rising above a court of the Palace. The actual ground-plan of a similar building, off the Central Court, has now come to light, and an elevation showing its tripartite division into one central and two lateral columnar cells has been drawn out by Mr. Theodore Fyfe of the Institute of British Architects. For the first time we are, therefore, able to reconstruct a Pillar Shrine like those seen on the gold plates of Mycenae.

15

L'INFLUENCE RELIGIEUSE DE L'ASTROLOGIE DANS LE MONDE ROMAIN

PAR FRANZ CUMONT. (RÉSUMÉ)

L'ASTROLOGIE, longtemps discréditée et délaissée, commence à s'imposer de nouveau à l'attention des érudits. A la fin du XIXe siècle le développement de l'histoire à montré son importance aussi bien pour l'étude des sciences que pour celle des religions dans l'antiquité. Son action qui devait devenir prépondérante dans le paganisme romain, est relativement récente. Les anciens Grecs ne l'ont pas ignorée, comme on l'a cru longtemps, mais ils l'ont condamnée, et la divination sidérale n'a jamais été admise par eux. Mais après les conquêtes d'Alexandre l'hellénisme entra en contact avec l'astrolâtrie chaldéenne. Les Babyloniens avaient constitué une théologie d'apparence scientifique fondée sur l'astronomie et les mathématiques. Le stoïcisme, qui partout s'attacha à concilier le polythéisme avec la philosophie, s'empara de ces doctrines et les fit entrer dans son système. Le penseur qui réalisa dans toute sa plénitude la fusion des traditions orientales avec les doctrines helléniques fut Posidonius d'Apamée. Les œuvres sont presque entièrement perdues; mais nous pouvons nous rendre compte de ses idées religieuses par celui qui les propagea avec enthousiasme dans le monde romain, le poète Manilius.

Le monde, qui est tout entier divin, est régi par des lois immuables. Les diverses parties de l'organisme universel sont liées par une solidarité étroite, mais une sympathie plus intime unit les corps célestes aux êtres et aux choses terrestres. Les révolutions des étoiles produisent tous les changements de la nature et déterminent toutes les actions humaines. Rouage infinie de ce grand mécanisme cosmique, l'homme doit se soumettre à la Fatalité ; mais, s'il ne peut résister à ses lois, sa raison peut les connaître, et, prévoyant ainsi leurs applications futures, pénétrer les secrets de l'avenir. Car l'homme, microcosme, est comme l'univers gouverné par un esprit divin. Son âme est une parcelle détachée des feux supérieurs. Descendue du ciel, elle doit y remonter après la mort, pour y vivre éternellement au milieu des astres, dont l'essence est aussi la sienne.

Cette conception grandiose et cohérente ne s'imposa pas seulement aux intelligences ; elle contenait des éléments mystiques qui faisaient appel au sentiment. Les étoiles, que l'homme aperçoit et dont il observe les mouvements, sont pour les astrologues des dieux; la contemplation du ciel devient pour eux une communion. Elle transporte l'âme extasiée au milieu du chœur sacré des étoiles et la fait même avant le trépas participer de leur divinité.

Une religion qui plaçait dans la contemplation et l'étude des astres l'idéal de la vie humaine, qui déduisait de théories sur la mécanique céleste de vastes doctrines théologiques, ne pouvait s'adresser qu'à une élite intellectuelle. Et en effet au début de l'Empire elle eut surtout des adeptes dans les hautes classes, dans les cercles de la cour et parmi les savants, et cependant elle devint largement populaire. Son pouvoir sur les masses la nouvelle religion sidérale ne dut pas à une propagande littéraire, mais à la prédication des prêtres orientaux. Déjà avant l'époque romaine l'astrologie s'était imposée au polythéisme égyptien et syrien, comme au mazdéisme perse en Mésopotamie. Or, vers le début de notre ère, les cultes de l'Égypte, de la Syrie et de la Perse se répandirent rapidement jusque dans les provinces occidentales de l'empire. Malgré les différences secondaires qu'ils peuvent présenter, on peut dire en général qu'ils firent triompher le système théologique, savant et mystique, qui s'était constitué en Orient à l'époque alexandrine. Ils amenèrent la prédominance dans le paganisme d'un panthéisme solaire, dont Aurélien, en créant son culte de *Sol invictus*, voulut faire la religion officielle de l'empire.

SECTION VII

RELIGIONS OF THE GERMANS, CELTS AND SLAVS

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

By SIR JOHN RHYS

I THINK I have read somewhere how it was held to be a telling criticism on MacPherson's *Ossian* that it never or hardly ever alluded to the Almighty. The impression this would have made on the mind of any one with anything like a comprehensive knowledge of the nature and scope of such literatures as the Neoceltic languages possess would have been rather the contrary. As a rule they supply but few references to divinity or deity, no explicit account of the religion of our Celtic ancestors. Nearly everything relating to the old gods and goddesses of the British Isles—and I include with them practically those of the Celts of Britany—is a matter of inference drawn from various precarious sources such as myths and folklore, helped by inferences from the names of persons, rivers, and places. We have no document descriptive of the figures of the Celtic pantheon as such, and had MacPherson made excursions into theology of any kind he would have been travelling beyond the domain indicated by his materials, whatever they may have been.

Everything we have of a literary nature has passed through the hands of Christian scribes, and what they or their early readers thought of the Irish texts before them may now and then be guessed by means of the exclamations which they left behind them, such as 'O Emmanuel!' How far the old scribes modified their originals it is seldom possible to say with any approach to certainty. Occasionally an illuminating gloss has slipped into the Irish text, and we are told that the character in hand was reckoned a divinity at one time. I am thinking of Conchubar or Conor, who is represented in the Ultonian Cycle of stories as king of Ulster. Of him we are told that he was a terrene god of the Ultonians of his time, by which was meant approximately the beginning of the Christian Era. The words used in Irish are *día talmaide*[1]. The former is the Irish for 'god', and comes from an early *deivos* or *dēvo-s* of Indo-European standing: I need not enumerate the cognates in the related languages. The adjective *talmaide*, derived from *talam*, 'the earth, the ground,' means 'of the earth, terrene'. The explanation of this is to be

[1] See the *Book of the Dun*, f. 101[b], and compare Windisch, *Irische Texte*, p. 259, and the Glossary.

sought in the ancient Irish story that the Irish gods had been beaten by the ancestors of the Irish race in a great battle, that the gods retreated into the earth, and continued to live inside the hills. The Fairies are likewise represented as making their homes underground; and hence there has arisen a certain amount of natural confusion between them and the gods of Irish mythology. A passage in point in the Life of St. Patrick describes him, together with his bishops, as having come at night to a well near the court of King Loigaire; it goes on to say that two daughters of the king came there for the purpose of washing at the break of day. The princesses were astonished at what they saw, and thought that the strange company consisted of Fairy men, or of terrene gods, or of mere phantoms. The Latin runs thus:[1] 'Sed illos viros *Side* aut deorum terrenorum aut fantassiam estimaverunt.' The Greeks relegated their pantheon to the cold heights of Olympus, but the Irish consigned theirs to abodes underground, where they form communities of their own, and whence they pay occasional visits to the world occupied by *dóini*, 'men,' literally 'mortals'.

It is to be noticed that not only is Conor called a god, *día*, but that his sister, named Dechtire, is likewise called a goddess. She was the mother of the great Irish hero Cúchulainn, who accordingly occurs described (in the genitive case) *meic dea*[2] *Dechtiri*, filii deae Decteriae, 'of the son of goddess Dechtire.' When applying the term god or goddess to any figures represented in Irish story, one must as a rule be understood to be speaking of euhemerized divinities, personages whose divinity is a matter only of comparison and inference. Such direct reference to divinities as we have in the case of Conor and his sister are, as I have already suggested, sporadic in Irish literature: in Welsh I know of none.

Now that I have chanced to call attention to the Irish *dea*, I have a reason for dwelling on it for a moment. Its importance lies in the fact that as a singular it is feminine; the nominative, as the genitive of which it serves, is not known to occur. It might perhaps be an early *deu̯i-s* making a genitive *deu̯i-as*; for in historical Irish, so to say, not only the final sibilant, but also both semivowels, would disappear, leaving the word reduced to *déa* or *dea*: the quantity of the *e* is not very certain. Anyhow, this is not altogether guesswork, as we find on the Continent a vocative, which would doubtless be also

[1] See the *Book of Armagh*, f. 12 a 1, cited in Stokes and Strachan's *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, ii. 265; also Stokes's *Patrick*, pp. 314, 315.

[2] It is found in Emer's elegy to her husband Cúchulainn in the *Book of Leinster*, f. 123b.

the nominative DEUI, i. e. *dewi*, 'goddess.' It occurs in one of the defixions[1] discovered some years ago at Rom, in the neighbourhood of Poitiers.

I am glad to add a second application of the genitive *dea*: it occurs in the name of a place mentioned more than once in the Tripartite Life of St. Patrick. In Irish it used to be called *Inber Dea*,[2] 'the river-mouth of the Goddess,' the goddess being the river divinity, who owned the stream and haunted its waters. The river meant is not a large one: its name now is Vartry, but the harbour at its mouth, close to Wicklow, used to be an important and well-known one. This is borne out in the Latin of the *Book of Armagh*, where one reads[3] that St. Patrick's ship 'in opportunum portum in regiones Coolennorum in portum apud nos clarum qui uocatur hostium *Dee* dilata est'. To *Inver Dea* must be added such names as *Sail Dea*, 'Willow of the Goddess,' and *Snám Dea*, 'Swimming-place of the Goddess,' both near Loch Mask, possibly on the Glensaul river, which empties itself into that lake in the county of Mayo.[4] The *dee* of the *Book of Armagh* is not the same word as our *dea*, though of the same meaning. The former is probably the genitive of the feminine corresponding to *dia* (= *dēyo-s*), 'god,' and postulates in that case *dēyā*, genitive *dēyēs*, whence *dée* (*déi*), *dé*, of the same pronunciation, it would seem, as the masculine *déi*, *dee*, *dé*, functioning[5]

[1] They were read and published by M. Camille Jullian in the *Revue Celtique*, xix, 170–4, and discussed by me in *The Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*, p. 95.

[2] See Stokes's *Patrick*, pp. 30, 32, 34, 275, 448; and compare the *Annals of Ulster*, A. D. 835, where one reads 'o Inbir deaae', and the Four Masters' *Annals of the Kingdom of Ireland*, which have under the same year *Inbhir Deaa*, on which the editor cites, I do not know whence, the Latin note 'Ostium fluminis Dee portus regionis Cuolenorum'; and A. M. 3501 he states that *Crich Cualann*, that is, the *regio Cuolenorum* in point, is included in the present county of Wicklow. The name is usually *Cualu*, genitive *Cualann*, which explains a Welsh tradition that the Matholwch of the Mabinogi of 'Branwen' was king of *Cel* in Ireland. I cannot find my reference, but it was something late. Probably Matholwch and his fleet sailing for Harlech were regarded as setting out from Inver Dea. Cualu, however, extended to Dublin, which is found called Ath Cliath Cualann, 'Ford of the Hurdles of Cualu': see *Revue Celtique*, xv. 455.

[3] See Stokes's *Patrick*, p. 275, and Stokes and Strachan's *Thesaurus Palaeohibernicus*, ii. 259.

[4] See the *Book of Leinster*, f. 350ᵃ.

[5] Stokes in his *Urkeltischer Sprachschatz*, while deriving *dia* from an early *deivos*, 'god,' derives the masculine genitive *dee* and other forms in point from a *desos*, which he supposes to have likewise meant a god: he also isolates *dēvā* as a *flussname*: see pp. 144, 145, 151. The later form of *dēyā* does not occur: it would have been *dia*, like the masculine.

as genitives of *día*, 'god.' Now *dēuā* occurs as Δηούα in Ptolemy's Geography, where it is given as the name of rivers in Celtic countries from Spain to Scotland. A larger number is easily established by counting all the streams[1] called Dee in Britain and Ireland.

This leads me to point out a parallel which forms a third application of the genitive *dea*, that I wish to mention. Irish mythology acquaints us with a large group of figures which may be said to have constituted an Irish pantheon, if I may use such a term at the risk of recalling without adequate reason the mythic splendour of Olympus. The most common form of their collective name is *Tuatha Dé Danann*, 'the Folks or Tribes of the Goddess Danu,' and more briefly *Túath Dé*, 'Folk of the Goddess'; for that is the meaning, and, as far as I know, no Irish scholar has ever treated *dé* in those two formulae as masculine. In any case, we have a proof of its femininity in such well-known variations of their name as involve *dea*. One of these was *Túath* (or *Túatha*) *Dea Danann*, 'Folk or Folks of the goddess Danu,' which was liable to be shortened into *Tuath Dea*, 'the Folk or Tribe of the Goddess'; frequently, also, *Fir Dea*[2], 'Men of the Goddess, *Viri Deae*.' Here it will be observed that *dea* (or *dé*) is treated as if it were a proper noun, the definite article not being prefixed. In fact there is no difference in this respect between *Tuath Dé*, *Tuatha Dea*, *Fir Dea*, on the one hand, and *Inber Dea*, *Sail Dea*, *Snám Dea*, on the other. This absence of the article is a common feature of old place-names in Ireland. Take, for instance, that of Loch Con, in county Mayo, which meant the '*loch* of *the* dogs'; not of any dogs, as will be seen on consulting the story in point. So with *Snám dá én* on the Shannon: literally this means the swimming-place of two birds, but the story about them makes them '*the* two birds'.[3] So also with *Ben uama*, in modern spelling *Beann uamha*, 'Benvadigen,' near Belfast: see the *Annals of Ulster*, A.D. 1468, where the editor naturally renders the name 'Peak of *the*

[1] Even this would probably not exhaust this class of names: take, for instance, that of the town of Dundee, which occurs spelt *Dunde* in Skene's *Chronicles of the Picts and the Scots*, pp. 214, 289: it looks as if it might be 'the *dún* or fortress of the goddess' of one of the waters of that neighbourhood. The 'Obsessio Duin deanae' in the *Annals of Ulster*, A.D. 691, has not, as far as I know, ever been identified with any certainty: Reeves, in his edition of Adamnan's *Life of Saint Columba*, p. 378, says 'Possibly Dundaff, in the parish of St. Ninian's, south of Stirling'.

[2] In the fragment of Cúchulainn's *Courtship of Emer*, in the *Book of the Dun*, we have not only the Men of the Goddess, but also 'the Steeds of the Goddess': see f. 122b.

[3] See Stokes's edition of 'the Rennes Dindshenchas' in the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 475 and xvi. 56 respectively.

cave', though the article is not in the Irish. On the other hand, the article is not apt to be missing in place-names formed with the aid, for instance, of the late Irish word *baile*, of the same origin as English *bailey*, as in 'Old Bailey', in Medieval Latin 'Vetus Ballium'. The word seems to have been introduced into Ireland by the English in Norman times, just as it was likewise into South Wales, where it is *beili*, 'a yard, a small enclosure,' entering into farm names such as *y Beili Glas*, 'the Green bailey,' near Llandovery in Carmarthenshire, and *Beili Ficar*, 'the Vicar's bailey,' near Llangadock in the same county. On the Irish side the Index to the 'Four Masters' has no lack of such instances as the following: Baile *an* Chaislein, 'bailey of *the* Castle, Castletown'; Baile *an* mhota, 'bailey of *the* moat, Ballymote'; Baile *na* hinnsi, 'bailey of *the* Island, Ballynahinch'; and Baile *na* huamha, 'bailey of *the* cave, Cavetown'; with which should be contrasted *Beann uamha*, already cited. The inference which I draw is that some old names, such as Inber Dea, Tuath Dea, Tuatha Dé, come down from a time when Goidelic speech was, like Latin, without the definite article, or else that they were perhaps only modelled on names put together before the article had come into use. At all events, we are not obliged to regard *dea* (*dé*) as a proper name: we are at liberty to treat it as meaning 'of the goddess'.

Besides *Dé Danann*, or *Dé Donann*, as it was also written, there was a goddess *Dé Domnann*, and, as might be expected, the names were now and then confounded, as will be shown presently. The formula is exemplified also by a third case, which it will be best to discuss at this point. The next few references are to the *Book of Leinster*, which gives, f. 324[d], the genealogy of a people of ancient Munster called the Érna, genitive Érann. There we come across a certain Carpri *m. Ailella Erand dé Bolgæ*, 'son of Ailill of the Érna of the goddess Bolg,' and the genealogy closes with Fiachra son of Oengus Turbech, a well-known ancestor. Fiachra has the epithet of *fer mara*, 'man of the sea,' and his story is one of exposure in a coracle, which is related on f. 22[b]. But our more immediate business is with Ailill Érand dé Bolgæ, more usually called simply Ailill Erand, as on f. 336[b]. Here, however, he or the Érna, or both, are associated with the divinity called Dé Bolgæ. Now *Bolgæ* seems to be a genitive feminine; so it is to be distinguished from the *bolg*, 'a bag' (Welsh *boly*, *bola*, *bòl*); also probably from the Irish feminine *bolc*, 'a gap' (Welsh *bwlch*). So we are left to translate *dé Bolgæ* as 'of the goddess Bolg'. One could wish to find *Tuatha dea Bolgæ*, *Fir dea Bolgæ* or, more briefly, *Fir Bolgæ*, 'men of

Bolg, *Viri Bolgæ*'; but they are not attested. They seem, however, to have once been in use, and to have served, in fact, to suggest the name—more strictly speaking, doubtless, the nickname—*Tuath Bolg* or *Fir Bolg*, which literally means the 'Folk or Men of the Bags'. Professor Kuno Meyer has detected[1] that description paraphrased in a poem ascribed to Columcille, f. 8[b] (= 131[a]), as *fir i mbalggaib*, 'Men in Breeches': compare 'bags' for trousers in English. The people meant seem to have left traces of their name—much oftener of their nickname—in place-names; take for instance the Modern Welsh *Llannol*, written earlier *Lanvol*, meaning the *llan* or church of Bòl, in Anglesey, and near it *Pembol* = Pen-bol, 'the end or top of Bòl,' also *Cors y Bòl* and *Rhos y Bòl*, the swamp and the moor of the Bòl respectively, in the same part of the island. In Ireland such names suggest themselves as *Dúnbolg*, near Donard, in County Wicklow, *Inis Bolg*, in Lough Gara, in County Roscommon, *Magbolg*, 'Moybolgue,' in Meath, and *Murbholg*, 'Murlough Bay,' on the coast of Antrim; and in Scotland the *Blatobulgium* (of the Antonine Itinerary) in the county of Dumfries; *Blebo* or *Blathbolg*, a modern *Blatobulgium* near St. Andrews; and perhaps Strathboggie, older spelling *Strathbolgin*, in Aberdeenshire. *Blatobulgium* seems to prove that the bags had become meal-bags, as in the Mabinogion story of warriors concealed in meal-bags: a similar story was once current in regard to Dunbolg.[2] The genealogy of the Érna has a note, f. 324[c] to the effect that Ailill Érann was the inventor of a weapon which is there termed a *faga*, a word usually understood to mean a short spear, a dart, or javelin: the technical meaning is, however, not certain, but I suspect that we have there an allusion to the obscure weapon mentioned, in the stories concerning Cúchulainn, as the *gái Bolgæ*, which I should render accordingly *gaesum Bolgæ*, treating the name of the goddess as representing her people. In other terms it would be a spear characteristic of the Fir Bolg, nothing being directly suggested as to its form by the words *gái Bolgæ*.[3] It

[1] See his *Contributions to Irish Lexicography*, s. v. *bolg*; but Stokes had already explained *Fir Bolg* as 'Men of Breeks', and compared *Gallia Braccata*: see the *Revue Celtique*, xii. 118.

[2] See Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, pp. 233, 282.

[3] Prof. Meyer, loc. cit., would regard this name as meaning 'a gapped spear'. He seems to treat *bolgæ* as an adjective, and he further takes this *gái* to have been 'a weapon like a pitchfork'; but it is more natural in that case to count points or prongs than the gaps or intervals between them. An important passage descriptive of it occurs in the *Book of the Dun*, ff. 81[a] and 122[b]. The word suggests to me only the barb of a spear of the barbed kind; but I confess that this does not seem to fit the descriptions.

is worth noticing that Cúchulainn was taught the use of the *gái Bolgæ* by a female warrior named Scáthach, in Britain, not in Ireland.

The inference I am disposed to draw from these facts would be that the Fir Bolg belonged to a seafaring people who wore breeches, wielded improved weapons, and traced their origin to a goddess Bolg. They can hardly have been Goidels, and it is nothing new to regard them as Belgae. When one comes to the question of the possible connexion of these names, one meets at the outset with that of Bolgios, mentioned by Pausanias as a Celtic chief who conquered Macedon towards the end of the third century before Christ. That author calls him Βόλγιος, x. 19, 4, 7, while Trogus Pompeius is not alone in calling him Belgius.[1] It is hard to say which of the two, *Bolgios* or *Belgius*, was the more correct, or whether both are not entitled to stand as optional forms. In favour of *Bolgios* it has to be said that it has an exact equivalent in *Bolge*, the Goidelic name of one of the witnesses to his giving of lands by Ungust, king of the Picts, to the see of St. Andrews.[2] In case, however, of Belgius being preferred, there is no suggestion that he was one of the Belgae: all that one can infer is that these three names point back to a single origin, and that origin was probably the same from which Latin derived such words as *fulgor*, *fulgur*, 'lightning,' and *flamma* (for *flagma*), 'flame,' Greek φλόξ and φλογμός, Sanskrit *bhárgas*, 'brightness,' and *bhṛ́gu-*, 'divinities of light.' All this fails to fix the attributes of the *dé Bolgæ*; it merely suggests that she may have been some kind of a goddess of fire or light, which is all the easier to believe, as the name of the sun was feminine in Medieval Welsh and is so still in Irish, just as it is in German.

The Irish story known as that of the second battle of Moytura is devoted to the great war in which the gods of the Tuatha Dé Danann group are represented triumphing over their enemies, the Fomori, who are to be mentioned again presently. The story is a wild and difficult one, but most of it has been edited with translation, glossary, and indexes in the *Revue Celtique*, xii. 52–130, by Dr. Whitley Stokes, with his usual scholarship. I refer to it because it contains in various forms the words which have been occupying us. Among others the genitive *Danann* is in some instances superseded by *Danonn*, in another by *Dononn*, and in still another by *Domnonn*, which is a distinct name more usually written *Domnann* or *Domnand*. This name claims our attention for a moment, for it enters into the

[1] See Holder, s. v. *Belgius*, *Brennus*, *Tolistobogii*.

[2] See the Legend of St. Andrew in Skene's *Chronicles*, which contains several other remarkable names; also the *Cymmrodor*, xiv. 130.

description of one of the chiefs on the Fomorian side, who is styled *Indech mac dé* (or *dei*) *Domnann*, 'Indech son of the goddess Domnu.' In the *Book of Leinster*, f. 9[b], he is called both *Indech mac de Domnand* and more briefly *Indech mac de*. The goddess was probably reckoned the ancestress of the Dumnonii, two of whom are commemorated, in a metrical inscription in Latin in Selkirkshire, as *Dumnogeni*. From the region between Galloway and the Clyde the Dumnonii seem to have made descents on Ireland both in front and from behind. Hence, probably, it is that Malahide Bay, to the north of Dublin, was called *Inber Domnann*, 'the river-mouth of Domnu,' where the name of the goddess appears to have stood for her descendants, the people of the Dumnonii. Similarly, the north-western district of the county of Mayo was called *Irrus Domnann*, 'Domnu's foreland,'[1] in English Erris. The difference of writing between *Donann* and *Domnann* was considerably less than appears from our way of giving the letters in full; and a passage in the *Book of Leinster*, f. 30[d], has *Donand*, possibly for *Domnand*. It refers to a triad of gods named Brian, Iucharba, and Iuchair, whom it describes as *tri dee Donand*, while giving them a pedigree which would agree better with the reading *Domnand*. However, in another passage, f. 11[b], they appear as *tri dee tuathe d. d.*, which one could hardly render otherwise than as the 'three gods of the Túath dé Danann', though it represents them slain beyond the sea in Man by Lug, one of the chiefs of the Tuatha dé Danann; for immortals euhemerized must die.

A passage in the same manuscript, f. 10[a], makes the position of Brian and his two brothers a little clearer in another direction, since it tells us that they were *na tri dee dana*, which possibly means that they were special gods of the *aes dána*, or professional men, such as wizards and necromancers. Here their mother's name is given as *Donand*, used as a nominative.[2] The same thing happens in at least two other passages in point. One of them, f. 10[b], speaks of *Donand mathair nandea*, 'Donand mother of the Gods,' meaning doubtless the Tuath dé Danann group, and not the triad.[3] The

[1] See the *Book of Leinster*, f. 127[a] and the *Todd Lecture* Series, vol. iii. 148.

[2] The scribe's ignorance goes a step further in the alternative pedigrees of Fergus mc Roig, f. 331e, where in one of them Lug comes in as son of Ethne *mc Donand*, with his mother and grandmother converted into males. The other has *Domnaind* wrongly for *Donaind*, a masculine genitive provided for *Donand* as nominative. When a new genitive feminine was made on the form *Danann*, it was *Danainne*. Such new formations are common enough for nouns of the consonantal declension.

[3] But the latter may have been alluded to in the Moytura story, § 60, where Stokes prints *fir tri nden i sidoib* and translates: 'the Men of (the) three gods

other passage comes in a poem, f. 11[a], and states that Donand was slain, *la dé nDomnand*, 'by the goddess Domnu.' Here 'goddess' seems preferable to 'god', as the point of the statement appears to be that the one goddess is the slayer of the other. Dr. Stokes, however, in the index to which I have alluded, treats the divinity in question as the father of Indech. There is room for the same doubt in the case of a divinity spoken of as that of druidism. In a fragment of a story in the *Book of the Dun*, f. 124[b], one finds Cúchulainn boasting of his having been educated by each of the great Ultonians of Conchubar's court, and among them by Cathbad, the druid, who had a school of no fewer than a hundred youths. So Cúchulainn could say that he was an adept *hi cerdaib dé druidechta*, 'in the arts of the divinity of druidism,' and an expert in what he considered best in knowledge. Unfortunately the name of that divinity has not been identified, and it is not known whether it was god or goddess. I have usually given the preference to the masculine, but I now perceive that analogy favours more or less the feminine. We seem to have traces of a slightly different description of this elusive divinity, to wit, in the name or nickname of a man who, according to O'Curry, ii. 173, was poet and prophet of Munster, but present at the court of Tara towards the close of the sixth century. He is usually styled *Bec* (or Bécc) *mac Dé*[1], 'Bec son of the divinity,' but he is probably to be identified with *Bec mac dé druad* at the head of a short pedigree in the *Book of Leinster*, f. 347[c]; see also 328[e], 335[c]. The genitive *druad* may be of any number, but I should take *dé druad* to be synonymous with *dé druidechta*, to be translated accordingly, 'Bec son of the goddess of Druids.' Should one prefer to say 'son of the god of druids', that interpretation might be said to remind one of Caesar's association of the Celtic Dis with the druids of Gaul. Enough has been said to show that the polytheism of the ancient Irish was to some extent departmental, and that the names of some of the divinities were habitually avoided, as suggested by the periphrasis in the case of the one associated with druids and druidism.

After these inevitable digressions I return to the Goidelic pantheon

. . . in the fairy hills.' But I am not sure that one should not read *trindea* (for *trén-dea*) and translate: 'the men of the champion goddess in the Fairy Hills.' Compare *trénfiru an tridho* in § 41, where Stokes translates: 'the champions of the Fairy-Mound.'

[1] Another *mac Dé* occurs in the pedigree of the Firmaige, f. 326[e], where we we have *m. Saiglend* | *m. Dé* | *m. Labrada*; on which I can at present throw no light. Possibly one may add *mc Defhatha*, *mc Deatha*, *Fer Deoda*, in the Fergus pedigrees, f. 331[e], 336[f].

of the Tuatha dé Danann, and in the first place to the last of those three words in their name. For the genitive *Danann* we have already had *Donann* and *Danonn*, also *Dononn*: this last, if not merely a scribal error, should be an older spelling probably than that of *Donann*, while *Danonn* looks as if due to the mixed influence of *Danann* and *Donann*. In chronological sequence the series might perhaps be arranged *Donon-os*, *Donon*,[1] *Dononn*, *Donann*, *Danann* otherwise written *Danand*. The nominative has not been attested, but it should, according to analogy, be *Donu*, later *Danu*. The precedence of the forms with *o* is made probable not only by the readings, but is also corroborated by the intrusion of *Domnonn*, already mentioned; for it is natural to suppose that it was an *o* form such as Dononn or Donann which occasioned the confusion rather than *Danann* or *Danonn*. Now *Donu*, genitive *Donann*, equates exactly with the *Don* (pronounced *Dôn*) of Welsh literature. She figures as the mother of quondam divinities just as is the case with the Goidelic goddess. But neither as Irish Donu nor as Welsh Dôn has she any attributes assigned her. She simply figures as ancestress, and that is almost all that one reads about her. Further, the Welsh group is very small compared with that of the Tuatha dé Danann. It consists of five sons of Dôn, one daughter[2] with her two sons, and three

[1] Compare Adamnan's St. Cainnech *mocu Dalon* 'kin of Dálu' with the later *Maccu Dálann*. Contrast also, in spite of the difference of vowel, the Irish genitive *Érenn* with the Welsh *Iwerdon*. The change of pronunciation from *on* to *ann* seems to imply the shifting of part of the force of the vowel to the nasal consonant following. But however the phonetics of the change should be rightly defined, it has left widespread traces of its former prevalence in the Goidelic dialects. They are most marked in the Gaelic of the Isle of Man, as is shown in my *Manx Phonology*, pp. 142–4, a paragraph written before 1894 and now in need of revision. One may, perhaps, compare also such spellings as *adn* for *ann*, 'there', *Domnadn* for *Domnann*, and other instances collected by Stokes from the Moytura legend: see the *Revue Celtique*, xii. 54. The common use of *nd* for older *nn* has possibly its foundation in the same peculiarity of pronunciation.

[2] The daughter's name was Aranrot or Arianrhod, which is not to be equated with that of any Tuatha dé Danann personage, because, as pointed out by Mr. Nicholson, it was a place-name = Gaulish *Argentorate*. It became personal by misconstruing the name of her castle *Kaer Aranrot*, 'the castle of Arianrhod,' as if Arianrhod had been the owner's name, just as if you inferred an author named Genesis from 'the Book of Genesis' in English. Carnarvonshire folk-lore, however, gives Dôn three daughters, one of whom is *Elan*, the local pronunciation of what would probably be otherwise *Elen*. This I suppose to represent Arianrhod and what was written in Irish *Ethlenn*, *Edlend*, otherwise *Ethnenn*, the genitive of *Ethne*, the name of the mother of Lug and daughter of Donu, as given (subject to the correction suggested in note 2, p. 10 above) in the Fergus pedigree already mentioned. Thus the Irish group may be said to be represented in Welsh by *Elen*, mother of *Lleu* and daughter of *Dôn*. See

other grandsons—that is, eleven in all. Two of the eleven had names which equate readily with those of two of the leading characters among the Tuatha dé Danann, to wit, *Lleu* (later *Llew*) in Welsh and *Lug* in Irish, to whom I shall return presently. In the second place we have *Gofannon*,[1] the smith; an older form of the name is represented in Welsh by *Gofynyon*, which equates exactly with that of the Tuatha dé Danann smith Goibniu, genitive *Goibnenn*: a smith is in Welsh *gof*, and in Medieval Irish *goba*, genitive *gobann*, in Modern Irish, with *a* as usual for *o*, *gabha*, genitive *gabhann*. From this Welsh group, however, it is hard to separate its chief and ruler, Math; who was brother to Dôn, and was pre-eminent as magician and, for his surroundings, as a singularly just and equitable character. I cannot lay my finger on more than one mention of his Irish counterpart under that name: it occurs in the *Book of Leinster*, f. 9[b], where we read *Math m. Úmóir in drúi* 'Math son of Umor, the druid' or magician; but I suspect it was the same personage that in the Moytura legend, § 78, has the fuller name *Mathgen*. The latter is described as a sorcerer, and made to say that he would cast the mountains of Erin on the Fomori and roll their summits against the ground. *Math vab Mathonwy*, as he is called in Welsh, would seem to imply an Irish *Math mac Mathgamnai*.[2]

It is sometimes suggested that the Welsh borrowed their Dôn group directly from Ireland, but for this there is no evidence. More probably they inherited it from the Goidelic portion of their ancestry; for from Roman times down, some two-thirds of the area of Wales were inhabited by Goidels or people speaking the Gaelic or Irish language, wherever they had come from. Approximately by the beginning of the eighth century they had given up their language and adopted Brythonic. This change is probably one reason why we have so much less legend and folklore concerning the Dôn family than the Irish have about the Tuatha dé Danann. The Mabinogion and one or two other stories, saved by some process of translation, are, as it were, only the outstanding points of a landscape the rest of which has long since been submerged for ever. There is one question which the Irish and Welsh groups suggest in common. Why are

the *Book of Leinster*, f. 331[a]; Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, pp. 207–10; and the *Nine Witches of Gloucester* in the Tylor *Anthropological Essays* (Oxford, 1907), p. 290.

[1] One of his four brothers is called in the Mabinogion by the name *Eveid*, which, influenced perhaps by the somewhat similarly sounding name *Heveid* or *Heveyd*, later *Hyfeid* and *Hyfaid*, may have been more correctly spelt *Eved* or *Yfed*, equating with the name of the Tuatha dé Danann champion *Ogma*, Gaulish *Ogmios*, that is to say *Ogmiǐos*, accented on the penultimate.

[2] See Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, p. 544, and the references there given.

they associated with an ancestress rather than with an ancestor? It is not easy to decide, but one may point out that it is in harmony with Irish usage in other cases. Thus Conor, king of the Ultonians, is usually described as Conchubar mac Nessa, after his mother, and so with another great figure in Irish legend, namely, Fergus mac Róig. So also in the case of the Dalriad Scots who crossed over from Ireland in the fifth century to settle in Argyll, their king, Fergus Mór mac Erce, was so called after his mother. But in Welsh this kind of metronymic nomenclature hardly appears beyond the limits of the Dôn family. Did the metronymic way of describing men and women argue a matriarchal state of society in the background? In the next place, would that matriarchy have to be traced to an Indo-European origin or to an amalgamation of Celts with a non Indo-European race which was wont to arrange the family on matriarchal lines? Those are questions which I have sometimes had the temerity to try to answer. The latest utterance in point was made the other day by Professor Ridgeway in his address to the Anthropological Section of the British Association. He points out that descent through women was the law at Athens, and that there is good evidence that the ancient Latins had the same system. He associates with them in this respect Ligurians and Illyrians, melanochrous Thracians, and others. So he argues that the prevalence of the same system of succession through the mother cannot be regarded as proving the Picts and the Irish to have been other than Aryan.[1] But, however the human family was arranged in ancient Erin, it is certain that the families of gods and heroes were drawn after the same model.

In any case the goddesses are, comparatively speaking, more conspicuous than the gods in Irish legend, and one may add to those already cited two that may be dimly traced to Celtic countries on the Continent of Europe. Both are very briefly mentioned in the Glossary usually ascribed to Cormac mac Cuilennáin, king of Cashel, whose obit is given in the *Annals of Ulster*, A.D. 907 or 908. The first of them is named *Ánu* or *Ana*, genitive *Anann* (later *Anainne*), whom he describes as mother of the gods, 'mater deorum hibernensium.' He adds that *Dá chích Anainne*, 'the two Paps of Ana,' that is, the Pap mountains in Kerry, were named in reference to her. This implies the phonetic confusion of *Anu* with *Danu*, after whom the mountains are usually called *Dá chích Dhanann*. In fact *Dá chích Anann* would sound the same in Medieval Irish, and against the idea of identifying Anu with Danu is to be placed the fact that in one of the Nennian Genealogies she appears as Anna, wife (more correctly

[1] See the report in *The Times* of September 4, 1908, p. 14[b].

mother) of Beli the Great, king of this island in her golden age, which lasted till Maxen came with his Romans and drove Beli and his Sons into exile on the sea.[1] Holder cites, from an inscription at Vaison, in the French department of Vaucluse, a divinity's name *Anoniredi* (in the dative case).[2] At first sight such a compound looks as though it should be interpreted 'the Charioteer of Anu'. The analysis, however, hardly warrants our making out of it anything more personal than 'the vehicle, waggon, or chariot of Anu'; but that also can have had a meaning, in fact a meaning deeper and more spiritual than the other. With Anu Cormac associates another goddess; for he says that just as Anu was mother of gods, so Buanann was mother and nurse of the heroes. By the latter he seems to have meant such figures as Cúchulainn and Fer-dead, who learnt feats of arms together from Scáthach in Britain; and a passage in the *Book of Leinster*, referring to those heroes as her pupils, compares Scáthach to Buanann; it seems, however, to stop short of identifying the one female figure with the other.[3] Now *Buanann* represents an early genitive *Bōnon-os* and implies a nominative *Buanu*, for an early *Bōnu*. From the stem *Bōnon-* comes probably the place-name *Bononia*, which in Italy has become *Bologna*, and in France *Boulogne*, as in *Boulogne-sur-mer*, called in Anglo-Saxon *Bunne*; but Holder enumerates in France six other Boulognes, and adds two old Bononias from Pannonia and Moesia. This means in all no fewer than ten ancient sites called Bononia. It is natural to suppose that the name was identified in some way or other with the cult of the goddess, who, under the Goidelic form of her name taught the heroes who were her pupils how to perform martial feats and distinguish themselves in single combats.

One frequently reads of characters in our Celtic literatures that one suspects of having originally been divinities, though the evidence may be lacking. Where a rare archaeological accident supplies us with that evidence, the result turns out in the highest degree interesting, as in the case of Nuadu of the Silver Hand, to whom I wish to call your attention for a moment. Irish myth describes him fighting against the Fomori and the Fir Bolg. In one of the

[1] See Stokes's edition of O'Donovan's translation of Cormac's *Glossary*, pp. 5, 17; the Oxford Mabinogion, p. 83; the *Cymmrodor*, ix. 170, 174; Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, pp. 548, 570, 693; and the *Welsh People*, pp. 41–3.

[2] See the Berlin *Corpus Inscr. Lat.* xii. 1285. The quantity of the *a* of *Anu* is doubtful, and still more so that of *Anoni-redi*: the former is sometimes marked long.

[3] See f. 88ᵃ, also the story of the fight of Fer-dead in O'Curry's *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, iii. 455.

conflicts he loses his right hand, and with it his kingship over the Tuatha dé Danann; for a king so maimed could not continue in the kingly office. At length, however, the professional men of his court cleverly provided Nuadu with a hand of silver, and endowed it with motion in every joint like any other hand; so he became king again. His story reminds one of the Norse Týr, whose right hand was bitten off, and of his Greek namesake the great Zeus, who lost the use of his hands and feet in his conflict with the giant Typho.[1] On Celtic ground the gods of the Tuatha dé Danann have as their foes the Fomori, with whom Irish story ranges the Fir Bolg. Here it is important to note that the name of the Fomori also means giants. The derivation of the word is very uncertain. The element *mor* in it, if not *mór*, may be of the same origin as the Irish word *muir*, genitive *mara*, 'sea'; and the whole word might then be rendered *submarini*, meaning elves or demons from under the sea and beneath the lakes. But I am now more disposed to see in *mor* a cognate of the German *mahr*, 'an elf,' and to compare the latter syllable of the French *cauchemar* and of the English *nightmare*.[2] Other etymologies of the word have been now and then suggested; but I need only mention that the phonetic resemblance to the Irish word for 'sea' led the learned comparatively early to think that the Fomori were not imaginary submarine creatures, but real transmarine men who came to Ireland as pirates or invaders.

In order to give the mythology fair play it is necessary to separate from the Fomori the allies usually given them. Most of these latter may be regarded as comprised under the following names: (1) *Fir*

[1] The story is preserved by Apollodorus, who makes Hermes find and restore to their places in Zeus's body the tendons which the giant had cut out of it.

[2] This etymology comes from Dr. Stokes (*Revue Celtique*, xii. 128, 130); but he has proposed another (ibid. xxii. 420) where he gives the singular, the two forms *fomóir* and *fomóre*. The former became *fomhair* and *famhair*, which is in use in Scotch Gaelic, as may be seen from Campbell's *Tales of the West Highlands*, where the *famhair* is usually a giant fond of feeding on Christians, especially Christian babies. But there was another singular, namely, *fomor*, later spelling *fomhor*, represented in Manx by *fowr* or *fowar*, 'a giant,' plural *fowir*: the Phillips' Prayer Book of 1610 (*Manx Society*, vol. xxxiii. 488) has it spelt *four* for the 'giant' in Psalm xix. 5. From *fomor* was derived an adjective *fomorach*, plural *fomoraich*, in later spelling *fomhoraigh*, which I have found in use in the North of Ireland in the sense of 'giants'. The Manx spelling of *fomorach* is *fowragh*, 'gigantic, huge'; but it is also said to mean 'a pirate'. When this word meaning 'a giant' came to mean 'a pirate' is, as will be seen, a somewhat difficult question, and it applies, for instance, to a passage in Stokes's *Acallam na Senórach*, p. 53, where one reads of a *fomor* who was himself a match for 400 men, but otherwise resembled an ordinary pirate: is the word to be translated there by giant or pirate?

Bolg, which has been already discussed. (2) *Fir Domnann*, 'the Men of the goddess Domnu,' to whom Irish literature applies also an adjective *Domnannach*, meaning 'Dumnonian' and referring to the people whom Ptolemy calls Δαμνόνιοι, occupying territory extending from the west of Ayrshire to the Ochil Hills; but the name was the same as that of the Dumnonii, from whom Devon is so called, in the south-west of England. There is inscriptional evidence that Dumnonii is the better form. (3) The *Galeóin* or *Galiúin*, a name which seems vaguely to claim kinship with *Galli* and Γαλάται. In the epic story of the Táin Bó Cualnge the Galeóin are so much more energetic and alert than the other troops of Ailill and his Queen, that the latter could hardly be dissuaded from having them all murdered, lest they should secure to themselves all the glory of the expedition. Matters were compromised by having them distributed throughout the army so as to leave no five of them together. (4) Lastly a people called *Lagin*, from whom the province of *Leinster* derives the first portion of its name. They are represented as auxiliaries whom Labraid the Exile introduced to place him in power some five centuries before our era; among his other troops were also Dumnonians.[1] All these peoples seem to have been intensely detested in Ireland, and the story, for instance, of the disappearance of the Galeóin, as retailed by Eugene O'Curry in his *Manners and Customs of the ancient Irish*, ii. 261, is a very curious one: 'Such, however, was the envy,' he says, 'and jealousy, if not the fears, which their valour and fame had raised against them in the country, that the Druids of Erinn, whether at the instigation of Queen *Medbh* or not I cannot say, pronounced withering satires and incantations against them, (according to the story); so that their whole race became extinct in the land, excepting a few, and these few of the "Gallians," as well as the whole of their fellow foreign tribes, the *Laighinns* and the *Domnanns*, were afterwards totally extirpated by the monarch Tuathal Teachtmar, on his accession to the throne of Erinn, A.D. 79.'

All this about the Galeóin argues warriors who had no women of their own with them, and it is to be noticed that no pedigrees of Fir Bolg, Dumnonians, or Galeóin find their places in the great collections of genealogies such as those in the *Book of Leinster*. We certainly read now and then of individual Goidels of Dumnonian descent or of Fir Bolg origin, a fact of importance to contrast with the absence of any human being with a Fomorian ancestry. It is

[1] See Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, p. 298[iii]; Rhys and Brynmor-Jones's *Welsh People*, p. 56[iv], where I now think the Dumnonii have been wrongly treated as Goidels; see also *C. I. L.* vii. 775–6.

needless to say that the numerous monuments of antiquity dotting the sites of the Moytura battles in the counties of Mayo and Sligo are not to be associated with the Fomori. They are the work of men, and some of them doubtless mark the scenes of real conflicts between the invading Dumnonians and the Goidels. Perhaps the confusing of the Dumnonians and their allies with the Fomori has not always been purely accidental. Take, for example, the case of Indech mac dé Domnann; that description of him suggests that he was a legitimate chief and leader of the Dumnonians; but to represent him as king of the Fomori was as much as to say in more modern phraseology that he was a devil and the chief of devils. In the absence of anybody who had to be called bad names, the king of the Fomori is represented as one of themselves, usually called *Tethra*, in the genitive *Tethrach*. Lastly, the story of the extirpation of the Dumnonians and the other peoples allied with them does not apply to the Fomori; for they, like their foes the Tuatha dé Danann, retired underground, where the peasantry of Kerry still suppose them to be living and ready to harm any one who ventures to explore ancient *ráths* and similar subterranean structures.[1] This sort of belief has led to more confusion with the Fairies or the Men of the *Sídh*.[2] It must also have tended to make the popular notion reduce the Fomori in point of stature, while it did not specially associate them with the sea.

The story of the Destruction of Dá Derga's Hostel, published from the *Book of the Dun* and other MSS. by Dr. Stokes in the *Revue Celtique*, vol. xxii, gives a remarkable description of three Fomori whom Mac Cecht had brought as hostages to the court of his king, Conaire the Great, whose reign of seventy years formed a golden age for Erin in the second and first centuries before our era. Stokes has rendered it as follows, § 94:—'Tis hard for me to liken that (trio).

[1] *Celtic Folklore*, p. 433. A friend of mine who heard this paper read has since called my attention to the fact that in the Highlands the Fomori are threatened with the fate of being reduced into molecatchers! At first sight this suggests that they cannot in this twentieth century procure a supply of babies, and that they have to be satisfied with moles and the like small deer. But not so; the question is purely phonetical. The Sc. Gaelic word for a mole is *famh*; so the mole man is called *famhair* or *famhoir*. Now *famh* proves to be a relatively late form of a word which Macbain gives as also *fath*, and he naturally compares the Welsh *gwadd*, 'a mole,' Breton *goz*, and Medieval English *want*, '*talpa*.' So disappears the possibility of any etymological connexion in Gaelic between the word for giant and that for molecatcher. A question of greater difficulty is raised by the Irish *fúmaire* with unmutated *m*: see Dinneen in his Irish-English Dictionary and O'Donovan in O'Reilly's.

[2] As, for instance, in the Moytura legend, § 41.

Neither of the men of Erin nor of the men of the world [i. e. the Continent of Europe] do I know it, unless it be the trio that Mac Cecht brought out of the land of the Fomorians by dint of duels. Not one of the Fomorians was found to fight him, so he brought away those three, and they are in Conaire's house as sureties that, while Conaire is reigning, the Fomorians destroy neither corn nor milk in Erin beyond their fair tribute. Well may their aspect be loathly! Three rows of teeth in their heads from one ear to another. An ox with a bacon-pig, this is the ration of each of them, and that ration which they put into their mouths is visible till it comes down past their navels. Bodies of bone (i. e. without a joint in them) all those three have. I swear what my tribe swears, more will be killed by them at the Destruction than those they leave alive. Six hundred warriors will fall by them in their first conflict, and a man for each of their weapons, and one for each of the three themselves. And they will boast a triumph over a king or chief of the reavers.'

Thus far of the Fomori, the giants opposed to the Tuatha dé Danann, and of the parallel with the giants and the gods of Greek mythology. I must now return to the name of the king of the Tuatha dé Danann, to wit, in Irish *Nuadu* or *Nuada*, which equates with *Nud* in Medieval Welsh, pronounced *Nûđ* and spelt in Modern Welsh *Nudd*. In Irish the full description of him was *Nuadu argetlâm*, 'N. of the Silver Hand,' while in Welsh the compound was arranged differently, and the whole must have once sounded *Núdons lâm'-argentios*. This would have resulted regularly in a later Nûđ Llaw ereint, but for the fact that alliteration seems to have set in early, making the name approximately into *Ludons lâm'-argentios*, whence the later form *Llûđ llawereint*. Where there was nothing to induce the alliteration the name remained *Nudons*, to become *Nûđ*. So we find Welsh literature splitting up the character into two: (1) Nudd, who had a son called Gwyn son of Nudd, who, in the story of Kulhwch and Olwen (Mabinogion, p. 124), is endowed by the Almighty with the temper of the devils of the other world, and thence he could not be spared, lest this world should be ruined. (2) Lludd Llawereint, whose name has survived to become that of King Lud in English. But this and a great deal more that might be said in connexion with Nudd and Lludd would have remained mere guesswork, had not a temple of Nudons been discovered a good many years ago, namely, at Lydney in Gloucestershire. The find not only yielded several inscriptions involving the god's name in various forms, but also a very remarkable mosaic forming the

floor of his fane. One of the dedications to the god begins with D. M. NODONTI, which Hübner completes into 'Deo M⟨arti?⟩ Nodonti'; that is to say, Hübner was in doubt whether the M stands for MARTI or not. Another ends with DEO NVDENTE | M. DEDIT, where he suggests 'DEO NUDENTE M⟨ARTI? *vel* MAGNO⟩ DEDIT'. In this case MERITO has also been proposed; at all events the inscriptions leave us in doubt with which of the Italian gods, if any, the Romans equated the Celtic divinity. A little bronze crescent found on the spot does not quite decide the case, though it strongly reminds one of Neptune rather than of Mars. It represents the god as a crowned, beardless personage, driving a chariot with four horses. On either side is a figure supposed to represent the winds, and beyond them on each of the two sides is a triton with the front feet of a horse. The god holds the reins in his left hand, while his right hand uplifted grasps what may be a sceptre or perhaps a whip. The equipment of the god recalls in some measure the Chariot of the Sun; but other portions of the find compel us to look rather to Neptune than any other god of classical antiquity.

Lydney has possibly been called after the god: it is situated on the western bank of the Severn estuary. Similarly Ludgate suggests the possibility of his once having had a fane on Ludgate Hill somewhere in the area now adorned by St. Paul's Cathedral. To this may be added the fact that Irish legend gives the Boyne a husband variously called Nechtan, Nuada, and Nuada Necht, and, whatever the euhemerists may say, the goddess of the river Boyne was originally meant when that river was first called *Rig Mná Nuadat*, a kenning which means 'the forearm of Nuadu's wife.' This must suffice for the present as to the distribution of the possible traces of the god in the British Isles.[1]

On the question whether Nudons was a sky-god or a water-god, or rather both at once, I would refer you to Mr. A. B. Cook's studies of 'The European Sky-god', in the pages of *Folk-Lore* (vols. xvi, xvii, xviii), especially chapter iv, in which he advocates the latter view and interprets D. M. as DEO MAGNO. He has treated the whole subject with a great wealth of comparison and illustration.

On the Continent no trace of Nudons has been detected in any Celtic country of antiquity, which is just the contrary with the Irish *Lug*, in Welsh *Lleu* and *Llew*. Lug was a favourite figure in Irish story, and Llew, or more commonly Llew Llawgyffes, has

[1] The principal references under this heading are to the *Book of Leinster*, *f.* 186[b]; O'Curry's *Manners and Customs*, iii. 156; my *Celtic Heathendom*, 119–33, and *Celtic Folklore*, 286, 432–4.

a very important place in one of the Welsh Mabinogion. On the Continent his name was *Lugus* (plur. *Lugoves*), which you will find in the Berlin *C. I. L.* xiii. 5078. After him was called *Lugu-dūnon*, in Latin *Lugudunum*, shortened to *Lugdunum*, 'the dūn or arx of Lugus.' But the famous Lugudunum, which we call Lyons, was only one of the places named after Lugus: according to Holder, no less in all than fourteen have been identified as towns of Lugus. They include, besides the city of Lyons, such others as Lugdunum Convenarum, or Saint-Bertrand de Comminges, in the department of Haute-Garonne; Lugdunum Vocontiorum, now Montlahue in the department of the Drôme; Lugdunum Remorum, now shortened to Laon, in the department of Aisne; Lugdunum Batavorum, now Leyden in Holland, and other towns less well known. In the Neo-celtic languages the compound corresponding to *Lugu-dunon* appears to have been resolved into *Dūnon Lugous* or *Dūnon Lugoues*. At any rate this was the case with Welsh; for we have two strongholds named *Dīn Lleu*, now shortened to *Dinllē*, one consisting of the enormous mound on the Carnarvonshire shore at the western mouth of the Menai Straits. The other was Dinlle Wrecon, which would seem to have been the ancient stronghold on the top of the Wrekin in Shropshire.[1] Place-names originating in Lug's name are also not wholly wanting in Ireland; but without going into details concerning them, I have said enough to show the wide area over which the name and cult of Lug must have been cherished in the Celtic world of antiquity.

Lug's great festival among the insular Celts was the first day of August or the day of first-fruits, called in English 'Lammas'. In Irish it was called *Lug-nasad*; but in Wales, which came under the rule of Rome, it is called *Gwyl Awst*, 'the feast of August,' and in the Welsh Laws it occurs as Dyw Awst, 'August's day.' One should, perhaps, speak rather of 'the feast of Augustus' and 'Augustus's day', since the emperor not only gave his name to the month of August, but seems also to have usurped the honours of the god on the first day of that month: for I find no reason to doubt that this was the date of the great festival of Lug in Gaul as well. In fact it may be taken to be the key to the importance and popularity of the First of August at the greatest of the cities called after Lug, namely, the Lugudunum on the Rhone. The Empire took advantage of this by associating Rome and Augustus with the First of Sextilis. The visible symbol of that cult was the 'Ara Romae et Augusti' dedicated on that day.

[1] Since this was delivered a friend of mine thinks he has found a *Dinlle* in the neighbourhood of Wrexham, in Denbighshire.

It was probably a modification of the old cult with new names, Rome for Lugudunum and Augustus for Lug, with whom the emperor was possibly identified, just as he was sometimes treated or wished to be treated as Apollo, and sometimes as Mercury or Mars. The view that the first of August was Lug's day was advanced years ago by the learned Celtist, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, and it has been accepted by most scholars, including Dr. Hirschfeld, the editor of the Berlin *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*; but we have important exceptions in the person of M. Gaidoz, in the *Revue Celtique*, and of M. Camille Jullian, some of whose learning is in process of passing through the press in the form of a great history of Gaul; but the thousand and more pages which have appeared already fail to reach Lugudunum in the time of Augustus. So I am not sure whether he adheres to the same opinion still.[1]

There is, however, another difficulty: I for one have always regarded Lug more or less in the light of a sun-god or an Apollo, but M. d'Arbois de Jubainville beholds in him a Hermes or Mercury. So also does Dr. Holder, who, s. v. *Lugudunon*, cites from the Berlin *Corpus*, xiii. 1769, the inscription at Lyons beginning with the words 'Mercurio Augusto et Maiae Augustae sacrum ex voto', and relating to a temple built for that triad of divinities under the auspices of Tiberius. In this context Holder equates Mercury with Lug, and he is probably right. The explanation of the difficulty is possibly to be sought in the many-sidedness of Lug's character. In the Mabinogion of the Welsh he and his father Gwydion once act the part of craftsmen, and are accordingly called golden cordwainers; but the father is the master craftsman. In Irish the father is practically effaced, and Lug himself is master of every craft and art worthy of mention in his time; and herein we have a striking parallel between Lug and his son Cúchulainn, who glories in having been trained by all the great men of the Ultonian Court in the special department in which each excelled. Inscriptions containing the name Lugus in the plural *Lugoves*, dative *Lugovibus*, are recorded from Avenches in Switzerland and from Bonn on the Rhine. These at first sight would seem to suggest brothers bearing each the name Lugus, and, in fact, Irish legend shows traces of brothers Lug; but on the whole I am inclined to think that Lug and his father were the persons meant. At any rate, the Spanish town of Uxama, bearing apparently a Celtic name, now Osma, supplies an inscription (*C. I. L.* ii. 2818) which states that a temple or, at any rate,

[1] See the *Revue Archéologique*, 1878, p. 388, *C. I. L.* xiii, p. 249; also the *Revue Celtique*, vi. 487, viii. 169, ix. 267, x. 238.

something devoted to the Lugoves—*Lugovibus Sacrum*—was presented by a certain L. L. Urcico to a guild of shoemakers or college of cobblers, *collegio sutorum d. d.* This recalls in a striking manner the Welsh story about Gwydion and Llew making shoes for Arianrhod. Gwydion, however, was the culture hero, the Hermes or Mercury of the Welsh Mabinogi, the wily shape-shifter, the crafty bargainer, and the inimitable storyteller.

So far I have roughly traced only one side of Lug's activities. In the Welsh story he can make a cast with amazing precision, and hurl his spear with stupendous effect; in an Irish story he kills, with the cast of a sling-stone, Balor, the most terrible of the Fomori. He institutes a great feast of first-fruits on Lammas Day, when the demons—in Irish legendary phraseology the wizards—that produce blasts and blights have been expelled or else compelled to give hostages not to harm the crops or the dairy. Lug, under one or more of his surnames, or else one of the brothers Lug, takes part in this routing of the enemies with whom the farmer has to contend. After the defeat of the Fomori, Lug is represented as being made king by the Tuatha dé Danann, and the great feast at Lammas is treated as Lug's marrying of the sovereignty of Erin, which is represented as a princess crowned with a diadem of gold. A famous Irish king named Conn is described as led once on a time to the presence of this wonderful pair of more than human stature and beauty. Lug sat in his royal seat, and there never was seen at Tara a man of his great size or 'of his comeliness, for the beauty of his form, the wonderfulness of his face'. Erin the princess asked questions as to the succession of kings at Tara beginning with Conn, whom Lug, taking upon him the part of prophet, informed how long he should rule; and Conn was informed likewise of his successors, of every sovereign that was to be at Tara.[1] As euhemerized gods have to die, we find that Erin's next husband was called Mac Gréine, 'Son of the Sun'. Taking into consideration these suggestions of Irish legend, one is reminded rather of Apollo than of Hermes, and still more so if we combine them with the previous ones. If the same or a similarly wide range of attributes were ascribed to Lugus in Gaul, one cannot help asking how he was to be equated with any single Roman god of the Augustan age. At any rate it cannot seem wonderful if he was sometimes associated with Mercury and sometimes with Apollo, possibly also with Mars. One can hardly advance in favour of Apollo the fact that he occurs in conjunction with Augustus in several of the Lyons inscriptions. There is more

[1] For the text and translation see O'Curry's *Lectures*, pp. 618–22.

perhaps to be said for an Apollo Siannus (*C. I. L.* xiii. 1669), who was, as it would seem, honoured at the expense of the common fund of the three provinces of Gaul. He was probably a Celtic god, as was Mars Segomo (ibid. xiii. 1675) who was honoured also at the expense of the three provinces. The latter god was so certainly Celtic that we find his name entering into men's names in Ogam inscriptions found in the country of the Déssi, what is now the county of Waterford in the South of Ireland. The association of the emperor with Apollo was sometimes carried further. It is known, for instance, that Augustus affected the rôle of Apollo, and that the sculptor's art was sometimes applied to give him the attributes of that god.[1]

As you will have observed, when we come to Gaul we are brought into more direct contact with the divinities of the ancient Celts. We have inscriptions commemorating dedications to them, and we have notices of some of them in the works of various authors of antiquity. The words of Julius Caesar as to the pantheon of the Gauls will occur to you all; and I would remind you of a very different passage, namely, Lucian's quaint account of Ogmios, the Gaulish god of eloquence, whom the Gauls equipped as a Hercules, because he achieved by the words of his mouth what Hercules did by means of his club. In addition to these sources of information a considerable number of statues of Gaulish gods and goddesses may be studied, either in the original or in casts, at the French National Museum, which is housed in the Château Saint-Germain under the direction of the learned M. Salomon Reinach. Among other scholars who have advanced our knowledge of the gods and goddesses of ancient Gaul, I may mention, from the pages of the *Revue Celtique* alone, M. Vallentin, M. Mowat, M. Gaidoz, M. Cerquand, and M. d'Arbois de Jubainville.

It need hardly be said that the divinities of ancient Gaul receive almost every year additions to their number, owing to the discovery of statues or inscriptions not previously known. It has been my luck to discover the name of one of the last found gods of Gaul, not by digging, it is true, but by examining a monument which the

[1] For more on these points, see Holder, s. v. *Lugudunon* and *Lugus*; Rhys's *Celtic Heathendom*, pp. 236, 272, 307, 405–11, 414, 417; d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Le Cycle mythologique irlandais*, pp. 138, 139, 304, 305; *Revue Celtique*, x. 238–41; Hirschfeld, *Le Conseil des Gaules*, in the collection of memoirs published by the members of 'La Société nationale des Antiquaires de France, Centenaire 1804–1904', pp. 213, 214; *C. I. L.* ii. 2818, xiii. 1669, 1675, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1769, and pp. 227, 229, 230, 249; Cook on 'The European Sky-god', in *Folk-Lore* for 1905, p. 310.

spade had brought to light in many pieces. I refer to the find, made ten years ago at Coligny in the neighbourhood of Lyons, of numerous bronze fragments, which are now in the museum of that city.[1] About one half of the entire document is missing; but the remains have been put together as far as possible, and prove to be portions of a calendar, together with other pieces which make the statue of the presiding god almost complete. For it is natural to suppose that the bronze calendar was set up at a temple dedicated to the god. Most Celtic philologists are agreed that the language of the calendar is Celtic, though they are not quite agreed where exactly in the Celtic family of languages it must have stood. As so much is wanting, it is fortunate that the calendar covers five years; so that, where it is complete, we have each month five times over.

The god's name was *Rivos*, dative *Rivo*, and the name of his special month was *Rivros*, genitive *Rivri*. It thus seems evident that the name of the month is derived from that of the god. But Rivros means in the calendar not only his month, which was approximately that of our August, but also harvest or crop; and in that sense we have a plural *rivri*. On the thirteenth day of Rivros, but with the number XIII carefully omitted, we have an entry to the effect that the harvest or crop was given or dedicated to the god Rivos (*Dewo Rivo*). The two entries remaining on that day in other years out of the five allow us to infer—for unfortunately abbreviations are used—that they practically convey the same sense, except that they appear to substitute as the recipient the god's priest for the god himself. On the fourth day of Rivros in the same year which supplies *Dewo Rivo* we have an entry which may be rendered 'Rivos is with us', that is to say that the god himself was present. But the four other entries on that day suggest that some of the harvest reached the homestead or the house on that day. I infer that this refers to the bringing home of the first-fruits, or samples of the harvest, and that the god was supposed to be present to accept it. At all events neither of these sets of entries can refer to a final function. We have that just a month after the fourth of Rivros, namely, on the fourth of Anagantios, the following month, where we read in the three entries remaining the same words three times over, namely, *Ociomu Rivri*, which are in the plural, and mean, 'We have the harvests or crops with us.' I consider that I have got at the literal meaning of the foregoing entries; but I do not feel sure of the exact nature of the transactions to which

[1] See my *Celtae and Galli*, pp. 17, 33, 35; *Celtic Inscriptions of France and Italy*, pp. 83, 84.

they refer. So much, however, seems to be certain, namely, that the month belonged in a special manner to the god Rivos, the only divinity to which the calendar, so far as we have it, can be said to refer. It seems not improbable that Rivos was a local name for the god Lugus, after whom the month of August may well have been called. The question naturally suggests itself whether Augustus had not some such a fact in his mind when he chose Sextilis as the month to be called after him, and not September, the month in which he was born. The words of Suetonius (Augustus, 31) seem to suggest that he and others would have thought September the natural month for the emperor to have taken; but there was a reason ready to hand for selecting Sextilis, and it was incorporated in the decree of the Senate, as given by Macrobius (i. 12. 35), namely, that Sextilis was the month in which the emperor first became consul, and the month in which his great victories had happened. This appears amply sufficient; but it by no means excludes a different reason from the one avowed, or at any rate a different form of the one avowed: that is, a form more flattering and thoroughly pleasing to a personality disposed to play the rôle of Apollo. It is unfortunate that the etymological meaning of the name *Rivos* is uncertain[1]; but several men's names derived from it are recorded by Holder, such as *Rivulus* and *Riumanos*, more correctly *Riumanios*, 'son of Riumanos.' The name Rivos is to be found also in an Irish story, namely that of the formation of Lough Ree.

The forms which Rivos takes in Medieval Irish are *Rib*, pronounced *Ribh* (= *Riv*), and *Ri* or *Rii*, which was perhaps the genitive of *Rib*. Rib is represented as the son of a king of Munster leaving his father's house at the head of a multitude of men, women, horses, cattle and other property, in quest of a place in which to settle. Rib and his people were led to the banks of the Shannon, where they settled, and where Rib had charge of a magic well, which after the lapse of thirty years burst forth at Lammas and drowned the district. The result was the formation of Lough Ree, which is an expansion of the Shannon between Athlone and Lanesborough. The magic well was at one time a favourite theme of stories both in Ireland and in Wales, but what exactly one is to make of the story which I have summarized I hardly know.[2] If we regard Rib

[1] Possibly the language of the calendar was one that had begun to drop Indo-European *p*. In that case *Rivos* would admit of being referred to the same origin as Welsh *rhyw* 'kind, sex', and Gothic *fraiw* 'Saame, Geschlecht, Nachkommen.'

[2] See the *Revue Celtique*, xv. 445–6, xvi. 151–2, and O'Grady's *Silva Gadelica*, i. 233, ii. 484, 532; also Rhys's *Celtic Folklore*, pp. 435–7.

as a blurred version of an ancient Celtic divinity, the question arises what sort of a divinity that was. One may answer that Rib's rôle in the only story known about him would seem to point to Apollo rather than to Mercury.

This brings me back to Rivos and the bronze fragments found at Coligny. When they were put together, under the direction of M. Dissard in the Lyons Museum, the statue of the god grew out of the ruins almost complete; so complete, in fact, that the only difference of opinion that has arisen is as to whether they make an Apollo or a Mars. M. Reinach is very decidedly in favour of Apollo, and it was he that called my attention to the striking parallel between Augustus in the rôle of Apollo giving his name to the month of August, and Rivos giving a name derived from his own to Rivros, the same month. The Coligny calendar is not supposed to date before our era. Mr. Nicholson thinks that the writing belongs to the middle of the first century. Moreover, nobody has suggested, as far as I know, that the statue belongs to an earlier period than the calendar. So one sees pretty clearly what happened as to the image of the god Rivos. The priests of the Sequani and other Celts of Gaul must have been familiar with the association of Augustus with the month of August. So when they wanted an image of Rivos, who was specially identified with the same month under its native name of Rivros, they simply procured a statue of Apollo with whom Augustus was pleased to identify himself; or—shall I rather say?—a statue of Augustus in the character of Apollo. In a word, Rivos came to be represented as his statue shows him, under the reflex influence of Augustus and the teaching of the Roman theology of the time. Prima facie, Augustus as Mars is less probable than Augustus as Apollo, as the model adopted in connexion with the calendar of an agricultural people interested mainly in their festivals, the state of the weather, and the operations of harvest. In either case the equation illustrates one of the ways in which the paganism of imperial Rome tended to influence the native paganism of Gaul.

2

THE DRUIDS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT THEORIES

By CANON MacCULLOCH

It is first necessary to discuss recent theories of the origin of the Druids. Of these M. d'Arbois de Jubainville's theory, based on Caesar's words that 'the system is thought to have been devised in Britain and brought thence into Gaul', and alleging that Druidism was the religion of the Goidels of Britain, and became that of their Gaulish conquerors, passing ultimately to Gaul, is scarcely likely. Gauls in Britain might have accepted Druidism, but it could hardly have spread into Gaul and obtained such great influence there. Goidels and Gauls were akin, and probably possessed the same religion from the first. Caesar's words suggest that the British origin of Druidism was only an opinion, not a fact; and in all probability Britain, being less open to foreign influences than Gaul, had preserved its Druidic cults, &c., intact. Hence Gauls went to Britain to perfect themselves in Druidism. On the other hand we have Pliny's opinion (*H. N.* xxx. 1), that it passed from Gaul to Britain.

Another theory, supported on different grounds by Sir John Rhys, Mr. Gomme, and M. Salomon Reinach, is that the Druids were a pre-Celtic priesthood, who imposed themselves upon their Celtic conquerors. Sir John Rhys maintains that Celtic polytheism differed from Druidism, which was of a lower order. But there exists no evidence to show that the Druids ever were priests of a non-Celtic people, nor is it easy to see how the priests of a conquered race could ever have obtained such influence over their conquerors as the Druids certainly possessed. The case of conquering peoples who resort occasionally to priests or magicians of a subject race because the latter possess more powerful magic, is not really analogous. The Druids were not resorted to occasionally, but dominated the Celts always, in all departments of life. Mr. Gomme contends that many Druidic beliefs (e. g. in shape-shifting), practices (e. g. human sacrifices of atonement), and functions (e. g. judging, arranging boundaries, &c.) were opposed to Aryan sentiment, and seeks an analogous case in the occasional services of a similar kind rendered by un-Aryan tribes to Hindu village communities. But existing evidence shows that the Druids rendered more than occasional services to the Celts, nor was it only among the ruder Celtic tribes that their influence predominated, as Mr. Gomme contends. Moreover, the hostility of Rome to

the Druids as true Celtic priests is inexplicable if their position only corresponds to that of pariah priests in India. Further, if their beliefs and practices were opposed to 'Aryan sentiment', why should Aryan Celts so readily have accepted them? The Aryans must have had a savage past, and such practices were still in vogue among them, while recent theories about the Aryans show that they were probably on a lower level than the peoples they conquered. The basis of all Celtic cults was doubtless composed of beliefs and ceremonies akin to those of the aborigines, instead of being of a loftier and purer kind.

M. Reinach argues that the probable lack of images among the Celts before the Roman conquest suggests a religious prohibition and a priesthood powerful enough to enforce it. The existence of such a priesthood he finds implied among certain pre-Celtic peoples by their megalithic structures and lack of images; and therefore reasons that these priests were the Druids, who became the priests of the Celts. But this conclusion is based on negative evidence; there exist no relics of purely Celtic images in Gaul, therefore there never can have been such images. But in other regions, where image-worship was common, images are not now found. If the Celtic images were of wood, their disappearance would be accounted for. Moreover, the Celts in Ireland were certainly image-worshippers, although the Druids were strong among them, and certain of the Gaulo-Roman images show no trace of classical influence, but in their form suggest existing native types. Further, if the Celts were opposed to image-worship as a result of Druidic influence, why should such an outbreak of it have occurred after the Roman conquest? M. Reinach's contention that the Celts adopted Druidism *en bloc* is shown to be incredible, while his supposition that the Celtic military caste had begun to rebel against this *ex hypothesi* foreign priesthood, and that their power was consequently declining, is not supported by evidence. Priest and soldier have always opposed each other wherever such bodies exist as separate castes.

Taking, therefore, these various theories together, there is no historic or epigraphic evidence for them, while the classical evidence contradicts them. Although Druids are not formally connected with certain Celtic regions, it must be remembered that no classical writer has written fully about them. Hence the probability is that the Druids existed wherever the Celts were found, though perhaps not always called Druids. Against the theory that they were pre-Celtic stands the fact that they are not said to have existed in such a non-Celtic region as Aquitania. The theory demands the supposition that the Celts had no native priesthood or that it was overcome by the Druidic priesthood. Certain Celtic priests were called *gutuatri*, attached to certain temples and to a definite cult. M. d'Arbois de Jubainville

considers that these were the only priests known to the Celts before the coming of the Druids. But the probability is that they were a Druidic class, since the Druids were a composite priesthood with a variety of functions. If the priests or servants of Belenus, described by Ausonius and called by him *aedituus Beleni*, were *gutuatri*, then the latter must have been connected with the Druids, since the poet says they were of Druidic stock. Similarly the *sacerdotes* and *antistites* of the Boii, mentioned by Livy, may have been Druids proper and *gutuatri*. Classical evidence suggests that the Druids were a great inclusive priesthood, with a variety of functions—priestly, prophetical, magical, medical, judicial, and poetical. Caesar attributes many of these to the Druids; in other writers they are each in part in the hands of different classes. Diodorus refers to the Celtic philosophers and theologians (Druids), diviners, and bards, as do also Strabo and Timagenes, while Strabo gives in Greek form the native name of the diviners, οὐάτεις, a word akin to the Celtic *vātis* (Irish *fáith*). These diviners may also have had bardic functions, since *vātis* means both singer and prophet. Again, Druid and diviner were closely connected, since both studied nature and offered, or assisted in, sacrifice and auguries according to Strabo, Timagenes, and Cicero. Hence, perhaps, Lucan does not mention diviners, but only Druids and bards. Diviners were probably a Druidic sub-class, standing midway between the Druids proper and the bards. Pliny speaks of 'Druids and this race of prophets and medicine-men', and this suggests that some were priests, some diviners, while some practised an empiric medical science. On the whole this agrees with what is met with in Ireland, where the Druids, though appearing in the texts as magicians, were certainly priests and teachers. Side by side with them were the *Filid*, 'learned poets,' occupying a higher place than the third class, the bards. The *Filid*, who may have been known as *Fáthi*, prophets, were also diviners and in certain methods of augury used sacrifice, while the Druids proper also used divination. Thus Druids or Priests, Vates, and Bards in Gaul correspond to Druids or Priests, *Fáthi* or *Filid*, and Bards in Ireland, their functions in both cases overlapping.

This inclusive Druidic priesthood was a native Celtic priesthood, not an aboriginal priesthood adopted by the Celts. Some have seen in the Druids an esoteric and occult priesthood; but the probability is that they had grown up *pari passu* with the native religion and magic. In certain parts of Gaul, they may have been more civilized as a result of the influence of Greek civilization filtering in through the Massilian colonies, but as a whole they were addicted to magic, and took part in all local, as well as the greater, cults. They had been evolved from primitive medicine-men, later perhaps a series of priest-kings, practising magic and officiating at religious ceremonies. The folk themselves

may have practised minor cults, but they doubtless felt that true success depended on the presence of a Druid.

The Druids cannot be regarded as a philosophic priesthood, advocating a pure religion to a polytheistic people; nor was Druidism a formal system outside Celtic religion. It covered the whole ground of Celtic religion: in other words, it was that religion itself. The idea that the Druids possessed esoteric knowledge is due to the idea entertained by a chain of classical writers that they were philosophers. What might be called a 'Druidic legend' was formed, but the basis of it was probably to be found in the fact that the Druids taught immortality, which no classical priest had done. They knew also that the Druids had a certain organization and considered themselves divinely inspired. The eyes of classical observers were dazzled and read much into this priesthood which it did not possess. But side by side with this 'legend' was the fact that the Druidic religion was considered cruel, grossly superstitious, and savage, while on these and other grounds it was attacked by the Roman power. Modern writers in turn have probably exaggerated the force of what classical writers stated. The Druidic associations were probably not much higher than the organized priesthoods of barbarians. Their doctrine of metempsychosis, if it really was taught, involved no ethical content as in Pythagoreanism. Their astronomy was probably astrological: their knowledge of nature a series of cosmogonic myths and speculations. The evidence points in this direction, while, if a true Druidic philosophy and science had existed, it is strange that it exerted no influence on the thought of the time. As to the supposed connexion with Pythagoreanism, while Pythagorean teachings may have reached Gaul, it is certain that the Druidic teaching of immortality in no way resembled the Pythagorean metempsychosis doctrine. There are Celtic myths regarding the re-birth of gods and heroes, but the doctrine taught was apparently this, that the soul was clothed with a body, its own or a new one, in the future state. The Druidic teaching of bodily immortality was mistakenly assumed to be the same as the Pythagorean doctrine. Other points of resemblance were then discovered. The organization of the Druids was assumed by Ammianus to be a kind of corporate life; but those who wrote most fully of the Druids knew nothing of this. The position and power of the Druids demanded some kind of organization, and in Gaul there was a chief Druid wielding authority over the others. Evidence tends to show that the insular Druids were similarly organized and had a chief, as was certainly the case with the *Filid*. M. Bertrand's development of the words of Ammianus, and his theory that the Druids were a kind of monks living a corporate life, while Irish monasticism was a transformation of the system, is opposed to the evidence. Irish Druids had wives and children. Christianity opposed Druidism

too much to adopt any part of its system, and there is no doubt that Irish monasticism was modelled on that of the continent. The Druidic organization probably denoted no more than that the Druids were bound by certain ties, and were also more or less graded, with different classes practising different functions, though these were perhaps never very exclusively defined. The religious, magical, and other functions of the Druids are well known; their position as teachers, both in Gaul and Ireland, deserves examination. Their teaching of immortality had the practical end of making men fearless of death. Their scientific teaching was connected with magic and included cosmogonic myths. Their theology was largely mythological; their moral teaching resembled that found in all barbaric societies. Ritual formulae, runes, incantations would also be taught: these were probably the subject of the verses which were never committed to writing and which were kept secret from the people. This secrecy did not involve an esoteric, philosophic, or monotheistic teaching. These secret formulae were magical, and were kept secret lest they should lose their power by becoming too common.

The last point to be discussed is the question raised by some recent writers as to the differences between the continental and insular Druids, viz. that the latter had no organization, no judicial functions, and were magicians, not priests. The Irish Druids have already been shown to have possessed some organization. Judicial functions are ascribed in the Irish texts not to the Druids proper, but to the *Filid*, who have been shown to be a Druidical class. M. d'Arbois, de Jubainville suggests that the exercise of such functions by the Christian clergy in Ireland might be due to the fact that the Druids had a judicial position. As to their religious functions, while they appear in the texts rather as magicians, magic and religion were always closely connected, while we know from Tacitus that the British Druids were priests. The absence of reference to their priestly functions in the texts is doubtless due to a deliberate suppression of all that related to religion or the pagan priesthood. Certain rites in which the Druids took part involved the slaughter of animals, and that slaughter must have been sacrificial. In other notices of ritual which have escaped being tampered with, the Druids appear as taking part in sacrifice. The opposition of Christian missionaries to the Druids shows that the latter were priests; if they were not, it remains yet to be discovered what body of men did exercise priestly functions in pagan Ireland. Thus a close examination of the position, powers, and functions of the Druids in Celtic life inevitably leads to the conclusion that no non-Celtic priesthood could ever have attained to these among the conquering Celts. They were from the beginning as Celtic as the Celts who submitted to them and whom 'they tamed as wild beasts are tamed'.

3

THE RELIGION OF THE MAKERS OF THE STONE CIRCLES IN BRITAIN

By A. L. LEWIS. (Abstract)

There are in this country various kinds of stone circles which it is generally easy to distinguish from each other: hut circles, or circular walls of stones without mortar, which have been the foundations of prehistoric dwellings: barrow circles, or rings of stones surrounding sepulchral tumuli, barrows, or cairns: circles consisting of larger pillar-like stones, with spaces between them, concerning which there is no evidence that they were ever intended for burial-places, and which seem suitable for public assemblies and the performance of public ceremonies: and circles which, although their primary purpose was probably sepulchral, seem to suggest by their construction that rites and ceremonies may also have been conducted in them. It is with the two latter classes we are here concerned, to see whether any inference can be drawn from them as to the religious ideas of those who set them up.

The Bards and Druids of the later middle ages claimed some knowledge of the stone circles, and those of the present day make use of small circles of a kind; but the best informed admit their ignorance, which is proved by the fact that, whereas they always insist on a central stone, on which the presiding official takes his stand, no such stone remains or seems ever to have existed in most of our ancient stone circles. No clear statement as to the use of the circles has come down to us either in history or tradition, but inferences may perhaps be drawn from their construction or surroundings.

It is well known that there is at Stonehenge an outlying stone called the 'Friar's Heel', and that at midsummer, which was a great pagan festival, the sun is seen from the circle to rise nearly over the top of this stone; that, when the stone was placed in its present position, the sun probably rose exactly over its summit; and that attempts have been made to fix the age of Stonehenge by determining the period at which it did so rise. Even if, as has been suggested, the 'Friar's Heel' had nothing to do with the circles, this would not affect the question; for the whole of Stonehenge was directed to the midsummer sunrise, and Sir Norman Lockyer has dated it to about 1600 B.C. by the position of the earthen banks, which form the avenue in which the 'Friar's Heel' stands, and which are possibly much older than it is.

This apparent reference to the sunrise at midsummer or at Beltane (May 1) may also be illustrated by Avebury, Arborlow, Stanton Drew, and other circles.

At Stanton Drew the distances between the three circles and the other stones, and the diameters of the circles themselves, appear to have been arranged in certain proportions, within an error of workmanship of one per cent. The diameter of the north-eastern circle is precisely the same as that of the outer stone circle of Stonehenge, and is to the diameter of the central circle in the proportion of five to nineteen. Five, seven, and nine, all of which occur in the proportionate measurements of this group, are significant numbers, but nineteen is the most important of any, because of the statement of Hecataeus respecting the island of the Hyperboreans, where Apollo (or the sun) had a stately grove and renowned temple of circular form, beautified with many rich gifts; that the god visited the island once in the course of nineteen years, in which period the stars complete their revolution, and that for this reason the Greeks distinguished the cycle of nineteen years by the name of the greater year. There is little doubt that the island referred to is Great Britain, and the temple has been thought by many to be that of Avebury or Stonehenge, but Stanton Drew is more accessible from the sea, and therefore more likely to have been known to casual visitors, and the embodiment of the number nineteen in its measurements makes its identity with the temple of Hecataeus very probable. Nineteen is in fact the lunar cycle, the number of years in which it was thought that the sun and moon returned to the same relative place in the heavens, and allusions to it have been suspected in the inmost circle at Stonehenge, at Dance Maen, and at Boscawen-un circles, all of which consist of nineteen stones. The temple of Hecataeus may indeed be a sort of composite tradition based upon several circles rather than upon any one.

At Mitchellsfold in Shropshire a prominent hill to the north-east is exactly in the same line from the circle as is the 'Friar's Heel' from Stonehenge; the top of this hill, though a sufficiently good skymark, is not much elevated above the horizon, and the ground was no doubt carefully selected so that the rising of the sun should not be obscured; the hill to the south where the sun is at its highest point is, however, the highest in the country round, and that is so in other instances. The summit of the hill to the north-east of Mitchellsfold is just half-way between it and another circle now nearly destroyed, and beyond that in the same line the view is terminated by a range of three low hills. This suggests a possible symbolism of three and one, which of course has nothing to do with the Christian Trinity, but might have some connexion with the pagan phallic trinity and unity. Such hills also stand north-east from Penmaenmawr, Keswick, and Brogar Circles.

At the remarkable circle at Callernish in the island of Lewis there is a range of three hills to the north-east, and there it has also been discovered that any one standing at the south end, so as to look up along the tops of the stones forming the south line to the top of the central stone, finds his eyes directed to the pole-star. Although references to direct north are not frequent in southern Britain, there are many lines of observation in directions between north-east and north, but too far north for the rising of the sun; these have been associated by Sir Norman Lockyer with the rising of certain special stars, selected, as he suggests, as 'clock-stars', but perhaps also for other reasons.

In Scotland, on the other hand, there are large groups of circles, in some of which the north seems to have been especially regarded. Circles consisting of single or sometimes double concentric rings of standing stones are numerous in the western half of Scotland, where, however, unlike those of England and Wales, they are chiefly sepulchral; but in the north-east of Scotland there are two large groups of circles, each of a special type, which also appear to have been primarily sepulchral, but one of which, confined to the country within fifty miles from Aberdeen, is also very suggestive of other purposes. This type of circle has a small cist in the middle, covered by a tumulus, surrounded by a sort of retaining wall of comparatively small stones, outside which is a circle of larger standing stones; and, filling up the space between two of them, and always in the southern half of the circle, facing northward, is a large stone, standing on its longest edge, locally called the altar-stone, though it could not have served as an altar, and is thus more scientifically called the 'recumbent stone'. This feature, peculiar to the Aberdeen circles, certainly suggests some object in addition to that of burial, and the space between the tumulus and the outer circle is admirably suited for a processional path or for circular dances; the presence of the burial cist and tumulus suggests that any religious rites performed might be in the nature of ancestor worship. When the recumbent stone faces due north, it may be supposed that the pole-star was the object to be observed, and there are instances in other countries of the pole-star being regarded as the habitation of the departed; when it faces somewhat east or west of north it probably had reference, as Sir Norman Lockyer tells us, to the rising or setting of some circum-polar star, either as a 'clock-star', or warning of the approach of sunrise, or out of respect, for some reason or other, to the star itself. It has been objected to this that the recumbent stone does not afford a sufficiently precise point of observation, but the observations of prehistoric days were by no means so accurate as our own, and, if they were made from behind the recumbent stone, all that was required of them could have been attained without difficulty. The Rev. Dr. James Garden, Professor of Theology

in the King's College of Aberdeen, wrote a letter on 15 June, 1692, (reprinted in *Archaeologia*, vol. i), to Aubrey, the English antiquary, describing some of these circles, and saying that the general tradition concerning them was that they were places of worship and sacrifice in heathen times. Those who say that Aubrey and Stukeley invented the theory that circles were temples, are therefore clearly wrong; and since this Aberdeen tradition could hardly have been handed down from the neolithic or even from the bronze period, it would seem that the suggestion that circles were used by the Druids is not so unreasonable as it was a few years ago the fashion to believe. It is true that the building of circles began long before the appearance of the Druids in history, but we do not know how far Druidism went back into the prehistoric period, nor how, when, or where it began. It may have started here in the neolithic age, or, if it were brought in at a later period, the Druids may have made use of any structures they found ready for them; if indeed they had not used them, they would probably have destroyed them, since their power in religious matters was absolute and intolerant. The apparent suggestions of sun and star-worship or observation in the circles fit well with this idea, as also does the imperfect but traditional use of circles of a kind by those who, at a later period, have endeavoured to restore some of the ancient glories of the Druidic hierarchy.

My conclusion, therefore, respecting the circles is that they possess features which indicate the probability of sun and star worship, or observance of some kind, and the possibility of ancestor, mountain, and phallic worship having been carried on in them.

4

THE VALUE OF THE MABINOGION FOR THE STUDY OF CELTIC RELIGION

By E. ANWYL

In dealing with the Mabinogion for the present purpose, it is clear at the outset that the romances of Owein and Luned, Peredur, and Geraint and Enid, which are substantially identical in narrative with Chrétien de Troyes' Yvain, Perceval, and Erec et Enide, whatever Celtic elements they may ultimately be found to contain, are in a different category from tales such as The Four Branches of the Mabinogi, Macsen Wledig, Lludd and Llevelys, and Kulhwch and Olwen. In these latter stories there are such numerous and obvious

allusions to Welsh topography, that it is not unreasonable to suppose that some of their material, at any rate, is derived from local legend and folk-lore, and that, when they were written, they were composed by men who were in touch with living mediaeval narrative. In spite of the fact that, as literary works of imagination, they contain elements derived from the fancy of their writers, yet, the more they are examined, the more clearly they seem to contain traces of strata of narrative; these traces, though often very faint, are yet linked to the pre-Christian ideas of Wales, and so cast some rays of light on the early religious conceptions of the Principality.

The main stories which form the Mabinogion are linked together in the bonds of a common tradition, probably as the professional stock-in-trade of the bards and story-tellers of Wales. The agglomeration of narrative in question as a more or less united whole reveals itself in other portions of literature connected with mediaeval Wales, in Geoffrey of Monmouth, in the Welsh Triads, in the older body of Welsh poetry, and in the various legendary allusions, that are scattered through the works of the Welsh mediaeval poets. The stories connected with the various characters are not everywhere identical, nor are they combined together everywhere in the same proportions; but the body of narrative as a whole is substantially the same, and the connexions in which it is found lead forcibly to the view that its basis is a professional tradition, handed down and developed by the bards, who were officially connected, in Wales as in Ireland, with the courts of the Welsh princes. The very term 'mabinogi', as Sir John Rhys has pointed out, appears to mean 'the stock-in-trade of a "mabinog" or apprentice-bard'. That the bards of Wales combined with their purely poetic functions those of story-tellers is clear from statements in the Four Branches themselves, as, for example, the reference in Math ab Mathonwy to Gwydion and Giluaethwy's skill in story-telling, when they went as bards to the court of Dyfed.

From the purely bardic circles the stories in question appear to have passed into the Welsh monasteries and abbeys, and it is in MSS. copied in these institutions that they have come down to us. Before arriving at their present form, they appear to have undergone several recensions, both oral and literary, and many of their earlier features have doubtless been obscured in the process. In their present form, as the writer has endeavoured to show in articles in the *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie*, they reflect, in their references to gradations of rank and to homage, the ideas of feudal times, and, as he has suggested later in the *Celtic Review*, the collection as a whole in its final form shows signs of being arranged on a chronological basis (parallel to that of Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanniae*), where we seem

to have stories of the pre-Roman, the Roman, and the post-Roman periods. It is even possible that the compilation of the collection as a whole was suggested by the desire to supplement and to rival the work of Geoffrey of Monmouth. The stories of Lludd and Llevelys and of Macsen Wledig have all of them the appearance of being supplementary to Geoffrey's narrative, and with Lludd and Llevelys and Macsen certain of the narratives of the Four Branches are linked both topographically and otherwise. The three chief literary recensions which The Four Branches of the Mabinogi appear to have undergone before reaching their present form, appear to be those of Gwynedd (Western North Wales), Dyfed (Western South Wales), and Gwent (Eastern South Wales). The first recension may have been made at Clynnog or Beddgelert in Carnarvonshire, the second at Whitland or Talyllychau (Talley) in Carmarthenshire, and the third in one of the large abbeys of Glamorgan or Monmouth, possibly in the Benedictine Priory of Monmouth itself. There are several linguistic points of contact between the Gwentian recension of the Four Branches and the Welsh versions of the Chrétien romances, and, consequently, it may well be surmised that they are products of the same literary school. According to Mr. Egerton Phillimore, the story of Kulhwch and Olwen probably reached its present form at Talyllychau in Carmarthenshire; but, before reaching that form, it has clearly undergone a process of development similar to that of the Four Branches, though probably not in the same districts. With some of its oldest strata the present writer has dealt in his article in the *Celtic Review* on 'Wales and the Ancient Britons of the North'. In the case of the Four Branches it is probably to the Gwentian recension that the story belongs of Gwri Wallt Euryn and Teyrnon Twryf Vliant. As for Gwri, however, it is not impossible that a story originally associated with Caerlleon (Chester) and the Wirral promontory of Cheshire, called in Welsh Cil Gwri (the retreat of Gwri), has, owing to the identity of the two names, been transplanted into Gwent into association with Caerleon-on-Usk. The local connexion of Teyrnon with Gwent shows itself clearly in the name Llantarnam, anciently known as Nant Teyrnon (the brook or valley of Teyrnon). The transplanting of stories from one district to another is one of the chief difficulties in the way of a thorough analysis of all ancient documents, and the Mabinogion in this matter is no exception.

In the earliest or Gwynedd recension the majority of the stories are topographically connected with Carnarvonshire and Anglesey and with the adjoining parts of Merionethshire. This recension shows traces of stories from the Dee Valley, especially from the neighbourhood of Llangollen and the Hiraethog district, relating to Bran and his family. From some of the allusions in the Gogynfeirdd poetry, we

know that Gwynedd (Western North Wales) bore the name of Bro Beli (the land of Beli), while Eastern North Wales was called Bro Bran (or 'y Vran vro'). It is not improbable that the conception of the rivalry of the families of Beli and Llyr (the father of Bran), which is implied in the framework of the Four Branches, reflects the rivalry that existed at one period between the two districts in question, and something of this tradition has passed into Geoffrey of Monmouth's account of the feud between Belinus and Brennus. It is from the eastern portion of North Wales that the name Matholwch (also known as Mallolwch) comes; the name being found, according to Mr. Egerton Phillimore, in that of Caer Vallwch (= Vallolwch) in Flintshire. Closely linked to the Gwynedd recensions of the Four Branches are the stories of Macsen Wledig and Lludd and Llevelys. In some genealogies Macsen is represented as the father of Peblig and Baglan, the saints of Llanbeblig and Llanfaglan, the two parishes of Carnarvon. Perhaps it might not be inopportune here to mention that both Beli and Llyr were associated with the sea. Llyr (the Irish *Ler*, gen. *Lir*) is in Welsh a common noun meaning the sea, while the name Beli, in its association with the sea, survived in the expressions Biw Beli (the cattle of Beli) for the waves, and Gwirawt Veli (the liquor of Beli) for brine. In the story of Macsen Wledig, Macsen is said to have conquered the Isle of Britain from the sons of Beli, and to have driven them 'upon the sea', an evident allusion to their connexion in popular legend with that element. In the story of Math ab Mathonwy the fortress of Aranrot, daughter of Beli and Don, is accessible over the sea; and it is therefore not unlikely that Beli and his family were associated in the popular mind with the sea and its islands.

In the Four Branches of the Mabinogi as we now have them, there is no reference to Arthur, but this is probably due to an attempt in their latest recensions at a chronological treatment. In the Book of Taliessin, as well as in Kulhwch and Olwen, which give the bardic body of legend in a less clarified form, Arthur is made to associate freely with the 'men of Caer Dathyl', Pwyll, Pryderi, Taliessin, and others. In Kulhwch and Olwen, Arthur is even said to have been related to the men of Caer Dathyl (i.e. the Don family) on his mother's side, a statement which is probably an echo of ancient Arthurian legends in Arfon.

The question now arises, in view of these various recensions, whether there are any portions of the Mabinogion in which traces are visible of pre-Christian religious ideas; and the writer suggests that such traces may be safely looked for in connexion with the following features.

1. The existence in these stories of aetiological myths.

(*a*) Myths explanatory of certain place-names. The value of

these is that they seem to spring, in some cases at any rate, from living mediaeval folk-lore, and so may, through their association with definite place-names, go back in some of their features to a remote antiquity. There is here the possibility, as in local folk-lore generally, that stories and explanations may be handed on from generation to generation, containing strata of ideas that were psychologically and sociologically natural under earlier conditions, but which could hardly have been spontaneously invented at a later stage, owing to their incongruity with the later psychological and sociological situations. The place-name stories of the Four Branches have been discussed by Sir John Rhys in various articles, and by the present writer in the *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie*. In the Four Branches, they relate mostly to Gwynedd, Ardudwy, Dyfed, and Gwent; in Macsen Wledig they relate to Gwynedd, in Lludd and Llevelys to Gwynedd, in Kulhwch and Olwen to Dyfed, Buallt, Ewyas, Erging, and Gwent. It is impossible to enter here into an exhaustive account of these place-name explanations, but it is worthy of mention that there is a marked interest shown in some of them in the sea, the element which probably played a prominent part in the religious conceptions of the Welsh coast population.

(*b*) Aetiological myths explanatory of Games, Proverbial expressions, Triads, &c. In the Mabinogion we have, for example, the explanation of the game 'Broch ygkot' (a badger in a bag); 'A vo penn bit pont' (let him who is a head be a bridge); numerous explanations of Triads and the like. In the case of traditional practices and expressions, there is always a possibility that, like the practices and expressions themselves, certain stories connected with them may survive. The analysis of stories of this type is often delicate and tentative enough; but occasionally a passing reference, for example, to such a significant date for the old Celtic year as the First of May (Calan mai) may give a clue to the earlier *milieu* in which the story was evolved. In the account of Teyrnon Twryf Vliant's mare, and of the feud between Gwythur and Gwyn fab Nudd for Creurdilad, the reference to the first of May is perhaps an ancient feature.

2. Certain of the ideas embodied in the Mabinogion and closely connected with religious and kindred conceptions. The chief of these conceptions is that of Annwfn, the Welsh other-world. This is first mentioned in connexion with Arawn, one of its kings, whose home is said to have been there situated. It is clear from the picture of Annwfn here given, that it was regarded as a kind of counterpart of this world, containing, like this world, countries and kingdoms. For example it contains, besides Arawn, another king Havgan, with whom Arawn is at war. It is clear, too, that the inhabitants of the lower world were thought to have access to this world, and to be engaged

in similar pursuits, such as fighting and hunting. In the story of Pwyll the dogs that are mentioned as belonging to Arawn are probably those still known in Welsh folk-lore as Cwn Annwfn. In this story Annwfn is regarded as more advanced in civilization than the upper world, inasmuch as it is from Annwfn that certain of the boons of civilization, such as swine, are said to have come. It is interesting to note the prominence given in this narrative to swine, a trait which suggests that at an older stage Welsh folk-lore was greatly preoccupied with them. We know that among the Celts there was a god Moccus (Welsh Moch), and we know too that the men of Pessinus did not eat swine. It cannot be said, however, that in the inscriptional allusions to Celtic religion the pig holds a prominent place. Yet it is not impossible that, in these references to swine in the Mabinogi and to Arthur's hunting of the Boar Trwyth in Kulhwch and Olwen, we touch a very ancient stratum of folk-lore. Again, we find closely associated with Annwfn the ideas of change of form and magic. Probably Celtic religion regarded the denizens of its other-world as possessing powers much greater than those of the men of the world above, though these powers may not have been regarded as greater physically. Thus the conception of Annwfn appears to be related to the conception, so prevalent in Celtic countries and elsewhere, of local δαιμόνια, whether viewed singly or in groups, who had the power of influencing the life of the world above. That Annwfn played an important part in Welsh mediaeval folk-lore we clearly see from the allusions to it in the poetry of Dafydd ab Gwilym (fourteenth century), who even alludes to the summer 'as going to Annwfn to rest for the winter'. The allusions to Annwfn in Welsh mediaeval poetry and in Dafydd ab Gwilym are of importance, as showing how living the idea of it was in the folk-lore of the time.

Another point that comes to view in the folk-lore of the Mabinogion is that the older conception of Annwfn appears to have been been, not that of one homogeneous other-world, but rather that of a number of local other-lands, not necessarily all related to the upper world in the same way. Caer Aranrot, for example, appears to have been regarded as an island, and certainly in the Book of Taliessin some expeditions to Annwfn are regarded as having been made in ships, as for example, in Prydwen, the ship of Arthur. In the Book of Taliessin Annwfn is expressly stated to have been 'beneath the world' (is eluyd); but other allusions suggest a view of it as being on the same plane as the countries of the upper world, and accessible not simply by sea, but by land. In the story of Kulhwch and Olwen, Arthur is represented as going thither by an expedition to the North. All these considerations lead to the belief that the primitive conceptions of the Celts implied a number of other-lands varying in character

and situation and not simply an other-world. This earlier conception is in some respects not unlike that of the fairy lands of Welsh folk-lore of modern times. In the story of Math ab Mathonwy it is not improbable that Math himself and Gwydion were originally on the same plane as Arawn rather than on that of Pwyll and Pryderi, and were, in the original story, represented as dwellers in a local Annwfn rather than as inhabitants of the upper world. Their close association with magic and with such a spot as Caer Aranrot suggests that their narrative was originally of this kind. The story of Ysbaddaden Bencawr also suggests that it had a similar origin, and it may well be considered whether some of the magical sections of the Arthurian legend itself may not have had similar sources.

Another type of story which seems to have affinities with early folk-lore in the matter of Annwfn is that of Rhiannon. There are certain features connected with this story, which suggest that it contains matter of a very ancient kind. For example, the association of Rhiannon as a rider with a horse, and the further association of her son Gwri Wallt Euryn with horses, raise the question whether Rhiannon herself may not once have been a kind of deity like Epona, a goddess in the form of a mare. The allusion also to the mare of Teyrnon, which foaled every year on the first of May (the beginning of the second half of the Celtic year), suggests forcibly the idea that there may at one time have been an attempt to explain the growth of summer by the rebirth, from a divine mare, of the spirit of vegetation in the form of a foal. The great Earth-Mother may well have been herself represented as a mare, since it does not in the least follow that she, while regarded as a mother, would be represented in human form. The year's period of gestation of a mare would also help this conception. In the older conception Gwri Wallt Euryn may not have been regarded as human at all, but simply as a foal. That similar stories were found in Wales is suggested by the local story of Castellmarch in Lleyn, where the original owner March is said to have had horse's ears. In view of the fact that Rhiannon's father's name was Heveyd, it is not impossible that one form of her story came from the Radnorshire (Builth) zone, the name of Radnorshire in Welsh being Maesyfed, that is 'Maes Hyfeidd', the plain of Hyfeidd. In one of the poems of the Myvyrian Archaeology, Elfael in Radnorshire is called 'Bro Hyfeidd', 'the land of Hyfeidd.' The search for local other-lands in the Mabinogion may thus be very fruitful for the student of Celtic religion, and the same method may with advantage be pursued in the study of Irish legend, and even in that of Arthur himself.

3. The existence among the heroes and heroines of names which are undoubtedly survivals of divine names from the pre-Christian period. The most obvious of these names are those ending in -on. This

ending in the older form was -ōnos for gods, -ōna for goddesses. Among the most authentic names of Celtic deities there are several instances of this type, as, for example, Măpōnos, Epōna, Sīrōna, Dămōna. In the Mabinogion we find several examples of names of this formation, such as Mabon (Măpōnos), Modron (Mātrōna), Rhiannon (Rigantōna), Teyrnon (Tigernōnos), Amaethon (Ambactōnos), Gofannon (Gobannōnos), Gwydion (Vītiōnos). To this type possibly belong also the curious forms Blathaon, Afaon, Amathaon, Ffaraon, where it is probable that a 'g' has vanished between the 'a' and the 'o'. A name like Geirion (unless it be Gāriānus) might also be referred to this type. To this type may also possibly be referred such a name as Dreon Lew (Ox. Mab. 302, 19), Eidon Vaur Vrydic (107, 29), Gamon (109, 3), Gwryon the father of Hunabwy (110, 8), Banon, given also as Panon, (108, 3, 138, 22). The river name Gwrangon, found in the Welsh name of Caer Wrangon, Worcester, is also probably of this type. The root here is probably 'Gwrang' (youth). The name Cynon is undoubtedly of this type, too, and also Godybrion or Gotyvron in the name Gwynn godybrion (Gwynn beneath the water). The place of dogs in the ancient Celtic religion is well worthy of separate investigation.

It is probably to this type, too, that we are to refer the name Saranhon (107, 25), and with this name we may compare the river name Taranhon (the Thunderer), a river in Montgomeryshire. Another type of name that is of a religious significance, is that which corresponds clearly to a name prominent in Irish legend, for example, Llyr to Irish Ler, Bran to Irish Bran, Manawyddan to Irish Manannan, Nudd to Irish Nuada, Lleu to Irish Lug (with a difference of vowel gradation), Ellyll to Irish Ailill. In the case of Nudd we know the proto-Celtic form Nodens, or Nodons, from an inscription at Lydney, while the corresponding form Lludd probably goes back to Lodens or Lodons. Nudd may have meant 'mist', since the derivative 'nudden' is still used for 'mist' in some of the dialects of South Wales. The name Llyr is undoubtedly that of a sea-god, like Neifion (the swimmer), a name, however, which does not occur in the Mabinogion. A name like Bran (raven) suggests the survival of animal deities in the form of birds, as well as of other animals. There may be also a hint of such a survival in the terms Adar Rhiannon (the birds of Rhiannon), while the fabulous creatures whose names had become proverbial, such as Carw Rhedynfre, Cuan Cwm Cawlwyt, y Twrch Trwyth (or Trwyd in pure Brythonic), Mwyalch Cilgwri, Eog Llyn Lliw, Eryr Gwernabwy, and Gast Rymi, may have been originally worshipped. Proverbial names such as these may well be very ancient. With the fabulous birds of Rhiannon may be compared the fabulous birds of Gwendoleu, mentioned in the Triads (Ox. Mab. 303, 24). Possibly Gwalchmei (the Hawk of May) and Gwalchhaued (the Hawk of Summer)

are names of this type. There may be also some suggestion of a similar kind in the name Gwrgi (Man-dog), such as Gwrgi Garwlwyt, Gwrgi Gwastra, and Gwrgi Seueri. The fabulous monster, Cath Paluc, and the others that Arthur is represented as hunting, may well have been at one time revered deities in certain localities. The same is also possible in the case of the fabulous stag mentioned in Peredur (245–6), though here the romance narrative is too remote from any definite local folk-lore to make it possible to attach to it any clear mythological significance. In the Mabinogion there are no names of the same type as Arthen (Artogĕnos), which might be due to this order of ideas, but in Welsh place-names several names of this type are to be found. The proper names of the Mabinogion fall into various types, but an analysis of them in respect to formation and structure falls beyond the scope of the present work. At the same time, attention may be called to the type of name like Pryderi, Blodeuwedd, which had a distinct significance at the time when they were given.

4. The survival of reflections of the grouping of deities on the basis of a matriarchal rather than of a patriarchal family. In the Four Branches of the Mabinogi the most conspicuous instance of this is the Don family, which contains certain names that have an undoubtedly religious significance, such as Amaethon (Ambactōnos) and Gofannon (Gobannōnos). Another instance of the same type is Modron, the mother of Mabon (Măpōnos). We find the same phenomenon in Irish legend as, for instance, in the case of Conchobar mac Nessa. The name Modron (i.e. Mātrōna) is clearly of a religious significance, and has a link of connexion with Gaul, since it is the origin of the river-name Marne. This vein seems to be distinctly fruitful for the study of the earlier groupings of Celtic religion.

5. The conception of man's relation, whether active or passive, in relation to the future. As passive he receives omens (coelion), some of which come to him accidentally, while others come by deliberate search. In the latter category were those obtained through fire, and the Welsh name for a 'bonfire' is still 'coel certh' (a sure omen). The idea of omens appears but to a slight degree in the Mabinogion, though we know from the Black Book of Carmarthen that it was prevalent in mediaeval Wales, and that omens were derived, for example, from sneezing. In the Mabinogion, however, there comes to view a conception which is more important from a religious point of view than this, namely, the idea that one person could influence the destiny of another by the process called 'tyngu tynghed' (the swearing of a destiny). Evidently we have here a kind of verbal sympathetic magic, which probably belongs to an ancient cycle of ideas, of which the Mabinogion preserve in their present form only a few passing traces.

6. In close conjunction with the latter conception—that of 'góidonot' (witches). The precise significance of this name is uncertain; but it seems to suggest from the narrative that they were belligerent women, whose weapons were not merely magical. The stories concerning them are more interesting sociologically than religiously in the Mabinogion; but they are indirectly valuable for the latter purpose, since they suggest the possibility of survival in legend of reflections of older sociological conditions. Of the same type are the allusions found in fairy-tales to the fairy dislike of iron. It is a very delicate task to trace out with certainty these sociological survivals; but all folk-lore contains them, and it is because they consist so largely of local folk-lore that this aspect of the Mabinogion is one that has to be continually kept in view. It is remarkable that the allusions to struggles with witches should appear above all in the Arthurian legend, both in the Black Book of Carmarthen and in the Mabinogion, while in the Four Branches they are not to be found.

7. The conception of magic. In dealing with this aspect of the Mabinogion it is necessary to distinguish between magic as the favourite machinery of popular mediaeval narrative, and magic as a real belief that had a religious bearing. In the former sense it is much more characteristic of the purely Welsh tales than of the Chrétien romances. In Dyfed the great magician is Llwyd fab Cilcoed (the Irish Liath mac Celtchair), while in Gwynedd it is Math ab Mathonwy and Gwydion who are the chief characters of this type. From the fact that in Irish, as well as in Welsh, Liath mac Celtchair was famous as a magician, it is impossible not to believe that here we have a survival from an early Celtic period of a belief in beings with superhuman magical powers. Moreover, there appears to have been a similar belief as to the existence of races of superhuman acuteness, for example, the Coranyeit (possibly =the pigmies) who are mentioned in Lludd and Llevelys. The characteristics of these and that of Math ab Mathonwy are so much alike, and the topographical allusions in the stories are so clearly akin, that it is not unnatural to regard them as belonging to the same zone of ideas, and we know from the proper names of the Don-series that they are in several cases religious in their connexions. From these and similar data we may gather that Celtic religion held the belief not only in individual beings of superior powers, but also in tribes and other social groups of this kind. It was probably with tribes of this kind that the Celtic other-lands were peopled, and there is no suggestion in the Mabinogion that the inhabitants of these other-lands had anything necessarily to do with the spirits of the dead. In the case of Llew Llaw Gyffes the spirit of Llew takes the form of an eagle, and it is not at all improbable that the conception of a spirit as obtaining a winged form, whether during life or death, was fairly common.

Such are some of the considerations which appear to the present writer in regard to the Mabinogion, when critically studied as a valuable document for the study of Celtic religion; though, as already stated, the number of modifications and recensions which the stories have undergone make it necessary to use them for this purpose with the utmost care.

5

OLD RUSSIAN PAGAN CULTS

By E. ANITCHKOFF

The principal data or sources of the ancient Slavonic religion may be divided into three groups. In the first are popular customs, rites, and rituals, as described by modern students of folklore, or found in old books and other documents which, for various reasons, treated of such matters. In the second are popular tales and stories; these give us information on such supernatural beings as *lechyĭ*, *vodianoĭ*, *domovoĭ*, *russalki*, &c., who correspond to the ancient dryads, naiads, penates, and so on. In the third are old chronicles and records of undoubted authenticity, which acquaint us with the gods.

A peculiarity of our data for the subject of Slavonic paganism is that we have no works of art or fiction, and no poems which paint for us our ancient gods, or relate of their doings. We possess only one poem of the eleventh century, the well-known *Slovo o Polkou Igorevi*, that directly mentions three or four gods. We shall further ask to what class of people its author belonged, and for what purpose he, being already a Christian, came to speak of pagan gods.

To the three above-mentioned groups of our sources I have to add only the sermons and other polemical works whose object it was to stifle paganism and its survivals. The old Russian literature is rich in such works, there being a succession of them from the twelfth century till the time of Peter the Great. I shall have an opportunity of speaking of these works, but, for the moment, let us take into consideration the three first groups only.

The usual method in mythological studies has been to embrace all these groups of data at once in an endeavour to reconstruct the ancient religion in its entirety. This strikes me as one of the greatest failures of the scientific method in the study of paganism. It seems to me that each group of data should be, to begin with, the object of a separate study. We have to deal not only with distinct groups of sources, but also with different groups of facts, and these facts are, if I may say so, heterogeneous. For instance, in popular tales the *russalka* is

a beautiful woman who lives in the rivers and lakes, but in popular customs a *russalka* means a hobby-horse.[1] This radical distinction between the *russalka* of the tales and that of the customs shows how very careful one must be in dealing with the groups of our sources.

This divergence is easily explained. The popular tales, scattered among the people until our own day, have been for very many years verbally narrated by a special kind of popular fable-tellers, the so-called *skomorokhi*.[2] These have been influenced by the tales of neighbouring nations, and even by literary traditions. When we meet, in a Slavonic tale, with a *russalka* depicted as a beautiful woman, we may ask ourselves if this figure is not simply a stray reminiscence of the ancient Greek or Roman mythology. An isolated fact taken from a tale must be studied with the same method that is generally applied in folklore to plots of tales: representations found in folk tales may be matters of fiction, and not of popular belief.

Much attention has been paid in the last few years to the study of popular rites and customs. On this part of mythological studies Professor Frazer's *Golden Bough* has thrown much new light; in my book on *Spring Songs and Customs*[3] I worked in the same field. It is, I think, sufficiently proved now that the popular rites and customs of all nations are based on a kind of magic that may be considered as a certain stage of civilization, through which humanity has passed; just as much as the 'Naturalwirthschaft' and the 'village community', with which this early agricultural religion of magic is so closely connected.

The study of these rituals brought about the discovery of widely spread customs among Indo-European nations, such as fetishism, animism, cults of trees, water, fire, of ancestors and penates, all of which have been long ago noted as phases in the evolution of the religious conscience in primordial man.

From the knowledge of rites and customs is derived the strict distinction between poetical receptivity and religious conscience. The words of the gospel that 'faith without deeds is dead', have a methodological significance for the student of religion. Religious faith infallibly transmutes itself into acts, and therefore the study of religious performances and rites is fundamentally important. Only that which transmutes itself into performances and acts is indubitably religious; and consequently towards those representations which are attested

[1] See A. N. Minkh, *Popular Customs, Rites, and Superstitions of the Peasants of Saratov* (in Russian).

[2] *Ethnographical Review* (in Russian), 1904, No. 2.

[3] St. Petersburg, 1904 and 1905, 2 vols., published by the Academy of Science in St. Petersburg; see Dr. Ludwig Deubner's report in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, ix, pp. 277–304.

as having lived only in the imagination of nations, the historian of religion must be sceptical. For instance, the *domovoï* is the same in popular tales as in popular rites. In both we see a belief in a supernatural being, who takes care of the cattle and of the household in general. When a new house is built, or a new animal brought into the stable, a special rite is performed to make sure whether the *domovoï* approves of the proceeding or not. It is the rite which proves the existence of the belief in the *domovoï*, and not the tale.

There are but two families of ancient Slavonic gods that we know; the gods of the Baltic Slaves with Sventovit at their head, and the Russian gods of whom Peroun and Volos seem to be the most important.

The most authentic documents referring to eastern Slavonic gods are pacts concluded with Byzantium. The Variago-Russ (ῥῶς) led by their princes attacked Byzantium several times. In the years 907, 945, and 971 treaties of peace were concluded between the emperors of Constantinople and the princes Oleg, Igor, and Sviatoslav.[1] These pacts were enforced by solemn, inviolable oaths from both sides. Our text gives us a full description of the whole ceremony. The Variago-Russ proffered oaths on their weapons and on gold, in the same fashion as their Scandinavian kinsfolk.[2] This was probably the usual and proper way, but as there were also Christians on both sides, an oath in the name of the Christian God was added. As an equivalent to the Christian God, the pagans had to swear in the name of their most respected divinities, Peroun and Volos. We read in the act of 907: 'The Tzars, Leon and Alexander, concluded peace with Oleg to whom they paid a tribute, and they swore peace with each other; the Greek emperors kissed the cross, and Oleg brought his men to swear peace in the Russian custom on their weapons and in the name of Peroun their god and Volos the Beast-god, and after this fashion was the peace confirmed.'[3]

In 945 a new treaty was made between the prince Igor and Byzantium. It was signed in Byzantium, not by the prince himself, but by his ambassadors, who both signed and proffered oaths—those who were Christians in the Church of St. Elias which the Variags possessed

[1] The texts of these pacts first appear in the Chronicles (*Lietopis*) about the year 1116, when the Abbot Silvester compiled the *Annals of Bygone Days* (Poviesti vremennykh liet). See Shakhmatov, *The Oldest Compilation of Annals in Kiev*, Moscow, 1897, p. 47 (in Russian).

[2] See St. Rojniecki, 'Perun und Thor,' *Arch. f. slavische Philologie*, xxiii, and Tiander in the *Report of the Russian Department of the Imperial Academy of Sciences*, vii (1902), book iii.

[3] *Annals of Bygone Days* under the year 907; see the text of L. S. Leibotovitch, *Svodnaia Lietopis*, p. 29.

in Byzantium, and those who were pagans in the name of Peroun, as was usual. The pact ended with these words: 'He who forgoes his oath shall be cursed by God and Peroun.' This finished, they returned to Kiev with the Greek ambassadors, and there Igor had to take the oath. The scene of this oath, sworn by Prince Igor himself in Kiev, is of capital importance and all the details valuable: 'In the morning did Igor summon the ambassadors to the hill whereon stood Peroun. Igor and those of his men who were pagans put down their weapons, shields, and some gold; and he took the Russians who were Christians to the church of St. Elias.'[1]

The third pact in 971 was concluded in Bulgaria, between Byzantium and Prince Sviatoslav. It ends with the words: 'We take this oath in the name of God, in whom we believe, and of Peroun, and of Volos the Beast-god.'[2]

The mythologist who seeks to discover what force of nature is personified in the gods Peroun and Volos, can draw but slight information from the texts of these three pacts. The only fact in favour of the supposition that Peroun was the god of thunder, is that the oath was given by the Christians in the church of St. Elias[3]; this saint is indubitably in Christian mythology a dispenser of thunder, and it is characteristic that he had been chosen as a counterpart of Peroun. But if we take our standpoint, not in mythology, but in the study of the cult, the above-quoted pacts will be valuable to us in another sense.

We must first note that Prince Igor, in his own town of Kiev, with his own warriors, took the oath in the name of Peroun only; whereas, in the oaths of Sviatoslav and Oleg, the god Volos is also mentioned. Why should this be so? There is perhaps an explanation for this in the fact that Oleg not only led against Byzantium the prince's warriors, but further 'took with him a multitude of Variags, Slovenes, Tchudes, Krivichi, Meria, Drevliani, Rodimichi, Poliani, Severi, Viatichi, Douliebi, and Tiverchi.'[4] This means that he went to war with an immense horde gathered from various Slavonic or even Finnish races. Moreover in the pacts of Sviatoslav we find the words 'all the Russ take oath'.[5] We may thus conclude that, having to deal with Sviatoslav and Oleg, the Greeks would not be confident in an oath in the name of Peroun alone, but claimed some other responsible divinity.

Now who is this Volos or Veles? He is generally spoken of as a god of cattle, which seems a simple deduction from his nickname 'Beast-god'. In passing, I shall only add that the denomination of

[1] Ibid., pp. 46–7.
[2] Ibid., p. 64.
[3] L. Léger, *La Mythologie slave*, Paris, 1901, pp. 66 sq.
[4] Liebotovitch, l. c., d. 26.
[5] Ibid., p. 64.

'Beast-god' gives us a right to suppose that the idol of Volos had the shape of a beast. What is more important is the topographical situation of his cult in Kiev. We shall see that St. Vladimir, ten years before he became a Christian, built a pantheon of idols close to his palace, among which Volos is not even mentioned. We know, however, that an idol of him stood in Kiev[1]; for in the *Life of St. Vladimir* the author, when telling us about the destruction of the idols, says that Volos had been thrown into an arm of the river Dnieper, the Potchaï. This is generally considered to prove that the idol of Volos did not stand on the mountain, where was the dwelling of the princes and of their warriors, but below, in a suburb called Podol[2], a part of Kiev where the citizens lived in time of peace. Moreover, we find Volos mentioned in another part of Russia. In the *Life of St. Abraham* it is said that this Saint destroyed the idol of Volos in the town of Rostov.[3] From the same *Life* we learn that the idol stood in the part of the town called 'Tchudskoï Kraï', which means the part where lived the Tchudes. There is another difference also between Peroun and Volos. The idols of Peroun were wooden. We cannot doubt it, since it is clearly stated in the chronicles; moreover, in both the passages that relate to the destruction of Peroun's idol, it is said to have floated in the river into which it was cast: whereas the idol of Volos, destroyed by Abraham, was made of stone.[4]

These reflections on the cult of Volos allow one to put forward the hypothesis that the Slavonic divinities, far from belonging to all the Slavonic races, were not even the divinities of one single Slavonic race: they merely belonged to some part of the population. The cult of Volos seems to be a kind of merchant cult, something like the Mercurius-Rosmerta cult of central Europe. Professor Klioutchevski considers that 'Beast-god' means god of wealth, since in the chronicles the word cattle also means money.[5] Such a supposition explains why we find idols of him mentioned in suburbs and not in the burghs; taking the word burgh in its old signification of a fortified enclosure where, in time of war, the population found security from their enemies. It explains also why the Greeks insisted, every time that they had transactions, not only with the prince and his warriors, but with the Russ, that oaths should be taken in the name of Volos. Professor Klioutchevski thinks that in those days the Russ (ῥῶς) meant the merchants

[1] See the texts published by Professor A. Sobolevski in the *Readings of the Society of Nestor*, vol ii (the so-called ordinary *Vita*).

[2] *Description of Kiev* by N. Zacrevski, Moscow, 1868.

[3] *Monuments of old Russian Literature*, i, pp. 221–2.

[4] Professor Ainalov, 'Statues of Old Russian Gods,' in *The Account of the University of St. Petersburg for the Year* 1904, p. 16.

[5] Professor Klioutchevski, *Russian History*, Moscow, 1906, ii, p. 137.

from big towns who, together with the prince's warriors, carried on trade with Byzantium.[1]

The supposition that the cults of Slavonic gods were cults of small localities and had a certain social significance appears still more evident from the study of Peroun.

We have already seen that the prince and his warriors took oaths in the name of Peroun. His idol stood on some hill near the dwelling of the prince. We can determine the spot more precisely, since it is indicated in the history of the beginning of St. Vladimir's reign, as given in the so-called 'First Compilation[2]' of our annals.

'And now began indeed Vladimir to reign in Kiev, and he put on a hill, outside his palace yard, the wooden Peroun, with the silver head and golden moustaches, and Khors and Dajbog and Stribog and Semargl and Mokosh. And the people brought them sacrifices and called them gods, and took to them their sons and daughters, who also brought sacrifices and profaned the earth with the cult of them; and the soil of Russ and of this hill was besmeared with blood.'[3]

It is a Christian who wrote these lines, a Christian who lived a hundred years after the event he tells us of. His disapproval of the bloody immolations is natural. Prince Vladimir was canonized soon after his death, and the Russian Church till the present day reveres him deeply. The above-quoted passage of the chronicle is out of harmony with the conventional representation of St. Vladimir. Neither the earliest lives of him, nor yet the *apologiae*, mention the fact of his having built a heathen pantheon.[4] The orthodox scholars, of the same frame of mind as the authors of the Lives, also try to weaken the importance of this objectionable pantheon. But the interest St. Vladimir took in the paganism of his fathers cannot easily be denied. Immediately after having erected new idols of Peroun and other gods, he sent his uncle Dobrynia to Novgorod, and, as says the chronicle: 'Then came Dobrynia to Novgorod and put an idol of Peroun on the

[1] Ibid., p. 197.

[2] *Natchalnyi Svod.* This compilation was made in Kiev at the end of the eleventh century. See Shakhmatof in the *Records of the Department of Russian Language and Literature of the Imperial Academy of Sciences*, xiii, 1 (1908), pp. 238–9. That the 'First Compilation' contained the description of the beginning of St. Vladimir's reign, according to the critical analysis of M. Shakhmatof, is proved by the fact that the passages I refer to are to be found in the so-called *First Novgorodian Annals*.

[3] See the *Annals* under the year 980: translated from the text of Leibotovitch, l. c., p. 71, and compared with corresponding passages of the *First Novgorodian Annals*, published later than the texts of Leibotovitch. See the edition of the Archaeological Commission.

[4] See the texts published by Professor Sobolevski, Nos. 1 and 2.

Volkhov, and the people of Novgorod brought it sacrifices as though to God.'[1]

The easiest way to undermine the significance of both these quotations is to say that Vladimir simply restored ancient idols to their former places; this is the opinion of Professor Goloubinski, author of the best history of the Russian Church.[2] Basing his position on the passage of the chronicle where Prince Igor is seen to swear fidelity to the Greeks on the idol of Peroun, Professor Goloubinski says: 'we positively know' that the idol of Peroun already stood there. And when he mentions the fact that Dobrynia erected an idol in Novgorod, he argues that the Novgorodians were heathens and also already possessed idols of Peroun. The only interesting information Professor Goloubinski sees in the above-quoted passages is that every Russian prince, at the beginning of his reign, was in the habit of rebuilding old pagan sanctuaries; which seems the more probable as these sanctuaries were wooden.

Our great historian Soloviev explains these two passages in a very different way. He sees in the youthful Vladimir a convinced restorer of the ancient paganism, which was already shattered and giving place to Christianity; Vladimir, however, murdered his brother Iaropolk with the aid of the pagan party, and, under the influence of this party, became a restorer of the ancient creed.[3]

The whole matter may assume a different aspect if we examine attentively one small detail of the text we are debating. It is said that Vladimir put all his idols outside his palace courtyard; and this is a valuable topographical indication.

In studying ancient cults from Christian sources, all such indications are particularly precious, the more so when they are exact and well defined.

Of ancient paganism none but topographical reminiscences survive; since the hundred years after the Russians had embraced the Christian religion saw crosses, chapels, and even churches placed where formerly idols had stood. The rhetorical introduction to the 'First Compilation' of Russian annals, written in about the year 1093, says emphatically: 'Where the ancients brought sacrifices to the pagan demons on the mountains, there stand now holy churches of stone with golden summits, and great cloisters.'[4]

The old chronicler states with special interest that, on the spot where Peroun once stood, a church in honour of St. Basile had been built; so that he is fully informed.

[1] Leibotovitch, l. c., and the *First Novgorodian Annals* under the same year.

[2] *The History of the Russian Church*: Goloubinski, Moscow, 1901 (in Russian), vol. i, p. 150.

[3] Ibid., p. 148.

[4] See the text published by M. Shakhmatof in the *Records of the Department of Russian Language and Literature of the Imperial Academy of Sciences*, xiii. 1, p. 264.

In such a case we have every right to suppose that the cult in question was founded on a local tradition, and that there existed material tokens of it such as, for instance, a building, hill, spring, forest, &c. Therefore, in investigating the ancient cult of Peroun, we must minutely examine all the topographical indications of the chronicle. In this case the words 'outside his palace courtyard' are important, and have been inserted pertinently.

Now the prince's yard called 'Teremnoï dvor' is evidently the *curtis dominicalis* or the Frohnhof of the Riourikovitchi, and was of great importance for the author of the chronicle. He mentions it with especial care. Once, in alluding to it, he says: 'this *terem*, that I have already mentioned.'[1] From another passage we know that this castle was of stone, a rare thing for that epoch. Thus the *curtis dominicalis* of Vladimir was a castle (*castellum*), and although it no longer existed at the end of the eleventh century, the chronicler knew well where it had stood; for he says that it was near a certain church. This castle was the dwelling of whole generations of Riourikovitchi from the times of Igor to Iaroslav I. In this castle had lived the celebrated St. Olga, widow of the prince Igor; here she horribly massacred the ambassadors of the Drevliani; in this castle, again, St. Vladimir slaughtered his brother Iaropolk.[2]

It stood outside the walls of the burgh of Kiev; for the princes possessed their own separate castle outside the burgh where they resided in times of peace with the citizens of Kiev, while their other dwelling inside the burgh is called by the chronicler 'Kniajdvor' (court of the princes). Dark sayings were most likely whispered about this castle; it was the place where the Riourikovitchi, with the aid of their men, committed fierce murder. The appearance of the building, with its stone walls, both attracted and repelled: and especially must this have been so in the days when lived the chronicler, as its ruins were still visible; if, therefore, he informs us that the idol of Peroun stood outside the ramparts of this celebrated castle, he by no means says it lightly. And as he does not mention this fact when he speaks of Prince Igor, we may rightly suppose that the idol was then, not outside the castle, but in it. Let us now combine the fact that the Riourikovitchi swore peace to the Greeks on the idol of Peroun with the supposition that this idol stood in the very castle or *curtis dominicalis* of the princes. The *curtis dominicalis* of a prince, a Kogan, a König, or any pre-feudal lord, has both a political and economic importance. The warriors, *drougina*—which means *comitatus* or *maisnie*, or in O.E. *hādelinge*—of a pre-feudal lord received their food at their master's

[1] See *Annals*, year 980 (Leibotovitch, l.c., p. 69).

[2] See *Annals*, years 945 and 980 (Leibotovitch, l.c., pp. 48, 49 and 69).

table. Let us remember the famous scene in Beowulf, where Khrodgar gives a banquet in the beautiful hall he had built. Brunner calls Beowulf's poem 'eine Hauptquelle für das richtige Verständnis des Gefolgswesens,' and he says: 'Das Merkmal der Gefolgschaft bildet die Aufnahme des Gefolgsmannes in die Hausgenossenschaft des Gefolgsherrn. Die Gefolgsleute speisen und zechen und schlafen in der Halle ihres Herrn.'[1]

The habits and customs of the Riourikovitchi were certainly very like those of the northern Germans. Our chronicle speaks about the prodigality of Vladimir towards his officers and warriors,[2] and the folk-poems have made him into a kind of King Arthur with his Knights of the Round Table. St. Vladimir is called the 'gracious prince Vladimir, beautiful as the sun'. In pagan times a feast is already a kind of sacred act and very often a sacrifice: those who eat together are already, to a certain degree, of the same creed. May we not, after all that has been said, safely suppose that Peroun was the god of the Riourikovitchi and of their warriors, their *hädelinge*, and was most certainly a military god? This supposition will be made still more plausible if we add that there is no certain indication of the existence of Peroun's cult outside Kiev, except in Novgorod, which belonged to the same Riourikovitchi, and where, as we know, Dobrynia introduced the cult of Peroun by order of Vladimir, and consequently at a rather late date.

These considerations on the cult of Peroun are strengthened by our knowledge of the Baltic Slavonic cult.

We know much more about the gods of the Baltic Slaves than about those of Russia. Baltic gods are of a very definite and military character. As Adam of Bremen, Tietmar, and Saxogramaticus describe them, their temples stood in the midst of fortresses; they had a special armour, and (e.g. the god Sventovit of Arcona) horses of war; part of the plunder of war was given to them, and their banners were carried on the battlefield.[3]

The cults of the Baltic gods lasted for almost one century and a half longer than those of the Russian gods. This is perhaps the reason why their cults are more elaborate, their idols more complicated, and more artistically fashioned, and their temples of a beautiful architecture. But still it is easy to trace a great resemblance between them and Peroun. They were made of wood like Peroun; even the face seemed to be more or less in the same style: Sventovit had but a very short-cut beard, Peroun had no beard at all, as only his moustaches are mentioned. Moreover, the Baltic gods also stood under the open sky,

[1] H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1887, vol. i, p. 137.
[2] *Annals*, year 996 (Leibotovitch, l. c., pp. 99–100).
[3] See L. Léger, l. c., pp. 11–31, 76–106, 136, &c.

and this was probably a strictly observed rule: there was a sheltered corridor surrounding the idol, and had a roof over the idol been allowed by tradition, it could easily have been made. All these considerations lead us to think of Peroun as a god whose cult is very like that described in Saxogramaticus. If so, it is all the more probable that Peroun's idol stood inside the *curtis dominicalis* of the Riourikovitchi and their warriors. When we read in the chronicle that Igor went to a hill where stood Peroun, we may take it for granted that this Peroun stood inside the castle yard.

It is clear now that Vladimir, for some reason or other, thought it necessary to move the idol to a new place. He placed it outside the castle's rampart, and at the same time, as has been said, he sent Dobrynia to Novgorod and bade him put an idol of Peroun on the banks of the Volkhov. These two facts, put together, enable us to advance a step further in our study. Vladimir seemed to wish, by these two acts, to expand the cult of Peroun; he imposed this cult upon his people.

It would be premature to speak of the institution of a new religion in the days of Vladimir. This prince's power was still extremely vague. Although he was called the Great Prince, only Kiev and Novgorod were actually under his rule; since some fifty miles from Kiev lived different hordes such as the Petchenegi, the Polovtzi, the Tchernyi, Klobouki, and independent Slavonic races. Vladimir strove energetically to form a government, but it is only his son Iaroslav who can be considered as the real founder of the Russian state in its most rudimental form. Nevertheless, the idea of making his subjects, or all those he endeavoured to make his subjects, worship the same god as he and his *drougina* is a political idea which Vladimir was likely to have had. 'The purely military force of the princes and their *drougina*,' says Prof. Klioutchevski, 'gradually develops into a political power.'[1]

The political scheme of Vladimir, when he tried to impose the worship of Peroun on the Russ, will be clearer if we glance at the relations then existing between the Russ and Byzantium. They stood as follows. The great rivers of Russia formed an easy commercial road, along which the Variags went to Greece, dealing in wax, honey, furs, slaves, &c. The princes were at the head of these expeditions and their chief destination was Byzantium.[2] There the Russ had probably already in the ninth century some dwellings belonging to them.[3] Yet although they carried on a regular trade, these expeditions of the Russ to Byzantium were, to a great extent, military enterprises. On their light canoes, made from trunks of trees, the Russians had to pass the cataracts of the Dnieper, where their enemies, the Petchenegi, lay awaiting them. The political importance of the Russian princes

[1] *Russian History*, i, p. 174. [2] Ibid., i, p. 170. [3] Ibid., i, p. 169.

lay in the fact that the towns where the goods were unladed belonged to them, as also did the military escorts of the caravans.[1] The campaigns of the Russians to Byzantium in the tenth century, already mentioned when speaking of the pacts of peace, were, says Professor Klioutchevski,[2] caused in the main by the eagerness of the Russians to maintain or to reopen their interrupted commercial dealings with Byzantium. This explains why they generally ended in commercial pacts. In Byzantium the Russian guests were not always welcome. We know from trustworthy Greek sources that, in two cases, the *motif* of the Russian campaigns was the slaughter, in Greece, of Russian merchants.[3] Byzantium certainly dreaded the annual return of the armed barbarians, who declined to obey any laws, and maintained in Byzantium their own bloody code. The Greeks sought evidently to gain some hold upon them either by means of the civilizing Christian religion or by the Roman code. They endeavoured to convert their enemies, and to make them accept Greek priests, who should be agents, in Russia, of the Greek empire. To gain this end the Greeks willingly expended great sums. Porphyrogenet says in his *Basilios Makedo*: 'The emperor, by means of generous presents in gold, silver, and silk garments, brought the warlike and impious Russ to negotiations with him, and, after having concluded peace with them, he induced them to submit to the rite of divine baptism, and succeeded in making them accept an archbishop consecrated by the patriarch Ignatius.'[4] When Olga, widow of the prince Igor, was baptized, she also received costly gifts from the Greek emperor.[5]

The Greeks pursued another aim also: the bravery of the Russians had attracted them, and they wished to organize a portion of them into a separate military body in their own service. Therefore they constantly tried to entice Russians into their army, and on every possible occasion they entreated the Russian princes to send them regiments. So, after Olga had become a Christian, the emperor reproached her for not having sent him gifts and soldiers, although she had accepted presents of him.[6] And when Vladimir was converted, we see in Byzantium Russian bodies of six thousand men.[7] Whilst Vladimir was at enmity with the Greeks, he had every reason to gather the greatest military forces he could against them, and to exalt his own

[1] *Russian History*, i, pp. 174, 175, 181–4.

[2] Ibid., i, p. 184.

[3] Ibid. This happened in 865 and in 1043.

[4] Quoted by Professor Goloubinski, *History of the Russian Church*, i, pp. 51, 52.

[5] See *Annals*, year 855, and the report by Porphyrogenet (quoted by Professor Goloubinski, l. c., p. 101).

[6] *Annals*. Leibotovitch, l. c., p. 55.

[7] Professor Vassilievski's *Study on Variago-Russian Military Bodies in Byzantium*. See his works published by the Academy of St. Petersburg, 1908, vol. i, pp. 196 sq.

pagan cult. But, after his expedition to Khorsoun, when the Greeks loaded him with gifts,[1] he became their ally, married the emperor's sister, and had to submit to baptism. Christianity gave him what he had first expected from a widened cult of Peroun, I mean political importance. The doctrine of the anointment of sovereigns served his schemes of power well. There is a striking analogy between the proceedings of Vladimir in 980 and in 988. In 980 he had sent Dobrynia to erect in Novgorod the idol of Peroun; in 988 he sends Iakime, a Greek priest from Khorsoun, to Novgorod again, but this time to destroy Peroun.

We have now studied the cult of Peroun closely, and can trace two stages in it. First, until the reign of Vladimir, Peroun is a kind of family fetish or military god, adored by a group of warriors attached to the family. Later, when this family becomes more powerful, and gains in political significance and influence, Peroun becomes a kind of head-god.

This second movement in the evolution of Peroun's cult was crossed by the introduction of Christianity. If Peroun's evolution had continued, he would perhaps have become πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, and if he really was the god of thunder, as some suppose, he would have presented a striking analogy to Zeus.

In his most brilliant period, when Vladimir erected in Kiev a magnificent idol of him, Peroun was surrounded by five other divinities: Khors, Dajbog, Stribog, Semargl, and Mokosh. We may say that we know nothing about these accessory gods.[2]

The only important text we have that throws some light on the character of these gods, is the *Slovo o Polkou Igorevi*. This famous poetical monument of old Russian literature is the work of a scholar who stood in close relation to the princes and their *comitatus*.[3] He composed a kind of poetical paper on the political conditions of Russia in his time. He introduced into his work the names of our pagan gods and, quite like his Byzantine models, made use of rhetorical figures. The text is very intricate, and I cannot undertake to give a full interpretation of the parts which are pertinent to our study. But if the *Slovo* is obscure when speaking of Stribog or Dajbog, it is, on the contrary, quite clear when it calls a great prince the grandson of Dajbog. As a member of the *drougina*, the author was certainly well informed about the whole generation of Riourikovitchi; perhaps he had acquired his knowledge from poetical tradition, from songs of the military *baïany* at the prince's feasts. It is quite characteristic that he speaks of precisely those gods whom Vladimir had exposed to the

[1] The oldest *vita*, published by Professor Sobolevski, l. c.

[2] On these gods see L. Léger, *Mythologie slave*, pp. 111 sq., and 238–9.

[3] See Professor Jdanov, *Works*, vol. i, pp. 353–5.

popular view. Volos, whom Vladimir had not included in his pantheon, is mentioned by the *Slovo* only as the grandfather of popular poets and singers (*baïany* or *boïany*). The author seems to consider him a peaceful god and a patron of arts.

We must now pass on to a third period in the evolution of ancient pagan gods. It is a period of decay and peculiar literary survival. The heathen gods did not vanish in the light of Christianity. We meet them again, transformed by it, when we study the sermons and other works whose aim it was to destroy the last survivals of paganism.[1]

This polemical literature has its traditions and consists almost entirely of compilations; for our Slavonic preachers borrowed profusely from Byzantine sources or Russian annals.

These writings represent our gods as demons. We see that demons figure under the names of Peroun, Dajbog, Khors, Volos, from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. In a text, *The Peregrinations of the Holy Virgin in Hell*, demons are called Peroun, Volos, Khors. In another text, *The Discourse of Three Saints*, it is said that there are two angels of thunder: the Hellene Peroun and the Jewish Khors. In a Tcheck text of the fifteenth century the writer says: 'Let us leave these sins with Veles.' In another Tcheck text of the fourteenth century, the author exclaims: 'What demon, what Veles has set him against me?' A Tcheck translator (sixteenth century) of the Ecclesiastes by Jesus Sirach says: 'Go to Veles,' for 'Go to the devil.' A Russian text of the sixteenth century calls a witch by the name of the goddess Mokosh.[2]

A close study of demonological writings of the Middle Ages would perhaps elucidate this strange destiny of the pagan gods. It seems certain that, in the very hottest of their strife against paganism, when Christianity was introduced, the Christian preachers did not deny the existence of pagan gods, but simply opposed to them the Christian God and tried by every means to depreciate and humiliate them. Hence sprang the habit of considering these gods as demons.[3] It is a curious fact that the destruction of ancient pagan idols was followed by special rites. We have seen that the gods Volos and Peroun were thrown into the Dnieper; the Peroun of Novgorod was thrown into the Volkhov, and the Christian author of our Annals naïvely relates that Peroun spoke as he floated, and even quotes his words.[4] As the

[1] This literature has been studied by Mr. Azboukine in the *Russian Philological Messenger*, vols. xxviii, xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii, and xxxix.

[2] All these passages are to be found in every Slavonic mythology. See L. Léger, *passim*.

[3] Peroun is called a demon even in the oldest *vita* of St. Vladimir. See text by Sobolevski, l. c.

[4] See *Annals*, years 988 and 991.

spot where Peroun stood was, in the eyes of Christians, a place of abomination, it had to be purified by the performance of some rite; and, in all countries of the world, to throw an object into water is an act of purification.

The idea that pagan gods are demons was taken by the Russian learned men out of Greek literature, which was evidently their principal source of knowledge. I remember, for instance, that in one of the miracles of St. Nicolas, when he destroys the temple of Artemide, he is said to fight against the demon Artemis.[1] We may, perhaps, discover the literary current through which this idea glided into the old literature. It is known that the Bulgarian Manicheism, the so-called Bogomilism, took a great interest in the study of evil spirits. All the Cosmos seemed a struggle between the good and the evil principle, between God and Satan. A Slavene tale which throws considerable light on Bogomilism calls the devil Dabog, which corresponds to the Russian Dajbog.[2] The *Discourse of Three Saints*, where Peroun and Khors are supposed to be angels of thunder, is a Bogomilic text. It is very possible that Bogomilism diffused over all Slavonic lands the names of Slavonic gods under this new aspect, whereas in the times of heathendom these gods were only known among a few definite tribes.

Therefore, if, as we have seen, the Tcheck or other Eastern Slavonic writers know the names of Russian gods, it does not by any means imply, as has been believed, that these gods are pan-Slavonic. Similarly, if a Novgorodian writer knows the name of the Baltic god Svorogitch, it does not imply that Svorogitch is a Russian god.

I have myself, in translating the chronicle *Malala*, put Svorog in place of Hephestos, and Dajbog in place of Helios. Professor Jagic supposes that Hephestos is called Svorog because the very name Svorog resembles the word for 'to cook', or 'to boil', which made the translator think of the Egyptian Hephestos.[3] Hence different writers against paganism call Svorog the god of fire. I therefore venture to say that the idea of considering our ancient gods as personifications of different powers of nature—Peroun as thunder, Dajbog as the sun, Svorog or Svorogitch as fire, and so on—is a literary idea.[4] This same view has of old been applied to the Greek and Roman gods, and, in any case, we must remember once for all that we can only make use of Christian sources for the knowledge of pagan gods after a complete study of Christian literature in relation to paganism.

The Christian literature with its ideas about demonology and gods

[1] See my study, 'St. Nicolas and Artemis of Ephesos,' *Folklore*, v, pp. 111–12.

[2] Professor Jagic, 'Mythologische Skizzen,' *Archiv für Slavische Philologie*, iv, pp. 11–13.

[3] 'Mythologische Skizzen,' l. c., p. 426.

[4] To my knowledge no indication of such a view on our gods is earlier than the fifteenth century.

as elements of nature, has saved the names of these gods from oblivion; but it gives us only the current ideas of the cultured classes about these gods, and not those of the nation at large.

That all that has been written against paganism is taken from literary sources and not from direct intercourse with the people, appears clearly from the fact that the writers speak quite differently about the gods and the popular religion, about which we know from the study of modern rites and customs.

In speaking about gods they sometimes attribute to the Russians such gods as Dyi (Дый) or Diva (Дива) who, as Professor Jagic has shown, are nothing but the genitive *Dios* from Zeus, and Demeter with the omission of Meter. On the other hand, whenever they speak of rites and customs, they give correct details and insist upon their knowledge as eye-witnesses. In their struggle against paganism the authors of such works have invented a special word, 'double-faith.' They say that the new Christians (*aku o mau*) secretly confess their old belief. They insist on the duty of a Christian not to cleave to the old pagan rituals, but to give them up entirely and to cease offering sacrifices. We must note—and this is particularly important—that they persuade the people to address themselves always not to the creatures but to their Creator, which means that the people should not implore 'nature' nor try to force her by means of magic to serve their interests, but should simply believe in the power of the Creator who is sole master on earth. The preachers say that famines, fires, and all other calamities are punishments of God to man. A special treatise was composed on fine weather, and on the punishments of God: 'Saith the Lord, the wicked shall seek for Me and shall not find Me, because they do not wish to walk in My paths, but follow vain demons and honour the work of their own hands.'[1] If men will repudiate their old ways and rituals, they may expect to be richly rewarded: 'If we reject all this wickedness, God will give us, as to His children, forgiveness and send us rain in time, and our barns shall be full with corn, and our casks shall overrun with wine, &c. . . .' Such exhortations become particularly violent and frequent in times of famine or any other popular calamity. Our chroniclers speak of such crises that happened over a century after the baptism of the Russ. The people, in moments of distress, sought with particular faith the aid of sorcerers and magicians, *koudiesniki* and *volkhvi*, or accused them, on the contrary, of being the authors of their misery, and burnt them. In either case the Church expounded to them the theory about the opposition of the creature and the Creator, and exhorted them to offer prayers to the Creator that He should direct the creation for the welfare of the people.[2]

[1] Azboukine in the *Russian Philological Messenger*, xxxv, p. 230.

[2] See *Annals*, years 1024 and 1074.

All these considerations make it evident that the Christian writers lived amongst a people who firmly believed in the most rudimentary agricultural magic.

In this paper I have no intention of dilating upon the popular religion of the ancient Slaves. I have done it to a certain extent in my book on *Spring Songs and Customs*, but I believe that, by studying the question of gods, we should make a forward step in the comprehension of ancient Slavonic religion. These gods appear as something heterogeneous in the popular religion, but still we cannot affirm that their origin is unconnected with that of the popular religion. The Slaves had a multitude of gods. The Arabian writer, Ibn Fazlan, tells us of numerous Russian gods he saw on the Volga; and Tietmar says about the Baltic Slaves: 'Quot regiones sunt in his partibus, tot templa habentur, et simulacra demonorum singula ab infidelibus coluntur' (vi. 25). And it is not the penates he alludes to. Ibn Fazlan also speaks of gods and not penates. Helmold even insists on the idea that the gods are not penates: 'Praeter penates et idola quibus singula oppida redundabant' (i. 163). Peroun, Volos, and other gods were born in the enormous family of Slavonic gods. Their future was more brilliant because of their political importance, but their origin was obscure and humble.

The question now arises: In what relation did the gods we have studied stand to popular religion? My researches hitherto have not carried me far enough to find this relation. It is only clear to me that these gods do not actually represent anything initial, and that, whatever was their original form, their further development was determined by the military and commercial situation of the people.

6

In an *Étude philologique sur les noms propres de l'Irlande et de la Grande-Bretagne* the Abbé Fourrière maintained that the early history of these islands showed traces of the cult of the sun and human sacrifice, brought, as earlier to Greece (cf. p. 183), from Palestine by emigrant Danites. He enforced his conclusions by showing in the place-names of Great Britain and Ireland connexion with Hebrew sources, especially with the tribe of Dan and its worship of Baal; finding, for example, Dan in the names Thames, Tamar; Baal in Belfast, Belper; and in Ely, Halifax, the prophet Elijah.

7

In a *Note on Cloelia and Epona*, M. Salomon Reinach showed that both on the coast of Latium and in Rome there existed archaic statues of horsewomen; the Roman one was called Cloelia, which is an epithet meaning 'famous' or 'brilliant' and gave rise to the well-known legend of early Roman history. Such figures are proved, by the discovery of an archaic terra-cotta statuette at Lusoi in Arcadia, to represent the Arcadian horse-goddess, coupled with the horse-god whose cult, according to Dionysios, was introduced into Latium by the Arcadians (Poseidon Hippios). When the Gauls found it necessary to represent by sculpture their riding goddess Epona, they borrowed from Rome the archaic type of Cloelia, i.e. the Arcadian type of the horse-goddess, represented by anthropomorphism as a horsewoman. So the type of the Celtic Epona is of Arcadian origin, the way from Arcadia to Gaul having passed through Rome.

SECTION VIII

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

By W. SANDAY

In opening the business of this section our first thought is of those distinguished men whose loss we are all feeling, who have dropped out of our ranks almost on the threshold of the Congress itself, Prof. A. Dieterich, Prof. O. Pfleiderer, and M. Jean Réville. Two of the three were not only devoted to the special line of studies which this Congress represents, but were also intimately connected with its organization. M. Jean Réville was permanent secretary of the Congress, which was greatly indebted to his zeal for its foundation and for its prosperity. He had been editor of the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* since 1884, and he had contributed actively by his writings, such as *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères* (1884), *Les Origines de l'Épiscopat* (1894), and *Le quatrième Évangile* (1900), to the studies of our own section. Prof. Dieterich had in a manner entered upon the inheritance of his father-in-law Hermann Usener, who had been in a still larger sense one of the founders of these studies; he too had enriched them by a series of monographs (*Abraxas*, 1891; *Nekyia*, 1893; *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 1903; *Mutter Erde* and *Sommertag*, the first a paper read at the Basel Congress; both were published in 1905); at the time of his death he was editor of the *Archiv für Religions-Wissenschaft*, a post which he had held and filled with great energy and efficiency since the reconstruction of the *Archiv* in 1904. We had hoped that he would preside over the section of Greek and Roman religion; and we can see from his writings that he always had in view the bearing of his researches upon Christianity. Prof. Otto Pfleiderer was not quite so intimately associated with the special aims of the Congress; he was primarily a religious philosopher and a historian of religious thought; but he too was deeply interested in Comparative Religion, and his latest book *Religion und Religionen* (1906) came directly under that head. His help in this section would have been very welcome.

A brief retrospect like this of those who, if they had lived, would have been sure to take a prominent part in our discussions, reminds us how many shades and degrees of appropriateness there are to the particular lines of a Congress on the History of Religions. I must myself do what I can to follow the hints thus suggested. My duty, as I understand it, is to give a rapid survey, which alone is possible, of the literature of our subject since the last Congress four years ago. Our section is headed 'Christianity'; but that does not of course mean Christianity in all its aspects, but rather those specially related to the History of Religion. It will be seen at once that this involves a certain amount of overlapping with other sections. I shall have to consider what the literature of other sections contributes to the study of Christianity; and then I shall also have to consider the data which Christianity supplies to the broader subject of the History of Religion. From the point of view of Christianity itself, and taking my stand in its First Age or period of Origins, I shall have (1) to work back through its antecedents; (2) then to speak of its surroundings; (3) to take up the literature of Christian Origins; (4) to follow its subsequent development and history.

In attempting this survey, I must hope to be forgiven for simply repeating what for many here will be matter of elementary knowledge. I suppose that is really what a survey is intended to be. I am afraid there is not much more that a survey can be in its present hands.

1. *Antecedents.*—The antecedents of Christianity at once open up to us long vistas—the longest and the most direct of course that which connects it with the Old Testament and with the Religion of Israel; but this again is coming more and more to involve us also in the history of other religions which from time to time have exercised an influence upon that religion. The four years that we are chronicling have seen active discussions under these heads. And the most distinctive and characteristic feature in these discussions may be said to have come specially from the side of the History of Religion.

It may be convenient to call our periods Olympiads. We may do so the more appropriately because, by a fortunate coincidence, the meetings of our Congress synchronize with the revived Olympic Games. So far as the Old Testament is concerned, the particular Olympiad which it falls to me to review found the field in possession of Wellhausen and his school. The period happens to include a number of works which may be taken to represent a sort of gathering in of the harvest of a whole period of investigations conducted on

Wellhausen's lines. This holds good not only in respect to Wellhausen himself and his more immediate followers and disciples, but also with respect to a number of independent writers, older and younger, who have been convinced by his arguments and who have given their adhesion to his general scheme.

From Wellhausen we have new editions both of his *Prolegomena* (1905) and of his *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte* (1906), with a sketch covering the same ground as the latter in *Kultur d. Gegenwart* (1906). Bernhard Stade had been almost a lieutenant or second in command to Wellhausen; no one had done more to work out and popularize his ideas. It was therefore an event of considerable importance when he was able to bring out the first volume of his much expected *Biblische Theologie d. Alten Testaments* in 1905, and the hopes that had been formed of it were not disappointed. It had just the quality of ripeness which might have been anticipated for it. Unhappily it was a first volume doomed to remain without a second, as the writer was cut off in the midst of his active labours within a year. By the side of Stade's comprehensive work stand smaller treatises by Giesebrecht (1904), Marti, and Löhr (both 1906). All these works deal with the religion of Israel, and all are marked by the sobriety, moderation, and general ripeness of which I have spoken.

For us in England it was of special value that the extra volume of Hastings's *Dictionary of the Bible*, which came out in 1904, contained an article on 'The Religion of Israel', by Dr. E. Kautzsch, which was of the dimensions of a treatise, and that no small one. It would have been impossible to have a more admirable or more weighty summary of the work done upon this subject in recent years. I would take this opportunity to say that I hope that all our younger English students will make a point of grounding themselves thoroughly in this article as a solid foundation not only for the study of the Old Testament but of all that depends upon the Old Testament; in other words, of Christianity as a whole. I may also perhaps be allowed to remark in passing, for the benefit of our foreign guests, that a large proportion of the work done in this country during the last ten years or more, and not a little of that which may be expected in the near future, has found and is likely to find its way into dictionaries. This is partly due to the great energy and organizing ability of the editors of these dictionaries, but also to the fact that a dictionary offers a convenient opening to students who are conscious that their country is somewhat in arrears, and who are anxious to make up for lost ground. At the same time it would be ungrateful not to recognize

the great amount of help received in these dictionaries from foreign scholars, of which the article of Kautzsch just referred to is a splendid example. I am only glad to think that the same volume also bears satisfactory testimony to the activity and zeal of our own scholars, a zeal that is not confined to the reproduction of what is already known, but is also bent upon the quest for new knowledge.

In this country we may take as typical my colleague Dr. Driver's commentary on Genesis (1905), which seems to me (if I may venture to say so) quite a model in its kind, and I am glad to think that it is one of many that we now possess from his hands. I also hear high praise of Mr. MacNeile's *Exodus* in the same series. I may complete this slight sketch by referring to Cornill's largely re-written *Einleitung in d. A. T.* (1905), and to Budde's *Gesch. d. althebräisch. Literatur* (1906) in the series of Handbooks on the Literatures of the East. This book of Budde's may be taken as summing up the literary treatment of the Old Testament in much the same way in which Kautzsch sums up the treatment of its religion. The total result was really a combination of literary and historical criticism mainly within the limits of Israel itself.

So far I have spoken of what may be called the main stream of scholarly production. But in the period with which we are concerned another voice has been strongly heard—the voice of the Assyriologists. The movement had been growing for some time, but gradually, and it had for the most part been confined to a few of the more advanced scholars, until two events gave it a sudden notoriety. Both these belong more strictly to the period before that of which I am speaking. One was the famous 'Babel-Bibel' controversy, which broke out in the year 1902 over a lecture by Friedrich Delitzsch, was at its height throughout the year 1903, and began to subside in 1904. The other event was the publication of the Code of Hammurabi, king of Babylon towards the end of the third or beginning of the second millennium B. C. This Code, inscribed upon a block of black diorite, was discovered by the French explorers at Susa early in 1902, and was published with commendable promptitude in the same year. It was soon made accessible in other languages. Both these events took hold on the public imagination, and naturally gave an impulse to the theories which the Assyriologists had already begun to formulate. My present audience will not need to be reminded that the leader in the movement—the main movement, as distinct from episodes to which I have referred—was Dr. Hugo Winckler, Professor in the University of Berlin, who had been actively propounding his theories all through the nineties, and had

made some distinguished converts or part-converts in this country as well as elsewhere. In our period he has found vigorous and efficient allies in A. and J. Jeremias, the former of whom published an elaborate work *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients* in 1904 and a revised and enlarged edition in 1906. Winckler and his allies are extraordinarily prolific in ideas, extending over many fields, chronology, geography, archaeology, history, and in particular the history of religion. One significant adhesion has been lately received. Dr. I. Benzinger brought out last year a completely re-written edition of his *Hebräische Archäologie*, embodying many of the new ideas. The impulse in this case was given not only by the writings of the Assyriologists, but still more by prolonged residence in the East, stimulating what was felt to be a more oriental way of looking at things.

While these literary developments were going on in Europe, Winckler himself was engaged last year in remarkably successful explorations on the site of Boghaz-Köi, the ancient capital of the Hittites. A preliminary account of his discoveries has been given in the *Mitteil. d. Deutsch. Orient-Gesellschaft* (Dec. 1907). They are said to be comparable in importance with the discovery of the Tell el-Amarna tablets in 1888, and to illustrate in a striking way the political relations and culture of the East about the year 1400 B.C. As I am speaking of discoveries, I must needs refer to the surprising light which suddenly and quite recently has been thrown on the early history of the Jewish *Diaspora* by documents found near Assuan, on the site of the ancient Elephantine, some of which have been published in this country by Sayce and Cowley, and others even more important in Germany by Dr. E. Sachau. Those who are not already aware of the fact may be glad to know that three closely packed lectures on the gains from recent archaeological researches and discovery, from the pen of Dr. Driver, are to be published shortly. They were delivered in the spring of this year under the new Schweich foundation, which is administered by the British Academy. I only regret that the work entailed by these lectures, and other public duties, have prevented Dr. Driver from taking the active part that he would otherwise naturally have taken in the present Congress.

Dr. Sayce, I need not say, is an Assyriologist of long standing. He may rightly claim that research is coming round to his field of study. And another colleague and friend of mine, Dr. Cheyne, I wish indeed could be here to speak for himself. He will, I am sure, have the sympathy of all in the serious illness which keeps him away. He has always been in the forefront of progress, and has been one of the very first to greet new knowledge of every kind. He brought out

last year *Traditions and Beliefs of Ancient Israel*, a very original running commentary on the Book of Genesis, giving special prominence to ethnology and geography and to drastic textual criticism. I may also mention here a small and popular but important book, *Bible Problems* (1904), which belongs partly to this head and partly to the New Testament.

I spoke of Benzinger's conversion as significant. Some might think still more so the remarkable excursion into the field of theology of P. Jensen, who is one of the most courageous and learned of those who have broken their teeth on the Hittite language. He published in 1906 the first volume, in more than a thousand pages, of a work entitled *Das Gilgameschepos in der Weltliteratur*, the effect of which is intended to show that not only the greater part of the Old Testament, but even the substance of the Gospels themselves, are but faint echoes of the old Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh (corresponding to the biblical Nimrod) and the Flood. These strange doctrines are said to have made one convert in Jensen's fellow-Assyriologist Zimmern; but I greatly fear that for the rest they are likely to be preached to an unbelieving and perverse generation. By his own admission Jensen is gifted with a very fertile imagination, and with him imagination takes the form of extreme quickness to perceive analogies, which is apparently combined with some reluctance to criticize them. The consequence is an elaborate construction which seems to be built on the principles made classical by Fluellen:

> There is a river in Macedon; and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth. . . . 'Tis so like as my fingers is to my fingers, and there is salmons in both.

I must not go out of my own sphere; and I ought to confess that I have not myself read Jensen's book; I only know it through what appears to be a very good review by Hans Schmidt in *Theol. Rundschau*. But I would venture to make two suggestions to the Assyriologists: (1) that it might be well to be rather more severe in deciding what are valid analogies and what are not; and (2) when they come to the New Testament, that it is important for them to make clear to themselves precisely what they mean by mythology, and precisely in what relation the supposed mythology stands to the New Testament documents. I do not doubt myself that mythology has entered into the New Testament, e. g. into the description of the Mother and Child in Rev. xii. But it is a very different thing to explain mythologically the contents of leading Synoptic documents, such as the Mark-Gospel or Q.

One of the most pleasing examples of the influence of Assyriology on Old Testament problems that has come in my way is B. Baentsch, *Altorientalischer und Israelitischer Monotheismus* (1906). And yet I hardly think that this is likely to effect so great a change in current opinion as its author appears to suppose. Some of the points which he takes up from Winckler I should be glad to see established, especially that about the solar aeons and about the tendencies towards Monotheism in Babylonia as well as Egypt. And I can well believe that, as Volz is also contending (*Mose*, 1907) and Dr. Burney (in *Journ. of Theol. Studies*, 1908), more should be set down to the work of Moses than has often been done in recent years. But I doubt if the general conception of religious evolution in the Old Testament period will be greatly changed. Within our period would also fall *David u. sein Zeitalter* (1907) by the same writer, which I have not seen.

Another instance of an Old Testament scholar influenced by Assyriology and other oriental studies, but steering an independent course midway between the two main parties (Wellhausen and the Assyriologists), is supplied by Gunkel. Gunkel's most important work would fall in previous periods; we have from him a sketch of the Literature of Israel in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* (1906), broadly planned and freshly apprehended. But an even more notable production—I suppose one may say, from Gunkel's school—is Dr. Hugo Gressmann's *Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie* (1905). This is a very vigorous and able piece of work, sometimes perhaps pushed rather to an extreme, and is especially interesting for its bearing on the history of New Testament terminology and ideas. It is well that we should be reminded of the important caution that the first extant mention of an idea is very often far from being its first real appearance in the course of history. And another fruitful suggestion or reminder of Gressmann's is that what we have before us (e.g. in important passages like Dan. vii. 13, 14) is only a fragment of a larger and more comprehensive conception. For the ultimate root of the ideas that he investigates Gressmann often goes outside Israel, and the tendency of his book is to multiply the threads which connect the religion of Israel with other Oriental religions.

I cannot do more than mention the interesting and searching questions that are being raised almost as I write by Prof. Eerdmans of Leyden in the two parts that have so far appeared of his *Alttestamentliche Studien* (1908) and in the August and September numbers of *The Expositor*. Prof. Eerdmans propounds new and enterprising views as to the Exodus and the early condition of Israel. He seems

to deny the common opinion that the Israelites can be rightly described as nomads at the time of their entrance into Palestine. But I see that the challenge which he throws down is already taken up by Prof. G. Adam Smith in the pages of *The Expositor*.

With Gressmann we naturally pass over from the Old Testament to the New. For the space between the Testaments I suppose that the most considerable event that I have to record is also one of the most recent, the publication of Dr. Charles's two volumes (one containing text, and the other containing translation and commentary) of the Testaments of the XII Patriarchs (1908). At last we have a standard edition of this significant and characteristic book, which is at once so rich in illustration of the Christian writings and so worthy a monument of (in the main) the better side of Judaism. With these volumes we have also the close of the long series which Dr. Charles has dedicated to the elucidation of this extra-canonical Jewish literature. It is superfluous to say that our debt to him in this country is immense. If over all this ground the English scholar is not only as well but even better equipped than his neighbours, it is pre-eminently to Dr. Charles that the credit is due. I am glad to be able to add that in conjunction with other scholars he is preparing a complete *Corpus* of this literature.

Another event that we all heartily welcome is the appearance of a second edition, revised and largely reconstructed, of Bousset's *Religion d. Judentums* (1906). The only fact which makes this event of less capital importance is that the edition is the second and not the first (the first came out in 1903). Dr. Bousset is one of the most indefatigable and prolific writers of the rising generation; and we are glad that he should be, because his writings are all distinguished not only by great knowledge and lucidity, but by real interest in religion and by a very laudable effort after objectivity. He also seems to me to have marked skill in indicating problems and throwing out suggestions for their solution. The *Jüdische Eschatologie* of P. Volz, of which we naturally think along with Bousset, belongs to the date of his first edition, and so is outside our limits. Perhaps I should mention here the second edition of Schlatter, *Geschichte Israels von Alexander d. Grossen bis Hadrian* (1906), a book that we are glad to have for the convenient period which it covers, though it probably contains not a little that is more ingenious than sound. I do not speak of it from personal knowledge.

There has been a good deal of discussion in recent years about the comparative value of the two Books of Maccabees. The impulse was given by B. Niese in 1900, and an important article surveying

the whole question by Wellhausen appeared in the *Göttingische Nachrichten* for 1905. In this connexion too I should note Mr. E. R. Bevan's excellent history of the [*House of Seleucus* (1902)] and *Jerusalem under the High Priests* (1904). If we may judge from the reviews, it does not seem as though we need trouble ourselves much over the so-called Samaritan text of Joshua; but I ought perhaps to mention the comprehensive work on the Samaritans by Dr. James A. Montgomery (1907).

Before leaving this section, I must not fail to recall the welcome increase in the activity of Jewish scholars, bringing out of their stores to enrich the common stock of knowledge. A better survey of this activity than I can give will be found, from the pen of Mr. G. H. Box, in the current (September) number of the *Review of Theology and Philosophy*. Add to the list of available books Oesterley and Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue* (1907). We have not yet perhaps quite succeeded in striking a balance between the Jewish contribution and the Christian; but that will come in due course.

2. *Surroundings.*—The student of the surroundings or (as we may call it) the *nidus* of Christianity is at the present time in a position of great advantage both absolutely and in comparison with the state of things a few years ago. For externals, he has Schürer, brought up to date by unremitting labour; for within six years of the completion of the third edition, itself greatly enlarged upon its predecessors, a fourth edition has already begun to appear (end of 1907). For the inner history of contemporary Judaism, he has the second edition of Bousset, just referred to. For Graeco-Roman religion he has the masterly survey by Wissowa (in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch*, 1902) with the detailed account of Roman religion in the same volume. The older book by Aust (1899) was also very good and was a product of the same school. In English we have also older work by Mr. Warde Fowler, and brief but attractive sketches by Mr. J. P. Carter (1906) and Mr. Cyril Bailey (1907). Dr. Farnell has continued his great work on the *Cults of the Greek States* with two more volumes (iii and iv) in 1907, and there is much relevant matter in his *Evolution of Religion* (1905); Miss Jane Harrison's *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* was earlier (1903), but she too contributed a brief sketch of the subject in 1905; Dr. O. Gruppe's vast collection of material (2 vols., also in Iwan Müller) dates from 1906.

Another masterly survey of Graeco-Roman thought and religion, with especial reference to the rise of Christianity, is that by Dr. Paul

Wendland, which came out in Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum N. T.* in 1907. Along with this should be read an older paper by Wendland, *Christentum und Hellenismus in ihren litterarischen Beziehungen* (1902); and with both should be compared a very able paper by Dr. P. Corssen, *Über Begriff und Wesen des Hellenismus* in the June number of the *Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft* for the present year. Dr. Corssen has several criticisms of Wendland in regard to which I am inclined to think that he is right, especially where he demurs to the stress laid on the 'isolation' of Philo. No doubt Philo does bulk large in history, and he does appear to be isolated; but that is mainly because so much of his voluminous writings has survived, while the links that would have connected them with other literature of the kind have perished. Schürer, Bousset, Wissowa, and Wendland make up a quaternion of writings that are of the greatest value for the study of the environment of Christianity. The English reader also has access to three interesting books: Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius* (1904); Bigg, *The Church's Task under the Roman Empire* (1905); and Mahaffy, *The Silver Age of the Greek World* (1906). All who know the writings of Dr. Bigg, with their wonderful charm of thought and expression, will know what we have lost in him.

One of the questions that have been actively discussed in the period before us is the question as to the influence, direct or indirect, of the further East upon early Christianity. This influence may be sought in three main directions; it may have come from Babylonia, from Persia, or from as distant a region as India. For Babylonian influences a wide period lies open; they may go back to quite prehistoric times, or they may have filtered in more gradually during the period of the Hebrew monarchy, or they may have poured in with a broader stream during the exile. Persian influences will have made themselves felt chiefly in the later period of the exile. In either case the direct impact will have been upon Hebraism or Judaism, and it will be through these channels that ideas and tendencies reached downwards to Christianity. On Babylonian influence the literature is abundant; on Persian, there is a repertory of materials by Böklen (1902), which however appear rather to need sifting. Pfleiderer, Cheyne, Bousset, and Gressmann are all inclined to lay stress on Persian influence, which is also advocated by Prof. L. H. Mills (*Zarathustra, the Achaemenids and Israel*, 1905–6).

Indian influence stands more by itself, and those who assume it would suppose that it was in more immediate contact with Christianity. It may be remembered that in his *Hibbert Lectures*

(1882) Kuenen rather summed up against the idea, which at that time was coming forward. Its principal advocate was Rudolf Seydel in several works dating from the early eighties. The hypothesis was taken up again in a temperate and judicious spirit by Dr. van den Bergh van Eysinga in 1904. I confess that I am not myself prepared to exclude the possibility of Indian influence. It has to be borne in mind that, since the conquests of Alexander and the establishment of a Greek kingdom in Bactria, and of a Greek dynasty on the Tigris (the Seleucidae), the outposts of western civilization had been pushed further east than ever before, and the channels of communication between the further East and the West had been multiplied. If Greek stories and *motifs* of stories could travel through to India, then by the reverse route Buddhist stories might find their way to Antioch and Alexandria, and, if to Antioch and Alexandria, also to Palestine. I cannot say that I have yet sufficiently considered the question to form a definite opinion, but it is an important fact that so expert a scholar as Oldenberg, in a review of van den Bergh in the *Theol. Literaturzeitung* for 1905, seemed inclined to regard the thesis as not proven.

3. *Origins.*—When we turn to the more direct consideration of the Christian documents and Christian history, we have again to face the question where the line is to be drawn and what shall be admitted into our survey and what shall not. Strictly speaking, everything is relevant. If our data are to be sound, they must be based upon a right reconstruction of the texts as well as upon a knowledge of their history. And not less is it necessary to form a right idea of the process by which the Gospels assumed their present shape; they must be analysed into their component parts, and the relation of these parts to each other must be determined. All these investigations belong to the indispensable 'underground work', without which any attempt to build up a history of Christianity as a religion and in relation to other religions must rest upon insecure foundations. And yet from our present point of view these branches of the inquiry are subordinate and can only be touched upon in passing.

As to the text of the New Testament, it must suffice to say that the great undertaking of Freiherr von Soden makes progress. He has now finished his first volume, with an immense mass of analytical detail and a complete exposition of principle, at least for the Gospels; and we are waiting with the greatest interest to see the application of these principles in practice. Along with this should be mentioned the new volume of Merx, *Markus u. Lukas*, which came out in 1905;

it is full of original matter, and will be long before it is utilized as fully as it deserves. In this country the most important work in recent years has been done by Prof. F. C. Burkitt, with his ally Mr. P. M. Barnard, especially the admirable edition of the Old-Syriac Gospels (*Evangelion da-Mephar-reshe*) in 1904. I ought also to chronicle the completion of the edition of the Bohairic Version at the Clarendon Press in 1905. And I should like, if I may, to invite the attention of those of our guests from abroad who are interested in these matters to a forthcoming article by Mr. C. H. Turner in Murray's *Concise Dictionary of the Bible*, which I believe may be expected soon and which will be found to contain a masterly review of the subject along with a clear indication of the newer tendencies at work among us. There may be other parts of the volume for which I should less like to answer; I speak only of what I have seen.

In regard to the Synoptic Problem, the period of which I have been speaking has been signalized by the entrance into the arena of two leading critics, Wellhausen (1903–1905) and Harnack (*Lukas*, 1906; *Sprüche und Reden*, 1907; cf. *Apostelgeschichte*, 1908). In both cases the problem is attacked with characteristic incisiveness and energy. Not less noteworthy is the return to his old ground of the veteran Bernhard Weiss (*Quellen des Lukas-Evangeliums*, 1907; *Quellen d. Synopt. Überlieferung*, 1908). It is encouraging that these three eminent scholars agree in the main lines of their analysis, if we allow for the more extended use of Q (the discourse document) postulated by Weiss. The most important question at present *sub judice* is that as to the special source or sources of St. Luke; on this the views of Harnack and Weiss are widely divergent.

Other weighty contributions to this subject have been made by Jülicher (*Einleitung*, 1906; *Neue Linien*, 1906) and by Johannes Weiss (in *Schriften d. N.T.*, 1906). Another distinguished veteran, Dr. H. J. Holtzmann, has taken up the pen again with much advantage in a review of the 'Mark Controversy' in the *Archiv f. Rel.-Wiss.* for 1907. Altogether the Olympiad has been fruitful in searching work. I ought also to mention, besides minor productions, Mr. W. C. Allen on St. Matthew (1907), a new edition of Zahn's Commentary on St. Matthew (1905; ed. 1, 1903), and Loisy's two ample volumes on the Synoptics (1907).

In regard to the Fourth Gospel, in one sense there is, in another sense there is not, much progress to record. Broadly speaking, the two opposing estimates, the higher and the lower, confront each other obstinately with very little change. A book or pamphlet on the

one side is usually followed by a book or pamphlet on the other. Among the most recent literature I may mention, for the traditional view, Zahn's impressive Commentary (1908), Barth, *Einleitung* (1908), Lectures by the Dean of Westminster (1908); against, Burkitt, *Gospel History and its Transmission* (1906), Ernest F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel, its Purpose and Theology* (1906), two tracts by P. W. Schmiedel (1906), and commentaries by Heitmüller (1907) and Walter Bauer (1908). Two valuable works by Dr. Edwin A. Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary* (1905) and *Johannine Grammar* (1906), are analytic collections of material that need not be regarded as controversial; and as much might almost be said of Mr. H. L. Jackson's carefully balanced argument (1906), and of two delicately discriminating studies by Dr. Lock in *The Interpreter* for 1907 and in *Journ. of Theol. Studies* for April of this year.

An equally sharp division is to be observed between those who accept and those who reject the statement attributed to Papias about the death of St. John, which has become so prominent in recent years. As a rule the conservative writers dismiss it, while the critical writers insist upon it. I find myself here rather between the two camps, as I cannot satisfy myself that it is safe either to build much upon it or to treat it as non-existent.

And yet, although the general position is one for the most part of stubborn attack on the one side and stubborn defence on the other, the controversy is gradually being brought within narrower limits; the two parties are coming to understand each other better, and the antitheses are less extreme.

I should note in passing, the hypothesis of divided authorship—of an older and a later stratum—advocated by Wendt, Dr. C. A. Briggs, and Prof. von Dobschütz. I am afraid that I am not yet converted.

Of the other books of the New Testament, the Acts is once more the subject of lively discussion, turning mainly round Harnack's two monographs on the Lucan writings. So far, Harnack has been rather in a minority among his own countrymen; but it is only fair to him to say that in this country he has many sympathizers. With us, it is not only a question of results but of method; and I confess that for myself I prefer Harnack's methods to those of his opponents. I believe that the data on which he grounds his case are (within their limits) less subjective and more trustworthy than the arguments brought on the other side.

The last four years have been a comparatively quiet time for the criticism of the Pauline and Catholic Epistles. Since Clemen's *Paulus* (1904), I do not think that there is anything of great impor-

tance to chronicle except commentaries (1, 2 Thessalonians, Milligan 1908, [Wohlenberg, 1903]; 1 Corinthians, Bachmann, 1905, [Goudge, 1903]; Galatians, Zahn, 1905; Ephesians, &c., Philippians, P. Ewald, 1905; Pastorals, Wohlenberg, 1906; St. James, Knowling, 1904; and other series), also the more general head (St. Paul and Christ) that I shall come to presently.

Apart from the Gospels, the chief centre of critical activity has been the Apocalypse. It fell to me to review the recent literature—especially the English literature—on this book in the *Journ. of Theol. Studies* for July, 1907; and, as the subject is secondary for our purpose and time is pressing, I may perhaps be allowed to refer to that article, without going into further details; it is supplemented and extended in two articles by Arnold Meyer in the *Theol. Rundschau* also of last year. Two words may be added. One is that, since these articles there has appeared a posthumous fragment on Apoc. i–iii by Dr. Hort, with an introduction advocating the early date 69 A.D. The other remark is that the work on Apoc. to which we are all most indebted is Bousset's Commentary, of which a new edition came out in 1906 (1st ed. 1896).

Over all this ground of the New Testament the subject that most concerns the historian of religions is the presentment of religious ideas. From this point of view we may note as specially characteristic of the new century and in full swing during the period with which we are dealing, the strong appeal that is being made to the people as contrasted with the more limited public of scholars to which the theology of the last century addressed itself. The impulse was probably given by the publication of Harnack's famous lectures *Das Wesen des Christentums* in 1900; but there was a crowd of younger professors and writers who were ready and eager to act upon the hint on a more extended scale. The series *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher* was launched in 1904, and the stream has been running in swift and full current ever since. The rival series of *Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen*, from a more conservative or conservative-liberal point of view, was started a year later and is also carried on with much energy. Other series, like Weinel's *Lebensfragen*, have a similar object. I believe that these popular tracts have had and are having a wide circulation in Germany. In these islands, too, religious discussions always excite a widespread interest; the misfortune is that popular writers with us are not always so competent as they usually are among our neighbours. A heightened religious consciousness and interest may be taken as a mark of the twentieth century, along with a striving after freshness and reality which is not content

with simple acquiescence in ancient formulae. It may be understood, therefore, that the discussions of which I am about to speak, though for the most part originating among scholars, reach further than such discussions used to do. The Gospels and the Life and Teaching of Christ are in these days the dominant topic; and if we ask which of the sub-heads has been most prominent in the last four years, it would probably not be wrong to say that it has been what is technically called Eschatology.

In the period preceding the last International Congress at Basel it might be said that the leading New Testament topic under discussion had been the question as to the title 'Son of Man'. By the time that the Congress was held that question had nearly worked itself out. The upshot was that, while it was fully admitted that in the Aramaic of Palestine as it was spoken at the Christian era the phrase had come to mean simply 'man' or (with the article) 'the man', it did not by any means follow—as had been supposed in some quarters rather hastily at first—that it had not been used by Christ Himself and of Himself. It was seen to be difficult to hold any such view in face of the evidence which showed it to be deeply rooted in the Synoptic as well as in the Johannine tradition, and at the same time no less remarkably confined to this and absent from the usage of St. Paul and of the Primitive Church in general. Most scholars had come to think that there was a tacit reference to the famous vision described in Dan. vii. 13, the Human Figure as contrasted with the four Beasts which stood for the four world-empires. There was also a general tendency to see the same Figure in the heavenly Judge of the Similitudes of the Book of Enoch, who is there too called the Son of Man. Dr. Cheyne (in *Bible Problems*, 1904) argues that the reference was to the Messiah in the form of the archangel Michael; Gressmann, in the book of which I have spoken above (p. 7), connects it with 'the heavenly man' or 'the ideal man', thinking that 'the man' stood for these fuller phrases much as 'the day' or 'that day' stood for 'the day of the Lord', 'the day of judgement,' or 'the great day'.

But the point that came out most clearly was that in the usage of the time the conception was essentially eschatological; it was part, and a leading part, of the general conception of the approaching end of the world which was dressed out in such vivid colours. And whereas in the period before 1904 controversy had turned largely round the particular conception of 'the son of man', in the period now before us the whole question of the eschatology of the New Testament has been actively debated. I am glad to think that we have

on our own programme papers on the subject by two distinguished scholars, which I am sure will be listened to with the greatest interest. We are all of us apt to be influenced by subjective impressions, and I confess that for my own part few of the books that have been published during this period have taken a stronger hold on me than Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (1906). It is a combative book, and has passed rather like a storm-cloud across the sky. No doubt it has its faults, as well as its conspicuous merits. To discuss these quite freely would lead me outside the sphere of this Congress. The chief mistakes of the book appear to me to be two. It does not take sufficient account of the literary criticism of the Gospels; and it does not allow enough for the extent to which Christ, in adopting the current ideas of the time, also transformed them. I think we may say that the extent to which He did transform this particular group of ideas is one of the leading problems that the student of the New Testament has to consider. I may point out that, while the later writers, St. Paul and St. John, practically substituted another group of ideas—or at least laid the stress upon this other group which they silently withdrew from the eschatological—they did not even to the last discard the eschatological idea altogether. As late as Phil. iv. 5, St. Paul still puts forth the warning, 'The Lord is at hand'; and as late as 1 John ii. 18, St. John writes, 'Little children, it is the last hour; and as ye heard that antichrist cometh, even now have there arisen many antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last hour.' This is a part of the problem that must not be lost sight of.

Among the recent writings which are most helpful to us in weighing this and other questions, probably the most valuable are those of H. J. Holtzmann. It is a delight to see with what undiminished — nay, accelerated — energy this most experienced of scholars makes use of the leisure that he has earned so well. He gives us just what experience and knowledge such as his are best able to give us, surveys at once broad and penetrating of one branch after another of the department of which he is master. Perhaps the most important from our present point of view is his treatise on the Messianic consciousness of Christ, *Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu* (1907), which is specially interesting as bringing out the large amount of substantial consent which underlies the individual diversities of apprehension among the scholars of the present time. Dr. Holtzmann distributes his favours over a rather large number of periodicals, but one of the most fortunate in this respect—and indeed I may say, one of the most fortunate from the point of view of our subject generally—

during the period I am reviewing has been the *Protestantische Monatshefte*.

Of the burning questions of our time, we might say perhaps that the Virgin Birth has been a little less burning than usual. At least in this country and in Germany there has been, if I am not mistaken, a certain lull in the discussions. These have been more active in America, and especially in the *American Journal of Theology*. We may divide with America the credit of the volume of lectures from the conservative side recently (1907) published by Dr. Orr of Glasgow, one of our most prolific and able writers on this side. I should like also to commend the articles on the subject in Hastings, *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*, and an article by Mr. W. C. Allen in *The Interpreter* for October, 1905, with the relevant parts of his Commentary on St. Matthew.

Eastwards of the Atlantic, there has been more stir on the subject of the Resurrection. On this we have a survey by Holtzmann in *Theol. Rundschau* for 1906. I may mention more particularly in this connexion works by Arnold Meyer (1905), Voigt (1906), Kirsopp Lake (1907, critical and very ingenious), and a series of papers by Dr. Orr in *The Expositor* of the present year. Both the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection were discussed by Dr. Cheyne in *Bible Problems*.

Another fundamental question that has been freely discussed in the last few years is the relation of Christ to St. Paul—and that on all its sides, the extent of St. Paul's knowledge of Christ, his personal attitude to Christ, and the relation in which his teaching stands to that of Christ. Dr. Knowling's *The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ* (1905) covers most of the ground. More recently we have had a number of suggestive and interesting pamphlets by Julius Kaftan (1906), Wrede, Jülicher, and Arnold Meyer (all in 1907), among which that of Jülicher seems to me especially admirable; and I may perhaps be allowed to mention an article of my own at the end of vol. ii of the *Dict. of Christ and the Gospels*.

Questions bearing on the history of religious ideas naturally come up in connexion with the Apocalypse, especially chaps. xii, xiii, xix, xx. The pioneer and protagonist in the interpretation of these chapters specially from this point of view is Gunkel, who has been mentioned along with others in what has been already said about the literature on the book. Reference may also be made to the survey in *Theol. Rundschau* for 1907.

4. *Later History.*—When we leave behind the period of Origins

and pass on to the subsequent development of Christianity, our Olympiad has not I believe any single work to show of first-rate importance, but in many directions our knowledge has been deepened and made more exact, and in some few it has been enriched by new materials.

In the way of general survey there are the two volumes of Mgr. Duchesne (*Histoire Ancienne de l'Église*, 1906–7), the earlier portion of which perhaps preserves its engaging simplicity, in part at least, by not probing too deeply. Beyond these volumes I do not know that there is anything new to chronicle, but only new editions. But when we remember that these new editions include Harnack's *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums* considerably enlarged (1906), and also what is described as a complete recasting of Loofs's *Dogmengeschichte* (two parts, 1906), it will be understood that the gleanings are by no means to be despised. Though he keeps its modest title, Dr. Loofs is obliged to confess that his work has really outgrown the limits of a 'Leitfaden'; it represents the mature views of one who has worked closely at his subject as Professor for some two-and-twenty years.

Really new ground is broken in the posthumous treatise of Lucius, *Anfänge des Heiligenkults* (1904). Lucius and Hegler were two young scholars of great promise lost to historical science in the same year (1902).

One of the regions which, especially for us in England, stands out in much clearer light than it did is the Syriac-speaking Church with its centre at Edessa. We owe this mainly to Prof. Burkitt, who has not only gathered together what had been previously made out by Tixeront, Duval, and others, but has himself cleared up much that was obscure, particularly as to the history of the Syriac Scriptures.

Another example of the breaking up of comparatively new ground is supplied by the writings of Reitzenstein. Reitzenstein is a classical scholar who has turned his attention to the study of Hellenistic Religion, and especially to the so-called Hermetic literature, in which Egyptian religion in its Greek dress comes in contact with Christianity. His *Poimandres* (1904) should be read along with a criticism by F. Granger in *Journ. of Theol. Studies* for July, 1907. Another fresh and instructive work of Reitzenstein's is *Hellenistische Wundererzählungen* (1906), in which much use is made of the Life of Apollonius of Tyana.

Prof. Bousset's *Hauptprobleme d. Gnosis* (1907) will, I doubt not, mark a real step in advance in the mastering of that intricate subject. Carl Schmidt contributes a Coptic version of the so-called First Epistle

of Clement of Rome (1908), and Geffcken an exhaustive and valuable commentary on two Greek Apologists, Aristides and Athenagoras (1907).

The most important accession of wholly new material is the rediscovery and publication by two Armenian scholars of a work of Irenaeus preserved in an Armenian version, 'In Proof of the Apostolic Preaching' (1907). This appeared, with an epilogue and notes by Harnack, in *Texte u. Untersuchungen.* There is no doubt about the genuineness of the treatise, which reproduces the characteristic teaching of Irenaeus but can otherwise hardly be said to add to what we knew before.

Through the Berlin series of Ante-Nicene Writers we are put in possession of admirable editions of Clement of Alexandria (vols. i, ii; Stählin, 1905, 1906), of the Gnostic works Pistis Sophia and Book of Jeu (C. Schmidt, 1905), of writings of Eusebius including the completion of the Church History (E. Klostermann, 1906; E. Schwartz, 1908), and of the *Acta Archelai* (Beeson, 1906). All scholars will appreciate the value of these editions, which give them sound tools to work with instead of unsound. Among the additions to *Texte u. Untersuchungen* is a portion of the original Greek text of the Chronicle of Hippolytus, published for the first time from a Madrid MS. (A. Bauer, 1905), verifying conjectures by Mommsen and other scholars. Another elaborate edition is Funk's *Didascalia et Constitutiones Apostolorum,* the last and crowning work of a career devoted to learning.

We must note the removal of Commodian of Gaza from the list of African writers of the third century to the middle of the fifth century and to Gaul, which appears to be made good by the monograph of Father Brewer (1906). For the writers of the fourth century we have a number of monographs, which have all advanced our knowledge; e. g. Leipoldt on Didymus the Blind (*Texte u. Untersuchungen,* 1905), G. Ficker on Amphilochius (1906), Lietzmann on Apollinaris of Laodicea (*Texte u. Untersuchungen,* 1904), Künstle on the controversy which gathered round Priscillian and his writings (*Antipriscilliana,* 1905). This last work, although it has certainly advanced our knowledge, does not quite seem to have struck the final balance of what is to be said for and against Priscillian. To the fourth century also belongs the writer known as Ambrosiaster, on whom Dr. Souter has contributed an exhaustive monograph to the Cambridge *Texts and Studies* (1905). And from Cambridge also proceeds Dr. Burn's edition of Niceta of Remesiana (1905). On these two writers should be read Mr. C. H. Turner's two papers, which amount to a monograph of a very searching kind, in *Journ. of Theol. Studies,*

1906. For the fifth century we have Dr. Loofs's admirable collection of *Nestoriana* (1905). For the end of the sixth century we have a Life on a large scale of Gregory the Great by Mr. F. H. Dudden (1905).

In the way of texts, the Vienna *Corpus* has been making progress, with a new part of Tertullian (Kroymann, 1906), the first part of Boethius (S. Brandt, 1906), a new part of St. Augustine (Petschenig, 1908), and the *Quaestiones* of Ambrosiaster (Souter, 1908). I must also note the appearance of a further part of Mr. C. H. Turner's monumental work on the Latin Canons in 1907.

This is as far down the stream of ecclesiastical history as I can attempt to go. I must not, however, leave my subject without mentioning the comprehensive survey of the Christian Religion, from the first beginnings of the Religion of Israel down to the position of its leading branches at the present time, in the *Kultur der Gegenwart* (1906). Among the many able papers which compose this volume I suppose that the weightiest, as it is also considerably the longest, is the estimate of modern Protestantism by Troeltsch. It is interesting to compare the full and careful review of this by Kattenbusch in *Theol. Rundschau* of last year. And, in conclusion, I should like to do justice to the real effort after impartiality in another comprehensive work, Dr. Paul Wernle's *Einführung in das theologische Studium* (1908). Dr. Wernle has a warm temperament and strong opinions of his own, and it must have cost him not a little to state both sides of the many open questions that beset the Christian theologian with as much objectivity as he has succeeded in attaining. His special gift of clear, well-proportioned, vigorous and vivid presentation has ample scope in this volume.

2

THE PLACE OF THE SACRED BOOK IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

By F. C. PORTER. (Abstract)

In the Jewish Church of the time of Christ the Old Testament was viewed under three aspects, as a book of law, as a book of revealed mysteries, and as a book of devotion. These three aspects and uses of the book corresponded in a general way to the three parts of the canon, since after the law came the prophets, who were regarded especially as the revealers of mysteries of the unseen world and of the future; and the most important book of the third canon was the Psalms. But it can be said that the whole Old Testament was viewed and used by some Jews predominantly as law, by some as prophecy or revelation, by some as a book of prayer, giving language to religious feeling and food to the religious life. It cannot be doubted that in the time of Christ the first view and use of the book was the most prevalent, or at least the most prominent, and that the word 'law' best names the place which the Scriptures then held in Judaism. This means that the use even of non-legal parts of the book was in a measure determined by a legal conception of the nature of religion; and that the book as a whole was thought to speak to the will and to require submissive acceptance and obedient following in deed and in belief. To some Jews, however, the whole book appeared rather as a revelation to the mind of things otherwise unknowable. The mystery which the book was meant above all to disclose was that of Israel's calling to be the peculiar people of God. It is this mystery that the stories of the past explained in its beginnings and established as an historical fact. It is with the real meaning and the purposed end of this singular relation of God to Israel that the prophets are concerned. But Philo, on the one hand, and the apocalypses on the other, prove that when the book is viewed under this aspect, as the revelation of what could not otherwise be known, it is a natural consequence that all sorts of mysteries of the unseen world and of first things and last things will be sought and found in its pages.

There is, however, no doubt that to many Jews, of this as of all ages, the sacred book was chiefly one of devotion, appealing rather to the religious feelings than to the will or to the intellect. It is not only the Psalms that give evidence of this use, but the emotional element so penetrates and inspires the Old Testament writings throughout that it is impossible to imagine a time when to simple religious

souls its impression should not have come chiefly through the avenue of feeling, by means of the quality of the words themselves, which are charged with a contagious faith and hope and love.

Of course I do not mean that the three views and uses of the book are exclusive of one another. In fact it was the law that defined and secured Israel's peculiar calling, and the possession of the law and the sense of being a peculiar people were chief springs of religious feeling. Yet it makes an essential difference in the place of a book in a religion, whether one conceives of it chiefly as a law to be interpreted and observed, or as a key by which the secrets of the universe can be unlocked, or as a literature of faith and hope to be enjoyed.

From the Jewish religion Christianity received its first, and for a long time its only, sacred book. Did it with the book inherit also the place and use of the book? Of such inheritance there is much evidence; yet it was limited and controlled by three obvious facts. (1) Christians almost from the first gave up the observance of important parts of the law. (2) Christianity ceased at the same time to be a national religion. Its central mystery was not Israel, but the person and work of Jesus Christ. For him, his origin, nature, destiny, the Old Testament was searched. (3) Before many generations, and as a result of tendencies that go back to the first generation, Christianity added the New Testament to the Old, and had a sacred book of its own.

To determine the place of the book in the Christian religion we must first understand the place of the Old Testament in the religion of Christ himself. His attitude seems to have been on the one side that of every pious Jew, one of reverence as before the words of God. But on the other hand he neither had the scribes' training nor liked the scribes' use of Scripture. His words and conduct as to the laws of Sabbath, of purification, and of temple rites, his elevation of the law of love to God and man, his polemic against Pharisaic tendencies, indicate that the Old Testament was not to him chiefly a book of law in the Jewish sense. He found in it, what he found first in his own heart, universal principles of character, rather than particular and separating rules of conduct. In spite of remaining differences of opinion among scholars, the impression grows that by the side of an unquestioned reverence there was in the attitude of Jesus toward the Old Testament an essential freedom, the range and consequence of which we need not indeed suppose him fully to have known, a freedom which belonged to the immediateness and certainty of his sense of God. But if the book did not have a legal character in his use of it, did it have the place of a revelation of mysteries? That prophecy appealed more strongly to him than law we may well believe; but he appears to

us, as to his contemporaries, rather as one of the prophets than as depending upon them for his knowledge of things unseen. That he was conscious of the likeness of his message and lot to theirs is clear, but it does not appear that he learned from them as a final source or authority the truths he taught. We are thus led back from the first and second to the third use of Scripture, and reach the conviction that Jesus' use of the Old Testament was essentially devotional, that spiritual imagination and religious feeling determined his use of the book. He seems to have found God in the book with the directness and simplicity with which he found Him also in nature and in human life. 'With all piety toward the sanctity of the book, he observed and used throughout only that in it which answered to his own genius, and could be assimilated by it because it was related to it.'[1]

But the place of the Old Testament in the religion of Jesus does not necessarily fix the place of the book in the Christian religion, for the obvious reason that this religion consists in an attitude toward him rather than in his attitude toward the book. The place of Christ in the Christian religion is therefore clearly the previous question. For beginning in this direction we naturally go back to Paul. But in Paul's attitude toward Christ two sides are apparent, a profound and passionate reverence and worship, and a conscious likeness to Christ, which he could only express by saying that Christ lived in him. He was a slave of Christ, and yet he was for the first time free, because of Christ, and in him Christ did not hold in his religion the place of a new law, but of a life-giving spirit. Hence Paul did not feel bound to quote the words or imitate the outward ministry of Jesus. He opened new ways and uttered new thoughts with the certainty that he had the mind of Christ. In other words, Paul's attitude toward Christ was in principle like Christ's attitude toward the Old Testament, one in which reverence and freedom were harmoniously united. The place of Christ in the religion of Paul was such, that he did in principle, even if not with an equal simplicity, imitate Christ's attitude toward the Old Testament. But even with this it is not self-evident that *we* are to imitate his attitude. For after Paul the sacred book of Christianity came to contain the New Testament, and our attitude toward it is therefore dependent on our attitude not only toward Christ, but toward Paul himself, and other New Testament writers.

To the New Testament, and the Old interpreted by the New, Christianity has often given the place of law, and still more often that of a revelation of mysteries of the heavenly realm and of the past and future, which without it would be utterly unknowable. Yet

[1] Holtzmann.

the history of the rise of the New Testament canon does not suggest that the book was properly the foundation of the religion. The place of the book would have been very different if Christ himself had written it, even if Peter had given himself the task of recording the words and deeds of his master, or if Paul had written set treatises instead of occasional letters, the book would have had a different sort of authority. These men are greater because they did not conceive of this as their task, and their choice of other ways of forwarding the work of Christ makes it clear that in its real nature the new religion was neither a new law nor a new mystery. Its distinctive quality appears to lie, not in the region of rules or of ideas, but rather in that of ideals and motives, felt and loved and made controlling. In reality, though much used as a law and a revelation, the New Testament, like the Old, has always been also a book of devotion, through which the heart has been stirred and lifted up into the presence of God.

The Reformation had indeed the effect of increasing a legalistic use of the book as a substitute for the authority of the Church; yet its most characteristic effect was its giving the Bible back to the common people, in their own tongue, with trust in its power to speak to them and in their capacity to understand it. This must be taken as a further witness to the truth that the place of the book in Christianity is not such that it requires interpretation, as does either an outward law or a source of information as to facts or doctrines, but such that it can take a hold in the experience of common people, who read it as it stands.

We come now to the question, what effect historical criticism has on the place of the book in religion. The historical study of the Bible is simply the use of its books as historical documents; it is the search, through the surface of the literature, for the facts below. The facts are concealed in part by ideas about them, by the interests or beliefs or theories of the writers. No doubt a natural effect of historical study is therefore that one puts more value on the facts than on the records, and concludes that religion also should look to the facts, rather than to the faiths that have reshaped the facts, as containing God's real deeds and the means by which we are to know Him. These facts which history uncovers are regarded by some as consisting chiefly in a great development of religion and morals; by others chiefly as a succession of great men. Accordingly for some the development, for others the man, constitutes the thing most important for faith. Especially strong is the present tendency to think of the Christian religion as the religion of one historical personality, and of the Bible as essentially a collection of historical documents through which this person is to be known. The teaching

of Jesus is to be recovered by a critical analysis of the sources; or the character, the personality, of Jesus is to be known by a subtler process, by criticism combined with historical tact and imagination. In either case the sacred book has the significance of a source of our knowledge of facts not otherwise to be known. This is therefore a modern form of the second of the three conceptions of the place of the book in religion. In this view the gospels become a Bible within the Bible, and the historical criticism of the gospels becomes almost the chief concern of religion itself.

There are serious objections to this as an adequate definition of the place of the book in the Christian religion. It would seem to take the book from the common people and put it into the hands of historical scholars, since they alone can understand it. But this is contrary to the spirit of Christianity, and to the origin and purpose of the Biblical books. Further, an inevitable uncertainty belongs to the results of historical research, greater perhaps when a development is made out, but still great when a personality is to be understood. In fact peculiar difficulties stand in the way of making a knowledge of the historical Jesus the chief or only religious value of the sacred book. The gospels, it may be urged, do not allow us to reach certainty as to just what Jesus said and thought. Some things that he seems to have said have value for his place and time rather than for ours. And again some things not said or thought by him, but first by Paul or John or even later, have the Christian quality and a permanent value for the Christian religion.

I would therefore raise the question whether the use of the sacred book as the source of our knowledge of facts and persons should not be supplemented by a simpler and more direct use of the book as it is, by a more emotional appreciation of its qualities as a book, and a more inward response to the spirit that moves in it. This may seem to present a point of view out of place in a Congress of the History of Religions; yet I venture to think that as historians it is important for us to reflect upon the ultimate significance of historical studies, and to define the limits within which they should claim to determine the religious use of the Bible.

The third use of the book, then, the devotional, a use centreing in religious feeling and spiritual imagination, needs, I think, to be reaffirmed. The Bible remains a book, after, as before, the historian's search for its origins and for the facts that lie behind it; and as a book it possesses certain qualities and powers. Literary criticism proper, in distinction from historical criticism, is an attempt to answer the question, what gives a book permanent power? what is the secret and nature of greatness in books? Great books are known to be great by their effects; and these have never been better described than

by Longinus, who reduces them to two, ecstasy and wonder. A great book transports us; it so carries us away that we are filled with joy, as if we had ourselves produced what we read. It is ecstasy rather than persuasion, an emotional rather than an intellectual effect, that the great book produces; and it does so not only by the greatness of its thoughts, but also by the passion which creates for the thoughts wonderful words, especially words concrete and boldly figurative in character. Further this transport lifts the reader even above what is said, and sends the mind on to further reflections of its own. But this freedom and exultation are always properly accompanied by wonder at the power that so uplifts us and imparts itself to us. To render the tribute of wonder to what is truly great, as to something divine, is the highest capacity of human nature. Now no one can fail to see the close parallelism between this description of the proper effect of greatness in books and the effects which we have seen that the Old Testament produced upon Jesus, and the impression which Jesus made upon Paul. Freedom and reverence, the sense that the book is our own, that it carries us up to itself and sends us on beyond itself, and reverence which grows with the freedom, are the due and natural response of our minds to great books. But are we justified in describing in any such terms the effects of the Bible upon Christian people? It is for the sake of urging the importance of considering this question rather than with the hope of answering it, that this paper is presented. I believe that the way is prepared for such a view and use of the book by the example of Jesus and of Paul, and by the principle of the Reformation. I think it evident that it is *as a book* that the Bible has had its greatest value for religion in the past. And I would venture to urge that students of the book should add to their historical criticism, literary criticism in the proper sense of that phrase, the effort to appreciate those qualities of the book as it is which have given it power, and to analyse those effects which have proved it great. The question, Shall we understand the Bible? has been effectively used as a justification of historical criticism; but there is another even more important question to which historical science does not furnish the answer, Shall we enjoy the Bible? I find more help in answering this question in Aristotle's Poetics and in Wordsworth's Prefaces than in the writings either of theologians or of historians. The question becomes for us specifically one as to the relation between historic fact and poetic truth in the Bible. The study of this question leads to a re-examination of those upper surfaces which as historical critics we remove in order to uncover the facts, and to a discrimination between the more theoretical and the more emotional and imaginative coverings with which the facts are overlaid. In some places we shall find the historian correcting imperfect

chronicles, but in others rather spoiling poetic beauties. Sometimes his movement is upward from theory to fact, but sometimes downward from truth to fact. That in many parts of the Bible historic facts or traditions have become symbols of eternal truths and ideals, in other words that in many parts of the book the value of the record is greater than that of the facts, is self-evident; yet the book has not been seriously enough treated as having the character of an idealizing literature. The question of the place of the book in the Christian religion, it is clearly recognized, leads back to the general question of the present religious significance of past facts and persons; but it is not enough recognized that this is at least as much a literary as a philosophical question, and that the faith and the passion that have made the facts the embodiment of ideals, are not to be regarded chiefly as veils that obscure the facts.

The place of the sacred book in the Christian religion has been and must in the end be fixed by what can only be called, in the highest sense of that word, its poetic quality, by the universal truths which it so pictures that they are 'carried alive into the heart by passion', not by the particular facts which it enables us to know.

Now the use of the Bible as, in this highest sense, a poetical literature, will at first seem to believers in the Christian religion easier in the case of the Old Testament than in the New, and hardest, if indeed applicable at all, in the case of the Gospels. Here the difficulty of considering the question of a distinction between poetic truth and historic fact may seem unsurmountable. It is indeed great, and is not lessened by the consideration that the problem is not to determine the place and use of the gospels which we may ourselves prefer, but to explain the secret and nature of the religious power which on the whole these books have actually exerted. This application of the distinction is so hard, and yet so necessary if the proposal to define the place of the sacred book in Christianity by its help is to justify itself, that I should not have thought it worth while to present this suggestion here in such general terms, if it were not that I hope before long to put it forth in greater detail. I may be permitted to add a few words in its favour.

At no point does historical study seem more seriously to disturb the place of the book in the Christian religion than in the criticism of the gospels. Two methods of adjustment have been proposed, one by means of history itself, the other more philosophical in character; or perhaps I should say, one resting on the conception of personality, the other on that of development, as the decisive factor in history. One seeks to prove that there is in the gospels something which can be accepted as certain historical fact, either as a result of historical research, or as in some way independent of research, namely, the

inner life or personality of Jesus of Nazareth ; and that the gospels furnish the means by which we may experience this person, both as an historical fact and as a religious power. The other maintains that we may freely yield to the insoluble difficulties of gospel criticism, because the Christian religion does not consist in an attitude toward the historical Jesus, but in the acceptance of the Christian ideal or principle, which only took its start in him, but is to be known even more fully in its later developments, and can be experienced as a present reality. The chief objections urged against the first view are that, if criticism renders details in the gospels insecure, the total impression, the character or inner life of Jesus, cannot have the sort of certainty which faith requires ; and that in any case an historical person cannot be the object of present faith. The main objection to the second view is that actual Christian experience, past and present, centres in the person of Jesus Christ and not in an abstract ideal. No one, I think, can fail to feel the greatness of the problem presented by this well-known division in the ranks of liberal or historical theologians.

May not help toward an understanding come from the recognition that the question of the place even of the gospels in actual Christian experience is not only, and perhaps not primarily, a question of past historical fact, or of permanent historical forces and processes, but also of the power of the mind to clothe its deepest feelings and highest apprehensions of truth, its most living sense of God and the unseen world, in concrete narratives or pictures, and that, whatever their precise relation to fact, these pictures, in any case, have their real significance as the language of faith and emotion, in their transformation of things seen into symbols of things unseen and eternal.

3

CHRIST'S DESCENT INTO HELL

By FRIEDRICH LOOFS

When in this congress I undertake to speak of Christ's 'Descent to Hell', you will think that I intend to explain the origin of this idea from parallels in religious history. The assertion that the descent-idea has its origin in mythological influences is now not unheard of : in Germany Pfleiderer,[1] Bousset[2] and others have defended it, in

[1] O. Pfleiderer, *Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung*, Berlin, 1903, pp. 65–71.

[2] W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, pp. 255–60.

England one of the best known teachers of this University.[1] But I have in view just the contrary. I wish to point out that the idea of the descent is a primitive Christian idea, which has no relation whatever with the alleged parallels of other religions.

For this purpose I will trace back the history of the descent-idea by five steps, the first of which will be from our own time to the middle ages.

It sounds very mythical, to be sure, when we are taught that 'it is to be believed, that Christ went down into hell'.[2] And the Lutheran conception of this portion of the Creed, which more than others does justice to its present text, is in fact in no way derived from the New Testament. 'The entire Christ, God and man'—so teaches the *Formula Concordiae*[3]—'after His burial descended to hell, overcame the devil, destroyed the power of hell, and deprived the devil of all his prestige.' But this conception of the descent is nothing but a foolish dogmatizing of some of Luther's picturesque expressions. Luther himself, in the sermon to which the *Formula Concordiae* refers, says: 'Bodily it did not happen so, because Christ remained in the grave the three days.'[4] 'But,' so he adds, 'I am pleased with what is painted: that Christ descends with banner in hand, comes to hell, smites the devil and expels him, storms hell and rescues His own.'[5] 'Thus the people would be led to believe that Christ has released us from hell.'[6] Therefore the conception of the *Formula Concordiae* is really based upon mediaeval pictures of the descent to hell. We have them still in great number to-day.[7] Two distinct things are here represented: the releasing of the Old Testament saints from the forecourt of hell, and the victory over the devil. This releasing of the Old Testament saints had no place in Luther's thoughts: he considered Adam a Christian[8] because of his belief in the promise, and therefore the lot of the Old Testament saints after death was to him no other than that of Christians. Consequently only the victory over the devil remained for him, and for the forecourt of hell was substituted the

[1] Percy Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, 2nd edit., London, 1907, pp. 263–74.

[2] Thirty-nine Articles, art. 3.

[3] Art. 9; *Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, ed. J. T. Müller, Stereotyp-Ausgabe, p. 696.

[4] Sermon preached at Torgau, 1533, *Luther's Werke*, Erlanger Ausg., Deutsche Schriften, 19², 41; cf. F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 4. Aufl., Halle, 1906, p. 779.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., and p. 45.

[7] Some examples are given by J. Monnier, *La descente aux enfers, Étude de pensée religieuse, d'art et de littérature*, Paris, 1905, pp. 193–209.

[8] Cf. e.g. *Predigten über das* 1. *Buch Mosis*, Weim. Ausg., 24, 99 sq.; Erl. Ausg., Deutsche Schriften, 33, 99.

very hell itself, the fortress of the devil. This conception of the descent may remind us of old myths; but that its *origin* was influenced by myths cannot be said.

And now the second step. How are we to explain the origin of the paintings referred to by Luther, and of the Roman Catholic conception expressed by them? There can be no doubt that the fancy of the mediaeval painters and theologians arose from the so-called 'Gospel of Nicodemus',[1] an *apocryphon* perhaps of the fourth century which was widespread in the middle ages. It relates with dramatic vividness how Christ after His death descended into Hades, released the Old Testament saints, who greeted Him with joy, but chained the devil (who wished to see Him retained there) and thrust him into Tartarus.[2] Here also the later tradition does not exactly agree with the earlier. In the gospel of Nicodemus the scene is the Hades, expressly distinguished from Tartarus, and the chief feature is the releasing of the Old Testament saints, the subjection of Satan being only an accompanying incident. To mediaeval theologians, and still more in the popular belief, it was hell to which Christ descended. It is true, the theologians declared that it was not the very *infernus damnatorum* to which Christ descended, but the forecourt, the limbo, where the Old Testament fathers dwelt.[3] But many of the pictures have as their scene Satan's fortress, even the jaws of hell,[4] and the victory over the devil comes already more into the foreground here than it did in the gospel of Nicodemus.

In the pictures we can see also a mythical element, especially in those details which are not found in the gospel of Nicodemus; but, nevertheless, mythological influences were at work only remotely. In every particular, it is true, the process by which the Hades of the ancients became the hell of the middle ages has not yet been fully investigated. But it is probable that some well-known passages of Scripture—for example, the parable of the rich man and Lazarus,[5] and Christ's utterance about the strong man armed who is overcome by a stronger,[6]—the crude realism of popular imagination, and the one devil in the gospel of Nicodemus, who here also 'took with him seven and more other devils',[7] had a greater part in this development than did mythological influences.

[1] More exactly, the second part of this gospel; *Evangelia apocrypha*, ed. C. von Tischendorf, ed. sec., Leipzig, 1876, pp. 322 sq. (Greek text) and pp. 389 sq. (Latin texts).

[2] Ibid., Greek text, c. 6, p. 329, Latin text B, c. 8, p. 429; differently related in Latin text A, c. 6, p. 400 ('tradidit eum inferi potestati').

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* iii. 52. 2.

[4] See e.g. Monnier, fig. 6 (p. 294).

[5] Cf. Luke xvi. 23 sq.

[6] Luke xi. 21 sq.

[7] Cf. Luke xi. 26.

Now by a third step I come to the source of the mediaeval idea, the gospel of Nicodemus. Have mythological influences here been a creative factor? On the contrary we may again refer to an older Christian tradition. In proving this I will not enter upon the history of the Apostles' Creed. One knows that in the Creed the words *descendit ad inferna* cannot be traced back much beyond Rufinus.[1] But the idea itself is much older. In our review of its earlier history we must first pause in the second half of the second century. At that time a conception of the descent was prevalent in the Church, of which the story of the Nicodemus gospel was without any doubt a further development. Irenaeus speaks often of the descent, and no less than six times[2] cites a prophecy purporting to be from Jeremiah, which determined his conception. 'The Lord, the Holy One of Israel'—so reads the prophecy—'remembered his saints, who slept in the realm of the tombs, and descended unto them to preach his salvation, in order to save them.'[3] Tertullian thinks likewise concerning the descent;[4] while Justin knows the prophecy of Jeremiah quoted by Irenaeus, for he says that it was expurgated by the Jews.[5] In Clement of Alexandria also we find a similar conception of the descent,[6] and even Celsus, the pagan controversialist, is acquainted with this Christian idea.[7]

Comparing this conception of the descent with that of the Nicodemus gospel we discover this important difference: no mention here is made of the victory over Satan in connexion with the descent, the only meaning of the descent-idea being that Christ, like all the dead, went down to Hades and there imparted His salvation to the Old Testament saints. Again, it is undeniable that the additions in the gospel of Nicodemus increase the similarity to mythical thoughts. But equally I assert that the account in Nicodemus is not rooted in mythical ideas. The Epistle to the Hebrews says that Christ 'through death destroyed him, who had the power of death, that is the devil'.[8]

[1] Cf. F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol*, ii, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 895 sq.; F. Loofs, *Symbolik*, i, Tübingen u. Leipzig, 1902, p. 41.

[2] *Adv. Haer.* iii. 20. 4 (Massuet), ii. 108 (Harvey); iv. 22. 1, ii. 228; iv. 33. 1, ii. 256; iv. 33. 12, ii. 267; v. 31. 1, ii. 411; and once in the ἀπόδειξις recently discovered (Texte und Untersuchungen, ed. Harnack u. Schmidt, xxx. 1, Leipzig, 1907, p. 42).

[3] Irenaeus, *adv. Haer.* iii. 20. 4, ii. 108; comp. A. Resch, *Aussercanonische Paralleltexte zu den Evangelien* (Texte und Untersuchungen, ed. Harnack und v. Gebhardt, x. 1 and 2, Leipzig, 1893–94), pp. 372 sq.

[4] *de Anima*, 7 and 55, ed. Oehler, ed. min., pp. 1008 and 1071; cf. F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol*, ii, pp. 902 sq.

[5] *Dialog.* 72, ed. Otto, ii. 260.

[6] *Stromata*, vi. 6. 44–46, ed. O. Stählin, pp. 453 sq.

[7] Orig. *c. Celsum*, ii. 43, ed. Koetschau, i. 166.

[8] Heb. ii. 14.

Is it not, therefore, intelligible that in the gospel of Nicodemus, as elsewhere in the literature of the third and fourth centuries,[1] the idea of the vanquished devil, so often expressed in the New Testament, is combined with the releasing of the Old Testament saints? For the explanation of this we have no need of the comparative study of religions.

But do we need it—now I make the fourth step—to make intelligible the origin of the more simple descent-idea prevalent about 180? Whence did this arise? Certainly not from the New Testament—that is the first answer which must be given. There are two familiar passages in the New Testament which for centuries, though not universally, were explained as referring to the descent—1 Pet. iii. 19 sq.: 'by which (viz. the spirit) also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which sometime were disobedient, when once the longsuffering of God waited in the days of Noah'; and iv. 6: 'for this cause was the gospel preached also to them that are dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit.' Till the present day it is disputed whether these passages must be interpreted as references to the descent.[2] I think they should not. But I may leave this question undecided. For one thing is certain: the descent-idea prevalent about 180 is not traceable to any of these Petrine passages.[3] For the first speaks of an announcement to those who sometime were disobedient, but the Church about 180 connected with the descent only the preaching to the Old Testament saints. And the second passage speaks of a message to those who afterwards were judged in the flesh; but the Old Testament saints received their judgement, viz. death, before they had the gospel brought to them. Also before Clement of Alexandria, who in discussing the descent alludes somewhat vaguely to 1 Pet. iii. 19 sq.,[4] there is no mention whatever of these Petrine passages in connexion with the descent-idea. Irenaeus too, although

[1] Cf. e. g. Origen, *in Gen. Hom.* 17. 5, ed. Lommatzsch, viii. 290 'rediens ab inferis et ascendens in altum captivam duxit captivitatem. Hoc ergo modo et in somno suo leo fuit, vincens omnia et debellans et destruxit eum, qui habebat mortis imperium, et velut catulus leonis die tertia suscitatur.'

[2] Cf. C. Clemen, *Niedergefahren zu den Toten*, Giessen, 1900, pp. 115 sq., and the latest discussion of the subject by H. Holtzmann in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, ed. A. Dieterich, xi, 1908, pp. 285 sq.

[3] That was asserted rightly by Theodor Zahn forty years ago (*Der Hirt des Hermas*, Gotha, 1868, pp. 425 sq.). When Bousset states that the later (post-apostolic) conception of the descent in general was determined by 1 Peter iii. 19 sq. (*Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907, p. 256), then he asserts without proof things which cannot be proved, but which also are evidently false.

[4] *Strom.* vi. 6. 45. 4.

he regards 1 Pet. as Petrine,[1] makes no use of these passages when collecting evidence for the descent.[2] These Petrine passages, if they refer to the descent, must be considered as witnesses to a peculiar conception of it which had no tradition in the old Church. No other passage which could be held as the source of the descent-idea prevalent about 180, can be found in the New Testament. Therefore it might be possible to trace back the idea to the religious syncretism of the second century, if we could not show that the idea rests upon older Christian tradition.

In the West, it is true, the idea of Christ's preaching in Hades had no older history. For Hermas (about 140) makes the Old Testament saints acquainted with the name of the Son of God through the Apostles, not Christ, preaching in Hades.[3] Hence it must be concluded that he knew nothing of Christ's preaching in Hades. But in other places we find this idea. Justin knew it, as we have seen; but since he did not grasp the difference between the Old and the New Testament, and since he regarded as Christians even some of the Greek philosophers because 'they lived with the logos',[4] he could not have originated the idea that a message of Christ was necessary for the Old Testament saints. Probably he brought it with him out of Asia Minor, where he was baptized. Here in Asia Minor the existence of the idea is evident also from the fact that Irenaeus for his conception of the descent quotes as authority one of the 'presbyters',[5] that is to say, one of the older Christians of his native country. This presbyter, I consider, cannot have written much before 150, because he was an opponent of Marcion.[6] By Marcion again we are led a step farther. He believed, as Irenaeus relates, that Christ descending to Hades won by His preaching Cain and others like him, the Sodomites, Egyptians, and people of that kind, and multitudes of other pagans, while Abel and Enoch, Noah, Abraham, the patriarchs and prophets, did not receive His message, thinking their God was trying them once again.[7] This belief of Marcion obviously is a complete reversal of the idea that Christ released the *saints* of the Old Testament, and proves that he was familiar with the idea, which he reversed. He must, surely, have made its acquaintance, before becoming a heretic; in his native country, Asia Minor. There, indeed, we meet the idea long before Marcion. For it was known to Ignatius of

[1] Cf. *adv. Haer.* iv. 9. 2, ii. 170.
[2] Cf. *adv. Haer.* v. 31, ii. 411 sq.
[3] *Simil.* ix. 16. 5.
[4] *Apol.* i. 46. ed. Otto, i. 128.
[5] *Adv. Haer.* iv. 27. 2, ii. 241.
[6] Cf. A. Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Litteratur*, i, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 338 sq.
[7] Irenaeus, *adv. Haer.* i. 27. 3, i. 218 sq.

Antioch, who wrote in Asia Minor and very probably had earlier relations with that country.[1] He says of the prophets, that they were disciples of Christ and expected Him as their teacher, through the Spirit; 'and for this cause,' Ignatius adds, 'He whom they rightly awaited, when He came, raised them from the dead.'[2] In another place he calls the prophets 'approved by Jesus Christ and numbered together in the gospel of our common hope.'[3] The same thoughts probably are in the background, when Ignatius characterizes Christ as 'the door of the Father, through which Abraham and Isaac and Jacob enter in and the prophets and the Apostles and the whole Church'.[4] Evidently here we have a conception of the descent similar to that which was prevalent in the Church about 180. Nevertheless, the Ignatian conception has its peculiarity, at least in comparison with that of Irenaeus and Tertullian.

Tertullian[5] says clearly that heaven is shut so long as the earth stands.[6] All the dead dwell in the intermediate realm, and all people, Christians and others alike, descend into Hades after death; only the souls of martyrs come immediately to paradise.[7] There Tertullian presupposes also the presence of the souls of the released Old Testament saints.[8] Irenaeus, who as regards the eschatology had not mastered the different traditions brought down to him, held essentially the same opinion.[9] Yet apparently he thought of the πνευματόφοροι (that is the spirit-bearers, namely the martyrs and the most perfect Christians) after death not simply as spirits, as Tertullian, but—probably basing his theory on 2 Cor. v. 1 sq.—as clothed with intermediate bodies.[10] Now from Ignatius we hear, that Christ *raised*

[1] Cf. E. v. d. Goltz, *Ignatius von Antiochien als Christ und Theologe* (Texte und Untersuchungen von Harnack und von Gebhardt, xii. 3, Leipzig, 1894), pp. 174 sq., and F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 4. Aufl., Halle, 1906, p. 102, note 10.

[2] Magn. 9. 2 παρὼν ἤγειρεν αὐτοὺς ἐκ νεκρῶν.

[3] *Philadelph.* 5. 2.

[4] Ibid. 9. 1.

[5] Cf. F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol*, ii. 902 sq.; L. Atzberger, *Geschichte der christlichen Eschatologie innerhalb der vornicänischen Zeit*, Freiburg i. B., 1896, pp. 301 sq.

[6] *de Anima*, 55, p. 1071 'nulli patet caelum terra adhuc salva'.

[7] *de Resurr. Carnis*, 43, p. 973 'nemo enim peregrinatus a corpore statim immoratur penes Dominum nisi ex martyrii praerogativa, paradiso scilicet, non inferis diversurus'.

[8] *de Anima*, 55, p. 1071 'in paradiso, quo iam tunc patriarchae et prophetae appendices dominicae resurrectionis migraverunt'; cf. *Apolog.* 47, p. 145 'si paradisum nominemus, locum divinae amoenitatis recipiendis sanctorum *spiritibus* destinatum'.

[9] Cf. Atzberger, l. c., pp. 238 sq.

[10] *adv. Haer.* v. 5. 1, ii. 330, Enoch is called τὴν μετάθεσιν τῶν δικαίων μηνύων and Elias τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῶν πνευματικῶν προφητεύων.

the prophets from the dead.[1] This same term is used in the passage quoted by Eusebius from the *Acts of Thaddaeus*, written about 250. Here it is said of Christ: 'He was crucified and descended into Hades and raised some of the dead; thus He descended alone, but ascended to His father with a great people.'[2] Also in the gospel of Nicodemus we are told that Christ seized the first parent Adam by the hand and raised him.[3] That this raising (ἐγείρειν) must be interpreted as a bodily resuscitation anticipating the resurrection of the flesh,[4] I cannot believe.[5] It means, at least in Ignatius, only this, that Jesus imparted to the prophets, held in captivity by death, His eternal life. Details are not given by Ignatius; hence we cannot decide whether he took into account the souls only, as Tertullian, or whether, as Irenaeus, he thought that the raised saints possessed intermediate bodies. But the idea itself may be explained by an analogy. For himself, that is, Ignatius does not expect a sojourn in Hades; for he hopes after death to 'attain unto God', to be with the Lord.[6] Now we cannot imagine that Ignatius, since he was far from considering himself more perfect than other Christians, looked forward for himself, as a martyr, to a lot which he held to be unattainable for others. Therefore he must have supposed that all Christians, though they will experience the resurrection of the flesh only at the end of all things, do not fall into the captivity of death, that is in Hades, but through the door of death will enter eternal life. That which the Christians experience immediately after death, according to Ignatius apparently was imparted to the Old Testament saints by the descent of Christ. In Tertullian, and less clearly also in Irenaeus, paradise is a better section of the intermediate realm, the Hades of the most pious;[7] in Ignatius, however, the Christians and the released Old Testament saints have nothing to do with Hades: for the Old Testament saints are awakened from the sleep of death, and the Christians in Christ have a life of which they never shall be deprived.[8]

The Ignatian conception certainly is the more original. First because it was still extant in the Church in the time of Irenaeus and

[1] *Magn.* 9. 2.

[2] Eusebius, *H. E.* i. 13. 20, ed. C. Schwartz, i. 96.

[3] c. 8, p. 330.

[4] That is the meaning of Th. Zahn (*Ignatius von Antiochien*, Gotha, 1873, pp. 598 sq.).

[5] What the gospel of Nicodemus tells of the malefactor (c. x, p. 331) is a reason for the contrary.

[6] *ad Rom.* ii. 1, 2; vi. 1, 2; vii. 2; *ad Polyc.* f. 1 a. o; cf. v. d. Goltz, pp. 37–41.

[7] Cf. Atzberger, pp. 302 sq., and 244 sq.; Kattenbusch, *Das apost. Symbol*, ii. 906.

[8] Cf. *ad Eph.* iii. 2 Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, τὸ ἀδιάκριτον ἡμῶν ζῆν.

Tertullian as an idea which they opposed.[1] Also it shines through the later conceptions[2] and, in spite of Irenaeus and Tertullian, to some degree held its own in the Church. For, although the conceptions of an intermediate realm in Irenaeus and Tertullian, when earnestly thought out, would have degraded the release of the Old Testament saints from Hades to simply an elevation from a lower to a higher place in Hades—yet they have not hindered posterity, nor entirely Irenaeus himself,[3] from thinking that the Old Testament saints and the best of the deceased Christians were already, before the end of the world, in heaven in the society of God.[4] Further, the idea that the martyrs and the other spirit-bearers were destined to enjoy after death a different lot from the common Christians is evidently a modification of earlier and bolder hopes. For in the idealistic view of the primaeval age all Christians were regarded as spirit-bearers.

When we now ask, what has caused the modification of the descent-idea in Irenaeus and Tertullian, we may indeed point to mythical traditions; but not to mythical traditions from the Far East. It is the Greek Hades-idea which caused that modification directly, and indirectly late Jewish apocalyptic views. But here too the mythological influence was not the only determining factor. The situation in the Church which did not allow all Christians to be considered as spiritual and fit for the Lord's society, had its share in the development.

Now by a fifth step I come to the last question. How does the Ignatian conception stand? Was it at least originated by mythological influences? As before we must ask if this descent-idea can be traced back further in the Church. Many things indicate that it can. First, Ignatius did not teach the matter, but presupposes it as well known. Then, too, we cannot separate from his conception of the descent the steadfast idealism of the primitive age which considered all Christians as fit for the society of Christ. Finally, the whole idea shows a genuine Palestinian-Christian colour. For till Clement of Alexandria, who gives to pagans also the benefit of the preaching in Hades,—if not Christ's, at any rate that of the Apostles,[5]—in the Church only a release

[1] Tertullian, *de Anima*, 55, p. 1071, refutes those who say: 'in hoc Christus inferos adiit', ne nos adiremus. ceterum quod discrimen ethnicorum et Christianorum, si carcer mortuis idem?' And Irenaeus (*adv. Haer.* v. 31) resists *orthodox* Christians, who assert, 'interiorem hominem ipsorum derelinquentem hic corpus in supercoelestem ascendere locum.' Cf. Kattenbusch, *Das apost. Symbol*, ii. 902 sq.

[2] That the Old Testament saints ascended with the Lord continues to be said; cf. Tertullian, *de Anima*, 55 above, p. 26, note 8, and *Acta Thaddaei* above, p. 37. Now the Lord is in heaven, not 'only in paradise'.

[3] *adv. Haer.* iv. 33. 9, ii. 263 'ecclesia . . . multitudinem martyrum . . . praemittit ad patrem'.

[4] Cf. the catholic doctrine.

[5] *Strom.* vii. 6. 45, 4.

of the Old Testament saints was derived from the descent. Clear evidences of Christ's preaching in Hades, it is true, are not to be found before Ignatius. Nevertheless I think that the existence of this idea even before his time can be proved. I wish to prove it from three sources.

In Asia Minor we have found so far the oldest traces of the descent-idea. Now does the idea appear also in the Johannine books, which are certainly, whoever wrote them, the basis of Asia Minor's theology? I think it does. It is intimated in Rev. i. 18: 'I was dead, and behold I am alive for evermore, and have the keys of hell and of death.' Also the fourth gospel in my opinion is acquainted with the idea. The much-disputed passage, viii. 56: 'Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it and was glad', is sufficiently cleared up, if 'he saw it and was glad' is interpreted as having happened at the descent of Christ. The words then as words of Christ imply, of course, a strong anachronism. But without the supposition of an analogous anachronism John vi also cannot be understood.

The second passage, which seems to me important, is Matt. xxvii. 51 sq.: 'the earth did quake and the rocks rent, and the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints, which slept, arose and came out of the graves after his resurrection and went into the holy city and appeared unto many.' The origin of this legend must be explained. The hypothesis that originally only the fact of the earthquake and the opening of the graves, which resulted from it, was related, and that the story of the risen saints resulted from the opened graves,[1] seems to me scarcely plausible; for the ideas of the opened graves and of the resurrection of the saints are connected together in the tradition. The simplest explanation in my opinion is the supposition that in Matt. xxvii. 51 sq. we have an incomplete and coarse reminiscence of the descent-story.

Still more firmly am I convinced that the Epistle to the Hebrews is aware of the descent-idea. It says (xi. 39 sq.) concerning the Old Testament saints, who are cited as examples of faith: 'These all having obtained a good report through faith received not the promise, God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect.' In chapter xii, however, we find it supposed that included in the heavenly Zion, besides the Church of the first-born, are the spirits of just men made perfect.[2] Certainly here the Old Testament saints must be included. This implies that the Holy of Holies must have been opened to them,[3] and only Christ could have

[1] Cf. the commentary of H. A. W. Meyer.

[2] xii. 22 sq.

[3] Cf. ix. 8 τοῦτο δηλοῦντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου, μήπω πεφανερῶσθαι τὴν τῶν ἁγίων ὁδὸν ἔτι τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς ἐχούσης στάσιν.

effected this.[1] He, as our forerunner,[2] entered through His death into the hitherto barred Holy of Holies, that is, eternal life;[3] He 'has consecrated a new and living way for us through the veil, that is to say, his flesh'.[4] Surely here primarily is meant the sacrifice of Christ. But the statements of the Epistle become richer and clearer if we do not exclude the idea that Christ through His descent to Hades and His ascent thence prepared both for the Old Testament saints and for Christians the way to eternal life.

I do not mean that the idea of Christ's descent to Hades and the release effected was common in apostolic times. In Paul it is not clearly traceable; and had it been common in the apostolic age, it would not have been unknown in Rome about 140. But I am convinced that the idea already existed in apostolic times.

That the idea originated from the mythical traditions of other religions is improbable, because we cannot suppose that these traditions were known to Palestinian Christians. Who can believe, without being otherwise convinced, that the Palestinian Christians of the apostolic age were acquainted with Orpheus going down to the underworld,[5] with the Babylonian myth of Istar's descent to hell,[6] or with Hibil-Ziwā, the divine visitor and vanquisher of hell in Mandaeism![7] Then again these alleged parallels compared with the original descent-idea have more contrasts than similarities.[8] Finally—and this is the chief point—it is not right to seek complicated explanations, where a simpler one is at hand. That Christ after His crucifixion, as all the dead, descended into the realm of the dead (that is *Scheol* or Hades) is presupposed by Acts,[9] Paul,[10] and the first evangelist.[11] Every Jew would think so. But Christ's resurrection was considered by all Christians as something absolutely new, in contrast with all the past. Hence the patriarchs and the prophets also had not eternal life before Him, but dwelt in Hades. If therefore the Christians were convinced

[1] Cf. v. 9 τελειωθεὶς ἐγένετο πᾶσιν τοῖς ὑπακούουσιν αὐτῷ αἴτιος σωτηρίας αἰωνίου.

[2] vi. 20.

[3] ix. 24; cf. ix. 8. [4] x. 20.

[5] Cf. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, sec. ed., pp. 263 sq.

[6] Cf. Pfleiderer, *Das Christusbild*, pp. 65 sq.

[7] Cf. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, pp. 244 sq., and p. 259.

[8] Christ comes into Hades because he died and was buried; cf. Tertullian, *de Anima*, 55 'huic quoque legi satisfecit forma humanae mortis apud inferos functus'. How different it is in the 'parallels'!

[9] ii. 31 οὔτε ἐγκατελείφθη εἰς ᾅδην.

[10] Eph. iv. 9 τὸ δὲ ἀνέβη τί ἐστιν εἰ μὴ ὅτι καὶ κατέβη εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς; Rom. x. 7 τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον; τοῦτ' ἔστι Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν.

[11] Matt. xii. 40.

that whoever believe in Christ should never die,[1] then they would hardly think that the holy fathers were still held in death. Now Christ descended where they were; and thus the idea was suggested that He had brought them thence with Him. The descent-idea is a primitive Christian idea, grown up in ancient Palestinian soil; and, although limited thereby in its horizon, must be considered as an expression of faith in the absoluteness of Christianity,—as a counterpart of the Hellenistic-Christian idea of the λόγος σπερματικός.

The syncretism of the time has influenced in detail its later development, but not its origin. The contrary rather is probable. The descent-conception is one of those primitive Christian ideas which have fostered the growth of a Christian syncretism. In order to understand this, we need only see what use the gnostic Theodotus made of the descent-idea. 'The Saviour'—so he wrote—'when descending (viz. from heaven), is seen by the angels, and so they also preached Him. Also He is seen by Abraham and the other just men in the place of rest at the right hand. For it is written: "he rejoiced to see my day," that is His appearance in the flesh. Hence when He had arisen, the Lord preached to the just who were in the place of rest, and transferred them and translated them; and all shall live in His shadow.'[2] Oriental myths of a Saviour who descended from heaven, are now held by many scholars to be important for the origination of the Gnosis. I do not object to that. But we must not forget that also the descent-idea offered points of departure. Eph. iv. 9, and specially what the Epistle to the Hebrews says concerning the consecration of a new and living way to eternity, in which Christ, as our forerunner, preceded us,—all this offers parallels to gnostic ideas, which are more persuasive than all alleged mythical parallels to the descent-idea.

4

LES CHRÉTIENS D'ANTINOË

PAR E. GUIMET. (RÉSUMÉ)

PARMI les nombreuses momies qui ont été mises au jour par les fouilles pratiquées depuis douze ans dans la ville Égypto-Romaine d'Antinoë, plusieurs étaient ornées des portraits des défunts. C'était une survivance de l'idée du *support du double*. L'image du mort devait

[1] John xi. 26. To Jewish thoughts this was the same as 'shall not come into Hades' (cf. Acts ii. 29).

[2] Clement Alex. *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 18, ed. Dindorf, iii. 432.

retenir son âme (*ka* 𓂓). Ces portraits sont tantôt modelés en plâtre et appliqués sur le cadavre, tantôt peints sur la toile stuquée qui entourait la momie. On représentait non seulement la figure, mais aussi la poitrine et les mains munies d'attributs religieux ou faisant des gestes symboliques.

Cet usage a été pratiqué vraisemblablement du IIme au IVme siècle, au moment où le christianisme pénétrait en Égypte, et l'intérêt que présentent ces images pleines d'une vie intense est augmenté par les renseignements qu'elles peuvent nous donner sur les croyances, à ce moment, des riches habitants de la ville Hadrienne. On a pu sans trop de difficultés classer chronologiquement les personnages exhumés avant l'époque des portraits, les cadavres ont encore l'aspect des momies de l'Ancienne Égypte ; les dieux des bords du Nil sont représentés sur les enveloppes avec leurs titres, on voit les quatre génies funéraires désignés en égyptien, seulement l'usage des hiéroglyphes n'est plus qu'une tradition ; le peintre qui peut copier les anciens rituels n'arrive pas à écrire le nom du défunt ; le sarcophage reste anonyme.

Après l'époque des portraits les morts sont enterrés vêtus et enveloppés de nombreux linceuls richement tissés. Les ornements symboliques qui parent ces étoffes devraient nous guider pour déterminer la foi de ceux qui les portaient, mais ils peuvent aussi nous égarer ; car au milieu des arbres de vie, des swasticas, des fleurs cruciformes, des colombes, des paons, des anges ailés, le répertoire païen persiste. Ainsi la dame Sabina était chrétienne comme l'indiquent un poisson d'ivoire et un vase de verre orné d'une croix avec α et ω ; mais elle avait un immense manteau de pourpre, tout semé de groupes d'amours, avec cinq médaillons représentant la légende d'Apollon. Ce manteau est pourtant chrétien. Le choix du dieu de lumière est déjà une indication, mais dans une des scènes représentées on voit Daphné changée en laurier, symbole de résurrection, offrir au dieu une fleur cruciforme en arrondissant le pouce et l'index de manière à former le *ank* ☥ renversé ; Apollon pour répondre à ce geste tire de son carquois une flèche en disposant les doigts pour figurer le *ank* non renversé ☥ qui déjà simule le χ et le ρ de Χριστός. Ainsi cette superbe étoffe — représentation païenne — est cependant chrétienne.

Les momies à portraits nous offrent ce même mélange d'idées religieuses qui semblent contraires et qui tendent, pourtant, vers le même but : l'éternité. Tous ces gens ont le regard extasié, perdu dans l'infini ; ils sont assoiffés de clarté ; leurs mains font des gestes d'adoration, tiennent des guirlandes recourbées en forme de ☥, symbole de vie future, présentent des épis qui rappellent à la fois Osiris et

Jésus; quelques-uns portent avec dévotion la croix à boucle ☥ qui, par une sorte de calembour graphique, procède des deux croyances. Les portraits peints sont entourés des scènes du rituel funéraire, interprêtées à la romaine, Isis pleurant, Anubis, Horus, la balance de la psychostasie, le taureau qui emporte le mort; et ils tiennent néanmoins le monogramme du Christ. Leurs têtes s'encadrent dans un somptueux portique ouvert sur la lumière céleste; c'est la porte de l'au-delà, souvenir des portes des tombes pharaoniques. Mais s'agit-il du paradis isiaque si bien décrit par Plutarque ou du paradis chrétien?

Si on avait interrogé, de leur vivant, ces personnages qui nous occupent, peut-être n'eussent-ils pas pu répondre. Pour plus de sûreté ils étaient de toutes les sectes, ils s'assuraient à plusieurs chances, et la solution du problème à été donnée sans doute par l'empereur Hadrien lui-même qui, écrivant d'Égypte à un de ses amis, disait: 'Ceux qui adorent Sérapis n'en sont pas moins chrétiens et ceux qui se disent chrétiens adorent Sérapis.'

5

THE RELATION BETWEEN JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY

By T. WITTON DAVIES. (Abstract)

Neglecting intermediate views, the two following opinions have been widely held.

1. That Christianity was nothing else than what the religion of the Israelites all along looked forward to, what its rites and ceremonies typified, and its prophets foretold. To employ the usual language: the New Dispensation was the fulfilment of the Old, and was implied in every part of it.

2. That Christianity was a new and different religion. As Schleiermacher in his *Reden über Religion* (v) says: 'I hate to have Judaism described as the forerunner of Christianity. Every religion has in itself its own eternal necessity, and its beginning is original.'

Let us look at each of these antithetic conceptions more closely.

The view that Christianity is foreshadowed in the writings of the Old Testament, is the common one even yet. In the words of Augustine: 'Novum Testamentum in vetere velabatur: vetus Testamentum in novo revelatur' (*Sermo* clx). So also Calvin (*Inst.* i. 10 sq.) in effect; while Puritan and Roman Catholic scholars have alike inclined to this mode of regarding the matter. But modern historical and critical methods of Old Testament study are putting

an end to such *a priori* theories, by asking what the speakers and writers were understood to mean by their first hearers and readers. It is true that the New Testament itself appears to lend support to the older view, since it often speaks of events as 'fulfilments' of Old Testament passages, and even as referred to by those passages. This is especially the case where the life and work of Jesus Christ are concerned: e.g. Matt. i. 22 seq.; Mark i. 2, and similar language employed by Christ Himself, in Matt. v. 17, xi. 10 (Luke vii. 27), Luke iv. 21, &c. But it is probable that the sense of fulfilment in all such cases is 'realization' or 'exemplification', the speaker or writer seeming to say that what he is referring to involves the principle implied in the scripture quoted.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, indeed, seems to assume that the religion of the Old Testament, more especially that of the law, was designed to prefigure the better things of the New Covenant. The Old and the New Dispensations are connected in the same way as the objects of sense and the eternal realities of which they are the shadows. Yet we might here also apply the principle used in explaining the quotations from the Old Testament in the New Testament. With a wider and more sympathetic view of the religious aspirations and literatures of the ancient Chinese, Indians, Persians, &c., he might have seen forerunners of Christ and of Christianity in many lands and among many peoples. The narrow view which sees in Judaism alone the preparation for Christianity rests upon the notion prevalent among the Jews and the early Christians, that all non-Biblical religions were absolutely and only false.

Historically Christianity is an evolution out of Judaism; hence in studying it the latter has much light to give. But it is to be remembered that the Judaism with which Christianity stands connected is itself a syncretism, and owes much of its own character to foreign elements. From Zoroastrianism, Hellenism, and other sources, it borrowed much, always however putting its own stamp on whatever it appropriated. There is, moreover, much in the teaching of Jesus which is not only alien to Judaism, but is diametrically opposed to it. How often in the Sermon on the Mount does Jesus, when quoting 'Mosaic' laws, say with emphasis and authority, 'But I say,' &c.! Then the conceptions of the Church, its constitution, ordinances, &c., are largely of non-Jewish origin. An illegitimate identification of Judaism and Christianity has caused injustice to be done to both the Old and the New Testament.

The antithetic view to that just noticed may be thus stated: 'The religion which Jesus introduced, and which His disciples adopted and subsequently adapted, was a new beginning, having no special connexion with the Judaism of the time. Marcion's rejection of

the Old Testament, as the work of an inferior deity, is part of his Gnostic teaching; but it arose from a partial and unjust view of the Old Testament. Gnostics judged the whole of the Old Testament by the legalism of the Pentateuch, and by such parts of it as appear to stand on a low moral plane, e.g. the ruthless butchery of tribes and nations no worse than others. They failed to recognize, as Morgan and Schleiermacher in later times, the element of progress or evolution in the teaching of the Old Testament.

Thomas Morgan, the Welsh eighteenth-century Deist, who is better known on the Continent than in Great Britain, was a strong opponent of the Old Testament. But he approached the subject with a different motive from those which animated Marcion. His aim was to disprove the inspiration and authenticity of the Bible; and he felt that if he could bring discredit upon a part he could discredit the whole. In his writings, especially in the *Moral Philosopher*, he shows but little sense of the loftier and finer parts of the Old Testament. But in his views of the early church Morgan anticipated the central ideas of the Tübingen School, as before him did John Toland, an Irish Deist, who in 1718 wrote *Nazarenus, or Jewish, Gentile, and Mahometan Christianity*. As for Schleiermacher, he came to the study of Christianity as a Christian scholar and philosopher, but endeavoured to get at its root principles apart from a study of the Old Testament, by looking directly at the life and words of Jesus and of His early followers. In this respect he is to be compared with Kant and Herder.

Here, as so often, it is a case of *verum in medio*. On the one hand Christianity, growing out of Judaism, must partake of the soil from which it sprang, though that Judaism was itself a syncretism. Jesus and His disciples were Jews, observed Jewish customs and spoke according to Jewish conceptions. On the other hand, in the marvellous personality, life, and teaching of Jesus, we have a new beginning, with new issues both in the apostolic age and in the later history of Christianity.

6

NEW TESTAMENT ESCHATOLOGY AND NEW TESTAMENT ETHICS

By FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY

The most important contribution of this generation to Biblical interpretation has been made, beyond question, through the appreciation and analysis of New Testament Eschatology. Round the teaching of the Gospels, like an atmosphere which—even though

unconscious of it—they breathe, lies, according to this view, a circle of apocalyptic expectation, with its literature, its vocabulary, and its inextinguishable hopes. Though Rabbinical orthodoxy might regard this literature as heretical, it may well have had a peculiar fascination for contemplative or poetic minds. When, therefore, after solitary reflection on His mission, Jesus came into Galilee 'preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God', it might be anticipated that He, like John the Baptist, would apply to that kingdom the language of apocalyptic hope, and would announce its approach as heralded by a catastrophic end of the world-age. This key of interpretation, once in the hands of German learning, has been applied with extraordinary ingenuity to many obscurities and perplexities of the Gospels, and has unlocked some of them with dramatic success. The strange phenomenon, for example, of reserve and privacy in the teaching of Jesus, becomes, in this view, an evidence of His esoteric consciousness of Messiahship, which none but a chosen few were permitted to know. 'He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.' The cardinal phrases of the teaching, 'Kingdom of Heaven,' 'Son of God,' and 'Son of Man,' all point, it is urged, not to a normal, human or social regeneration, but to a supernatural, revolutionary, and catastrophic change. The heart of the Gospel is thus disclosed in its mysterious predictive passages: 'In those days, after that tribulation, they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds with great power and glory'; 'I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven'; and the same note is struck in the Epistles: 'Brethren, the time is short; the fashion of this world passeth away.' 'As a marine plant', remarks a conspicuous exponent of this view, 'blooms in water, but torn from its home, becomes faded and unrecognizable, so the historical Jesus fades when torn from its place in eschatology.'[1] Jesus, under this conception, is not so much Teacher as Prophet; with His gaze fixed, not on the conduct of life in the present world, but on the preparation of life for another world. 'How could Jesus, the Teacher,' asks Schweitzer, in discussing the withdrawal to the North, 'at such a moment desert a people so eager for teaching and help? [Such conduct] raises a doubt whether He felt Himself to be in fact a Teacher. . . . Even the announcement of His mission is not that of a Teacher, for His parables were, it is written, designed not to reveal, but to conceal, and of the Kingdom of God He spoke only in parables.'[2] 'His ideal', an English advocate of the same view has lately said, 'was not a human ideal, but a heavenly ideal. He did not wish to give men something to live by, but something wherewith to face the day of the Son of Man.'[3]

[1] A. Schweitzer, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*, 1906, p. 399.

[2] Mark iv. 10, 12, 34; op. cit., p. 350.

[3] H. W. Garrod, *The Religion of all Good Men*, 1906, p. 71.

In restrained, yet not unsympathetic, language, Professor Sanday calls attention to the significance of this tendency in criticism. 'I doubt if we have realized how far the centre of gravity of our Lord's teaching lay beyond the grave. . . . I doubt if we have realized to what an extent He speaks of the Kingdom of Heaven as essentially future and essentially supernatural. . . . I doubt if we have appreciated the preliminary and preparatory character of His mission.'[1]

Now it cannot be doubted that we have in this view an interpretative principle of the first importance. Its far-reaching effect upon critical study can be compared with nothing less than the epoch-making influence of Baur. Once in a century, it would seem, the pillars of New Testament history have to be tested, so that, as the Epistle to the Hebrews says, the removing of those things that are shaken may prove that those things which cannot be shaken shall remain. Yet, as it soon appeared that the *Tendenz* theory was destined to receive important qualifications, so that it must now be prized rather as a starting-point than as a conclusion in New Testament criticism, so it may be that eschatology must be submitted to many further tests before it can be trusted to support the whole structure of the Gospel. That much of the New Testament language is coloured by the apocalyptic anticipation, that the shadow of an imminent catastrophe passes, like a cloud across a landscape, over the Master's teaching, so that His mission receives what Professor Sanday has suggestively called an 'occultation',[2]—all this is not only so probable in the historical setting of the Gospels, but becomes so clarifying an element in their interpretation, that it is likely to remain a permanent factor in critical research. But to say this is to say much less than the consistent eschatologist affirms. To him this occultation was a life-long eclipse; the Gospels become a kind of drama in which Jesus disguises until the last scene His predetermined purpose; and the narrative is, in effect, the story of a colossal illusion, which Christian theology, by every device of spiritualized interpretation, has endeavoured to correct. 'The Jesus of Nazareth,' it is concluded, 'who appeared as Messiah, taught the ethics of the kingdom, and died to consecrate His work, has never lived. He is a figure, sketched by rationalism, called to life by liberalism, and supplied by modern theology with the clothing of historical science.' 'The entire history of Christendom down to the present day rests on the delay and non-arrival of the Second Coming, on the surrender of eschatology, and the accompanying and self-developing deliverance of religion from the eschatological idea.'[3]

Such an interpretation of history invites consideration from many

[1] *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*, 1907, p. 121.
[2] Op. cit., p. 131.
[3] Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 396, 356.

points of view, and may be examined with advantage even by those who are not New Testament critics. One may, for example, approach the subject with the modest purpose of a teacher of ethics, and ask himself what was likely to be the ethical teaching which would naturally issue from this condition of exalted and confident expectation. It has been said that 'it is necessary in interpreting the moral ideas of Christ to have our attention always fixed on His apocalyptic ideas.'[1] May not the converse of this proposition also be true, and may not the influence of the apocalyptic ideas be fairly estimated by reconsidering the ethics of the Gospels? Instead of applying the key of eschatalogy to New Testament ethics, may not New Testament ethics be applied as a key to its eschatology? What view of human conduct is likely to be held by one whose absorbing concern is for a supernatural and apocalyptic change, in which the fashion of this world would soon pass away? This inquiry is, at least, one which deals with the most unquestionable of the historical data. Whatever else may have been the purpose of Jesus, He was certainly a preacher of righteousness, and whatever else in His message may have been misinterpreted, His hearers were not likely to forget or to pervert His moral instruction. 'The ethical note', wrote no less radical a critic than Baur, 'is the purest and most unmistakable element in the teaching of Jesus, and the essential core of Christianity.'[2] 'The ethical ideas of Jesus', Professor Herrmann has said, 'are incontestably the essential element in the spiritual experience of the modern world.'[3] May it not then be reasonable to estimate the force of the eschatological anticipation by its effect upon this ethical note? If the controlling interest of the teacher was habitually and consistently detached from present cares, what would his ethics be? Obviously they would express with consistency and continuity this abnormal, anticipatory, waiting habit of mind. The ethics of the Gospels would give us a teaching, not designed for this world, but preparatory for another; an 'Interim-ethics', appropriate for those who looked for some great catastrophe, but not to be taken seriously by those who have waked from the apocalyptic dream. The best way of conduct on the approach of an earthquake is not the best rule of conducting a stable world. 'Can any moralist,' it has been asked, 'firmly persuaded of the imminent dissolution of the world and all things in it, frame an ethical code adequate for all time?'[4] The answer to this question is in the unwavering declaration of Schweitzer: 'It is altogether false to affirm, with modern theology, that service is

[1] Garrod, op. cit., p. 65.
[2] *Christenthum der ersten drei Jahrhunderte*, 1860, p. 35.
[3] *Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu*, 1904, p. 29.
[4] Garrod, op. cit., pp. 60, 61.

the new ethics of the kingdom. There is, to Jesus, no ethics of the kingdom; for in the kingdom all natural conditions, even differences of sex,[1] are to disappear. Temptation and sin will no more exist.... Service, humility, temptation, willingness to die, even penitence, belong to an interim-ethics.'[2]

When, however, we turn with this problem to the Gospels themselves, and set side by side with each other the eschatological dream and the ethical teaching, it seems not too much to say that at many points they do not match. The practical instructions of Jesus for the conduct of life do not easily fit in as a whole with the plot of the apocalyptic drama. Many passages there are undoubtedly which touch the anticipatory and millennial note, and some which strike that note firmly and unmistakably. If one fixes his attention on single passages, or on a single group of passages, he may easily conclude, with Tolstoi, that the essence of the Gospel is in the single virtue of non-resistance, or, with Schweitzer, that it is in the single idea of eschatology. When, however, we recall the prevailing tone of ethical teaching, and still more the habitual attitude of the Teacher toward the world in which He found Himself, it is difficult to see in it a predominating quality of indifference to the world's affairs or a complete preoccupation with a supernatural catastrophe. On the contrary, the ethics of Jesus exhibit on the whole a kind of sanity, universality, and applicability, which are independent of abnormal circumstances, and free from emotional strain. There is nothing apocalyptic in the parable of the Good Samaritan, or in the appropriation by Jesus of the two great commandments, or in the prayer for to-day's bread and the forgiveness of trespasses, or in the praise of peace-making and purity of heart. Yet in these, and not in the mysterious prophecies of an approaching desolation, the conscience of the world has found its Counsellor and Guide. The apocalyptic anticipations find their parallels in much of the contemporary literature, but the ethical sagacity and sufficiency are original and unique. The same genuine concern for the existing world is indicated even in the teaching of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of God. Here, no doubt, His message is often coloured by the sunset-splendour of the End of the Age; but it is not less often set in the prosaic light of common day. The kingdom is prepared, not for those only who have dismissed from concern the obligations of daily life and have fixed their eyes on a supernatural future, but for those who, in the world as it is, feed the hungry and clothe the naked and visit those who are sick or in prison. Whatever millennial promises may be comprehended in the message of the kingdom, the teaching of Jesus seems quite as often a warning against excessive contemplation of a supernatural consummation and

[1] Mark x. 25, 26.

[2] Op. cit., p. 362.

a recall to the humble service of the existing world. Still more corrective of a thorough-going eschatology is the habitual attitude of Jesus toward both nature and life. He looks on both, not with the eye of an ascetic or visionary, as though they stood between Him and His supreme desire, but with a keen and undisguised appreciation and delight. Each phase of nature—springtime and harvest, the lilies and the birds, the mountain and the lake, each household task—the working of the leaven and the sweeping of the room—is to Him beautiful and sacred; not as of a world that is passing away, but as of a world that is divinely given and spiritually symbolic. Human life also, its joys and sorrows, the children at their play, and the labourer at his work—these are not viewed with the pensive indifference of one whose heart is elsewhere, but with a keen sympathy and alert responsiveness which have suggested to many critics a Hellenic quality in Jesus, and have induced at least one writer to claim for Him even a Hellenic descent.[1]

In short, the ethical data of the Gospels appear to provide a test which is likely to modify in limit an extreme application of eschatology to their interpretation. If, as Bousset has remarked, the Gospels offer a religion of 'ethical liberation' it may be reasonable to conclude with him that 'though steeped in the eschatological hopes of His time and country (Jesus) yet succeeded in altering and purifying them at the critical point, and in breaking through the limits which hemmed them in.'[2] The drama dimly discerned in the Gospels may thus be interpreted by the conduct habitually commended in the Gospels. Either we must conclude that while the mind of the Master was fixed on the future He scattered along His way, as a by-product of that teaching, His universal ethics, or else we must conclude that however real to His thought, as to that of His contemporaries, the Messianic expectation may have been, it did not dominate His teaching or His character, and that in His most immediate instructions He rose above the anticipations of His time into the presence of timeless ideals. In short, this historical problem has to consider whether the secret of Jesus lay in His reflection of contemporary ideals or in His creation of new ideals; whether the apocalyptic expectation was His master or whether it was His servant; whether He reiterated the current eschatology or utilized and spiritualized it; whether in a word the central motive of His teaching was dramatic or didactic, the work of a herald or the work of a teacher; whether His place in history is to be found within the circle of contemporary thought, or whether He stood 'above the heads of His reporters'.

[1] H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, 5te Aufl., 1904, i, 219 ff.

[2] *Jesus*, tr. Trevelyan, 162 ff.

The conclusion which Wellhausen, not without impatience, but with eloquence and authority, announces, may provide a sufficient answer to these questions. 'It is held', he remarks, 'that the announcement of a future kingdom is the central element in the message. And yet, in Mark's Gospel, this element is completely in the background. Jesus, in His Galilean period, is not a herald but a teacher; and a teacher, it may be added, not of the Kingdom of God, but of the various subjects which, in natural succession, are thrown in His way,—of obvious truths applied to the needs of people misled by their spiritual guides . . . The eschatological hope first reached its intense significance through the earliest disciples, who attached it to the person of Jesus . . . His own way of life was not like that of His followers, determined by eschatology. They renounced the world to prepare for His coming; but His ethics were assuredly not, as uninformed persons have recklessly asserted, provisional ethics, to be endured only through the expectation of an approaching end, and beyond that point superfluous. His ethics were the eternal will of God, in heaven as on earth. He was no doubt deeply affected by faith in the future, in the general resurrection, the judgement, and the Kingdom of God. All this He could assume as accepted by His hearers and needing little exhortation . . . (Yet) it is the non-Jewish and human, rather than the Jewish in Him, which stamps His character.'[1]

Such are some brief suggestions of a corrective influence on New Testament eschatology which may proceed from New Testament ethics. The eschatological problem, it has been truthfully said, is just now 'in the air'.[2] It may be the task of ethical inquiry to give to this airy structure of criticism a substantial under-pinning on the ground. And this, it may be lastly pointed out, is not only an order of procedure which is applicable to New Testament criticism, but one which reflects the order of teaching which seems to have been the way of Jesus Himself. Not, first, a conviction concerning His place in the plan of the Eternal and a full understanding of His mission; but, first, loyalty, obedience, moral susceptibility—such seems to have been His education to discipleship. 'Follow me,' He says, 'Take up thy cross and follow;' and along the way of service you may reach the end of truth. Obedience, as Robertson taught, was to Jesus the organ of spiritual knowledge. Whatever dramatic elements are included in the message of the Gospels may be best disclosed through its didactic elements. The first appeal of Jesus Christ was not to the reason or the imagination, but to the will. Character to Him was the path to insight. The pure in heart should see God. Perhaps the guidance of New Testament criticism to a

[1] *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905, pp. 106, 113, 114.

[2] Sanday, op. cit., p. 65.

stable conclusion may be in the same manner committed to Christian ethics, and the metaphysics of the Gospels may be approached through the appreciation of their characteristic morality. Perhaps it may still happen that those who will to do the will are on the way to know the doctrine.

7

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EARLY CHRISTIAN ESCHATOLOGY

By ERNST VON DOBSCHÜTZ

Eschatology was not so long ago the last chapter of dogmatics. The biblical scholar was quite satisfied when he had made all the New Testament sayings about the last things fit into his system. Nobody cared what the early Christians felt and thought in reading these sayings, and but few people were personally interested in their contents. Time went on, and New Testament exegesis became historical instead of dogmatic. Students learned to ask what the New Testament authors meant and felt. But there was so little appreciation for eschatological ideas that these were, if not neglected altogether, softened down and modernized.

It is only within the last thirty years that the attitude of biblical theology has changed. Modern criticism allows a special interest in everything which is alien to our own time. Hence, together with angelology and demonology, eschatology to-day forms the most attractive of New Testament studies. And, as it generally happens, where there was once utter neglect, the tendency is now towards the opposite extreme—an over-estimation of the significance of eschatology on the part of a considerable number of scholars.

Under these circumstances I may be justified in laying before this distinguished assembly this question—What was the real significance of eschatology in the earliest days of Christianity ?

I do not propose to deal here with early Christian eschatological doctrines in general. It is well known what a number of apocalyptic ideas were current during that period. We may take it for granted that all these were borrowed from Judaism, whatever may have been their origin. The Gospel introduced two new points only : (1) the central place was given to Jesus, whose parousia or descent from heaven in the glory of the Father was to bring with it the end of this world, the resurrection, the judgement, the Kingdom of God, and life everlasting. And (2) this was expected to happen very speedily, the

Messiah having been sent already by God in the person of Jesus, and being postponed for a short space only. This is the vital point: early Christianity was not simply meditating on eschatological dreams that might be realized some time or other at a remote period, but the first Christians were persuaded that the great day when all would be changed was to come in the lifetime of their own generation.

No modern scholar will deny, I trust, that Jesus Himself and His disciples, including the apostle Paul, shared this persuasion. Of course it cannot be proved that Jesus ever thought that He would succeed in establishing the Kingdom of God without dying first. It is a widespread hypothesis among theologians of our time that He did so, at least in the first period of His ministry; that He tried to win His people by preaching and healing, and that He was only led by the experience of growing hatred on the part of His countrymen to reckon, first with the possibility, then with the necessity, of His death, and, finally, to attribute to it a positive efficacy. In vain we ask for proofs of this theory. Jesus says that unto this (present) generation no sign should be given,[1] that there were some of them that stood there who should not taste of death till they had seen the Kingdom of God come with power.[2] He never speaks of his own lifetime[3]: it is only in the next generation that the kingdom will come. His disciples have to wait for it, as they pray for its coming.[4]

And thus the Apostles, when Jesus was taken from them, taught the people that Jesus of Nazareth, whom the chiefs of the Jews put to death, was the man ordained by God; but they did not tell them that the new era had already begun. The kingdom was still to be expected. Jesus must come back from heaven to establish it, and would come quickly.

St. Paul felt sure that he would be still alive at the coming. 'We which are alive and remain,' he says to the Thessalonians[5]; and in his first letter to the Corinthians he expresses the same view.[6] Later on his attitude changes. As a matter of fact, in the second to the Corinthians, his position has become uncertain: still he hopes and wishes that death may not come to him before Christ's parousia; but having realized that death can come suddenly, even upon him, he declares solemnly his confidence that he will be in communion with Christ even in death: 'We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord.'[7] Here we find for the first time the individual death taking the place of the parousia, an alternative often suggested by later Christian writers. But Paul does

[1] Mark viii. 12. [2] Mark ix. 1.

[3] Matt. x. 23 is to be understood of the missionary work after Jesus's death, not of the disciples' short trip through Galilee. [4] Matt. vi. 10.

[5] 1 Thess. iv. 15, 17. [6] 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52. [7] 2 Cor. v. 6–8.

not at all mean to set aside the enthusiastic expectation of Christ's immediate advent. His only doubt is this—will he himself be still alive? The event is not postponed; on the contrary, it draws nigh rapidly, as he writes to the Romans: 'Now is our salvation nearer than when we believed.'[1] And even in the last of his letters he declares: 'We look for the Saviour from heaven.'[2]

To these testimonies we may add the opening and the closing words of St. John's Revelation: 'Things which must shortly come to pass'; 'for the time is at hand'; 'Surely I come quickly. Amen. Even so, Lord Jesus'[3]—sayings like these show that early Christianity was deeply impressed with this conviction.

Not a single modern scholar, I feel sure, will deny these statements. The question, however, is how far this belief in an immediate coming of the end acted upon the mind of Jesus and of His disciples. We shall find that it did not do so as much as we might expect.

Jesus declares that the gospel must be preached to all nations before the Kingdom can come[4]: but He does not go beyond the Jewish frontiers.[5] Although at the sending out of His disciples to preach in the cities and villages of Palestine His orders show that He would have them hurry on,[6] He Himself makes no haste at all. There is no evidence that He ever dreamt of hastening on the day of the Lord by His activity or His suffering, that (to quote from a recent author) He was possessed with the idea that His intervention would bring to a standstill the wheel of history.

And even St. Paul, much as he was impressed by the urgent need of accomplishing his missionary work throughout the world before the coming of Christ,[7] did not hurry on from town to town; on the contrary, he was anxious to stay as long as his activity was needed, not merely to found, but to develop and to educate a Christian community.

Now, as a matter of fact, in his exhortation he frequently insists on the approach of judgement and final salvation.[8] When he appeals to scriptural 'examples' he justifies himself by the remark that the end of the time has come upon his readers.[9] But we cannot say that this view materially influenced his ethics. Many scholars maintain that we have to explain from the eschatological point of view what Paul says about marriage in 1 Cor. vii, and, indeed, his general idea is that, as the time is short, nothing should be changed: he who was married when he became a Christian should remain married; he who was unmarried should so remain: let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called.[10] His preference for celibacy, however, is not to be ex-

[1] Rom. xiii. 11–12. [2] Phil. iii. 20. [3] Rev. i. 1, 3; xxii. 20.
[4] Mark xiii. 10. [5] Mark vi. 1 sqq. [6] Mark vi. 8–12. [7] Rom. xv. 16.
[8] 1 Thess. v. 1 sqq.; Rom. xii. 11. [9] 1 Cor. x. 11.
[10] 1 Cor. vii. 17, 20, 24.

plained by his eschatology[1]: it was the asceticism of his age which influenced him in regarding marriage as the lower state.

Jesus certainly looks forward to a rich reward, which is to be given to the poor, the hungry, the merciful, the pure in heart,[2] and so on, when the Kingdom comes; and this will be very soon. He insists on the duty of being watchful, because the day will come suddenly as a thief in the night.[3] But if we eliminate His eschatological ideas His ethics remain unchanged. Take, for example, the parables of the Good Samaritan and of the Prodigal Son.[4] The great commandments of love and of self-renunciation[5] are in no way suggestive of an 'interim ethics', but of a definitive, absolute system of ethics.

And in this way His ethical precepts were understood, taught, and acted upon by the early Christians.[6] That they are strange to our modern Christian mind is not due to the fact that we have abandoned the eschatological idea, but to the fact that the enthusiasm which inspired them and made their fulfilment easy is no longer ours. This enthusiasm, however, has its roots not so much in eschatology as in the profound consciousness of a change already accomplished through the experience of salvation, as we shall see hereafter.

It is true that neither Jesus nor Paul conceived the idea of a gradual development of the kingdom, or of an extension of the Church through a long period of history upon earth. Jesus's first coming was not indeed the end, but at the end of history. It is from this point of view that we have to understand what Jesus Himself says about His death, as a ransom for many and the making of a new covenant.[7] He looks backward in history. The new covenant will be in another aeon, not on this earth, not under these conditions of life.[8] When St. Paul speaks of Jesus as a propitiation, and of the redemption and forgiveness of all sins by His death,[9] this is intelligible on the supposition that what stands at the end of history extends its influence backwards upon the whole period which preceded. Paul does not think about the sins of millions of men, who will live after Christ's death. When he insists on the parallelism between Adam and Christ,[10] he is thinking of humanity in its beginning and in its end. Christ is not the centre or turning-point of a great historical development, as we may now call Him from our remote standpoint, but He is the end itself. What follows is no continuation, but a renovation of what has gone before, a new humanity in a new world.

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 26, 31, have been partly misinterpreted, partly overvalued in their significance.

[2] Matt. v. 3–12; Luke vi. 20–22.

[3] Matt. xxiv. 42–44.

[4] Luke x. 30 sqq.; xv. 11 sqq.

[5] Mark xii. 28–34; Matt. v. 38–48; Luke vi. 26, 27.

[6] e.g. 1 Thess. v. 15; Rom. xii. 17–21.

[7] Mark x. 45; xiv. 24.

[8] Mark xii. 25; xiv. 25.

[9] Rom. iii. 25.

[10] Rom. v. 12–21.

Thus the general conception of history in primitive Christianity so characteristic of Jewish thought as contrasted with Greek philosophy is strongly influenced by what we may call the eschatological idea. And it is this historical conception which throws light upon the early Christian theories of redemption.

These theories, however, are but a form of religious thought, just as ethics are only a way of forming the moral power of Christendom. When we ask what is the kernel of early Christian religious feeling, we shall find that there is nothing eschatological about it.

Jesus's religious position may be rightly defined as a life of unbroken union with God. The Judaism of His time, even in its most pious form, thought of God as of a distant Being, removed and completely separated from this world of sin, which was given into the dominion of subordinate or even evil spirits until the time when God should come to judge the world and to establish His own sovereignty. Jesus knows Him—and teaches men to know Him—as the Father, who, always and everywhere present, cares about the welfare of all His children;[1] who has compassion on the sinner and forgives trespasses whenever man repents. It is in the strength of this trust that Jesus goes on His way, undisturbed by hostile threats;[2] that He sleeps in the storm,[3] feeds the multitude,[4] heals all kinds of sickness,[5] and casts out the demons.[6] Thence He gets a conception of the Βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ quite different from the current one; the Kingdom of God is not to be brought about by a miraculous act of God, but it is the domination of God casting away all evil powers.[7] Jesus Himself by His complete union with God brings in this domination of God: it is where *He* is: it is present among men (or in men's hearts—within you [8]), and not to be looked for in external miraculous signs. So Jesus—in His own opinion—is not only preparing the future Kingdom of God, like His forerunner, John the Baptist, but He is actually bringing it in.[9] He is the bridegroom whose companions cannot fast while He is with them.[10] From the parables of the garment and of the wine-bottles[11] we learn that He looks on Himself and His surroundings as something quite new. He does not speak much of the new spirit, but all His acting is dominated by a new spirit. So is that of His disciples. Of course in His addresses to the people He speaks as the missionary; there is the need to be watchful, for the great moment will come shortly, suddenly. But in the intimate circle of His followers there is no anxious self-preparation for judgement to come, but a happy enjoy-

[1] Matt. v. 45; Luke vi. 35. [2] Luke xiii. 31, 32. [3] Mark iv. 37–40.
[4] Mark vi. 34–40; viii. 13–26. [5] Mark i. 32 sqq.; ii. 5; v. 34; xi. 23, 24.
[6] Mark iii. 22 sqq. [7] Matt. xii. 28; Luke xi. 20. Cp. Luke x. 18.
[8] Luke xvii. 21. [9] Matt. xi. 9–10; Luke vii. 26–8; xvi. 16.
[10] Mark ii. 19. [11] Mark ii. 21, 22; Matt. xiii. 16, 17.

ment of all blessings which God's grace had vouchsafed to them in Jesus. This is the meaning of Peter's confession:[1] 'People may say, Thou art a prophet, one of a large number, an Elijah or John, i.e. the forerunner of a greater one. *We* confess that Thou art the Christ, the unique bringer of salvation: there is none greater than Thou; in Thee we enjoy our union with God, in short our salvation.'

It is this spirit of gladness, caused by the experience of the greatest gifts of God, that we discern in the disciples after Jesus had gone from them. Whether it be called the experience of communion with the risen Lord or the communion of the Holy Ghost, it is not the anticipation of something yet to come; it is the actual possession of a present benefit.

This fact becomes still more patent when we turn once more to St. Paul. What has the triumphant hymn in Rom. viii to do with eschatology? The Christian is sure of God's love as shown and guaranteed to him by Christ who came down and died for this very purpose, and by the Holy Ghost, which is given into his heart.[2] Salvation is at hand, God has performed, Christ has died and risen, the Holy Ghost has been given to every believer. Christians then are washed, sanctified, justified.[3] They are living in a new state; old things are passed away, behold all things are become new.[4]

Eschatology, it is true, is at the background of all this, but it has changed its significance. Many sayings of Jesus and Paul are then only fully intelligible if we recognize that eschatological terms are used by them in a new sense; they discard all external, political, miraculous significance, but take the inward moral meaning as already fulfilled.[5] At the same time they do not entirely eliminate the other meaning; putting forward the new, they retain the original one combined with it. If time present had brought fulfilment, still larger fulfilment is in store for time to come.

Jesus, like all great religious personalities, was at once progressive and eminently conservative. The new gifts which He had to bring to mankind were envisaged by Himself in the form of old Jewish conceptions. External reality did not correspond to what people expected, to what Jesus Himself found in the prophets. There was still a lack of external glory. Now Jesus trusted to His Father that He would accomplish what He had begun, and fulfil all that He had promised. And so eschatology in its old form was for Him a postulate of His faith. The kingdom is at hand, it is present in His person, in His casting out devils, in His bringing sinners to repentance—but it has still to come in glory, when after His death and resurrection He will come upon the clouds from heaven.[6] Men are God's beloved

[1] Mark viii. 28, 29. [2] Rom. v. 5–8; viii. 32. [3] 1 Cor. vi. 11; i. 30.
[4] 2 Cor. v. 17. [5] See e.g. 1 Cor. iv. 8. [6] Mark viii. 38; xiv. 62.

and happy children: so runs His message, and they are this if they are merciful even as He is.[1] But He can also say: Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.[2] So in Jesus's preaching everything is at once present and future: you have it, you will receive it.

The same may be said of St. Paul's doctrine: there we find not only the double conception of the kingdom, present and future,[3] but also that of sonship, of redemption, of deliverance, of righteousness, and so on. We are children of God; we have the spirit of sonship, and yet we have to wait for the manifestation of the sons of God; we wait for the sonship.[4] We are redeemed, and yet we look for the redemption of our body.[5] Paul feels himself a new creature, exalted above all human misery and sin: and yet all that he now has, is but a small portion of what he will obtain when his Lord comes in His glory to glorify those who belong to Him.[6] If Christ's death has done such great things, he argues in Romans v, to reconcile us with God, how great will be the effect of Christ's life,[7] i.e. of His coming in glory and of our being united with Him eternally.

We are now in a better position to understand how it is that Paul, when changing his opinion as to the time of his own death in relation to the parousia, did not forthwith set aside the old conception (as we should have expected, had he been merely abandoning Rabbinical views for Hellenistic ones). Even in the latest of his letters he holds both conceptions: on the one hand he can desire to depart and to be with Christ; on the other he can anticipate Christ's return from heaven to conform the body of our humiliation to the body of His glory.[8]

It would be easy to demonstrate these alternating views by the Rabbinical doctrine of the two Olams (aeons, worlds), the one present, bad, evil, and the other future, glorious, happy. The New Testament writers use the terms, but it is difficult to say how precisely they view their own age. If Christ came that He might deliver us from this present evil world, Christians belong already to the new world. And yet all the external conditions of the old bad world still exist. Christians dwell still in the flesh, but they walk not after the flesh; or, as St. John says, they are in the world but not of the world. It is remarkable that we nowhere find an explicit theory of an intermediate state like later doctrines of the twofold advent of Christ, or the later distinction between 'ecclesia militans' and 'ecclesia triumphans'. The early Christians were so enthusiastic in their belief in an accomplished

[1] Matt. v. 45; Luke vi. 35. [2] Matt. v. 9.
[3] Rom. xiv. 17; 1 Cor. iv. 20; 1 Thess. ii. 12; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; Gal. v. 21.
[4] Rom. viii. 14, 16, 19, 23. [5] 1 Cor. i. 30; Rom. viii. 23.
[6] 2 Cor. v. 17. [7] Rom. v. 9, 10. [8] Phil. i. 23; iii. 20, 21.

salvation that, in spite of all external evidence, they imagined themselves already dwelling in the new order of things. If St. Mark illustrates the effect of Christ's death by the veil of the temple rent in twain from the top to the bottom, the gospel according to St. Matthew anticipates the signs of the parousia and the last judgement by the earthquake, the opening of the graves, and the rise of the many bodies of the saints.[1]

This attitude of early Christianity is to be seen in its clearest form in the Johannine writings. It is well known that the fourth evangelist (whoever he may be) uses eschatological terms in a modified sense: ζωὴ αἰώνιος, 'eternal life,' is not as in other books the life of the aeon to come, but it is something that begins in this life—life in the highest sense—whereas what men call life is but death. So Christ gives life everlasting to all who know Him and believe in Him. So, too, judgement and resurrection are taken in a figurative sense: for the Christian judgement lies in the past; he has passed from death into life;[2] the κρίσις is effected by the separation of believers and unbelievers.[3] It is to be understood in this figurative sense when Jesus says: 'The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live:' men, morally dead, by accepting the Gospel get life everlasting.[4] But when, three verses further on, he says: 'For the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgement (damnation)'[5]—the thought is fully eschatological. It is this combination of non-eschatological plus eschatological ideas which makes the Johannine characteristic as distinct both from primitive Christian and from Gnostic views. And yet it is the very attitude of Jesus and Paul which we recognize in this Johannine two-sidedness.

At this point we may stop. We have found eschatology playing a great part in early Christian belief and thought, (1) as a strong motive in moral exhortation—but only one motive besides others, such as thankfulness for God's grace, care for God's honour, Christian self-respect, and so on—and not influencing Christian ethics materially; (2) as the key to the historical conception of God's working with mankind, the sending of His Son as Saviour being the end of a long history of sin. But it was not of the essence of Christian faith, this being rather confidence in a present activity of God and an already accomplished salvation.

We may accordingly affirm that Christianity did not change its essence, when the expectation of Christ's coming became fainter and

[1] Mark xv. 38; Matt. xxvii. 51, 52.
[2] John v. 24.
[3] John iii. 17–21.
[4] John v. 25.
[5] John v. 28, 29.

eschatology fell into the rank of a doctrine of merely historical value. The remark may be added that the great eschatological pictures come in only at a later period of early Christian literature, not in the first, but in the second generation. That the mass of Jewish apocalyptic ideas is introduced, is in itself evidence of the weakening of early Christian confidence.

And at the same time we may determine the position of the Gospel in the history of religions. All religions of that time were religions of hope. Stress was laid on the future; the present time was but for preparation. So in the mysterious cults of Hellenism, whose highest aim is to offer guarantees for other-worldly happiness; so too in Judaism, whose legacy has but the aim of furnishing the happy life in the kingdom of the future. Christianity is a religion of faith, the gospel giving not only guarantees for the future life in another world, but bringing by itself confidence, peace, joy, salvation, forgiveness, righteousness—whatever man's heart yearns after.

With this it combines hope—this we must never forget. Hope is an essential feature of vivid religious feeling. But in primitive Christian piety hope takes only the second place. When, at a later period, hope takes the first rank at the expense of faith, as may be seen, e.g., in 1 Peter and Hebrews, this is due to the increasing influence of pre-Christian Hellenistic religion, and means a declension. Strange to say, the weakening of eschatological feeling and the other-worldly tendency are both produced by the same movement.

Now, where all stress is laid on hope, instead of on trust, joy changes into timidity, the religious stimulus once more becomes fear. So we see the Christianity of the second century creating a new system of guarantees, exactly similar to that which the mysteries of Greece had furnished: guarantees of a future salvation—a highly uncertain salvation. But wherever there is a revival of the Gospel,[1] we meet again joyful confidence and assurance of salvation combined with a secure hope of still greater blessings.

This is the proof from history for our thesis.

[1] e.g. in St. Augustine, St. Francis, Luther and the other heroes of the Reformation.

8

THE PARABLE OF THE WICKED HUSBANDMEN

By F. C. BURKITT

We have often been told, at least since the days of Auguste Comte, that St. Paul was the inventor of Christian theology. Of late this theory tends to be expressed in a new form. It is beginning to be recognized that a doctrine of atonement through the death of Jesus Christ is really implied in the Gospel according to Mark; this Gospel, therefore (so the theory goes), must have been conceived and planned under the influence of the Pauline theology. Of course, in so far as it may have been so conceived and planned, it will not be a simple report of the events recorded, but an artificial account of the events drawn up in accordance with a particular view of their meaning. I am by no means convinced of the truth of this theory. It is one of the main objects of this paper to point out how very different is the doctrine set forth in the Gospel according to Mark, and particularly in the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, from Paulinism. Both are 'Christian', but whereas St. Paul's doctrine is a deduction from the course of previous events, that in the Gospel is really an anticipation.

There is not much doubt as to the general meaning of the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen (Mark xii. 1–12). St. Mark tells us that the chief priests and the scribes and the elders knew that Jesus spoke the parable against them. Indeed, it did not require great perspicacity to perceive that. But before we go on to see whether any difficulties of interpretation yet remain, we must face the question as to the genuineness of the parable as a whole. Is it in its main outlines—the vineyard and its owner, the unfruitful tenants, the sending of the owner's son and his murder, the threat of eviction—a true report of what Jesus of Nazareth really said in Jerusalem, or is it the product of later Christian reflection? I must confess that I believe it to be wholly genuine. Perhaps a very acute modern historian might be found to put these words into our Lord's mouth, but I find a great difficulty in imagining any early Christian of any school who could do it. It seems to me certain that the thing which is *not* there is exactly what Christian invention would have put in: I mean, some reference to the Resurrection. The son of the owner is killed outright, according to the parable. Does it not seem likely, if the parable were based upon anything else than a real recollection of words spoken that we should be told that one of the husbandmen who had not

consented to the council and deed of the others saw the son outside the vineyard, and that he learnt that the son was not dead, but was gone back to be with his father until the appointed time ? The fact that the parable contains no suggestion at all of the son's resuscitation seems to me, the story being what it is, little short of positive proof that it took its shape before belief in the resurrection of Christ became the common property of the Christian community. And this is only a somewhat roundabout way of saying that the parable is a genuine historical reminiscence of words spoken by Jesus Himself.

But what part does the son really play in the parable ? If the parable be genuine historical reminiscence, it must give us our Lord's own idea of His mission. The son in the parable is killed, like the messengers that had preceded him. At first sight his errand also seems a complete failure : are we to suppose that Jesus went up to Jerusalem anticipating complete failure ? If so, what was the use of going up to inevitable destruction ?

When we look closer, we find that the son's mission was, after all, not a complete failure, at least not from the point of view of the government of the estate. The killing of the son by the husbandmen is really the event which directly brings on the catastrophe. The change of tenants, the new state of things, the new arrangement of the vineyard,—this is all brought about through the son's death. The death of the son will impel the Lord of the Vineyard to execute his judgement on the unworthy cultivators of it. In other words, the death of Jesus will hasten the Day of God's Judgement.

The triumph of Christianity has caused the Day of Judgement to change its meaning for us. Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire and of its successors ; the whole mass of the population became Christians, at least in name. When this change had taken place, the Day of Judgement was no longer the Day of Vindication for the oppressed people of the Lord, for every one had become one of the Lord's people. We have all become Christians, sinners as well as saints, and we may well feel individually apprehensive lest our offences should amount to a sin unto death in that day. This is the aspect of the Day of Judgement familiar to us from the mediaeval *Dies Irae* and from the preaching of such men as Whitefield. But it is not the primitive notion, not the notion that is presupposed in the New Testament. I say *presupposed*, because a number of references to the great Day of the Lord, in the New Testament as in the Prophets of old, are the words of religious reformers, of men in advance of their time, anxious to warn their contemporaries that God is no respecter of persons, and that it is not enough to say 'We have Abraham for our father'. But the popular notion was undoubtedly that the Day of Judgement would be the triumph of

God's chosen people Israel. In the present state of things other lords had dominion over them, but the Day of the Lord of lords was at hand, the Kingdom of God Himself was coming, and then Israel would be exalted and the Gentiles would be judged, judged according to the rigour with which they had oppressed the saints of the Most High. The Day of Judgement, the Consummation of the Age, the Consolation of Israel—these all mean much the same thing; they are all synonyms for the inauguration of the Kingdom of God.

To come back to the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, we have seen that the murder of the son brings about the new state of things, and that means that the death of Jesus will hasten the Day of Judgement, will hasten the inauguration of the Kingdom of God. We may pause for a moment to notice how imperfectly, if we take a strictly literalist view, the forecast contained in it was actually fulfilled. Until A.D. 70 the aristocracy of Jerusalem remained in possession; after A.D. 70 and the destruction of the Holy City the Vineyard was desolate. In a very real sense, no doubt, the Christian Church corresponds to the 'others' to whom the Lord of the Vineyard will entrust His estate. But a new non-national voluntary society of converts is hardly the alternative suggested by the parable to the existing constitution of Judaism. I only mention this in passing, to point out that the parable has none of the characteristics of a *vaticinium ex eventu*, a prophecy made up in the light of later events.

But from another point of view the theory underlying the parable is incomplete. It only exhibits our Lord in relation to His opponents. I began with it in this paper, because it appeared to me to bear so strongly the marks of historical genuineness that it made a convenient starting-point for investigation. We have gathered from it this, that Jesus contemplated His death as serving to bring in the Kingdom of God. We may now go on to ask what other passages there are in the Gospel according to Mark which deal with our Lord's anticipation of His death, and whether these agree with the ideas underlying the parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. There are not very many, for the passages containing the predictions of the Passion (Mark viii. 31ff., ix. 31 f., x. 32 ff.) only set the Passion before us as a thing decided and inevitable; they do not explain for what reason it must be undergone. The main passages for our purpose are Mark x. 45 and the verses that lead up to it ('the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many'), together with the sayings about Elijah in Mark ix. 11 ff.

The sayings about Elijah, spoken as our Lord and His most intimate companions were coming away from the mount of Transfiguration, are at first sight singularly disjointed, and on any hypothesis they form a very curious pendant to the Transfiguration itself. I do not

profess to be able to give you a satisfactory rationalization of the Transfiguration: it does not seem to me that any of the modern 'explanations' make the matter any simpler, and I take it that we have practically a narrative of what St. Peter thought he remembered having seen. Our interpretation of the narrative will depend mainly upon our general interpretation of the Gospel history. But what follows this narrative, the conversation reported in Mark ix. 9–13, does seem to me a piece of true historical reminiscence. The three disciples are descending the hill with their Master, persuaded that they have seen something marvellous, a presage of the glorious future. Jesus tells them to say nothing 'till the Son of Man be risen from the dead' (*ver.* 9). What this means they do not understand, for what has the Son of Man, whose office it is to act as God's Vice-gerent and judge the nations when the great Day arrives, to do with dying? The Son of Man, according to the similitudes of Enoch, is suddenly revealed when the time is ripe; He has been hidden with the Most High, but at last His Day comes and the kings and mighty ones of the earth look up and recognize Him sitting on the throne of His glory, and they prostrate themselves before that Son of Man, who judges them to be carried away to torment by His angels (Enoch lxii). So Peter and James and John say something about Elijah coming first (*ver.* 11). Some thought Jesus was Elijah; in any case Elijah was to come before the Day of the Lord, according to Malachi the prophet. Had perhaps the 'rising from the dead' something to do with the reappearance of Elijah? At least, this appears to be the connexion between Mark ix. 10 and 11.

In reply Jesus says, 'Yes, Elijah is to come first to prepare everything. But'—and here I venture to expand and paraphrase, so as to give what I take to be the train of thought—'but you wonder why I should speak of being rejected and killed, though you have recognized Me, and I recognize Myself, as the Anointed of God. You say, where is it written? I tell you it is the same as with Elijah. It was written in the Book of Malachi that Elijah should come; and Elijah has come, even John the Baptist, as I have told you before. It was not written in the Book of Malachi that Elijah should be killed; but he has been killed by the new Ahab, Herod Antipas. From the fate of the new Elijah I read My own fate. All things that happen are predetermined by My Father: they are, if you will have it so, written in the Heavenly Tablets, of which Enoch and others speak. In the Heavenly Tablets, in the determined counsel of God, it is written that the Son of Man shall suffer many things and be put to naught.'

This is what I believe Mark ix. 12, 13 to mean. I believe that John the Baptist prepared the way for our Lord by his example as well as by his preaching: if it was the will of God that John should be

killed, though the kingdom was at hand and though John was the foretold Elijah who was to be its herald, then it might well be ordained that the Christ should suffer before entering into His glory, even though no scripture seemed to indicate it. After the event it was easy enough to pick out Isaiah liii and give it a Christian interpretation, but there is nothing to show that this was ever done by any one before the Passion in Jerusalem. The one reference to Isaiah liii in the recorded words of Jesus is the more or less ironical warning to the disciples on the last night that soon their Master would be reckoned among lawless folk (Luke xxii. 37; cf. Isa. liii. 12). The identification, the synthesis, of the Messiah and the Suffering Servant, is the result of the Crucifixion, not an anticipation of it.

It was not the study of the scriptures after the manner of the Scribes, but an intuitive grasp of what our Lord called 'the signs of the times', that set Him on His way to bear witness, and if need be die, at Jerusalem. That the Kingdom of God was at hand was the general conviction. It is, in fact, the conviction that animates the whole series of Jewish Apocalypses that have come down to us, from Daniel to second Esdras and Baruch, and doubtless of many more which have not survived. The Gospel Message, as preached by John, and after him by our Lord, added to the announcement of the imminence of the Kingdom, the call to Repentance. 'The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe in the gospel' (Mark i. 15): this is what Jesus announced in Galilee. So imminent was the consummation, so near the coming of the Kingdom, that the disciples sent out to preach the tidings might not be able to work through the cities of Israel, before the Son of Man, the Son of Man spoken of by Daniel and by Enoch, was already come (Matt. x. 23).

But the disciples returned back to their Master and the end was not yet. Something was causing a delay in the coming of the Kingdom. 'When the fruit is ripe, immediately he putteth in the sickle' (Mark iv. 29). But was the fruit ripe? Had the preaching of John and of Jesus called forth an adequate response? It is clear that our Lord's answer is 'No'. What else can we gather from the Woes upon Chorazin and Bethsaida, and upon Capernaum? The Galilean crowds had not yet rejected their Prophet, but they had not, as a whole, paid much heed to His Message. They had not repented. These Woes upon Capernaum and Bethsaida do not indeed appear in the Gospel according to Mark, but we have there as an equivalent the disappointed, half-impatient references to 'this generation' (Mark viii. 12), 'this adulterous and sinful generation' (viii. 38), 'this faithless generation' (ix. 19), all, be it noticed, in immediate proximity to the announcement of the journey from the north to Jerusalem.

No, the nation as a whole had not repented. Therefore its guilt

remained. And, as a consequence, the coming of God's Kingdom tarried. Something yet remained to be done before the Kingdom could come in, before God would 'avenge His elect who cry to Him day and night' (Luke xviii. 7). God was longsuffering in the double sense. He was willing to forgive, willing to overlook; He was also willing to wait, if perchance 'this generation' should show signs of repentance. But He expected more from His people than He had hitherto got. He expected repentance from the sinners; perhaps if Jesus went to Jerusalem they would, after all, recognize and reverence Him that had been sent by the Father. And God expected more also from His elect. True, some of those who followed Jesus had left their property and their families, but that was not their most valuable possession. 'What shall a man give in exchange for his life?' (Mark viii. 37). The elect themselves must be prepared to lay down their lives for the sake of the Gospel, and even if some will escape without actually 'tasting death' itself, as is clearly implied in Mark ix. 1, others must lose their lives in order to save them for eternal life. And if some are thus to lose their lives, the Master must show the way. For if the most certain thing about Jesus of Nazareth is that He was intensely conscious of His special relation to the Father in Heaven who had sent Him, it is equally certain that He regarded His Mission on earth as a call to serve. Some day the Son of Man would appear from Heaven. Then He would sit on the throne of His glory. Then he would really play the part of Messiah, for which He has been 'designated' in the Eternal Purpose.[1] But at present He has come 'not to be ministered unto but to minister', and to give up His life for the Gospel's sake.

We have got very near, you will perceive, to the ideas which underlie Mark x. 45. Let us follow up this train of thought yet a little further. We have seen from the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen that Jesus contemplated His death as instrumental in bringing on the great catastrophe. In the parable we are naturally most concerned with the fate of the husbandmen; the Day of Reckoning is chiefly thought of as the day of punishment for the wicked leaders of the people. For them, of course, the Day of the Lord will be a catastrophe indeed, and for many others also in 'this sinful generation'. But for the real Israel, for God's chosen people, for those who are destined to sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of God, nay for Abraham and Isaac and Jacob themselves and the rest of the saints of old,—for these the Day of the Lord will be the day of release and of reconciliation. If God brings in His Kingdom at last, it means that God is reconciled with His people again; it will be

[1] Compare the use of ὁρισθέντος in Rom. i. 4.

a proof that their sins are blotted out and remembered no more. If the death of the Son of Man brings on the catastrophe, then at the same time it brings on the reconciliation of God with those with whom He will be reconciled. The death works as the sacrifices at God's altar were believed to work, it is in fact a sacrifice. Not indeed for all, not for the Wicked Husbandmen, not for some out of 'this sinful generation'. But it will be 'a ransom for many'. When the great Day comes, the nations will be judged, and the sinners in Israel will perish, but the true Israel will be delivered from their enemies and God will reign over them. He will come and visit His Vineyard.

All this seems to me to be what is implied in the Gospel according to Mark. At this Congress we are not directly concerned with the really vital question, whether these ideas are valid, whether they do correspond to the real facts, or whether it was all a dream. Our answer to this will depend chiefly upon our belief in the Mission of Jesus and in the reality of the Kingdom of God, apart from the imagery in which it has been from time to time embodied. But I venture to claim that at any rate these ideas are not Pauline, in the sense of 'derived from St. Paul'. St. Paul's doctrine of the convert's individual justification through subsequent faith in the already accomplished death of Christ seems to me an adaptation of ideas such as those I have endeavoured to put before you, rather than a source of them. These ideas are all directly connected with Jewish eschatological ideas, they have their roots in genuine Jewish soil, and therefore I see no reason why we should not accept them as historically true, as being what they profess to be, the ideas of our Lord about His own Death and its meaning.

There is yet another scene in the Gospel of Mark which appears to me to be told in a manner strangely inconsistent with what we should expect were it the product of later Christian reflection, and that is the story of the Last Supper. In Mark xiv. 22–5 there is no hint of a command to repeat the consecration or the partaking of the Bread and Wine, and the solemn asseveration, the 'Amen I say to you', introduces not the consecration of the elements but 'I shall not drink any more of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God'. In other words, the next Feast will be the Messianic Feast.

But if Mark xiv. 25 recalls ix. 1 in its insistence upon the nearness of the new age, the preceding verse recalls Mark x. 45. The blood of Jesus will be blood of the Covenant, poured out 'for many'. I do not think there would be any difference between ἀντὶ πολλῶν and ὑπὲρ πολλῶν when we retranslate these phrases back into Aramaic. In x. 45 we find ἀντὶ πολλῶν, and in xiv. 25 ὑπὲρ πολλῶν. In the parallel passage (Matt. xxvi. 28) we find περὶ πολλῶν: it all comes to the same thing.

The death of Jesus is 'for' many, 'instead of' many, 'to the advantage of' many. And how it comes to be 'for many' we have to explain, I venture to think, not by texts from St. Paul, but from the Gospel of Mark itself, from the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen. Jesus went to His death, believing that by so doing He was bringing in the Kingdom of God. As a matter of history, it brought into being the Christian Church. And to those who believe that, notwithstanding all shortcomings and imperfections, the Church is really animated by the Divine Spirit, the result stands as the justification of the course decided on and of the expectation cherished. It is only the translation of the phraseology of Jewish aspiration into terms and conceptions suitable for other lands and a new age.

9

JESUS IN JERUSALEM

PETRUS- U. PAULUSÜBERLIEFERUNG IM MARKUSEVANGELIUM UND DER NEUESTE EVANGELIENFUND (GRENFELL AND HUNT, v. 1–11).

VON K. LINCKE. (GEKÜRZT)

DAS Markusevangelium besteht aus einer kurzen Vorgeschichte (Mark i. 1–15) und vier Szenengruppen: (1) Kapernaumszenen, (2) Missions-, (3) Messias-, (4) Jerusalemszenen, denen die Erinnerungen des Petrus, die Markus aufgezeichnet hat, zu Grunde liegen. Sehr vieles ist aber in paulinischem Sinne weiter ausgeführt. Es ist die Aufgabe, Ur-Markus und paulinische Bearbeitung, Geschichte und Dogmatik zu unterscheiden.

Den Kapernaumszenen (i. 16–iii. 6) liegt der Bericht über den Tag von Kapernaum zu Grunde, an dem Jesus lehrend und heilend zuerst aufgetreten ist. Aus der Lehre in Vollmacht und dem ärztlichen Wirken in und vor dem Hause des Petrus entsteht durch Kombination die neue Lehre der Vollmacht des Herrn über die Krankheitsdämonen. Dazu kommt das Allmachtswunder der Heilung eines Aussätzigen, die Vollmacht der Sündenvergebung und der Sünderberufung, endlich die Vollmacht gegenüber dem Gesetz in drei Fällen. Im ganzen sind es sieben Einzelvollmachtszenen geworden, in denen Jesus, der Heilige Gottes, der Sohn des Menschen, als der Generalbevollmächtigte Gottes geschildert wird. Die Lehrwirksamkeit gegenüber den Schriftgelehrten tritt zurück. Jesus zeigt nach der Heilung des Aussätzigen einen echt levitischen Gesetzeseifer. Die Herrnworte vom alten Rock und dem neuen Stück Tuch, vom neuen Wein und den alten Schläuchen aber sind antinomistisch. Jesus wollte kein Kompromiss. Ebenso entschie-

den lauten die Aussprüche gegen das Sabbatsgesetz überhaupt. Am schärfsten verurteilt er Korban und vieles andre der Art. Jesus forderte eine Religion der Liebe zu Gott und den Menschen. Die Pharisäer, die sich geschlagen sahen, suchten Jesus umzubringen. Das war der grosse Tag der Eröffnung der Lehrwirksamkeit in Vollmacht *gegen* das Gesetz der Judäer.

In den Missionsszenen (iii. 7–viii. 26) wird die Tätigkeit, die Jesus entfaltet, vom Standpunkte der Juden- und Heidenmission geschildert. Jesus, der Sohn Gottes, der Sohn Gottes des Höchsten, ist all den Seinen entfremdet. Das Volk ist verstockt und soll es sein, damit ihm vergeben werde. Der erste Zeuge der Barmherzigkeit Gottes ist der Gadarener, der 'zu den Seinen' gesandt wird und zu den Juden in der Dekapolis geht. Die Jünger sind verstockt, sie verstehen weder das Gleichnis vom Säemann, noch das Speisungswunder in Galiläa und unter den Heiden. Sie sind blind und taub. Die wirklichen Jünger aber waren die, denen Jesus sagte: 'Euch ist das Geheimnis gegeben des Reiches Gottes,' die beiden Brüderpaare, die der Evangelist in Galiläa und beim Gastmahle des Zöllners unter den Gästen verschwinden lässt, um sie mit acht andern zusammen zum zweitenmale zu berufen. Das wirkliche Volk waren die Gemeinden, die Jesus in Galiläa einmal um sich versammelte. Das Gleichnis vom Säemann bezeichnet den wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen Judäa und Galiläa. Jesus warnte vor dem Sauerteig der Pharisäer, denen wohl auch das Wort galt: 'Mit welchem Masse ihr messet, wird man euch wieder messen.' Der Evangelist hat den Schluss des Tages, die essenische Eucharistie, im Auge. Jesus schuf an diesem Tage das Symbol der Glaubenseinheit der Christengemeinden in Galiläa und Samarien. Die Heidenmission wird eröffnet mit einer dreifachen Ansprache und ebenfalls als Wundertätigkeit, zum teil ebenso allegorisch wie die Judenmission, geschildert, in dem Gespräch mit der Griechin und in der Heilung eines Taubstummen und eines Blinden. Von der Entstehung der Christengemeinden, die die Apostelgeschichte in Damaskus, in Antiochia voraussetzt, ebenso wie in Samarien, sagt der Evangelist kein Wort. Er sieht in der Welt nur Juden und Heiden und erzählt alles nach dem Grundsatze, dass das Evangelium zuerst zu den Judäern und dann zu den Heiden gekommen sei. Die Missionstätigkeit der Zwölf ist beschränkt und bald zu Ende, ihr Missionsbericht dürftig und nichtssagend, während der Roman von dem Tode des Johannes beim Geburtstagsfeste des Herodes lebhaft und ausführlich erzählt wird.

In den Messiasszenen (viii. 27–x. 52) gilt es zunächst festzustellen warum Jesus, angeblich unterwegs auf dem Gange nach den Dörfern bei Caesarea Philippi, von Petrus der Christos genannt wird. Vielleicht ist Jesus in der Kaiserstadt selbst vor den römischen Legaten getreten

als Fürsprecher des galiläischen Volkes in schwerer Zeit, und ist deshalb, nach diesem Eintreten für die Seinen, als der Gesalbte, der Gottbegnadete, verehrt worden, nicht im Sinne eines Messias der Judäer, wie es der Evangelist ohne weiteres als Meinung des Petrus voraussetzt. Eine schwere Zeit war für das Nordreich gekommen. Das sieht man auch aus der Verklärung auf dem heiligen Berge Tabor, zu der der echte Petrusbrief (2 Pet. i, ii—das dritte entstand mit dem sogenannten ersten Briefe zusammen) den besten Kommentar liefert. Der Evangelist hat hier vieles hinzugefügt in Bezug auf Mose und Elias, Taufe, Opfertod, Auferstehung und Messianität. Echte Herrnworte aus der Spruchkette in dieser Szenengruppe sind: Mk. viii. 35, ix. 40, 50, und die wiederholte Hindeutung auf die Geenna (ix. 44 ff.). Auf dem heiligen Berge entschloss sich Jesus zu dem letzten, dem schwersten Gange: hinauf nach Jerusalem!

Die Lage in Palästina, das Verhältnis zwischen dem Nord- und Südreiche, war äusserst gespannt. Herodes hatte einen Einfall der Judäer unter Ezekias zurückgewiesen. Dann erschien das 'Testament des Mose', mit einem Kriegspsalm am Schlusse, einer Androhung des göttlichen Strafgerichts über die Abtrünnigen und Gottlosen, die Bewohner des Nordreiches. Im Jahre 35 etwa erfolgte der Einfall der Judäer unter Johannes, dem sogenannten Täufer, in das Gebiet des Herodes Antipas und der Überfall bei Tirathana am Garizim in Samarien. Dazu drohte Gefahr von dem Araberkönig Aretas von Petra, der bei Josephus als der natürliche Bundesgenosse der Judäer und des Johannes erscheint. Am Ausgang der wilden Schlucht, die von der Höhe des Gebirges in das fruchtbare Nordreich hinabführt, sehen wir Jesus und seine Getreuen im Begriff nach Jerusalem hinaufzugehen (Mk. x. 32), auch jene ebenso wie Jesus in Gefahr des Märtyrertodes, besonders Jakob und Johannes, wie der Rangstreit voraussetzt, den der Evangelist ausmalt.

Von dem Ernste der Lage zeugt auch das neugefundene Evangelienfragment. Jesus und der Pharisäer im Tempel, Auge in Auge einander gegenüber—welch ein Bild! Welche Sprache, voll Hoheit, Feuer und Kraft — voll Scheinheiligkeit und Selbstgerechtigkeit! Da ist, wie Harnack richtig sagt, nichts von Nachahmung. Wenn irgend eine, ist diese Szene geschichtlich wahr, ursprünglich echt. Rein nach dem Gesetz und rein vor Gott, Waschung der Haut im Davidsteiche oder geistige Läuterung im Himmelstau der Gotteskindschaft und Unsterblichkeit—das war die eine grosse Frage, die alles entschied. Der Evangelist setzt an Stelle der Einheit die Mannigfaltigkeit. Er lässt Jesus reden gegen einen Feigenbaum, gegen Geldwechsler und Taubenverkäufer, reden über Vollmacht, über den Erben des Weinbergs, usw., bis die Mordgedanken der Hierarchen sich allmählich zur Tat verdichten. Er lässt statt eines Gegners, Levi, die ganze

Klerisei des idealjüdischen Priesterstaates der Reihe nach auftreten, Oberpriester, Schriftgelehrte und Volksälteste, Pharisäer und Herodianer, Sadduzäer, zuletzt noch einen Schriftgelehrten, der nicht ferne war vom Reiche Gottes, weil er den Schwur der Essener, die Liebe zu Gott und den Menschen, lobend anerkennt.

Der Evangelist hat die Frage über Rein und Unrein in die Missionsszenen verlegt, wo auch der scharfen Kritik des Korbanparagraphen die Spitze abgebrochen wird. Der Evangelist lässt Jesus klagen über Verstocktheit, er führt die Zwölf ein statt der beiden Brüderpaare, um sie als Urapostel der Judenmission, als das taube und blinde Gefolge des Messias zu schildern. Die Blinden — das lehrt der neue Fund unwiderleglich — waren die Hierarchen. Sie waren es auch, die mit Korban und vielen ähnlichen Bestimmungen den Tempel ihres Gottes zur Räuberhöhle machten. Der Evangelist sucht das abzuschwächen und kehrt das Verhältnis der Jünger und der Hierarchen um. So verwandelt er den antinomistischen Galiläer Jesus, der als solcher in Kapernaum offen auftrat, in einen judäischen Reformprediger, der sich um Reinheit des Tempels bemüht. In Wirklichkeit hatte Jesus infolge der allgemeinen Lage ebenso wie einst Jeremias, der Anwalt der Rekabiten, um der Leiden seines Volkes willen Anlass, in Jerusalem selbst, als die Hilfe der Römer ausblieb, förmlich und feierlich zu protestieren gegen die Vorherrschaft des Stuhles des Mose in Jerusalem und gegen die Vergewaltigung der religiösen Gemeinden des auch national selbständigen Nordreichs.

Jesus und seine Getreuen haben den Tempel wahrscheinlich nur einmal betreten. Das Betreten schon des geweihten Vorraumes (Hagneuterion) des Tempels war jedem Angehörigen eines andern Stammes bei Todesstrafe verboten. Das Verbot, auf einer Warnungstafel in griechischer Sprache, ist noch erhalten. Die Galiläer handelten gegen dieses Verbot, und so hatten sie nach dem Rechte des jüdischen Priesterstaates — dieses Kirchenunstaates, wie ihn Mommsen treffend nennt — ihr Leben verwirkt. Dass auch Jakob und Johannes von den Judäern getötet wurden, bezeugt der syrische Bischof Papias von Hierapolis. Ostern 36 — nach den Untersuchungen von Keim und Hitzig — kam Jesus nach Jerusalem. Wenige Tage nach dem Feste traf auch Vitellius ein — zu spät! Die jüdischen Hierarchen hatten ihr Werk getan. Der Hohepriester Kajaphas wurde abgesetzt. Jesus aber war nicht tot, er lebte. Der Eindruck seiner Persönlichkeit war bereits eine Macht geworden, die vollen Ersatz leistete für die leibliche Gegenwart.

Die Erinnerungen des Petrus lassen sich noch von der evangelistisch-paulinischen Übermalung unterscheiden. Die Höhepunkte sind im Gedächtnis des Urapostels festgehalten: der Tag von Kapernaum, über den wir noch einen getreuen Bericht haben, dazu einige Nach-

klänge aus der Predigt und Disputation, die grosse Landesversammlung in Galiläa mit der Rede von zweierlei Boden und den dazugehörigen Worten gegen die Pharisäer und der schönen Schilderung des essenischen Liebesmahles, der Gang nach der Kaiserstadt, die Verklärung auf dem heiligen Berge, der Gang nach Jerusalem und die Gefangennahme, die Markus selbst mit erlebte. Zu dieser Überlieferung gehört das neugefundene Fragment. Es gleicht auffallend den 'erratischen Blöcken auf dem dogmatischen Felde des Markusevangeliums.'

Paulinisch ist die Dämonologie, die Christologie und die Eschatologie des Evangelisten, besonders die Formel der Glaubensforderung, die Einführung der Zwölfzahl der Jünger, die Herabwürdigung des Petrus, des Satans in Person, und die Einteilung der Menschheit in Juden und Heiden, ferner das zweite, auf Mose (und Zarathustra) deutende Bild der Verklärung, die Missionsansprache über Rein und Unrein, die Vollmacht der Berufung der Sünder, die Ehescheidungsfrage u. a. m. Paulinische Briefe und Markusevangelium verhalten sich zu einander wie Midrasch und Haggada. Der Synkretismus, der der paulinischen Theologie eigentümlich ist, verrät sich auch beim Evangelisten besonders in der Übereinstimmung mit Empedokles, der, einst hochverehrt im Bunde der Pythagoreer, in einer Art Heilandsbuch als Religionslehrer, Prophet und Arzt, besonders auch als Wundertäter erscheint, und dessen Seelenwanderungslehre unter anderm auch von Dämonen spricht, die in das Meer gejagt werden, ganz wie bei Gerasa oder Gadara.

Ein altes Evangelium begann so: 'Im fünfzehnten Jahre der Regierung des Kaisers Tiberius (29) kam Jesus von Nazaret herab nach Kapernaum, einer Stadt in Galiläa.' Markion entnahm aus diesem Evangelium die Tatsache, dass Jesus statt des rächenden, strafenden Gottes der Judäer den gerechten, den guten Gott verkündigt habe. Das war der Unterschied des Alten und des Neuen. Lukas hat das Jahr 29 von Jesus auf Johannes zu übertragen versucht. Im Kampfe gegen Jerusalem, den Hochsitz und das Urbild der Hierarchie, entdeckte Jesus die Religion, die universale Religion für alle Bewohner des römischen Reiches. Das war die Waffe des Propheten des Wortes und der Tat — in Vollmacht von Gott dem Vater. Dass diese Religion im Kampfe entdeckt wurde — gerade auch in ihrer reinsten Form — und im Kampfe sich bewähren muss, lehrt die Geschichte der Religion bis auf den heutigen Tag.

Das Christentum ist von Grund aus universal. Um die Wende der Zeiten erblühte in verschiedenen Ländern des römischen Weltreiches, aus Himmelssaat, auf Erden nie geschaut, aber längst von den Völkern ersehnt, in Persien, in Syrien, am schönsten in Ephraim, in Samarien und Galiläa, die Blume der Erlösung. Es war der ideale Gedanke der reinsten und innigsten, allgemeinen Verehrung Gottes,

des Vaters, in freier, innerlich fester Vereinigung der Gemeinden des unsichtbaren Reiches Gottes vom Aufgang bis zum Niedergang. Die Früchte dieses Erlösungsglaubens kamen den Ländern zu gute, wohin beim Abzug der römischen Legionen, die Bewohner mitwanderten nach andern, geschützteren Teilen des Reiches. Sie wanderten aus nach Ägypten und Mauretanien, nach Italien und Südgallien, an die Donau und den Rhein, nach England und Schottland. Es waren Mithrasverehrer, Manichäer und Christen.

10

OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREAT CHURCH OF DAMASCUS

By the PRINCE OF TEANO. (Abstract)

There is a commonly accepted tradition that in the Damascene Cathedral, during a certain period after the Arab conquest of Syria, Musulmans and Christians practised their respective rites contemporaneously in the same building. This tradition, if critically examined, can be shown to be erroneous. The shape and orientation of the building render its promiscuous use by the two communities extremely improbable. Moreover, a systematic study of the Arabic sources shows that the older and more trustworthy authorities know nothing of such a division of the church. The story appears for the first time in the writings of historians of the sixth century after the conquest. Lastly the pilgrim Arnulfus, who was in Damascus thirty years after the conquest, proves by his description of the Cathedral that the Christians alone used it in his time.

[The paper was concluded by the story, briefly narrated in its correct version, of the manner in which the church passed from the hands of the Christians into those of the Musulmans in the time of the Caliph al-Walid.]

11

MONASTERIES AND MONASTICISM IN CENTRAL ASIA MINOR

By GERTRUDE LOWTHIAN BELL

I PROPOSE to set before you some monastic plans[1] from central Asia Minor, and to consider what light they throw on the history of early monasticism on the Anatolian plateau. My observations are the result of some work which was undertaken by Sir W. Ramsay and myself last year in a district south-west of Konia. No one has as yet studied the very numerous monasteries, the ruins of which are scattered over hill and plain. The plans which I shall show you are the first that have been made, and cannot, unfortunately, be compared with similar constructions in parts of the country which I have not visited. Nor is this my only difficulty. The drawing of the plans was no easy matter owing to the terrible state of decay into which the monasteries have fallen and the irregularity of the architectural schemes. The decay is due in great part to the inferior quality of the workmanship. All over central Asia Minor, so far as my experience goes, the good work was reserved for the churches, while private houses and monastic buildings were miserably poor in construction. The same traits characterize early monastic buildings in other countries; till the seventh century most of the monasteries of Europe were built of wood, and Lenoir has pointed out that architectural formlessness was intimately connected with the absence of a strict monastic rule. The forerunner of the ordered community was the solitary ascetic who was submitted to no law but that imposed by himself. As early as the third century hermits and anchorites had begun to people the deserts of Egypt and to seek refuge from persecution in the barren hills. The fame of holy men like St. Paul of Thebes and St. Anthony attracted others to share their solitude, and the first monasteries were no more than a collection of huts and caves inhabited by anchorites. The fourth century saw the gradual organization of these colonies, first by St. Pahom, then by Shenute. In 357–8 St. Basil of Caesarea in Cappadocia visited the monasteries of Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, and brought back the rules to his own country. The rapidity with which the monastic idea travelled, and the influence it gained, are the most astounding features in the whole history of Christian civilization.

The early monasteries were of two kinds, the Laura, a loosely

[1] This paper was illustrated by lantern slides.

organized group of monks living in separate cells and reflecting not inaccurately the societies of hermits of the third century, and the Coenobium where the bonds of the community were drawn more closely. In the West the Coenobium ended by absorbing into itself all monastic impulse, in the East the anchoritic spirit never entirely disappeared, and the Laura continued to hold its own, side by side with the Coenobium. The different character of the two types is architecturally well marked. The West goes forward towards the splendid developments of which the ideal plan of St. Gall is the earliest existing representative, the East holds largely to a somewhat inchoate scheme, the true heir to such communities as occupied the scattered shrines and cells of establishments like that of Bawit in Egypt. Justinian legislated in vain against the system of separate cells, ordering instead common dormitories and refectories that the monks might watch each other night and day.

Under such influences as these grew up and developed the monastic institutions which St. Basil had implanted in central Anatolia, himself the author of the rule which is paramount in the East until this day. Some of the buildings that we studied must belong to the earliest period; there is no reason for placing them later than the fifth century. I have planned monasteries in the Ali Summassi Dagh, in the Karadja Dagh, and in Hassan Dagh. On the summit of every peak I found a cruciform church or churches connected in every case with a small monastic building. As a rule the churches are in plan simple T-shaped cruciforms roofed with barrel vaults and a dome. Two examples of such churches had already been published by Strzygowski, one being a small chapel with a trifoliate apse lying near a large basilica and enclosed by traces of monastic buildings. Crowfoot suggested that the chapel was a baptistery; Strzygowski was inclined, rightly as I believe, to regard it as a memorial chapel. Fresh evidence has brought me to the conclusion that the cross-shaped church is the memorial church of central Anatolia, and I reject in every case the baptistery hypothesis. In the first place we have found memorial inscriptions on two of these chapels; secondly they occur frequently without a larger church, but a baptistery could scarcely stand alone; thirdly they are situated on the summits of the hills, 6,000 feet above the sea in the Kara Dagh, 9,000 feet in Hassan Dagh, and such situations would be unreasonable for a baptistery, though they would accord well with the traditions of the land if the buildings can be taken as memorial churches.

I regard these small hill-top monasteries as establishments of clerks for the service of the shrine rather than as in the true sense monastic. *Monasteria clericorum* are mentioned in the fourth century, and De Vogüé believed all the early Syrian foundations to be of this character.

What then were these little bodies of clerks grouped round a memorial church? I believe the answer to this question can be given from literary sources. At the Council of Chalcedon in 451, special mention was made of *Memoria*, occupied by monks living under an archimandrite, who was not recognized as equal in rank to the head of a monastery proper. Nissen in his *Regelung des Klosterwesens im Rhomäerreiche* has suggested that these *Memoria* must be connected with the *Martyria*, or memorial churches, which are known to have been so common in Asia Minor. The architectural evidence seems to me to justify Nissen's conclusion to the full; the *Memorion* lies in ruins upon every hill, a tiny monastery standing round a memorial church.[1] The most significant example of the memorial monastery is a ruin that occupies the highest peak of the Kara Dagh, Mahaletch. A few feet below the church we found two Hittite inscriptions carved on either side of a passage or gateway, which was formed by an outcrop of rock. We believe it to have been a mountain sanctuary, a Hittite High Place, the first that has yet been found. From the period, therefore, of the earliest Anatolian civilization this mountain-top had been regarded as sacred ground. The ancient gods, calling themselves by other names, continued to be worshipped there; the Christians re-sanctified Mahaletch by building upon it a memorial church and monastery. And here again we are in touch with one of the oldest traditions of the country. Sir W. Ramsay long ago came to the conclusion that in Asia Minor there was no holy place without a burial; that a memorial chapel should have existed on every hill-top goes far to prove his view. The tradition is not yet dead: I climbed to the top of Hassan Dagh to visit the ruins of a cruciform chapel, and found the summit to be to this day a place of pilgrimage, sanctified by a Moslem grave.

Besides the hill-top memorials there were other small monastic establishments, some of them on the low ground, and some on the sides of the mountains. There is one that stands on a shoulder half-way up Hassan Dagh (Boz Dagh); I found another, singularly regular in plan, near the foot of the same mountain, and with it may be compared a ruin in Bin Bir Klisse, the lower town of the Kara Dagh. In the upper town, Deghile, there is a group of buildings which has in all probability a different history; if we are right in our conclusions as to its origin, it throws an interesting light upon monastic development. We have here a house with a memorial church, the narthex of which contains graves. The house and church are connected by a prolongation of the narthex and by a portico, both of which were

[1] It is well to mention that the word *memorion* was used very loosely. Sir W. Ramsay gives an instance where the *memorion* was a gravestone made by a deacon for himself: *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, No. 672, and so often.

added at different periods covering nearly a hundred years, as can be shown from the architecture and from inscriptions. Behind them lies another chapel in a walled enclosure which contains graves; it is, however, impossible to say what is the exact relation of the chapel to the church. The kernel of the whole group seems to have been in this instance a private house. Now it was not contrary to early custom to turn a house into a monastic establishment; I need only cite the example of St. Gregory, who converted his own house into a cloister for his monks. Architecturally the point is not without value. I suspect that there was little structural difference between the private house of central Anatolia and the early monastic establishment. The one grew out of the other just as simply as the monastic life grafted itself upon the domestic, and the absence of any very stringent monastic rule made it possible to use the secular building for religious purposes without much alteration.

There are three buildings in Deghile which show a very considerable advance in the monastic ideal; they prove that the Coenobium with its stricter organization was not unknown to the plateau. The best preserved of the three consists of a series of large chambers disposed round two sides of a square. The church, which I believe to be a later building, lies on the third side, but there are traces of an earlier wall which shut in the court on this side, and possibly the original chapel formed the south-east angle of the square. A great hall with columns down the centre must be taken as the common refectory; the monks lodged in a number of parallel chambers; then follows a vaulted storehouse or stable, a large room with a cupboard set in the thickness of the wall (lodging of the prior ?) and a tower-like structure at the corner. Almost the same series of rooms can be seen in the second monastery; the third is more completely destroyed than either of the other two, but a long line of ruined foundations show that its large chambers stretched for a considerable distance along the slope on which it lies.

These three monasteries formed part of the defences of the town. We have reason to believe that during the period of the Arab invasions (700 to 800 roughly dated) the Christian population of the Kara Dagh turned Deghile into a fortified stronghold, its position, high up on a shoulder of the mountain, giving it many strategic advantages. We can trace a roughly constructed wall that linked together church and chapel and monastery on the south side of the town; one of the monasteries guarded the approach from the lower town; a second formed the north line of the defences, while a third held the centre of the west side. The question that naturally suggests itself is, whether the monks who occupied these great houses may not have belonged to an order that combined a military with a religious life,

a prototype of the military orders of the middle ages. It is significant that one of the inscriptions on the church attached to the monastery in the centre of the town is a memorial inscription to a certain Philaretos who is said to have 'died in the war'. Nor is it only in Deghile that the monks seem to have been charged with the defence of the city. In the lower town a monastery stands like an outpost over the road that leads from Konia. The ruins cover a bit of high ground north-west of the town and the position must always have been considered an important one; for Sir W. Ramsay found on it traces of a much older fortification belonging to the period of the first civilization in the Kara Dagh. Here, as on Mahaletch, the Christian buildings re-occupy the site chosen by the original inhabitants, and the memorial chapel of a Christian saint or holy man consecrates the point that had formerly been placed under the care of a more ancient divinity or hero.

I am not concerned here to discuss the architectural features of the plans which I have submitted to you. They do not as a whole suggest any very specialized scheme. A church or churches with the clerical buildings grouped about them as the lie of the ground permitted, the whole surrounded by a wall that was supplemented as far as possible by the outcropping rock of the site, these are the main features of the central Anatolian monasteries. Generally there was an attempt to provide some kind of open court within the enclosure, and the vaulted cistern that contained the water supply was placed in it. We may look in vain for anything resembling the mediaeval monasteries of Europe, with their infirmaries and libraries, guest-houses, and store-houses. Monasticism in central Asia Minor was a much less complicated matter. It was closely interwoven with the common life of the people. The ascetics watching over remote shrines in the mountains were but a development of the ancient traditions of the land; the warrior monks of the fortified monasteries in the towns took their share in the civic existence by contributing to its security, and their important duties led to a higher organization which is reflected in the buildings they inhabited. It must not be forgotten that church and monastery were the only civic monuments of the land. Such records of the life of the community as were kept were placed upon the sanctuaries.[1] If we are ever to arrive at any realization of the history of the people, a history that shall be more than a bare catalogue of invasions and battles and the birth and death of emperors, it must be through the evidence offered by the architectural and epigraphic remains of religious foundations.

[1] The office of tribune is mentioned in an inscription on the fortified monastery of the lower town, that of eponymous tribune in a painted inscription on another large church.

12

LES CONFRÉRIES RELIGIEUSES DANS L'ISLAMISME ET LES ORDRES MILITAIRES DANS LE CATHOLICISME

PAR G. BONET-MAURY

ON sait aujourd'hui qu'il y a dans le culte musulman des prêtres et des saints, des monastères et des confréries religieuses. Ces dernières ont même joué un rôle très actif, non seulement dans le développement de l'Islamisme, mais en politique, et aussi dans les guerres des Arabes contre les nations chrétiennes. Les possessions de la France en Afrique nous ont appris à les mieux connaître. Je me propose, grâce aux études de nos officiers et de nos interprètes,[1] I. de rechercher le lieu et la date de naissance du culte des saints et des confréries musulmanes ; II. de rappeler brièvement l'origine des principaux ordres militaires et militants du Catholicisme ; enfin III. de m'enquérir s'il y a eu des rapports entre ces congrégations des deux cultes rivaux ? où ont eu lieu leurs points de contact ? si les fondateurs des confréries musulmanes ont copié les ordres catholiques ou réciproquement ? Telles sont les questions sur lesquelles je voudrais apporter un peu de lumière.

I

Après la mort de Mohammed, et à mesure que le Prophète disparaissait dans la gloire de son apothéose, les croyants éprouvèrent le besoin d'avoir auprès d'Allah des médiateurs plus facilement accessibles que Mohammed ou les anges, pour faire exaucer leurs prières. On commença par attribuer aux amis de Mohammed un pouvoir d'intercession auprès de Dieu, on les appela *Wouélis* — ce furent les premiers saints — et bientôt on leur attribua le pouvoir de faire des miracles. Chacun a sa spécialité. La nuit du 27 du Ramadan est la plus propice pour invoquer les wouélis (*Leilet el Kadr*). Puis, on éleva en leur honneur un monument, plus ou moins grand, suivant leur puissance, (*koubbah* ou *turbeh*) devant lequel on allume la nuit une lampe qui brûle perpétuellement. C'est là que chaque année, à l'anniversaire de naissance du *marabout*, les pèlerins viennent porter leurs prières et leurs offrandes. Les Musulmans ont aussi leurs saintes ou *cheikkat*,

[1] L. Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouans*, Alger, 1884. — A. Le Châtelier, *Les Confréries religieuses de l'Hedjaz*, Paris, 1887. — Depont et Coppolani : *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes*, Alger, 1897.

mais en petit nombre. Le culte des wouélis est encore aujourd'hui florissant en Égypte, au Maroc, etc. Si cette vénération offre des ressemblances avec l'hagiodulie des Catholiques, il y a pourtant des différences à noter[1]: 1 le wouéli n'est pas, comme le saint catholique, canonisé par une autorité ecclésiastique, mais par la voix populaire; 2 il n'est pas vénéré dans les mosquées, qui sont consacrées exclusivement au culte d'Allah, mais dans la koubbah ou la turbeh, lieu présumé de sa sépulture; 3 on ne fait du 'saint musulman' aucune représentation ni en sculpture, ni en peinture, tout au plus est-il parfois question dans sa légende d'une *sakina* ou auréole, qui entourait son visage pendant qu'il priait avec ferveur.

Les Musulmans ont aussi leurs ascètes et leurs moines. Les *derviches* (de *derouis*, qui signifie 'pauvre' en persan), originaires de la Perse, se distinguaient par leur pauvreté et leur ardeur à la prière. Ils se groupèrent d'abord au nombre de deux ou trois *fokra* dans des retraites, appelées *ribats*,[2] analogues aux 'laures' des ermites de la Thébaïde, ou aux *lavras* de la Russie contemporaine. Devenus plus nombreux, ils formèrent des *zaouias* ou couvents, en général près la tombe d'un marabout. Il y a eu aussi des couvents de femmes, par exemple celui qui fut fondé en Égypte (A.D. 806) par Zejnab, surnommée la fille de la Bagdadaise, et un autre à Monastir, près Sousse, en Tunisie.

Quant aux confréries musulmanes, ou 'Sociétés de *Khouans*', elles sont dues à trois causes: 1 le besoin d'honorer les marabouts morts ou les saintes; 2 le çoufisme; et 3 l'esprit d'association et de propagande. On sait le rôle capital que les confréries des Almoravides et des Almohades jouèrent au Maroc, puis dans l'Espagne jusqu'à 1273. Ce furent encore des derviches, tels qu'Abd-el-Kader, Alipha-Bah et Othman del Fodio, qui furent à la tête des insurrections politico-religieuses au nord-ouest de l'Afrique au XIXe siècle.

Les caractères propres du Khouan, ou moine musulman, sont, comme pour le religieux catholique, la pauvreté volontaire, la vie solitaire ou conventuelle, consacrée à la prière et aux mortifications, et le zèle missionnaire; mais il diffère de lui par le manque de continence. Le trait caractéristique de ces confréries est l'appel à la guerre sainte ou *djehad*; on distingue les Chadeliya, les Qadriya, et les Senoussiya. Ce dernier ordre, fondé par Mohammed ben Ali el Senoussi (m. 1839), est d'autant plus répandu et redoutable en Afrique qu'un Khouan peut s'y affilier, sans cesser de faire partie d'une autre confrérie. Son cheik l'a enrôlé sous sa bannière—les tribus guerrières du Ouadaï,

[1] Goldziher, 'Le Culte des Saints chez les Musulmans,' *Revue d'histoire des religions*, 1880, pp. 180–206. Comp. Carra de Vaux, *Le Mahométisme et le Génie arien*, Paris, 1898.

[2] La première *ribat* fut fondée au Maroc, en 1040, près du marabout d'Abdallah-en-Yacine.

du Fezzan, Benghazi, etc.; sa tactique est de faire le vide autour des Européens et puis de les anéantir.

Toutes ont d'ailleurs une organisation semblable. A leur tête se trouve un cheik, héritier spirituel du fondateur de la confrérie et résidant près de sa tombe. Il a sous ses ordres des Khalifes ou *naqib*, ses lieutenants et des *reqqas* ou messagers chargés de porter ses ordres aux différentes zaouïas ou monastères. Chacune a pour chef un *moqaddem* ou prieur, qui a sous ses ordres les Khouans ou frères et les *Kreddams*, sorte de frères lais. Le moqaddem veille à l'exécution des instructions du cheik et à l'observation des rites; il est chargé de l'éducation des novices et préside à l'initiation des nouveaux membres, qui s'engagent à pratiquer l'obéissance, la discrétion, et le dévouement. Il y a chaque année, à la zaouïa centrale, une assemblée générale ou chapitre de la confrérie.

II

Voyons maintenant les ordres monastiques catholiques. Nous ne traiterons ici que de ceux qui ont joué un rôle conquérant et missionnaire, et qu'on peut appeler d'un seul mot les ordres *militaires*. Ces ordres sont nés de l'union du monachisme et de la chevalerie, à l'occasion des croisades contre les Sarrazins (Orient) ou les Maures (Espagne). Les papes, jaloux de maintenir le bon ordre parmi les croisés, voulurent renforcer la discipline militaire, qui s'était montrée insuffisante, par le triple vœu monastique. Ils encouragèrent donc la formation d'ordres de moines armés. Ces derniers s'engageaient à faire aux Infidèles une guerre à merci. Les principaux furent: 1 les Chevaliers du Temple ou Templiers (A.D. 1119); 2 les Chevaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem (A.D. 1143), qui, après la reprise de la Palestine par les Sarrazins, prirent le nom de Chevaliers de Rhodes, puis de Chevaliers de Malte[1]; 3 les Chevaliers Teutoniques ou Hospitaliers de Sainte-Marie de Jérusalem (A.D. 1190), qui à partir de 1226 se consacrèrent à la conversion des Slaves, payem de la Prusse orientale, et de la Courlande; 4 les Chevaliers Porte-glaive, employés de même à la conversion par la force armée des payem de Livonie (A.D. 1202), qui se fondirent avec l'ordre précédent. Vers la même époque, à l'autre bout de l'Europe, parurent en Portugal (5) l'ordre des Chevaliers d'Avis (A.D. 1162), et en Espagne celui de Calatrava (A.D. 1153), fondé par des moines Bénédictins, transformés en chevaliers, pour la conquête et défense de la ville d'Oreto contre les Maures; 6 celui d'Alcantara fondé sur les frontières de la Castille, pour la défendre et spécialement la Vierge

[1] Les Chevaliers de Saint-Jean, ou Johannites, ont été rétablis au XIXe siècle comme Hospitaliers en Allemagne, par le roi de Prusse, Frédéric Guillaume IV (1852), et en Angleterre; dans ce dernier pays ils ont fondé des Hôpitaux, pour secours aux blessés en temps de guerre ou à la campagne.

immaculée contre les Infidèles. Ces derniers, sur les plaintes des maris de la ville voisine, furent autorisés à se marier (A.D. 1540). Tous ces ordres avaient à peu près la même organisation : à leur tête un grand-maître ('magister militiae'), revêtu d'un pouvoir absolu. Les affiliés se divisaient en trois classes : les prêtres, les chevaliers, les frères servants. On n'était initié qu'après des épreuves mystérieuses et redoutables. Tous étaient tenus au secret rigoureux et à l'obéissance, vis-à-vis du grand-maître et de ses lieutenants. On tenait chaque année un Chapitre de l'ordre. Les derniers ordres militaires disparurent après la conquête de la Terre-Sainte par les Turcs et après la conversion d'Albert de Brandebourg, grand-maître des Chevaliers Teutoniques, au Luthéranisme (A.D. 1525). Mais, alors même, naquit en Espagne la Société des Jésuites qui, bien que ses moines ne portassent point les armes, étaient essentiellement militaires, tant par eur hiérarchie que par leur discipline et la guerre à mort contre le Protestantisme : ce furent eux qui déchaînèrent sur l'Allemagne les horreurs de la Guerre de Trente ans. Plus près de nous, Léon XIII suivit la tradition des grands papes des XIe et XIIe siècles, lorsqu'il autorisa le Cardinal Lavigerie, archevêque d'Alger, à instituer la milice des Frères armés du Sahara, dits 'Pères blancs,' pour la protection des nègres chrétiens et la sainte guerre contre les marchands d'esclaves.

III

Il nous reste à examiner s'il y a eu des rapports entre les confréries musulmanes et les ordres militaires ou militants catholiques. Les unes et les autres s'étant développés parallèlement du XIIe au XVIe siècle, c'est à cette époque qu'ils ont pu entrer en relations. Où ont-ils eu des points de contact ? D'abord, en Palestine et en Égypte, au temps des croisades ; pendant les trêves, on sait que les Templiers et les Johannites eurent de fréquents rapports avec les Sarrazins[1] ; ensuite, au Mâgreb, c'est-à-dire, au nord-ouest de l'Afrique, où les marchands de Pise et de Gênes, de Marseille et de Barcelone, faisaient le commerce avec les Musulmans de Tunisie, d'Algérie et du Maroc. Dans ce dernier pays, il restait encore au XIIIe siècle quelques églises chrétiennes. Les émirs de Tunis, de Tlemcen etc., le sultan du Maroc, avaient à leur service des *frendjis*, c'est-à-dire des troupes françaises ou espagnoles.[2] Mais c'est en Espagne que ces rapports furent le plus étroits. Ce furent sans doute les confréries des Almohades et des Almoravides qui suggérèrent aux Portugais et Espagnols l'idée et l'organisation des

[1] Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique de la Croisade*. Jacques de Vitry, *idem*. Lessing, *Nathan der Weise*.

[2] Mas-Latrie, *Relations du Mâgreb avec les nations chrétiennes, dans l'Afrique occidentale*, Paris, 1886.

ordres d'Avis, de Calatrava, et d'Alcantara; les deux derniers noms sont arabes. D'ailleurs, bien après la conquête de Grenade les Maures furent tolérés dans le midi de l'Espagne; par exemple, la confrérie musulmane des Qadrija n'en fut expulsée qu'en A.D. 1524. L'influence arabe s'y prolongea jusqu'à la fin du XVIe siècle, ce dont l'architecture, le costume, la langue, les mœurs, le théâtre et même le culte offrent des preuves multiples. Nous ne traiterons ici que le dernier point.

M. Dieulafoy, dans sa belle étude sur la *Prédestination et le libre arbitre dans les tragiques espagnols*,[1] a démontré que les principaux personnages figurant dans les pièces de Calderon, de Cervantes, et de Saavedra sont imbus du dogme de la prédestination, qui est le trait une littérature dite *aljemiada* était écrite en langue castillane, mais caractéristique de la théodicée coranique. Jusqu'au XVe siècle, toute avec des caractères arabes; on trouve des vers de la Vulgate gravés en lettres çoufiques aux portes de plusieurs cathédrales. Dans beaucoup d'églises on lisait l'office et les Évangiles, traduits en arabe. Musulmans et Chrétiens chômaient parfois les mêmes fêtes, par exemple la nuit de la Saint-Jean, pendant laquelle on observait une sorte de trêve de Dieu. D'après tous ces rapports, on ne sera pas étonné de trouver, dans la constitution des Jésuites, conçue par un militaire espagnol, tant d'analogies avec les règles de certaines confréries musulmanes, par exemple les Chadeliya.[2] Ces traits de ressemblance sont au nombre de quatre:

1 Quant à l'esprit et l'objet des deux ordres, tous deux sont de mystique inspiration, mais avec une tendance militante et agressive; tous deux furent fondés 'ad maiorem Dei gloriam' et le triomphe des vrais croyants sur les Infidèles; seulement pour les Chadeliya, c'est Mohammed qui est le Prophète, tandis qu'aux yeux d'Ignace c'est Jésus qui est le vrai Prophète ou Messie et le Pape est son vicaire sur la terre.

2 Dans la méthode de préparation et la cérémonie d'initiation, le noviciat des Khouans dure deux ans et davantage; il consiste dans l'accomplissement de certains travaux domestiques et la récitation de prières. Si-Chadeli, fondateur des Chadeliya, et Abder-Rahman, fondateur des Rahmaniya, ont prescrit à leurs adeptes des 'exercices spirituels' qui produisent chez eux une surexcitation mentale, donnant lieu souvent à des phénomènes hystériques. Or on sait que les 'Exercitia spiritualia' d'Ignace de Loyola déterminent une obsession mentale et une annihilation de la volonté.

[1] Dieulafoy, *La Prédestination dans les tragiques espagnols*, Notices de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, Paris, mai 1908.

[2] Hermann Müller, *Les Origines de la Compagnie de Jésus. Ignace et Lainez*, Paris, 1808.

3 Il y a aussi des ressemblances frappantes entre la cérémonie d'initiation des Khouans et la prise d'habit d'un religieux catholique. Le nouveau frère est interrogé par le cheik sur sa foi en Allah et Mohammed, après quoi il prête serment de lui obéir en tout, de ne jamais abandonner la voie, ni révéler l'*oueid* ou formule de prière spéciale à la confrérie. Le cheik alors lie le néophyte, par un cordon, au bras des autres Khouans et lui coupe deux cheveux à l'occiput. N'est-ce pas une sorte de tonsure?[1]

4 Mais ce qu'il y a de plus frappant, c'est la ressemblance entre le gouvernement et le principe de la discipline des Jésuites et les confréries musulmanes. A la tête de celles-ci est le cheik ou grand-maître, qui a un pouvoir absolu sur les naqīb, les moqaddems et les Khouans. Il ne les consulte que s'il lui plaît et les révoque à son gré. Les subordonnés lui doivent une obéissance aveugle. 'Tu seras entre les mains de ton cheik,' dit la règle de l'ordre des Rahmaniya, 'comme le cadavre entre les mains du laveur des morts. Obéis-lui en tout ce qu'il ordonne, car c'est Dieu même qui parle par sa voix. Lui désobéir, c'est encourir la colère de Dieu!' Lisez, maintenant, la lettre d'Ignace de Loyola aux Jésuites portugais sur l'obéissance, ou les Constitutions de la Société de Jésus (part VI, ch. i), et vous y trouvez ces mots: 'Que ceux qui vivent dans l'obéissance se laissent mener par leurs supérieurs comme un cadavre, qui se laisse retourner et manier.' Et si l'on objectait qu'Ignace n'a pu connaître les confréries musulmanes, je répondrais que, d'après les biographies écrites par des Jésuites, il s'est rencontré au moins deux fois avec des Musulmans et a discuté avec eux sur la religion; d'abord en 1522, lorsqu'il quitta le château de Loyola, pour résider à Manresa, et, l'année suivante, lors de son séjour à Jérusalem. D'ailleurs en sa qualité d'ex-militaire, il avait certes observé la foi robuste et la forte discipline des Khouans.

Voici nos conclusions: 1 Les confréries musulmanes, pas plus que le culte des wouélis, ne sont une imitation des saints ou des ordres monastiques catholiques, mais ils sont le produit des mêmes aspirations mystiques; elles eurent pour berceau l'Arabie, l'Égypte et le nord-ouest de l'Afrique.

2 Ces confréries ont exercé une influence sur les ordres militaires catholiques, entre autres sur les Templiers, les Chevaliers de Calatrava, d'Alcantara, etc. C'est surtout en Espagne que l'on trouve leur empreinte profonde, par exemple, dans la constitution des Jésuites.

3 Ces confréries, entre autres les Chadeliya et les Senoussiya, exercent encore aujourd'hui une action missionnaire et militaire considérable au nord de l'Afrique, et particulièrement au Maroc.

4 L'Islamisme est donc loin d'être immobile et dégénéré, mais,

[1] R. P. Louis Petit, *Les confréries musulmanes*, Paris, 1902, chez Bloud.

obéissant aux mêmes lois psychologiques qui ont présidé au développement des autres cultes, il a suivi son évolution propre et s'est accommodé aux besoins du cœur humain et aux divers milieux. Comme l'a dit justement M. Houdas : 'L'idée du progrès de la forme religieuse est gravée au fond du cœur de tout Musulman.'[1]

13

L'AUTHENTICITÉ DES CANONS DE SARDIQUE

PAR E. CH. BABUT

LA question que j'aborde est une des plus importantes qu'ait à résoudre l'historien de la papauté au temps de l'Empire romain. S'il est vrai que le grand concile de Sardique (Sofia), en 343, ait conféré, ou, si l'on veut, reconnu à l'évêque de Rome une juridiction de cassation sur tout l'épiscopat catholique, on est en droit d'affirmer que la souveraineté ecclésiastique des papes fut surtout l'œuvre de l'Église elle-même. Si les canons de Sardique étaient faux, le pouvoir que les papes exercèrent au IVe et au Ve siècle, de juger en instance suprême les évêques occidentaux, n'aurait eu d'autre fondement juridique que les décrets de Valentinien Ier, de Gratien et de Valentinien III.

Le sujet a été débattu, il y a quelques années, avec abondance, avec quelque passion théologique, avec beaucoup d'utilité. Le point de départ de la controverse fut un mémoire de M. J. Friedrich, publié en 1901 et complété par l'auteur en 1902 et 1903[2]. Frappé surtout du fait que les Canons de Sardique ne sont cités par les papes, jusqu'au VIe siècle, que sous le nom de Canons de Nicée, et qu'ils portent dans plusieurs manuscrits le titre de *Canones Nicaeni*, M. Friedrich soutint que le concile de Sardique n'avait publié aucun règlement disciplinaire, et que les prétendus Canons de Sardique n'étaient que de faux canons de Nicée, fabriqués à Rome (par un Africain) en l'an 416. Deux siècles plus tard environ, désespérant de faire accepter le faux comme une vraie pièce nicéenne, on aurait pris le parti, toujours à Rome, de l'intituler Canons de Sardique ; et l'on aurait fait subir au texte apocryphe les quelques modifications rendues nécessaires par ce changement d'étiquette.

[1] Houdas, *L'Islamisme*, Paris, 1904.

[2] *Sitzungsberichte der philos-histor. Klasse der kön. bayr. Akad. der Wiss. zu München*, Jahrg. 1901 : 'Die Unächtheit der Canones von Sardica.'— Articles complémentaires dans la même Collection, Jahrg. 1902 et 1903.

Ce système a été combattu par plusieurs savants, entre qui sont MM. Turner[1] d'Oxford et Funk[2] de Tubingue, et il a été prouvé faux. Les principaux faits établis à l'encontre de M. Friedrich sont les suivants: le concile de Sardique de 343 a publié des canons; c'est par suite d'une confusion sincère que ces canons ont été appelés à Rome canons de Nicée; les citations de ces canons commencent, dans les lettres des papes, non en 416, mais vers 375; la citation qui fut faite des canons XVIII et XIX[3] au concile de Carthage de 350 environ est authentique; enfin les canons portent leur marque d'origine, car les évêques qui y sont nommés (et rien n'autorise à croire que leurs noms aient été introduits après coup dans la pièce) prirent tous réellement part au concile de Sardique, alors qu'un seul, Hosius de Cordoue, avait siégé à Nicée: or, si l'on eût fabriqué un faux concile de Nicée, on eût pris ses membres sur la liste des *Patres Nicaeni*. La réfutation est complète. Fournit-elle en outre une démonstration d'authenticité suffisante, et cette démonstration vaut-elle pour toute la pièce synodale telle que nous la possédons? Cela est admis, si je ne me trompe, par tout le monde.

Et pourtant! En dehors de la mauvaise raison tirée de l'appellation fausse de *Canones Nicaeni*, M. Friedrich a allégué, contre l'authenticité, des arguments que je renonce, faute de temps, à reprendre aujourd'hui, mais qui gardent, après les démonstrations opposées et malgré la ruine du système, une force presque invincible. D'une part des preuves d'authenticité irréfutables, d'autre part, en faveur de l'inauthenticité, la probabilité la plus inquiétante. Pour mon compte, je suis demeuré longtemps dans la contemplation de ce mystère historique.

J'ai fini par voir qu'il n'y avait là aucun mystère, que les arguments opposés, au lieu de se rencontrer, se croisent, et que les faits établis d'un côté, les faits presque établis de l'autre, se concilient de la façon la plus naturelle. Les quasi-preuves d'inauthenticité portent exclusivement sur ceux des canons de Sardique qui intéressent le Saint-Siège; ce sont les canons III, IV, VII et X, première partie (disons X^a), du texte latin; je les appellerai pour plus de brièveté les canons romains. Les preuves d'authenticité ne valent que pour certains des autres canons, comme les numéros I, XIII, XVI, XVIII–XIX, attestés au IVe siècle. J'ai donc été amené à chercher si la solution du pro-

[1] 'The Genuineness of the Sardican Canons,' *Journal of Theological Studies*, 1901, p. 370 et suiv.

[2] *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, t. iii, Paderborn, 1907, p. 159 et suiv.

[3] Tous ces numéros se rapportent au texte latin, tel que le donne Bruns, *Canones . . . Saeculorum*, IV, V, VI, VII, Berlin, 1839. Il y a une correction très importante à faire à ce texte: la suppression, au *Can.* III, du mot *Iulio* (Turner, art. cité, p. 376).

blème ne serait pas fournie par l'examen de la pièce synodale elle-même, si les quatre canons romains n'y auraient pas été insérés frauduleusement, et, puisqu'un faux est toujours reconnaissable, si les traces de cette insertion ne seraient pas restées apparentes. C'est le résultat de cette recherche que je vais exposer ici. L'hypothèse où j'avais été logiquement conduit par l'étude des mémoires de Friedrich et de Funk m'a paru être vérifiée par plusieurs indices concordants. J'indiquerai les plus apparents dans cette note provisoire et sommaire.

I

Premier indice : les canons romains interrompent la suite et l'ordonnance des délibérations du synode.

Les canons I et II énoncent des règles relatives à l'élection et à l'ordination des évêques. Avec le canon III on passe brusquement à trois questions toutes différentes, dont la principale est l'appel à Rome des évêques qui ont perdu quelque procès (on a eu tort d'entendre qu'il s'agissait seulement des évêques déposés) devant un synode. Le canon IV traite encore des appels à Rome. Avec le canon V[1] on revient aux ordinations d'évêques ; avec le canon VII, aux appels à Rome. Voilà une délibération bien sautillante.

Il est vrai que le canon VII, dans la version grecque de la pièce synodale, porte le n° V, et fait ainsi suite aux canons III et IV, qu'il doit compléter. Cet ordre de classement est évidemment plus rationnel. Admettons (ce qui n'est pas prouvé) qu'il soit primitif par rapport à l'ordre des textes latins[2] : il reste que les trois premiers canons romains s'intercalent au milieu des canons relatifs à la création des évêques. On continue au canon V des textes latins (VI du texte grec) à réglementer les élections, comme si les canons III, IV, VII n'avaient pas détourné l'attention vers un autre objet. La pièce aurait plus de suite et de cohérence si les trois premiers canons romains étaient écartés.

De même le quatrième des canons romains (x^a) apparaît dans le contexte comme une surcharge. Le canon VIII interdit aux évêques d'Afrique de se rendre en personne à la cour ; le canon IX ordonne que les évêques africains qui auraient une requête à présenter au prince devraient la faire porter par leur diacre. C'est à ces deux prescriptions que fait suite naturellement la réflexion d'Alypius de Mégare, qui forme aujourd'hui le canon x^b.

'Alypius episcopus dixit : Si propter pupillos et viduas vel

[1] V et VI. Mais je crois le canon VI faux, comme les quatre canons romains.

[2] M. Turner a établi que le texte grec est une traduction d'un texte latin. Mais on pourrait supposer que l'original latin du texte grec était plus correct que tous nos manuscrits latins.

laborantes, qui causas non iniquas habent, susceperint peregrinationis incommoda, habebunt aliquid rationis; nunc vero cum ea postulent praecipue, quae sine invidia hominum et sine reprehensione esse non possunt, non necesse est eos ire ad comitatum.'

Bien moins directe est la liaison de cette remarque d'Alypius avec le canon x[a] :

'Qui vero Romam venerint, sicut dictum est (ce mot renvoie mal à propos aux canons III, IV et VII), sanctissimo fratri et coëpiscopo nostro Romanae ecclesiae preces quas habent tradant, ut et ipse prius examinet, si honestae et iustae sunt, et praestet diligentiam atque sollicitudinem, ut ad comitatum perferantur. Universi dixerunt placere sibi et honestum esse consilium.'

Ainsi, dans le second cas comme dans le premier, il y a un indice externe d'interpolation.

II

Il y aurait en second lieu des remarques à faire sur la rédaction des canons romains, qui présentent tous des vices de forme, et des vices surprenants ; mais il serait imprudent d'argumenter en ce sens sans avoir recueilli des informations complètes sur la tradition manuscrite du texte[1]. J'en viens à la preuve d'inauthenticité la plus frappante ; elle pourrait être décisive.

Sur deux points les dispositions des quatre canons contredisent les canons mêmes de Sardique.

1 Le canon III contient la décision suivante : Osius episcopus dixit : Illud quoque necessario adiciendum est, ut *episcopi de sua provincia ad aliam provinciam*, in qua sunt episcopi, *non transeant*, nisi forte a fratribus suis invitati, ne videamur ianuam claudere caritatis. . . Synodus respondit : Placet.'

Or on voit au canon XIV :

'Osius episcopus dixit : Et hoc quoque statuere debetis, ut *episcopus si* ex alia civitate *convenerit* ad aliam civitatem, vel *ex provincia ad aliam provinciam et* ambitioni magis quam devotioni serviens *voluerit* in aliena civitate *multo tempore residere* : forte enim evenit episcopum loci non esse tam instructum neque tam doctum ; is vero qui advenit, incipiat contemnere eum, et frequenter facere sermonem ut dehonestet et infirmet illius personam ita ut ex hac occasione non dubitet relinquere assignatam sibi ecclesiam et transeat ad alienam. *Definite ergo tempus, quia et non recipi episcopum in-*

[1] Depuis que cette note a été rédigée, M. C. H. Turner a bien voulu me communiquer un texte critique des canons, établi par lui, et qui repose sur la collation de presque tous les manuscrits, de tous les manuscrits qu'il juge importants. Ce texte ne fait que confirmer les remarques que permet de faire le texte de Bruns.

humanum est, et si diutius resideat perniciosum est.' (On décide qu'un évêque ne pourra demeurer absent de sa cité pendant plus de trois semaines. Cette décision est rappelée au canon XX.)

Ainsi le même concile qui vient d'interdire absolument à un évêque de passer de sa province dans une autre aurait ensuite examiné les inconvénients du trop long séjour d'un évêque hors de sa cité ou de sa province, et fixé pour ce séjour un maximum de trois semaines. Les auteurs du canon XIV avaient donc oublié le canon III ? On voudra peut-être que les évêques visés au canon XIV comme séjournant trop longtemps hors de leur province aient bénéficié de l'exception prévue au canon III : *nisi forte invitati*. Mais le mot du canon XIV : *et non recipi inhumanum est*, interdit cette exégèse complaisante. On admettra encore comme possible (?) que le concile ait réellement oublié le décret qu'il venait de rendre : mais la motion XIV a pour auteur le même Hosius qui a fait la motion III. Il est bien plus probable que le concile qui a voté le canon XIV ignorait le prétendu canon III.

2 Il me paraît de même impossible de concilier le canon X^a^ avec les décisions qui le précèdent et le suivent.

Le canon VIII interdit aux évêques (on pense surtout aux Africains) de se rendre *ad comitatum*, à moins d'avoir été mandés par le prince. Le canon IX ordonne que les évêques qui auraient une requête à présenter au prince enverront à la cour un diacre. Le dit diacre, au départ, passera à l'évêché de la métropole, et le métropolitain lui remettra des lettres d'introduction pour les évêques des résidences impériales.

On arrive au canon X^a^ : 'Qui vero Romam venerint, sicut dictum est, sanctissimo fratri et coëpiscopo nostro Romanae ecclesiae preces quas habent tradant, ut et ipse prius examinet, si honestae et iustae sunt, et praestet diligentiam atque sollicitudinem, ut ad comitatum perferantur. Universi dixerunt placere sibi et honestum esse concilium.'

Le *qui* initial désigne certainement des évêques, car l'avant-dernière phrase a pour sujet *episcopi*, la dernière *episcopus*, et d'autre part le sujet inexprimé de la phrase qui suit est encore *episcopi*. Ces évêques, *qui Romam venerint*, sont, en arrivant, porteurs de suppliques ; il est impossible de supposer qu'ils n'aient formé le projet de présenter leur supplique que pendant leur séjour à Rome (cas visé par le concile de Carthage de 407, *Cod. Eccl. Afric.* No. CVI), car 1 : le canon dit *preces quas habent*, et non *si quas ibi preces habuerint vel receperint*, et 2 : le *et ipse prius examinet* suppose que la supplique des évêques qui arrivent à Rome a déjà été examinée par leur métropolitain. Enfin, comme aux canons VIII, X^b^, XI et XII on ne pense à d'autres voyages d'évêques que les voyages *ad comitatum*, les évêques *qui*

Romam venerint sont des voyageurs qui se sont mis en route pour se rendre à la cour, et qui passent par Rome. Notons encore que le concile de Sardique ne légiférant ici que pour l'empire de Constant,[1] et les suffragants directs du pape étant hors de cause,[2] le canon x^a^ ne peut guère intéresser que les Africains et, si l'on veut, les évêques d'Achaïe.

Comment donc les évêques, auxquels il était tout à l'heure interdit purement et simplement de quitter leur province pour porter leurs suppliques, ont-ils maintenant la faculté de porter en personne ces suppliques à Rome ? Ils ne peuvent arriver à Rome que s'ils ont violé les canons VIII et IX. Comment le concile fournit-il à ces délinquants le moyen légal d'échapper à la loi qu'il vient d'établir, et de faire quand même parvenir leurs suppliques avec chance de succès ? Le canon VIII disait formellement : 'Quicumque . . . preces habuerint vel acceperint, per diaconum suum mittant.' Ainsi il n'est plus temps, quand l'évêque étranger arrive en personne à Rome, d'examiner si la requête qu'il porte est honnête et juste. Quelle que soit sa requête, il est en faute. Au reste, le métropolitain, après avoir reçu la requête de son suffragant (on a vu qu'il y a dans le canon x^a^ une allusion à un premier examen de la requête fait dans la province du requérant), ne l'a pas renvoyée au suffragant lui-même, mais l'a remise au diacre du suffragant avec les lettres qui recommandent le diacre.

Mais voyons les canons XI et XII.

XI. Les évêques dont la ville est située *in canali* (les *canales* sont certaines voies, munies de relais, que suivent les courriers d'État [3]), quand ils verront un évêque étranger traverser leur ville, s'enquerront de l'objet de son voyage. S'ils découvrent que le voyageur se rend *ad comitatum*, ils ne le recevront pas à leur communion.

XII. (Mesure provisoire, applicable seulement jusqu'au moment où les règlements qui précèdent ne pourront être ignorés de personne.) Les évêques des cités situées sur un *canalis* devront avertir le voyageur et l'engager à rentrer aussitôt dans son diocèse, en laissant son diacre poursuivre seul le voyage commencé.

Voilà qui cadre parfaitement avec les canons VIII, IX, x^b^ : tout évêque qui a pris en personne la route de Milan pour porter une

[1] En effet : 1 Il y avait schisme au moment du concile de Sardique entre les deux moitiés de l'Empire.—2 Le canon VIII ne connaît qu'un *religiosus imperator*, le canon IX qu'un *felix et beatus Augustus*.

[2] Le *et ipse* du canon x^a^ suppose un examen antérieur à celui du pape ; et d'autre part on ne peut croire que le concile de Sardique ait légiféré spécialement pour la province du pape.

[3] *Cod. Theod.* viii. 5. 15 (au vicaire d'Afrique, 363) et vi. 29. 2 (357, au préfet du prétoire d'Italie).

supplique a agi contre les canons ; il faut s'abstenir de communier avec lui, ou, s'il a péché par ignorance, l'avertir et le presser de rentrer dans la légalité. Mais voilà aussi qui ne s'accorde pas avec le canon x[a]. Comment se fait-il que les évêques de la grande route aient à excommunier l'évêque voyageur, alors que l'évêque de Rome le recevra, et examinera si sa requête est 'honnête et juste'? Car on ne peut croire, à lire le canon x[a], que l'évêque de Rome ait à exclure lui aussi le voyageur de sa communion. La requête d'un excommunié ne pourrait pas être honnête et juste.

Prenons le cas d'un évêque d'Afrique ou de l'Italie méridionale dont la ville se trouve sur une route qualifiée *canalis*. Comment se fait-il que pendant la période transitoire prévue par le canon XII, voyant passer un collègue qui se rend *ad comitatum*, il ait à l'arrêter au passage ? D'après le canon x[a], l'évêque voyageur aurait le droit de poursuivre en personne sa route jusqu'à Rome. Ainsi, dans la législation très cohérente définie par les canons VIII, IX, x[b], XI et XII, le canon x[a] forme disparate ; il contredit chacun des cinq articles (ou plutôt des quatre, x[b] n'étant qu'un complément de IX) au milieu desquels il se trouve placé. Le canon x[a] paraît dater d'un temps où l'interdiction, prononcée à Sardique, des voyages d'évêques *ad comitatum*, était tombée en désuétude, où il était ordinaire et toléré qu'un évêque se rendît en personne à la cour. Tel était l'état des choses au début du ve siècle.[1]

Qu'on me permette encore trois remarques avant de conclure, ou du moins de clore cette note.

La première sera que notre texte latin des Canons de Sardique, dans beaucoup de manuscrits, porte la marque de son origine romaine, soit dans la liaison étroite des canons avec les Canons de Nicée (même titre, numérotation continue), soit dans la mention expresse : *transcripti in urbe Roma de exemplaribus sancti Innocenti episcopi*.

La seconde est que l'attestation la plus ancienne des canons romains de Sardique se rencontre, d'après M. Funk, dans une décrétale de 404, et, d'après M. Friedrich, dans une décrétale de 416. Les deux passages allégués sont à revoir de près ; ils s'expliqueraient peut-être aussi bien par une allusion au Can. VI de Nicée sous sa forme romaine : *Ecclesia Romana semper habuit primatus*. La première citation explicite se trouve dans le *Commonitoire* du pape Zosime à ses légats partant pour l'Afrique, pièce qui se date de l'an 418.

Ma troisième remarque est que les canons romains ne contiennent aucun nom d'évêque qui ne figure par ailleurs dans les canons de Sardique. L'argument tiré, contre l'hypothèse d'une falsification totale, des noms authentiques de Pères de Sardique, ne peut donc être invoqué contre l'hypothèse d'une falsification partielle.

[1] *Cod. Eccl. Afr.* cvi, texte du Concile africain de 407.

Ces constatations sont forcément très incomplètes, l'espace m'ayant été, suivant la règle nécessaire des Congrès, mesuré étroitement. Il m'a fallu laisser de côté des éléments importants de la question : le silence ou le témoignage négatif de tant d'auteurs ecclésiastiques et des papes de la fin du IVe siècle ; les recherches qui furent faites à Carthage, Alexandrie et Constantinople en 418–426 au sujet du canon VII, et qui aboutirent à ce résultat : *nulla invenimus patrum synodo constitutum* ; les anachronismes que ferait apparaître une étude attentive de la série des canons romains ; la forme incorrecte de ces canons. Il aurait été beaucoup trop long, aussi, de parler des circonstances exceptionnelles et même critiques qui pourraient seules faire apparaître la falsification comme explicable et vraisemblable. Une note sommaire comme celle-ci, sur une question si difficile, ne peut se terminer que par une conclusion provisoire et hypothétique.

Il me semble que si un texte quelconque, que personne n'eût avantage à sauver, se présentait dans les mêmes conditions que nos canons romains, avec ces témoignages négatifs terribles, avec une attestation positive qui vient si tard ; s'il offrait en outre, relativement à son contexte, ces apparences externes d'interpolation et ces contradictions internes, le texte serait classé comme suspect, et une enquête complète sur son origine serait jugée nécessaire.

14

In a paper entitled *The Origins of the Eucharist*, Dr. Eisler sought to reconcile the fact that, although the Eucharist was primarily a vegetable sacrifice intended to supersede the animal sacrifice of scriptural Judaism, there yet occurred in the Eucharistic tradition constant allusions to (1) the fish and (2) the lamb.

1. The miracle of the loaves and fishes, the incident on the shore of Lake Tiberias (John xxi), &c., were explained on the ground that Christ found at Bethsaida (Shrine of Fishing) a local pagan cult of the widely-spread fish-god, availed himself of it, and spiritualized it by means of an etymological coincidence between *lehem* bread, *luhm* fish, and *luhm* breath or spirit.

2. The reference in Mark xiv. 12–16, to the preparing of the Passover, was analysed and an effort made to prove that Christ ate the lamb in the form of an iconic cake after the manner of the Essenes.

15

EXTRAIT de l'Étude de M. H. CAMERLYNCK sur *l'Origine du Christianisme.* — Les Orientalistes qui ont pris connaissance du Bouddhisme et de la vie de Çakia-mouny ont été frappé d'étonnement en constatant que l'un et l'autre présentent de nombreuses similitudes avec le Christianisme et le Christ. Ces similitudes n'ont pu se produire que par pénétration de l'une de ces religions dans l'autre, si même il n'y a pas eu réciprocité entre elles sous ce rapport. Il est certain qu'un grand nombre de caravanes circulaient alors entre la Palestine et les Indes, et que les couvents bouddhiques avaient pénétré dans l'Asie Mineure. Il ne serait même pas étonnant que le Christianisme, inspiré d'abord de la morale bouddhique, ait plus tard absorbé le Bouddhisme dans une certaine mesure.

Une revue anglaise imprimée à Lahore (*Review of Religions*, 1903) a prétendu que Jésus n'est pas mort sur la croix, mais, en ayant été descendu vivant et évanoui, a repris ses sens, s'est enfui vers l'Orient, et y a vécu jusqu'à un âge fort avancé. Ses restes mortels auraient été déposés dans un tombeau situé au Khanhyar, à Srinagar (Cachemire). La tradition porte que l'occupant était un étranger venu, il y a 1900 ans environ, du pays lointain de Syrie, et était connu comme prophète israélite que ses compatriotes avaient voulu tuer, d'où sa fuite dans l'Inde. Quoi qu'il en soit de la revue, il convient en matière historique de se méfier de l'imagination souvent trop fertile des revuistes, et de rester ici dans l'expectation, dans la crainte d'une mystification qui ne serait pas la première de ce genre, bien que la version anglaise présente un ensemble de faits qui s'expliquent et se complètent, ont enfin toute l'apparence de la vérité. Espérons que nous n'aurons plus trop longtemps à attendre une solution susceptible de nous faire entrer dans une nouvelle voie de progrès moral.

16

REMARQUES SUR LE TYPE SECTAIRE DANS L'HÉRÉSIOLOGIE MÉDIÉVALE LATINE

PAR P. ALPHANDÉRY. (RÉSUMÉ)

IL est aisé de voir que l'appellation de *secte* — du moins dans le domaine de l'histoire religieuse du monde latin — est appliquée d'une façon presque constamment arbitraire. Les quelques observations qui suivent n'ont d'autre objet que d'en proposer un emploi plus précis et aussi plus restreint.

Secta, au moyen âge, signifie *opinion*, théorique ou pratique, qui est acceptée et mise *pratiquement* en action par un groupe. Les langues modernes désignent sous le nom de secte le groupe et non plus l'opinion, mais c'est là tout leur effort de précision : ce qu'est spécifiquement ce groupe, il reste à le définir — et d'abord on peut procéder par élimination.

1 Toute secte n'est pas l'école d'un homme, la projection de son *modus vivendi* ou de son *modus credendi*, bien qu'à premier examen il semble que la secte doive tout à la personnalité doctrinale ou morale de son fondateur. Saint Bernard s'étonnait que le Catharisme n'eût pas de chef reconnu, pas même d'éponyme, lorsque le Manichéisme, disait-il, avait Manès, le Sabellianisme Sabellius, l'Arianisme Arius. L'histoire populaire ou à demi savante personnifie immanquablement une doctrine dans un homme. Pourtant ce n'est jamais l'acte religieux défini d'un hérésiarque qui crée la secte. L'élément tragique, la légende des chefs de sectes, est très pauvre. Le groupe messianique paraît avoir généralement dépassé le messie dans les conséquences pratiques de sa doctrine. Il y a même de fréquentes sectes messianiques où le messie est mort, supposé ou omis.

2 On considère avec moins de raison encore toute secte comme nécessairement douée d'une force d'expansion indéfinie, comme l'embryon d'une église universaliste. Cette erreur est d'autant plus tenace que l'on a donné le nom de secte à de véritables religions universalistes comme le Catharisme, uniquement parce que l'avortement de leur prosélytisme les a historiquement restreintes.

3 Pas plus qu'avec une religion avortée la secte ne doit être confondue avec une *dévotion*, une pratique ascétique nouvelle : par exemple, celle des Flagellants. Cette confusion à vrai dire s'expliquerait mieux que les précédentes. Les groupes de ce type présentent des caractères qui les distinguent à la fois de l'école d'un homme et

d'une religion universaliste. Ces groupes sont généralement acéphales ; les chefs des Flagellants ne sont que des moniteurs dans une armée d'ascètes. La rigueur de la pénitence établit en fait une sélection : les Flagellants sont victimes expiatoires, *hosties*, forment un groupe élu au milieu de la masse innombrable des pécheurs. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que cette sélection n'est pas partie intégrante de la doctrine et qu'en principe le nombre des pénitents reste illimité.

4 Nous refuserons résolument le nom de secte à un parti réformiste dans l'Église. Il y a dans toute réforme un principe d'universalisme et non de sélection. Les mouvements vaudois, hussites, etc., partent toujours d'un esprit de simplification religieuse et d'antiritualisme marqué. Ils ne laissent même pas subsister à l'intérieur de la religion qu'ils veulent réformer cette hiérarchie mystique, ces degrés initiatiques qui constituent un clergé fermé, une sorte de secte dans la religion.

On le voit, nous contestons la qualité de *secte* à tout agrégat religieux qui ne comporte pas dans sa doctrine un principe de limitation du groupe. Mais cet élément doctrinal serait insuffisant à caractériser la secte si, pour préciser et situer ce type dans la morphologie religieuse, nous ne pouvions discerner quelques traits spécifiques dans ses organes même, dans ses formes rituelles et dans la pratique de sa morale.

Les sectes médiévales sont très inégalement hiérarchisées. Quelques-unes ont adopté les degrés gnostiques, mais rudimentairement reproduits. A cela doit se rattacher le type des noms symboliques imposés aux sectaires ou tout au moins aux membres d'une élite dans la secte (chez Éon de l'Étoile, chez certains hérétiques de Troyes au XIIIe siècle etc.). Mais ce symbolisme paraît n'avoir jamais fait partie de l'armature doctrinale de la secte, n'avoir jamais correspondu à une organisation initiatique. D'ailleurs cette organisation initiatique présupposerait l'existence d'un mythe fondamental. Or l'indigence mythique des sectes médiévales est un phénomène caractéristique : même leur eschatologie est aussi décharnée que possible, et le drame du monde est conçu par elles sous sa forme la plus pauvre en développements apocalyptiques. Le Catharisme a seul un fonds mythique de quelque intérêt, et encore n'est-il que faiblement original, les emprunts orientaux, d'ailleurs incomplètement élaborés, y étant évidents. De même le rite est, dans l'hétérodoxie médiévale latine, médiocrement caractéristique : à notre connaissance ce n'est que chez les Ortliebiens, dans les *Trinités*, qu'une valeur numérique rituelle est attribuée à l'individu.

De ce qui précède il nous paraît ressortir que la secte, en se constituant, ne tend qu'à donner le maximum de vie religieuse au groupe. D'où les remarques suivantes, dont nous ferions volontiers un criterium :

1 Les sectes ne peuvent être favorables à l'individualisme mystique ; c'est une cause d'insuccès pour une secte que la prédominance de l'élément contemplatif. Les Joachimites purement contemplatifs n'ont jamais formé une secte, sont restés des isolés; mais d'autre part les sectes dénuées de tout élément mystique (Cathares, Vaudois) sont des religions universalistes avortées ou des réformes. Il existe donc, à n'en pas douter, un mysticisme sectaire qui est (*a*) machinal, c'est-à-dire indépendant du génie religieux de tel ou tel individu. Il se manifeste par des extases collectives presque régulières, presque transformées en actes *rituels* (Amauriciens), des phénomènes de glossolalie (Hérétiques de Dormans au début du XIIe siècle), et s'obtient par des moyens artificiels ; (*b*) collectivisé : les extases sont publiques, profitent à l'édification de toute la communauté ; elles sont dévolues à certains sectaires qui, par une sorte de délégation, mettent ainsi le groupe en rapport avec la divinité. De plus, l'élément pratique du mysticisme y prédomine : l'extase se résout en prophétisme, ce qui est son utilisation collective; de même la solidarité spirituelle est tellement forte chez les sectaires que le panthéisme se change souvent chez eux en une simple forme d'union psychique (par exemple, chez les Amauriciens d'après le *Contra Amaurianos*). Il ne s'agit plus ici seulement d'une *parentela animarum* entre fidèles comme chez les Cathares et, à tout prendre, chez les catholiques ; il s'agit d'une communion absolue, tous les croyants étant membres du Christ.

2 Le second caractère auquel nous proposons de reconnaître le groupement spécifiquement sectaire, c'est son organisation — empirique ou non — sur un plan eschatologique; en un mot nous ne voulons considérer comme *secte* authentique — distincte à la fois des églises universalistes avortées, des partis réformistes nés au sein du catholicisme, des rudiments de créations monastiques, des innovations ascétiques — que le groupe que nous avons déjà maintes fois désigné sous le nom de *groupe de type montaniste*, c'est-à-dire celui où se discernent la plupart des éléments suivants : (*a*) Protestation rigoriste contre le relâchement de l'Église existante (caractère externe ; nous ne nous occupons ici que des caractères internes, nous le négligerons donc) ; (*b*) prophétisme exercé par un ou plusieurs inspirés ; (*c*) attente du règne terrestre de Jésus, ou de la Troisième Personne ; (*d*) constitution d'un groupe d'élus appelés à participer aux félicités millénaires.

Nous distinguons dans le groupe de ce type les traits suivants qui paraissent bien se combiner en un type *secte* défini, très distinct des autres modes de groupements religieux :

(*a*) Le mysticisme devient manifestation de groupe: d'abord parce qu'il prend à peu près une forme rituelle et d'autre part se socialise par le prophétisme, et aussi parce que les mystiques ont leur place dans le drame eschatologique. Les contemplatifs deviennent les *viri*

spirituales du troisième âge (Amauriciens, Joachimites, Panthéisme allemand du XIVe siècle, etc.) et leur individualisme s'atténue aussi manifestement, du fait qu'ils remplissent une fonction préfixée, sont soumis au déterminisme apocalyptique.

(*b*) Nous cherchons dans la secte le caractère collectif. Or il semble paradoxal, mais il n'est qu'exact cependant de dire que, dans un groupe messianique, la personnalité du messie est aussi peu dominante que possible. Le type messianique est en effet depuis longtemps fixé, immuable ; les traits individuels de chaque messie sont extrêmement faibles. Dolcino ressemble à Tanchelem, qui ressemble au bûcheron de Bourges (Grég. de Tours) ; les calomnies faciles ou les traits symboliques pris à la lettre par les polémistes orthodoxes pourraient seuls constituer aux messies un semblant de physionomie individuelle. De plus, le messie, Jésus ou Troisième Personne, est souvent prophète, c'est-à-dire instrument, interprète; et le prophète s'efface devant sa prophétie. Souvent même il disparaît presque complètement, la secte ne le prend que comme prête-nom, comme porte-enseigne (par exemple, Segarelli) ; parfois aussi c'est *post mortem* qu'il devient messie par la grâce de ses disciples (Pierre-Jean Olivi, Guglielma, etc.).

(*c*) La secte n'est constituée que par un groupe d'élus. Il n'y a pas, comme dans les religions universalistes avortées, de *cathari* et de *credentes*, de *clergé* et de *fidèles*. Il n'y a que des *élus*, élus que l'on peut aussi considérer comme des *hosties*, car ils sont souvent astreints à un certain nombre d'obligations ascétiques. D'ailleurs la morale est aussi commandée par le plan eschatologique ; il n'y a qu'une morale, c'est la morale des élus : tout ce qui n'est pas ce groupe restreint, éthiquement ne compte pas. Donc isolement absolu, et que les controversistes orthodoxes ont vu et cherché à s'expliquer : cette constitution d'un moralisme surhumain de groupe leur a semblé ne pouvoir donner naissance qu'à un amoralisme foncier.

(*d*) L'attente du règne terrestre de Jésus, et aussi de toutes les phases apocalyptiques qui le précéderont ou le suivront, retranche de la vie morale de la secte toute idée de fortuit, de précaire. Or, cette idée est essentiellement médiévale, et cette conscience eschatologique de la continuité des évènements, de leur enchaînement presque mathématique, d'avenir sans imprévu, doit isoler la secte au milieu de la civilisation de son temps. Elle doit aussi lui donner une unité, une organisation morale fixe. La vie historique et spirituelle du groupe se trouve ainsi tout entière réglée par le drame des derniers temps.

17

UNDER the common title of *Sacred Shrines of Catholic Art*, Professor YRIÖ HIRN endeavoured to bring together some of the most important objects of Roman Catholic worship. In the first instance he spoke of the altar as a tomb or a shrine, containing the bones of some martyrs or saints. Then he enlarged upon the symbolic and magical ideas connected with reliquaries. From these shrines he passed on to the tabernacles and ciboria, containing the Holy of Holies. And then he connected the receptacles of the Eucharistic Divinity with the human shrine, in which the incarnated God had His dwelling before He was born as man. The relation between the symbolism of the Mass and the symbolism of Mariolatry was pointed out, with examples drawn from the writings of the Early Fathers. The paper summarized the results at which the author has arrived in a work, shortly to be published, on the general aesthetics of Roman Catholic art.

18

THE USE OF SACRED NAMES

BY F. C. CONYBEARE. (ABSTRACT)

THE survival of such a phrase as 'a name to conjure with' shows that we have not long emerged from a phase of culture in which a man's name was regarded as mysteriously bound up with his personality, in such wise that, if he be himself gifted with powers beyond the ordinary, his name is the vehicle of similar power. We may even go further, and say that, in ancient religions, as in many folk-tales, a man's name was equivalent to his personality; and this belief so moulded language that we find authors writing of there being so many *names* in a city, where to-day we would say so many souls or persons. Thus, in Revelation xi. 13, we read that 'in that hour there was a great earthquake, and the tenth part of the city fell; and there were killed in the earthquake names of men seven thousand'—that is, seven thousand souls. And in the same book, in the letter to the Church of Sardis, it is said: 'Thou hast a few names in Sardis which did not defile their garments.'

The sanctity or virtue of an individual belongs, in a measure, to his garments, his hair, nail-parings, even to his spittle, and, after death, as the cult of relics well illustrates, to his bones. It equally adheres to his name, which, if it cannot be touched and handled, can

be invoked or uttered in speech. A thousand ritual observances have their root in this belief. Thus, one great bugbear of primitive peoples is the fear of being molested by the dead; and, accordingly, the name of a dead person must not be breathed out loud, lest his wraith be evoked together with his name. Among some races the name of a dead chieftain, which is often the name of an animal or plant, is tabooed, and a fresh name has to be invented for the natural object after which he was called. From this cause the vocabularies of such races are in perpetual flux.

Again, since a man's name is tantamount to his vital principle and personality, it must be concealed from his enemies no less than his picture and image. It is believed that to know another's name is to have power over him. This is why every ancient Egyptian had two names—one by which his fellows in this world knew him, and the other, his true or great name, by which he was known to the supernal powers and in the other world. An Abyssinian Christian similarly has two names given him at baptism—one his common name, the other a secret name never to be divulged. The guardian deity or patron saint of ancient Rome had a secret name not communicated to any one; for he who learned it might harm the eternal city by tempting the deity in question to desert it, just as the Romans, by the right of evocation, had won over to themselves the gods of many a conquered city. In parts of ancient Greece the holy names of the gods, that none might learn them and be able to profane them, were engraved on lead tablets and sunk in the sea. The same belief underlies our phrase 'to take a name in vain'; and in more than one statute rash swearing is forbidden because it amounts to desecration of a holy name, and, with the name, of the personality named. In Oriental folk-lore—for example, in the *Arabian Nights*—he that would enlist a ginn or demon in his service must, above all things, master the name thereof; for, knowing it, he can use the spirit and its authority how he will. As in other ways, so in their assurance of the magic potency of names, the writers of the New Testament, including Paul, announce themselves true sons of their age.

Paul, who conceived of Jesus as having been mysteriously promoted, through His resurrection, to a new and higher grade of spiritual existence than He occupied in the flesh, writes, Ephesians i. 20, 21, that the 'father of glory raised him from the dead, and made him to sit at his right hand in the heavenly region, far above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in that which is to come'.

Here the words 'rule and authority', &c., refer to the different grades of superhuman beings which tenant earth, air, and heaven; all these are 'names that are named' in this world and the next—

that is, names fraught with magic potency, and so invoked in order to control other inferior powers and forces of nature.

Names in themselves possess such potency in various degrees; and the divine Father, according to the Pauline theosophy, has them in His gift, to confer them on whom He will. When He wished to reward Jesus after death for the trust and humility He displayed on earth, He raised Him from the dead and 'exalted him highly, and gave unto him the name that is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of beings in heaven and on earth and under the earth'.

Similarly in the Egyptian legend the god Ra owned a secret name by which he controlled men and gods, and which was only known to himself. Isis said to herself: 'Cannot I, by virtue of the great name of Ra, make myself a goddess, and reign, like him, in heaven and earth?' And, by a stratagem, she forced Ra to transfer his magical name from his breast into hers, together with all its miraculous powers.[1]

An exact parallel is in Rev. xix. 11, 12, where he that 'sat on a white horse', whose 'eyes were a flame of fire and on his head many diadems, had', so we read, 'a name written which no one knew but himself.'

That already, during His Galilean ministry, Jesus had won such fame as a faith-healer that His name was used by exorcists otherwise strangers to Him we also learn from Mark ix. 38: 'John said unto him, Teacher, we saw one casting out devils in thy name; and we forbad him, because he followed us not.' Thus His name, even before He quitted Capernaum, had already become, as we say, 'a name to conjure with,' though His disciples considered that they had a monopoly of its use. Jesus, however, said: 'Forbid him not: for there is no man that shall do a mighty work in my name and be able lightly to speak evil of me.'

The name, according to the gnostic Valentinus (see Clemens Alex. ed. Syllb., p. 793), had come down upon Jesus in the form of the dove at His Baptism.

It was the *name* which, as fraught with the personal power of Jesus Christ, operated the cure narrated in Acts iii, though not without the pre-condition that the afflicted person had faith therein. On the morrow the priests hale Peter before them, 'And inquire, By what power, or in what name, have ye done this?' Peter answers that 'through the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth whom God raised from the dead doth this man stand here before you whole'. The name, that is to say, like the relic of a later saint, has a virtue all of its own; and Peter goes on to claim for this name a sort of monopoly of saving and life-giving power: 'Neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved.'

[1] See Frazer's *Golden Bough*, ch. ii, § 3.

The Jews quarrelled among themselves and with the Christians about what names should be used in exorcisms ; and on one occasion (Acts xviii. 14, 15), when in Achaia the Jews rose against Paul, and dragged him before the judgement-seat, Gallio, the pro-consul, an eminently sensible magistrate, *drave them* away, saying : 'If, indeed, it were a matter of wrong or of wicked villany, O ye Jews, it would be my duty to bear with you : but if they are questions about words and names and your own law, look to it yourselves.'

In Christian rituals, from about the year 300 on, an altar, shrine, and any sort of building, and also 'the natures' of oil, water, salt, candles, even of hassocks, have been consecrated by repeating over them the formula 'in the name of Jesus Christ', or 'in the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost'. Through such invocation any satanic taint there was, is expelled, and a transcendental virtue, authority, or *mana*, as the Melanesian native calls it, inherent in the name passes over like an emanation into them. Similarly, the recitation at the beginning or end of a prayer of the words *in* (or *through*) *the name*, &c., sets in operation, in the transcendental sphere to which the prayer is supposed to ascend, the personality or spirit named.

There thus survived in the Christian Church forms of prayer and exorcism derived, through Judaism, from the older religions of the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Persians. These forms doubtless were charged with another and weightier meaning in so far as Jesus in His life and character was other than the more or less legendary gods and heroes invoked in those religions. Yet it remains true that in thus hypostatizing names the earliest Christians were on the same plane of religious development as the rest of the ancient world.

SECTION IX

METHOD AND SCOPE OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

LES SCIENCES AUXILIAIRES DE L'HISTOIRE COMPARÉE DES RELIGIONS.

PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

By Count GOBLET D'ALVIELLA

Le Comité d'organisation a bien voulu me demander d'ouvrir nos travaux par quelques remarques sur l'état actuel des études qui ressortent spécialement de cette section.

Un point dont nous devons nous assurer en premier lieu, c'est si nous sommes d'accord sur la nature et les limites de notre domaine. L'histoire des Religions n'est qu'une branche de la Science des Religions. Celle-ci comprend tout d'abord deux grandes subdivisions que je vous demanderai la permission d'appeler respectivement l'*hiérographie* et l'*hiérologie*, en appliquant ici une distinction analogue à celle qui différencie l'ethnographie de l'ethnologie, ou, en termes plus généraux, la description de la synthèse.

L'hiérographie a pour objet de décrire toutes les religions connues et d'en retracer le développement respectif. L'hiérologie cherche à établir les rapports de concomitance et de succession entre les phénomènes religieux, en d'autres termes, à formuler les lois de l'évolution religieuse. Cette synthèse est plus fréquemment appelée histoire comparative des Religions, ou, plus simplement, Religion comparée. Je n'y ai pas d'objection, pour ma part, d'autant que cette expression a l'avantage de mettre en évidence la méthode essentielle dont fait usage l'hiérologie : la méthode comparative, où l'on supplée à l'insuffisance des renseignements sur l'histoire continue d'une croyance ou d'une institution, dans une race ou une société, par des faits empruntés à d'autres milieux ou à d'autres temps. Cependant, il doit être entendu que la comparaison n'est pas tout et que, si nous comparons, ce n'est pas seulement pour constater en quoi les religions se ressemblent et se séparent, mais encore et surtout pour tirer de ces rapprochements l'explication à la fois de leurs divergences et de leurs similitudes.

Dira-t-on que c'est là, en réalité, de la philosophie, de l'*hiérosophie*? Je crois pouvoir réserver cette appellation aux tentatives pour formuler les conséquences logiques qu'entraîne, dans le domaine religieux, la conception raisonnée de nos rapports avec Dieu et l'Univers. Ainsi comprise, l'hiérosophie constitue une troisième branche de la Science des Religions. Elle renferme en effet un élément subjectif, dont elle ne peut faire abstraction, tandis que l'hiérologie, ou, comme l'a appelée M. Chantepie de la Saussaye, la phénoménologie religieuse, doit conserver le caractère objectif des sciences qui s'inspirent exclusivement des faits; on ne lui demande pas ce qu'il est raisonnable de croire, mais comment les hommes en sont venus à croire et à pratiquer certaines choses.

C'est de la 'religion comparée' que je voudrais spécialement m'occuper ici, parce que les questions concernant les différentes branches de l'hiérographie seront traitées, et avec plus de compétence, dans les sections qui leur sont spécialement consacrées.

L'hiérologie présuppose l'hiérographie, mais embrasse une sphère plus large; d'abord parce qu'elle remonte au delà de l'histoire pour rechercher les commencements des croyances et des institutions qui apparaissent déjà toutes formées au début des temps historiques; ensuite parce qu'elle complète la méthode historique avec les méthodes déductives et comparatives en usage dans les diverses subdivisions de l'anthropologie, notamment dans la psychologie, l'ethnographie, le préhistorique, le folklore, la philologie et la sociologie.

Toutes ces sciences envisagent les phénomènes religieux au point de vue de l'objet particulier qu'elles poursuivent respectivement; mais, par cela même, elles fournissent des matériaux à l'hiérologie, dont elles guident, contrôlent et, au besoin, corrigent les conclusions, lorsque celle-ci s'aventure sur un terrain de leur compétence.

Je voudrais esquisser, ici, les services qu'elles ont rendus de nos jours aux tentatives pour reconstituer le développement religieux de l'humanité et même pour éclaircir la question des origines de la religion; quitte à examiner, en même temps, s'il n'y a pas lieu de rappeler à leur fonction de 'sciences auxiliaires' celles d'entre elles qui prétendraient résoudre seules tous les problèmes religieux, en faisant de l'hiérologie une simple province de leur empire.

I. *De l'Ethnographie.*

L'ethnographie nous renseigne sur l'état moral et social des populations non-civilisées; par suite, nous fait connaître les rites et les croyances des peuples qui n'ont jamais eu d'histoire.

Les populations non-civilisées du globe se partagent en un certain nombre de groupes ethniques dont il convient d'étudier successivement les manifestations religieuses. On ne peut mieux faire, à cet égard, que d'adopter la classification proposée par Albert Réville dans son ouvrage sur les religions des non-civilisés. I. *Les Noirs d'Afrique:* (a) Nègres, (b) Cafres, (c) Hottentots, (d) Bosshimans. II. *Les autochthones des Deux Amériques:* (a) Esquimaux, (b) Peaux-Rouges, (c) Caraïbes, (d) Tribus brésiliennes, (e) Gaycourous et Abipones, (f) Charruas et Puelches, (g) Patagons, (h) Fuégiens, (i) Araucans. III. *Les Océaniens:* (a) Polynésiens, (b) Mélanésiens, (c) Micronésiens, (d) Australiens, (e) Tasmaniens, (f) Dayaks et Andamans, (g) Madécasses. IV. *Les Finno-Tartares:* (a) Sibériens, (b) Lapons et Finnois. — Peut-être conviendrait-il d'ajouter deux subdivisions, comprenant l'une les sauvages de l'Inde et de l'Indo-Chine, l'autre les Aïnos du Japon.

On a mis en question la valeur et même la véracité des témoignages fournis par l'ethnographie. Certains voyageurs semblent n'avoir cherché dans leurs observations que la confirmation d'idées préconçues. De plus, même avec une parfaite bonne foi, il n'est pas facile de se faire comprendre des sauvages, encore moins de s'assimiler leur façon de penser et de sentir. Eux-mêmes ne sont pas toujours enclins à répondre. Ils aiment parfois à mystifier leur interrogateur. Ou bien ils lui cacheront leurs secrets religieux et magiques, aussi bien que leurs procédés industriels — par crainte qu'il n'en abuse, pour leur enlever l'aide des esprits. Ou encore ils préféreront inventer une réponse, plutôt que de faire un effort de réflexion et de mémoire. Enfin il suffit d'un contact antérieur, même passager, avec des représentants d'une culture plus avancée, pour introduire des éléments nouveaux dans les croyances et même les sentiments des primitifs.

Ces causes d'erreur sont considérables, mais ce n'est pas une raison pour contester, comme l'a fait Max Muller dans sa polémique avec Andrew Lang, l'abondance et la solidité des matériaux que l'ethnographie contemporaine est en droit d'utiliser. Il n'y a plus aujourd'hui, parmi les non-civilisés, un groupe tant soit peu notable dont la langue n'ait été apprise et étudiée par des explorateurs, savants, missionnaires, administrateurs, trafiquants. En tout cas, là où l'interprétation des termes reste douteuse, il y a les rites qui sont faciles à observer. Or les rites sont les croyances en action, quand ils n'en sont pas la source, et ils constituent souvent chez les sauvages la partie la plus importante de la religion.

Partout où les observateurs sont d'accord sur un fait, il y a une forte présomption en faveur de sa réalité. A plus forte raison, l'accord

est-il décisif, quand il porte sur des phénomènes généraux, identiques, chez des peuplades fort distantes, et relevés, souvent à des époques différentes, par les observateurs les plus divers.

Au XVIIIe siècle, on ne s'occupait des sauvages que pour les idéaliser; ensuite, par réaction, on en vint à les abaisser outre mesure, comme indignes d'occuper l'attention du savant. En réalité, ils sont dans l'ethnographie ce que sont en géologie, pour l'histoire de la terre, les *témoins* des couches érosées, qui se maintiennent au milieu de dépôts plus récents. Ils manifestent, avec plus d'évidence et de généralité, les lois psychologiques dont l'action, aux degrés supérieurs du développement religieux, est souvent masquée par la complexité des phénomènes. M. Roscoff les a ingénieusement comparés aux cryptogames, dont l'étude était autrefois dédaignée et où se révèle cependant, dans toute sa simplicité, la formation des cellules qui seule peut nous faire comprendre la structure et les fonctions des végétaux supérieurs.

Cependant il ne faut pas aller trop loin dans cette voie et prétendre tout expliquer en religion par les phénomènes de la vie sauvage. Si l'étude de l'embryon est nécessaire pour rendre compte de ses attributs ultérieurs et de ses phases successives, elle ne suffit pas à expliquer les détails et les fonctions d'un organisme dans les degrés supérieurs de son développement. Il s'est certainement introduit chez les peuples de culture avancée — et pas seulement dans leur religion — des éléments nouveaux, ou, si l'on préfère cette expression, des combinaisons d'éléments antérieurs suffisamment complexes pour acquérir une valeur nouvelle. Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'on peut rationnellement s'expliquer le progrès.

On ne doit pas non plus perdre de vue qu'à côté des ressemblances il y a des divergences nombreuses. Quand on veut conclure de la généralité d'une conception religieuse à son universalité antérieure, il convient de s'assurer d'abord si cette généralité est bien réelle; ensuite, si elle n'a pu se produire par voie d'emprunt ou même par raisonnement spontané, au cours des innombrables siècles qui se sont écoulés depuis l'apparition de l'homme.

C'est dans le champ de l'ethnographie que se sont livrées et que se livrent encore les principales batailles dont l'enjeu est la solution du problème des origines religieuses. Je ne puis que mentionner ici, dans les derniers temps, les grandes controverses qui nous ont valu des travaux si suggestifs de MM. Tylor, Robertson Smith, Albert Réville, Tiele, Jevons, Frazer, Andrew Lang, Sidney Hartland, Salomon Reinach, etc., sur l'importance et la généralité du totémisme; sur la priorité entre la religion et la magie, entre l'anthropomorphisme et le *tabouisme*; enfin sur l'existence prétendue d'une

croyance primitive à un grand Dieu Créateur et Justicier. Je m'empresse d'ajouter que ces controverses, si vives qu'elles soient, ne peuvent plus porter atteinte ni à l'emploi de la méthode ethnographique par l'hiérologie, ni à la valeur des renseignements que celle-ci en tire, ni même aux conclusions qu'elle en déduit dans la solution des problèmes accessibles à l'observation.

II. *Du Folk-lore.*

Le Folk-lore, 'savoir populaire,' ou Traditionalisme, est l'ensemble des croyances et des usages que le peuple se transmet de génération en génération sans intervention des esprits cultivés. Les études qui s'y rattachent ont été souvent viciées par un mélange de préoccupations littéraires ou de déductions personnelles au narrateur. Cependant, depuis qu'on a compris que les documents valaient seulement dans la mesure de la sincérité de celui qui les livre et de l'exactitude de celui qui les rapporte, il a pris l'allure d'une véritable branche scientifique qui a sa sphère propre, sa classification et sa méthode. Il en est résulté toute une littérature, dont l'abondance n'est pas le moindre inconvénient, quand il s'agit de grouper les recherches pour en tirer des conclusions sur les origines et sur les variations d'une tradition déterminée.

Le Folk-lore rend à l'histoire des Religions les services suivants:

1° Il fournit des éléments de comparaison entre les traditions religieuses des différentes races.

2° Il aide à retrouver les vestiges des religions officiellement disparues.

3° Il permet de reconstituer des phases de l'évolution religieuse qui ont précédé toute histoire.

Ainsi nombre de nos traditions populaires nous ramènent aux religions qui ont précédé le christianisme chez nos ancêtres. C'est même la reconstitution des paganismes celte et germain, qui ont surtout profité de l'extension donnée aux travaux de folk-lore depuis les recherches des frères Grimm, plus récemment de MM. Gaidoz, d'Arbois de Jubainville, J. Rhys, pour la religion celtique; de MM. Simrock, E. H. Meyer, Bugge et tant d'autres pour la mythologie germanique; sans oublier les études de M. Léger sur la mythologie slave. Ces recherches ont également aidé à nous faire connaître, dans une certaine mesure, le fond commun de ce qu'on appelait autrefois, par voie d'abstraction, la religion indo-européenne. Enfin un certain nombre de légendes et de rites, qui doivent remonter plus haut encore, ont été ramenés aux phases rudimentaires de l'évolution religieuse, qui constituent encore tout le culte de certains sauvages.

En général, quand des traditions sont en désaccord avec la culture intellectuelle ou morale du milieu où on les observe, il est vraisemblable qu'elles constituent des *survivances*, c'est-à-dire qu'elles remontent à une époque où elles n'étaient pas confinées dans les couches incultes et où elles étaient acceptées par l'ensemble de la société. Si toutefois l'état psychologique, dont elles sont le corollaire, existe encore dans une partie de la nation, il y a lieu de considérer qu'elles peuvent être également de formation ou d'importation récente. D'un autre côté, là où il est impossible de constater historiquement la présence de cet état psychologique dans le passé, on n'en est pas moins autorisé de conclure à son existence antérieure, si chez d'autres peuples, où il prédomine encore, il a engendré des croyances et des usages analogues. Cette thèse, déjà formulée au XVIIIe siècle par Fontenelle et le président des Brosses, a été surtout mise en lumière par les travaux de Mannhardt, de Tylor et de McLennan. C'est d'elle que s'inspirent les recherches sensationnelles de l'école folkloriste la plus récente qui, du reste, s'appuie également sur les constatations de l'ethnographie.

Cependant M. Farnell a récemment fait observer, à juste titre, qu'avant de suppléer aux lacunes de l'histoire chez un peuple particulier à l'aide de renseignements puisés un peu partout il convient d'abord de faire appel aux traditions en vigueur chez les ancêtres ou les voisins immédiats de ce peuple, comme lui-même l'a fait avec tant de succès dans sa description des cultes des États Grecs.

III. *Du Préhistorique.*

L'archéologie préhistorique ne nous renseigne pas seulement sur l'état industriel et social de l'époque la plus ancienne où l'homme a laissé des traces de son passage, mais elle nous fournit encore des vestiges matériels de certaines croyances et de certains rites.

Les anthropologues sont d'accord sur les grandes subdivisions des temps préhistoriques, ainsi que sur la correspondance générale de ces subdivisions avec les classifications de la géologie et de la paléontologie : 1° la période éolithique, qui commence dans les temps tertiaires pour se prolonger pendant la première partie des dépôts quaternaires, avec l'âge de l'*elephas antiquus* ; 2° la période paléolithique ou de la pierre taillée, qui comprend le reste des temps quaternaires, l'âge du mammouth ou *Elephas primigenius*, puis l'âge du renne ; 3° la période néolithique, qui ouvre les temps modernes dans l'histoire de la terre et qui coïncide avec la constitution de la faune contemporaine ; enfin 4° la période des métaux, qui débute avec l'apparition des in-

struments en bronze ou en cuivre et qui se poursuit, avec le premier âge du fer, jusqu'au commencement des temps historiques.

On n'a découvert jusqu'ici aucune trace d'usages religieux antérieurs à l'âge du mammouth, bien qu'on ne puisse tirer de cette lacune aucune preuve décisive contre l'existence antérieure de la religion et même d'un culte. Comment, en effet, retrouver, par exemple, la trace d'un rite verbal ou d'une oblation de nourriture aux esprits?

Les gravures et les peintures d'animaux, découverts dans certaines cavernes habitées à la fin de l'âge du mammouth (grottes de la Dordogne, etc.), ne sont pas seulement les premières manifestations de l'art, mais elles semblent encore attester, sinon la présence de la zoolâtrie ou du totémisme, du moins l'existence de la croyance à l'efficacité magique de ces représentations figurées.

Le culte des morts apparaît, vers la même époque, avec l'institution des repas funéraires aux abords de la tombe et la coutume de déposer, près du défunt, des armes, des outils, des parures, des vases (Cavernes de la Belgique et du midi de la France).

Parfois ces objets sont intentionnellement brisés ou brûlés. On ne peut voir que des rites funéraires dans l'usage de teindre les ossements en rouge et de replier les squelettes sur eux-mêmes, de façon que les genoux touchent le menton. Dès l'âge du renne, il semble qu'il existait des fétiches et même des ébauches d'idoles. A l'époque de la pierre polie, on relève, en outre, la trépanation des crânes, le culte de la hache, la construction des mégalithes. Avec l'âge du bronze se montrent les vestiges d'un culte rendu à certains phénomènes de la nature. Mais ici nous arrivons au seuil de l'histoire.

L'hiérologie se réserve le droit d'interpréter ces usages, non seulement en utilisant l'acception qu'ils comportaient au début des temps historiques, mais encore en tirant parti de l'explication qu'en donnent les sauvages des deux mondes, là où ceux-ci pratiquent des rites identiques ou emploient des objets analogues, dans un but soit magique, soit religieux.

Il convient de remarquer que si un âge de la pierre semble bien avoir partout précédé l'usage des métaux, cet âge n'a pas pris fin simultanément dans toutes les parties du monde. Chez certains peuples, tels que les Esquimaux et les Néo-Zélandais, on l'a vu se prolonger jusqu'à nos jours. Il est donc impossible d'établir le synchronisme des usages et des croyances révélés par les produits de l'industrie préhistorique, sauf là où ces produits sont associés avec les terrains ou avec les espèces qui caractérisent une phase déterminée dans l'histoire du globe.

IV. *De la Philologie.*

J'entends ici la philologie, non pas au sens large, qui en fait presque un synonyme de connaissance de l'antiquité, mais comme embrassant l'étude des langues et des littératures chez les peuples les plus divers du présent et du passé, en tant que cette étude peut nous éclairer sur l'histoire des mots et des idées qu'ils représentent. La linguistique comparée, comme on l'appelle parfois, tend notamment à nous instruire sur l'état moral et religieux des différentes familles ethniques à l'époque où se sont formées leurs langues respectives, voire aux temps plus lointains où se sont constitués les procédés du langage. D'autre part, elle exerce à la fois une influence correctrice, en établissant l'impossibilité des étymologies fantaisistes qui ont si souvent égaré les mythologues, et une influence constructive, en nous révélant la véritable signification des noms originairement donnés aux personnages surhumains.

Le concours de la philologie est indispensable pour établir le sens des épithètes qui, accolées au nom d'un dieu ou d'un héros, éclairent souvent sa nature et sa fonction; parfois aussi pour nous apprendre, par l'interprétation des noms théophores, quels sont les sentiments populaires à l'égard des dieux et comment étaient conçus les rapports des adorateurs avec leurs divinités. Elle conduit aussi à distinguer, dans les mythes, ce qui appartient au patrimoine commun de la race et ce que chaque branche y a spontanément ajouté; elle permet de découvrir les éléments exotiques qui se sont introduits dans la mythologie d'un peuple et même de déterminer la provenance de ces importations; enfin elle nous renseigne sur les cas où le mythe paraît sorti d'un oubli ou d'une confusion dans le sens d'un mot.

Certains philologues, toutefois, vont plus loin dans leurs prétentions, lorsqu'ils soutiennent, avec Max Muller et Michel Bréal, que non seulement les religions dépendent de la langue, mais encore que leur source même est dans une maladie du langage: L'homme, contraint originairement de recourir à des images pour exprimer sa pensée, aurait fini par prendre ses métaphores pour des réalités.

Il est très vrai que la linguistique comparée nous révèle une disposition mentale de l'humanité primitive à personnifier toutes les forces de la nature. Mais c'est une exagération de supposer que la personnification et, par suite, la divinisation des agents naturels soit due à la nécessité fatale d'employer des termes impliquant la vie et la pensée. Si le langage a mis partout ces attributs de l'espèce humaine, c'est que l'homme se refusait à concevoir une cause d'activité qui ne fut taillée sur son propre type.

Il s'en faut, du reste, qu'on puisse ramener à une explication philologique l'ensemble des croyances et même des mythes — à plus forte raison des rites qui ont souvent une origine indépendante de la croyance qu'ils semblent impliquer. Sans doute les noms divins ont tous comporté une signification quelconque à l'origine, mais ceux dont on peut retrouver le sens forment l'exception, parce que souvent ils se sont formés dans une période préhistorique antérieure à la constitution des dialectes où on les rencontre et même de la langue-mère.

De plus, même quand la racine est connue, il faut constater que les philologues sont rarement d'accord sur son sens originaire. Il ne suffit pas toujours de connaître la signification primitivement attachée au nom d'un personnage pour être aussitôt fixé sur sa nature et sur son rôle. Enfin, dans aucun cas, la connaissance de cette signification ne donnera nécessairement la clef de toutes les histoires auxquelles la tradition mêle le porteur du nom. Il faut tenir compte que les mythes, comme les rites, tendent à s'altérer au cours de leur transmission et, en particulier, que l'imagination populaire met au compte de chaque héros mythique nombre d'aventures originairement attribuées à d'autres personnages.

En résumé, le principal service que nous a rendu la philologie sur le terrain de l'histoire religieuse — et il suffirait pour lui assurer toute notre reconnaissance—c'est d'avoir, par ses recherches, rendu accessibles à la science des religions les textes religieux et les Écritures sacrées de tous les peuples qui ont consigné leurs traditions dans des documents écrits.

V. *De la Psychologie.*

Les sciences dont je me suis occupé jusqu'ici fournissent à l'hiérologie surtout des matériaux. La psychologie et la sociologie l'aident plutôt à mettre ces matériaux en œuvre. La psychologie est ici d'un emploi constant, car il n'est pas de phénomène religieux qui ne se ramène à une explication psychologique. N'est-ce pas l'intention qui seule imprime le caractère religieux à un mot, un objet, un acte? Les rites, si mécaniques qu'on les suppose, sont l'expression d'une croyance présente ou oubliée, et les croyances elles-mêmes ont derrière elles un processus mental qu'il importe de reconstituer.

Est-il besoin d'ajouter que j'envisage ici la psychologie dans son sens le plus large, comme coordonnant les résultats de l'observation externe avec ceux de l'introspection? Sans doute, rien n'interdit de recourir à la méthode intuitive dont l'école hégélienne a quelque peu abusé. Mais si cette méthode reste parfaitement légitime (sous

réserve de ne pas aller à l'encontre des faits) dans les problèmes dont la solution échappe à l'observation directe, comme c'est le cas pour presque toutes les questions d'origine, elle joue un rôle subordonné dans les problèmes où l'explication psychologique doit sortir de la comparaison des phénomènes et non dériver d'un principe abstrait. Or, le champ de l'observation externe tend de plus en plus à grandir en psychologie, qu'il s'agisse des individus ou des peuples.

La constance de certains phénomènes religieux permet de les rattacher à des lois psychologiques dont ils sont l'expression nécessaire. Certaines de ces lois rendent compte des manifestations religieuses chez les individus. D'autres font ressortir le lien entre la direction du développement religieux et les éléments multiples dont l'ensemble constitue le caractère de la race. D'autres encore établissent les rapports des rites et des croyances avec les modes de penser qui s'observent aux différentes étapes de la culture humaine.

C'est à la psychologie, notamment, qu'il appartient de déterminer, dans les manifestations religieuses, quelle est la part respective de l'influence ancestrale et des variations individuelles. Une école récente, surtout mise en lumière par les beaux travaux de M. William James, et plus récemment de M. James B. Prat, a fait ressortir l'importance des suggestions émanées de la région obscure et liminale qui s'étend, dans l'esprit humain, entre les réactions inconscientes de l'organisme physique et les manifestations de pleine conscience, idées ou images. Je suis loin de méconnaître la valeur des explications avancées au nom de la *new Psychology*. Cependant je me demande si, dans leur désir d'insister sur le rôle de l'instinct, elles font une part suffisante à l'intervention de la raison comme agent de direction et de contrôle dans l'orientation des manifestations religieuses.

C'est également à la psychologie de décider fréquemment si les phénomènes religieux, qui assument la même forme dans différents milieux en dehors de toute probabilité d'emprunt, doivent être attribués à des raisonnements identiques, dont le parallélisme s'explique par l'unité de l'esprit humain. Il est à remarquer que la similitude des raisonnements est plus fréquente encore que l'analogie des phénomènes par lesquels ils se manifestent; d'autre part, que des manifestations analogues dans la forme se rattachent parfois à des mobiles différents. Même dans ce dernier cas, il convient de rechercher si les diverses explications qu'on en a recueillies ne procèdent pas d'une conception identique. Ainsi, par exemple, Cafres et Peaux-Rouges font du feu sur les tombes: ceux-ci pour réchauffer l'ombre du défunt, ceux-là pour l'empêcher de revenir. N'est-ce pas la preuve que dans les deux cas on tient l'âme pour une substance semi-

matérielle, susceptible de ressentir, comme le corps vivant, les effets du feu ?

La physiologie constate que les individus reproduisent, dans les phases successives de leur développement physique (ontogenèse), les étapes traversées par leur espèce au cours de son évolution organique (phyllogenèse) ; cette concordance s'observe également dans le développement intellectuel et moral. Les petits enfants représentent à certains égards l'homme primitif dans ses modes de penser et de sentir. La psychologie enfantine peut donc fournir des éclaircissements sur certains traits religieux de l'enfance de l'humanité (par exemple : la tendance à étendre démesurément la sphère de la personnification, à supprimer les distinctions d'espèces, de genres, d'ordres, de règnes ; à introduire le merveilleux dans toutes les circonstances de la vie).

La psychologie des êtres inférieurs à l'homme a-t-elle également quelques rapports avec la science des religions ? La question, qui eut fait sourire naguère, ne peut être écartée sommairement, aujourd'hui que la théorie de l'évolution a conduit à rechercher chez les animaux supérieurs le germe des sentiments épanouis dans l'homme. Malgré les ingénieuses hypothèses de quelques observateurs, il n'y a aucune vraisemblance que l'animal possède la notion de survivance, ou qu'il ait cherché à entrer en relation consciente avec les forces de la nature. D'autre part existe-t-il une grande différence entre la façon dont le sauvage traite son fétiche ou son animal sacré et la façon dont le chien regarde son maître ? L'un et l'autre se trouvent devant un être dont ils reconnaissent la supériorité, dont ils ne peuvent comprendre la nature, envers qui ils éprouvent un sentiment mixte de crainte et d'affection, enfin avec lequel ils cherchent à nouer des relations pour leur propre bien. J'admets que ce ne soit pas de la religion. Mais c'en est peut-être l'antécédent.

VI. *De la Sociologie.*

La sociologie est la science des lois qui régissent les phénomènes sociaux. La religion doit être rangée parmi ces phénomènes, lors même qu'on cherche sa source dans l'individu — d'abord parce qu'elle tend à grouper les hommes en sociétés distinctes, ensuite parce qu'elle agit sur les mœurs et même sur le gouvernement des nations.

Les associations religieuses, communions ou Églises, sont des organismes qui ont leur vie propre et qui se trouvent forcément en relation avec les autres groupements constitués au sein de la société humaine en vue de buts particuliers. Au début, tous les groupements

sont plus ou moins confondus ; c'est la même société qui fonctionne religieusement, comme, à d'autres moments, elle fonctionne politiquement, juridiquement et militairement. Peu à peu, il s'établit une différentiation organique, parfois même un antagonisme apparent entre la société civile et la société religieuse. Les relations entre le pouvoir spirituel et le pouvoir temporel, comme aussi les rapports entre la société religieuse et ses membres, forment des problèmes qui ont joué un rôle important dans l'histoire et qui troublent encore aujourd'hui le fonctionnement de la civilisation.

Réciproquement, la religion a toujours subi l'influence des institutions politiques, juridiques et sociales, aussi bien que des conditions géographiques et économiques des milieux respectifs où elle s'est développée.

Cependant la religion, considérée objectivement, n'établit pas seulement un lien réel entre les hommes, mais encore un lien idéal, à conséquences pratiques, entre les hommes et les êtres surhumains auxquels ils croient, voire entre tous les êtres ou même tous les éléments de l'Univers. A ce titre, elle constitue une société transcendante, régie par des lois fixes qu'on peut comparer aux lois naturelles de la société générale, mais qui, à certains égards, ont une portée plus large et constituent dès lors ce que M. Raoul de la Grasserie a justement appelé une cosmo-sociologie.

De même que d'autres sciences auxiliaires de l'hiérologie, la sociologie a prétendu s'annexer l'histoire de la religion. Une école récente, partant de l'assertion que l'homme, avant de prendre conscience de son individualité, a éprouvé le sentiment de faire partie d'un groupe, soutient que le germe de la croyance à une puissance surhumaine doit être exclusivement cherché dans les faits de la vie sociale — soit que la conception des âmes individuelles ait été précédée par celle d'une âme collective (M. Henri Huber et jusqu'à un certain point M. Frazer), soit que la religion ait débuté par un système de tabous, c'est-à-dire de restrictions sociales, qui sont une conséquence nécessaire de la vie en commun (Salomon Reinach). Quelques sociologues contestent même que l'initiative individuelle ait pu se manifester dans la religion, tous les phénomènes de cet ordre étant le produit d'une tradition ou d'une suggestion.

Comme les hommes ont toujours vécu à l'état de société, il est parfaitement admissible que leurs manifestations religieuses aient été, dès l'origine, conditionnées jusqu'à un certain point par leur état social ; mais il en est de même pour tous les phénomènes de leur vie mentale, alors cependant que l'explication de ces phénomènes appartient incontestablement au domaine de la psychologie. Il faut,

sans doute, dans l'histoire des croyances et des rites, assigner un rôle plus considérable à ce qu'on a nommé la *Völkerpsychologie*, la psychologie des peuples ou plutôt de l'espèce humaine. Mais, à côté des manifestations religieuses, qu'on peut regarder, à raison de leur généralité, comme s'étant produites indépendamment des individus, il reste à rendre compte des variations entre les croyances, et ici il semble impossible de ne pas faire la part des initiatives individuelles, d'autant plus considérables qu'on s'élève davantage sur l'échelle des religions.

On ne peut guère attendre d'un homme, même le plus érudit, qu'il possède également à fond toutes les sciences dont je viens d'esquisser le rôle dans la constitution de l'hiérologie — pas plus qu'on ne peut lui demander d'avoir fréquenté toutes les peuplades dont il prétend utiliser les manifestations religieuses ou d'avoir appris toutes les langues dans lesquelles les hommes du présent et du passé ont formulé leurs croyances. Mais, dans chacune de ces disciplines les spécialistes, qui s'y sont plus ou moins cantonnés, sont arrivés aujourd'hui à des conclusions positives dont nous pouvons faire état dans notre travail de rapprochement et de synthèse. Ainsi que le dernier titulaire de la chaire d'histoire des Religions au Collège de France, Jean Réville, l'exprimait, il y a deux ans, dans son discours d'inauguration qui devait être son chant du cygne: 'La véritable méthode historique est la même partout. Quand on l'a pratiquée soi-même en une partie quelconque de l'histoire, on acquiert par cette pratique une certaine aptitude à discerner si elle a été bien dûment appliquée ailleurs.'

L'hiérographie est restée longtemps la plus maltraitée, sinon la plus négligée des sciences historiques. Chacun ne l'abordait qu'avec timidité, quand il s'agissait de ses propres croyances, ou avec prévention, quand il s'agissait des croyances des autres. On la regardait avec défiance, sinon avec défaveur. On prétendait lui interdire l'examen de certains problèmes et surtout on la tenait à l'écart de l'enseignement, sauf là où l'on cherchait à en faire la servante de l'apologétique. Cependant elle existait tant bien que mal; nous pouvons même affirmer que, du jour où les hommes ont cherché à se préoccuper de leur passé, ils ont porté leurs investigations, bien que souvent d'une main tremblante, sur les origines de leurs mythes et de leurs rites. Les temps modernes n'ont fait que proclamer son indépendance, élargir son domaine et rectifier ses méthodes, grâce, d'une part, à la constitution de la critique historique, d'autre part, aux merveilleuses découvertes de l'archéologie et de la philologie

contemporaines. — Sous cette réserve, l'histoire des religions peut être dite aussi vieille que la civilisation.

Il en est autrement de l'hiérologie. Qu'on la dénomme histoire générale de la religion, ou histoire comparée des religions — si nous laissons de côté quelques tentatives de synthèse prématurées, comme celles de Dupuis, d'Hégel, de Creuzer, d'Auguste Comte, etc., — elle n'est réellement née que dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, avec les travaux de savants dont les plus éminents viennent seulement de disparaître: Max Muller, Cornelius Tiele et Albert Réville, brillante triade à laquelle il serait injuste de ne pas ajouter, à des titres divers, les noms d'Ernest Renan; de Herbert Spencer; d'Otto Pfleiderer, dont nos études déplorent la perte récente; enfin du vétéran des sciences anthropologiques, que nous avons la bonne fortune de trouver à la tête de notre Congrès, Edw. B. Tylor. Il fallait assurément, pour rendre leur œuvre possible, les progrès de l'histoire générale réalisés au cours du dernier siècle, et, en particulier, de toutes les sciences auxiliaires que j'ai énumérées plus haut. Mais ce sont ces savants et leurs élèves qui ont mis les matériaux en œuvre; au point que, en quelques années, ils ont réussi à faire reconnaître l'hiérologie, comme branche autonome de nos connaissances, à la fois par la science, par l'opinion publique et, dans certaines limites, par les religions elles-mêmes. Non seulement elle a inspiré, dans les derniers temps, de nombreux manuels, tels que les traités généraux d'Albert Réville, Tiele, Allan Menzies, Chantepie de la Saussaye, Louis Jordan, etc., mais encore, s'il faut s'en rapporter aux renseignements fournis par ce dernier, elle a fondé, en moins d'un tiers de siècle, plus de 25 chaires dans les Universités des deux continents [1].

Il suffit d'ailleurs, pour montrer à quel degré les problèmes qu'elle soulève intéressent le public lettré, de rappeler le succès retentissant des ouvrages publiés, en ces dernières années, par MM. Robertson Smith, Andrew Lang, Jevons, Sidney Hartland, Frazer, etc., dont il serait superflu de vous rappeler les mérites. Même certains établissements orthodoxes ont cru devoir inscrire sur leur programme un cours d'histoire comparée des religions, côte à côte avec leur cours d'apologétique, et, tout récemment encore, nous voyions le Gouvernement bavarois lui-même transformer officiellement en chaire d'histoire de religion un cours théologique dont le titulaire était accusé de 'modernisme'.

Quelles sont les causes de ce revirement ou plutôt de ce progrès?

[1] M. Jordan, à la vérité, mentionne 129 chaires où s'enseignerait l'histoire comparée des religions, mais la majorité me semble rentrer plutôt dans l'apologétique (Jordan, *Comparative Religion*, p. 580).

Il y a d'abord la conviction que l'hiérologie est possible. On ne peut contester qu'elle ne possède désormais des matériaux suffisamment nombreux et solides pour lui permettre d'établir une classification scientifique des phénomènes religieux. D'autre part, il faut tenir compte des résultats obtenus, dans d'autres domaines, par l'emploi de la méthode comparative. On est arrivé à faire l'histoire comparée du langage, de l'art, de la propriété, du mariage, des principales institutions juridiques et sociales. Pourquoi pas de la religion également ?

Il y a ensuite une confiance grandissante dans la validité de ses conclusions. Alors qu'elle s'est montrée toujours prête à accueillir les patientes investigations qui tendaient à mettre en lumière des faits jusque-là laissés dans l'ombre, elle a toujours refusé de s'identifier avec les brillantes mais passagères hypothèses qui prétendaient trouver, dans un seul ordre de phénomènes, la clef de tous les problèmes religieux, que ce fût le fétichisme ou la nécrolâtrie, le culte du feu, de la lumière ou de la plante, aujourd'hui le totémisme ou le tabouisme.

Enfin, il y a la conscience de son utilité qui ne réside pas simplement dans la satisfaction d'une curiosité scientifique. Son existence même implique l'admission de l'idée que, sous toutes les divergences religieuses, il y a une certaine unité de principe et de lois. Cette renaissance, en une forme abstraite et rajeunie, de l'ancienne doctrine d'une religion naturelle, n'est faite pour déplaire ni à ceux qui, dans n'importe quel culte, — et leur nombre grandit, s'il faut en juger par des manifestations, comme le Congrès des Religions de Chicago, — voudraient dégager de toutes ces divergences la loi même du progrès religieux, ni à ceux qui, sans appartenir à aucune confession déterminée, rêvent d'enrôler la religion dans une croisade pour un peu plus de tolérance et de fraternité parmi les hommes.

2

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION

By JAMES H. LEUBA. (Abstract)

The failure to recognize in Religion three functionally related constituents—conation, feeling, and thought—is responsible for a confusing use of the term 'origin'. Some have said that Religion began with the belief in superhuman, mysterious beings; others that it had its origin in the emotional life, and these usually specify fear; while a third group have declared that its genesis is to be found in the will-to-live. These three utterances are incomplete, inasmuch as each one of them expresses either the origin, or the original form, of only one of the constituents of Religion.

I must leave on one side the establishment of the religious attitude or behaviour and the origin of the god-idea, as well as the rise of the methods by which man entered into relation with the divine beings in whom he believes; and can only endeavour to deal very briefly with the original emotional form of Religion.

Two opposed opinions divide the field. The more widely held is that fear is the beginning of Religion; the other, which is accepted by a small but weighty minority, that it has its origin in a 'loving reverence for known gods'. We shall have little difficulty in arriving at an understanding of the manner in which these two views, instead of opposing, supplement each other. The origins of the two emotions mentioned, fear and love, fall, of course, outside the limits of this paper, since they both existed before Religion.

'Fear begets gods,' said Lucretius. Hume concluded that 'the first ideas of religion arose . . . from a concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the human mind'. A similar opinion is maintained by most of our contemporaries. Among psychologists, Ribot, for instance, affirms that 'the religious sentiment is composed first of all of the emotion of fear in its different degrees, from profound terror to vague uneasiness, due to faith in an unknown, mysterious, impalpable Power'.[1] The fear-theory is well supported by two classes of interdependent facts, observed, we are told, in every uncivilized people: (1) evil spirits are the first to attain a certain degree of definiteness, (2) man enters into definite relations first with these evil spirits. If the reader will refer to *The Origin of Civilization* by Lord Avebury [2] he will see there how widely true is the opinion expressed by Schwein-

[1] *The Psychology of the Emotions*, p. 309.

[2] 3rd edition, pp. 212-215.

furth, 'Among the Bongos of Central Africa good spirits are quite unrecognized, and, according to the general negro idea, no benefit can ever come from a spirit.' In many other tribes the good spirits are known, but the savage always 'pays more attention to deprecating the wrath of the evil than to securing the favour of the good beings'. The tendency is to let alone the good spirits, because, being good, they will do us good of themselves, just as evil spirits do us harm unsolicited.

Shall we, then, admit the fear-origin of Religion? Yes, provided it be understood that fear represents only one of the three constituents of Religion, that it is not in virtue of a particular quality or property that fear is the primitive emotional form of Religion, and that this admission is not intended to imply the impossibility of Religion having ever anywhere begun with aggressive or tender emotions. Regarding the second reservation, it should be understood that the making of Religion requires nothing found in fear that is not also present in other emotions. If aggressive emotions are not conspicuous at the dawn of Religion, it is only because it so happens that the circumstances in which the least cultured peoples known to us live are such as to keep fear in the foreground of consciousness. Fear was the first of the well-organized emotional reactions. It antedated the human species, and appears to this day first in the young animal, as well as in the infant. No doubt, before the protective fear-reaction could have been established, the lust of life had worked itself out into aggressive habits, those for the securing of food, for instance. But these desires did not, as early as in the case of fear, give rise to any emotional reaction possessing the constancy, definiteness, and poignancy of fear. The place of fear in primitive Religion is, then, due not to its intrinsic qualities, but simply to circumstances which made it appear first as a well-organized emotion vitally connected with the maintenance of life. It is for exactly the same reason that the dominant emotion in the relations of uncivilized men with each other and, still more evidently so, of wild animals with each other, is usually that of fear.

When I said that fear need not have been the original religious emotion, I had in mind the possibility of groups of primitive men having lived in circumstances so favourable to peace and safety that fear was not very often present with them. This is not a preposterous supposition. Wild men need not, any more than wild animals, have found themselves so situated as to be kept in a constant state of fright. If the African antelope runs for its life on an average twice a day, as Sir Francis Galton supposes, the wild horse on the South American plains, before the hunter appeared on his pastures, ran chiefly for his pleasure. Travellers have borne testimony to the absence of fear in birds inhabiting certain regions. But, it may be asked, would Religion have come into existence under these peaceful

circumstances? A life of relative ease, comfort, and security is not precisely conducive to the establishment of practical relations with gods. Why should happy and self-sufficient men look to unseen, mysterious beings for an assistance not really required? Under these circumstances the unmixed type of fear-Religion would never have come into existence. Religion would have appeared later, and from the first in a nobler form. In such peoples a feeling of dependence upon benevolent gods, regarded probably as Creators and All-Fathers, and eliciting admiration rather than fear or selfish desire, would have characterized its beginnings. This possibility should not be *a priori* rejected.

The other theory is well represented by W. Robertson Smith. He denies that the attempt to appease evil beings is the foundation of Religion. 'From the earliest times religion, as distinct from magic or sorcery, addresses itself to kindred and friendly beings, who may indeed be angry with their people for a time, but are always placable except to the enemies of their worshippers or to renegade members of the community. It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion, in the only sense of the word, begins.'[1] One may agree with Robertson Smith without denying that practices intended to avert impending evils preceded the establishment of affectionate relations with benevolent powers. As a matter of fact our author admits this fully. What he denies is that the attempt to propitiate evil spirits in dread is Religion. It cannot be doubted that the inner experience as well as the outer attitude and behaviour of a person are substantially different when he seeks to conciliate a radically evil being and when he communes with a fundamentally benevolent one. Yet in both cases an anthropopathic relation with a personal being is established. In this respect, both stand opposed to magical behaviour. This common element is so fundamental that it seems to us advisable to make the name Religion include both types of relation. And since they differ nevertheless in important respects, the phrases *Negative* Religion may be used to designate man's dealings with radically bad spirits, and *Positive* Religion his relations with fundamentally benevolent ones.

Positive Religion is at first not at all free from fear. The benevolent gods are prompt to wrath, and cruelly avenge their broken laws. The more striking development of religious life is the gradual substitution of love for fear in worship.[2] This is one more reason for not completely dissociating the propitiation of evil spirits from the worship of kindly gods.

[1] *The Religion of the Semites*, p. 55.

[2] See on this development, my article, 'Fear, Awe, and the Sublime,' *Amer. Journal of Religion, Psychology, and Education*, ii, p. 1.

3

MATERIALISMUS, KANTIANISMUS UND RELIGION

Von P. DEUSSEN. (Gekürzt)

Seitdem Copernicus durch sein 1543 erschienenes Werk, *De orbium coelestium revolutionibus*, über unser Sonnensystem die heliocentrische Anschauung aufstellte oder vielmehr erneuerte, liess sich für ein konsequentes Denken der mittelalterliche Gottesbegriff nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten. Die Welt bestand nicht mehr aus Himmel und Erde, sondern an deren Stelle erstreckte sich nach allen Seiten der unendliche Raum und in ihm war nur das was ihn erfüllte.

Dass der Raum unendlich ist, kann von denen, welche nicht von Vorurteilen beherrscht werden, nicht bezweifelt werden. Überall ist der Raum, es giebt nichts was ausserhalb desselben wäre, alles, was überhaupt existiert, muss notwendigerweise im Raume existieren. Es kann dieses aber nur, sofern es einen Raum erfüllt; das den Raum Erfüllende aber heisst Materie. Es ist dies die genaueste Definition, die sich von der Materie geben lässt. Hiernach muss alles, was existiert, materiell sein, die Materialität, d. h. die Raumerfüllung, ist die einzige Form, in welcher die Dinge für uns existieren können. In der Tat kann niemand ernstlich daran denken, dass er im ganzen Universum, in allen Nähen und in allen Fernen, je etwas andres antreffen könnte, als den leeren Raum und in ihm nur und allein die zu Sonnen und Planeten, leuchtenden und beleuchteten Körpern geballte Materie. Durch diese Anschauung wird das Dasein Gottes zur Unmöglichkeit. Vordem suchte man dasselbe zu beweisen. Nachdem Kant diese Beweise zertrümmert hatte, tröstete man sich mit der Behauptung, dass doch auch das Gegenteil sich nicht beweisen lasse. Es steht aber vielmehr so, dass vom empirischen Standpunkte sich sehr wohl beweisen lässt, dass es keinen Gott gebe, keinen geben könne. Damit war das höchste Gut dem religiösen Bewusstsein geraubt und, wie es schien, unwiederbringlich verloren.

Nicht anders war es mit dem Glauben an die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Die Natur in ihrer nicht misszuverstehenden Sprache sagt es deutlich und naiv aus, dass wir alle durch Zeugung und Geburt aus dem Nichts, welches wir vorher waren, zu einem Etwas geworden sind, und dass wir durch den Tod aus diesem Etwas in jenes Nichts zurückkehren. Was werden wir alle nach 100 Jahren sein? Nicht mehr und nicht weniger als was wir vor 100 Jahren gewesen sind, d. h., empirisch betrachtet, Nichts. Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele

schien auf dem Standpunkte der modernen Weltanschauung unrettbar verloren zu sein.

Nicht besser stand es mit dem dritten und letzten unter den höchsten Gütern der Menschheit, mit der Freiheit des Willens und der nur unter ihrer Voraussetzung möglichen Moralität. Es giebt ein Gesetz, welches alles Werden in der Welt mit ausnahmslosem Zwange beherrscht, das Gesetz der Causalität; welches besagt, dass jede Wirkung in der Welt mit Notwendigkeit erfolgen muss sobald die entsprechende Ursache in der Vollzähligkeit ihrer Bedingungen vorhanden ist. Zu diesen Wirkungen gehören auch alle menschlichen Handlungen. Sie alle sind das Produkt zweier Faktoren, von subjektiver Seite eines bestimmten Charakters, von objektiver Seite der auf ihn einwirkenden Motive. Ob der Charakter des Menschen wandelbar sei oder nicht, kommt hierbei nicht in Betracht. Es genügt festzustellen, dass diese beiden Faktoren, der Charakter und die Motive, als die Ursachen der Handlung ihrer Wirkung, wie jede Ursache der Wirkung zeitlich vorangehn, somit im Augenblicke der Handlung schon der Vergangenheit angehören, folglich nicht mehr in unsrer Hand sind.

Materialismus, Nihilismus und Determinismus sind somit die unabweisbaren Resultate der empirischen Weltanschauung. Wenn sich das religiöse Bewusstsein gegen sie mit aller Gewalt sträubt und in aller Zukunft sträuben wird, so geschieht dies aus dem dunkeln Gefühle heraus, dass die zum vollen Materialismus als ihrer notwendigen Consequenz hinstrebende empirische Anschauung der Dinge und alle ihr dienenden empirischen Wissenschaften nicht die volle Wahrheit besitzen, nicht imstande sind, über das eigentliche und innerste Wesen der Dinge die tiefsten und letzten Aufschlüsse zu geben.

Dieses dunkle Gefühl zu dem Lichte wissenschaftlicher Klarheit und Überzeugung erhoben zu haben, ist das unsterbliche Verdienst der Kantischen Philosophie. Man kann sagen, dass sie in wissenschaftlicher Form dasselbe aussprach, was alle religiösen Lehrer der Menschheit intuitiv ergriffen hatten, man könnte sagen, dass diese alle unbewusste Anhänger der noch gar nicht vorhandenen Kantischen Philosophie gewesen seien.

Wie gelangte Kant zu seinen grossen Entdeckungen? Er bemerkte, wie von jeher der menschliche Geist sich nicht an der empirischen Anschauung genügen liess, wie er, sehnsüchtig und eines höhern Ursprungs sich bewusst über alle Erfahrung hinausging, um zu solchen Heilswahrheiten, wie sie das Dasein Gottes, die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Freiheit des Willens sind, zu gelangen. Diese Vorstellungen nannte Kant, weil sie alle Erfahrung übersteigen, *transcendent*, und die Aufgabe, welche er sich stellte, zu prüfen, ob die menschliche Vernunft solche transcendenten Objekte mit wissenschaftlicher

Sicherheit erweisen könne, nannte er eine *transcendentale*. Zu diesem Zwecke unternahm er in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft eine tiefdringende Analysis nicht nur dieser, sondern des ganzen menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögens, welches er nach einer althergebrachten, aber unhaltbaren Einteilung in Sinnlichkeit, Verstand und Vernunft zerlegte, und nun nach einander die Kräfte dieser verschiedenen Erkenntnisvermögen und ihre Tragweite untersuchte. Das Ergebnis dieser Analysis war vorauszusehen. Es bestand in dem klaren Nachweise, dass alle unsre Erkenntniskräfte nur im Stande sind, den von der äusseren und inneren Wahrnehmung gelieferten Stoff in sich aufzunehmen und zum Ganzen der Erfahrung zu verweben, dass sie aber nun und nimmer dazu ausreichen, über die Erfahrung hinauszugehen und das zu erkennen, an welchem uns mehr als an allem andern gelegen ist.

Soweit war das Ergebnis der Kantischen Kritik ein negatives. Aber indem Kant die alten und morschen Lehrgebäude der rationalen Psychologie, Kosmologie und Theologie zertrümmerte, wuchs ihm unter den Händen eine neue und positive Erkenntnis hervor, die er vielleicht selbst nicht erwartet hatte, deren Tragweite er jedenfalls noch nicht zu ermessen imstande war. Er kommt uns dabei vor (wenn es erlaubt ist, einen von Goethe am Schlusse des *Wilhelm Meister* geprägten Ausdruck auf Kant anzuwenden), wie Saul, der Sohn des Kis, welcher von seinem Vater ausgesandt wurde, die Eselinnen zu suchen und eine Königskrone fand. Indem nämlich Kant den menschlichen Intellekt mit einer nie vorher dagewesenen Penetration und Besonnenheit analysierte, indem er ihn wie ein Uhrwerk in seine Teile zerlegte und die Bedeutung dieser Teile sowie ihr Zusammenwirken im wesentlichen richtig bestimmte, machte er zu seiner und der Welt Überraschung die grösste Entdeckung, welche je auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie gemacht worden ist. Es stellte sich nämlich bei seiner Zergliederung des Bewusstseins heraus, dass gewisse Grundelemente des Universums, welche wir von Haus aus vermöge der Naturbestimmung unsres Intellektes für ewige, den Dingen an sich zukommende Bestimmungen halten, nicht dieses sind, sondern vielmehr angeborene Funktionen unsres Intellektes. Diese Bestandstücke der realen Welt, welche Kant als bloss subjektive Formen der Erkenntnis nachwies, sind: 1. der Raum; 2. die Zeit; und, wenn wir von den von Kant mit Unrecht in diesen Zusammenhang hereingezogenen abstrakten Kategorien absehen, 3. die Causalität, nebst der ihr als objektives Correlat entsprechenden Substantialität. Diese Lehre von dem nur vorstellungsartigen Charakter, oder kurz gesagt, von der Idealität des Raumes, der Zeit und der Causalität wurde von Kant nicht nur als eine Behauptung vorgetragen, sondern durch eine Reihe von Beweisen erhärtet, welche wir für eben so

unumstösslich halten, wie die Beweise der Mathematik. Es würde zu weit führen, hier diese Beweise der Reihe nach vorzuführen und nur als eine Probe ihrer Überzeugungskraft mag das Folgende dienen. Ich kann alles aus der Welt wegdenken, nur nicht den Raum, ich kann mir nie eine Vorstellung davon machen, dass kein Raum sei, obwohl ich mir ganz wohl vorstellen kann, dass keine Körper in demselben angetroffen würden. Dieser Tatbestand, von dem sich jeder in jedem Augenblicke und immer wieder aufs neue überzeugen kann, lässt gar keine andere Erklärung zu, als diese, dass der Raum nicht zu den Dingen, wie sie an sich bestehen mögen, gehört, sondern vielmehr meinem Vorstellungsvermögen als dessen angeborene Funktion anhaftet, denn von diesem, und von diesem allein, kann ich mich niemals losmachen. Soviel als eine Probe der Kantischen Beweise. Im übrigen müssen wir die Bekanntschaft mit ihnen voraussetzen und wollen uns hier nur mit den Folgerungen beschäftigen, welche diese Beweise für das religiöse Bewusstsein haben.

Die nächste Folgerung ist, dass die Welt, wie sie als ein räumlich ausgebreitetes, zeitlich verlaufendes und durch die Causalität im grössten wie im kleinsten geregeltes Ganze sich darstellt, nur in einem Bewusstsein wie dem meinigen existiert, dass sie aber an sich, d. h. unabhängig von meinem Bewusstsein raumlos, zeitlos und causalitätlos ist, ein Zustand, von welchem unser ein für allemal an die genannten Formen gebundenes Bewusstsein sich keine Vorstellung machen kann. Dieser Fundamentalsatz der Kantischen Philosophie, dass die Welt, wie wir sie kennen, nur Erscheinung, nicht Ding an sich ist, erneuerte in wissenschaftlicher Form das, was die ahnungsvollen Stimmen früherer Weisen nur intuitiv zu erfassen und auszusprechen wussten; und wenn die Inder diese Welt für eine blosse Māyā erklären, wenn Platon sie für eine Welt der Schatten hält, so spricht sich in diesen und ähnlichen Behauptungen dieselbe Wahrheit in unbewiesener Form aus, welche Kant durch seine Beweise zur wissenschaftlichen Evidenz erhob und dadurch zum ersten Male in der Weltgeschichte den höchsten religiösen Überzeugungen der Menschheit eine unerschütterliche Grundlage bereitete. Worin diese besteht, lässt sich mit wenigen Worten zeigen.

Wir sahen vorher, wie durch die Unendlichkeit des Raumes und durch die Unmöglichkeit, dass etwas anders existieren kann als indem es einen Raum erfüllt, das Dasein Gottes ausgeschlossen war. Kant beweist uns, dass die ganze räumliche Ausbreitung der Welt nur ein subjektives Phänomen ist, und eröffnet dadurch die Möglichkeit, dass hinter dieser räumlichen Weltordnung eine andere, göttliche Ordnung der Dinge besteht, von der wir uns freilich, solange wir an unsre Erkenntnisorgane gebunden sind, nicht die mindeste Vorstellung zu machen vermögen.

Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, diese höchste Hoffnung des Menschenherzens, wurde seit Platons Zeiten immer wieder durch Beweise zu stützen gesucht, welchen jedoch die Natur selbst durch ihre Aussagen über Tod und Verwesung jede Glaubwürdigkeit benahm. Durch Kant wissen wir jetzt, dass der Mensch als Erscheinung den Gesetzen der Zeit unterliegt, mithin wie alles einen Anfang in der Zeit und ein Ende in der Zeit hat, dass er hingegen seiner an sich seienden Wesenheit nach zeitlos ist, dass somit alles Anfangen und Endigen für diese seine an sich seiende Natur keine Gültigkeit haben. Die Unsterblichkeit ist daher nicht zu denken als eine Fortdauer in der Zeit, sondern als ein Heraustreten aus dem ganzen, phantasmagorischen Cyklus der Zeitlichkeit in das Gebiet des Zeitlosen, über welches unserem an die Zeitlichkeit gebundenen Erkennen jede Vorstellung versagt bleibt.

Nicht weniger wichtig als Gott und Unsterblichkeit ist für das religiöse Bewusstsein die Überzeugung von der Freiheit des Willens. Denn der einzige Weg, unserer ewigen Bestimmung entgegenzureifen, ist das moralische Handeln; Moralität aber setzt die Freiheit des Willens voraus und ist ohne sie unmöglich. Auf empirischem Standpunkte ist die Freiheit nicht zu retten, denn die Causalität beherrscht alles Endliche mit ausnahmslosem Zwang. Aber auch die Causalität ist, wie Kant bewiesen hat, nur eine unserm Intellekte anhaftende Vorstellungsform. Für unsre Vorstellung erfolgen alle unsre Handlungen aus ihren Ursachen mit Notwendigkeit, und dennoch sind sie, wie das Bewusstsein der Verantwortlichkeit bezeugt, nur die in dem causalen Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen auftretenden Äusserungen eines an sich freien Willens. Die empirische Notwendigkeit und die metaphysische Freiheit bestehen in jeder einzelnen Handlung zusammen. Empirisch ist unser Handeln unfrei, das ist ganz gewiss, ebenso gewiss wie die Tatsache, dass dieser Tisch vor mir steht; ebenso gewiss, aber auch nicht gewisser. Und wie dieser Tisch nach seiner räumlichen Ausbreitung in Breite, Höhe und Länge nur Erscheinung ist und als Ding an sich ganz anderen, uns unbekannten Gesetzen unterliegt, so gehört auch die so oft bewiesene Unfreiheit des Willens nur der grossen Weltillusion an, in welcher wir befangen sind, solange wir leben. Aber die Zeit wird für jeden von uns kommen, wo wir Raum, Zeit und Causalität wie ein veraltetes Kleid abwerfen und zu unsrer ewigen Bestimmung eingehen werden, welche das religiöse Bewusstsein vorausahnt und in mancherlei Bildern sich vorzustellen versucht, welche aber für das wissenschaftliche Denken durch die Kantische Philosophie ebenso vollkommen sichergestellt ist, wie sie andrerseits vollkommen unerkennbar bleibt und bleiben musste, um die alle egoistischen Hoffnungen verbietende Reinheit des moralischen Handelns zu wahren.

4

A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

By I. ABRAHAMS. (Abstract)

Among the aims of the Science of Comparative Religion some include the determination of the 'relative superiority or inferiority' of religions regarded as types. But such an estimate of values belongs to Apologetics. Comparative Religion no more leads to a preference for a religion than Comparative Philology to the choice of a mother tongue. Comparative Religion hardly exists yet as an organized science. What goes by that name is really an investigation of Origins. The comparative method with the aid of Psychology has successfully sought the origin of the idea of deity, and with the aid of history has delved deep into the beginnings of rites and beliefs. All this is the embryology of Religion, not its biology. Science is also concerned with the developed organism.

Comparative students are still suffering from totemitis. This is natural. What is called primitive culture is a fascinating and important branch of the Science of Religion. Moreover, science deals with facts; and the newest, the most accessible, the most objective, facts are those turned up by the spade of the excavator or amassed by the observer of extant savage customs. But in the attempt to discover law there is not only a tendency to find one key to open all locks, but a grouping together, as like, of the unlike. The Science of Religion has to regard finished products as well as beginnings, fruits as well as seeds. And here there must be an open mind.

It is the function of science to discard the *a priori* belief that sequence in time spells progress in religion. Not only does such a belief lose sight of the well-authenticated facts of Degeneration, but it applies to small intervals of time principles only applicable to vast processions of ages. The interval that separates animistic phases of religion from our own is insignificant as compared to the aeons that lay behind animism and lie before us. But most serious of all in the current theories of the evolution of religion is the ignoring of the possibility that divergences may be simply what they are—divergences, in the same plane, not necessarily on different levels. Science must trace out with equal mind the facts and the fate of each series of phenomena and must not vitiate the inquiry by *a priori* labels of higher and lower. It is important to examine starting-points, but it is also important to know the routes and goals and the comparative condition of the

runners as they struggle along their courses. One must also follow out causes to their effects in different environments and along different lines.

This can be most effectively done under the impulse of the new Pragmatism. The pragmatic description—it is hardly a definition—of truth amounts to this: There is no absolute truth but only relative truths, truths relative to the need and the good of the persons who hold those truths. The true and the useful are identical. Mendelssohn argued that the same religion is not necessarily good for all, and we should add not necessarily true for all, just as the same form of government may not equally fit all nationalities. Variety not unity, many truths not one truth, this may not be the ultimate conclusion (for not even the pragmatist can deny the conceivability of an absolute truth), but it is a most fruitful working hypothesis for the Science of Comparative Religion. There are, on this hypothesis, varying forms of truth equally genuine and valid within their limits, and none significantly true without its limits. The value of a fabric is not its ideal qualities, but its adaptibility to clothe the naked in the climate where it is used as a vestment. The admission of this principle carries us far beyond mere toleration of other people's beliefs. It gives for the first time a clue to the understanding of religions, and to their classification not as higher and lower in accordance with conventional judgements, but as successful or unsuccessful in producing certain useful results, from the point of view of those who have sought those results. Point of view is as significant as the thing seen. By this means we may arrive at generalizations and laws far more accurate than the *a priori* assumptions of a Law of sequential development. Such a Law of development no doubt underlies the varieties of human culture and religion. But we must discover laws before we can look for Law.

5

THE GENETIC STUDY OF RELIGION

By J. MARK BALDWIN. (Abstract)

The object of the paper, of which a summary is given in this abstract, was to show that the two great methods of studying religion, both genetic, yield 'concurrent' or parallel results. These two methods are called respectively the *Psycho-genetic*—the study of the development of religious experience in the individual—and the *Anthropo-genetic*—the study of the racial or historical evolution of religion.

I. It is shown in the paper, that recent work in genetic psychology, extended to the psycho-genetic study of religion, has established a view of the development of the sense of *Self*, which brings individual and racial religious development into essential unity or 'concurrence' on the following points :—

1. First, the *ideal self or person, the Deity*, develops, both in individual and in racial experience, from cruder to more refined forms, with the development of personal self-consciousness. The ideal, developing *pari passu* with the actual self, can never be a fixed and final object of thought. There is a progressive refinement both of the objective idea, the divine object, and of its spiritual meaning to the worshipper, as being in some sense a self or person.

2. Second, the *social character* of all religious experience is established, through the movement by which the personal self develops. This confirms, or 'concurs' with, the anthropologist's finding to the effect that religious institutions also fulfil an essential social function and rôle. The divine self of the religious life while 'ejected' as a separate Person, is also, from the social point of view, the immanent spiritual ideal of the group or nation. The tribal spirit is the tribe's oracle and deity—conceived in terms of an ideal 'socius' or personal Self. 'Great is Diana of the Ephesians' is not only a formula of spiritual experience—it is also a proclamation of national solidarity. The ideal self, that hovers over the individual and impregnates his personal spiritual life, also stands for the racial ideal of personality in respect to its more social spiritual interests.

3. Third, the religious object, the Deity, must always be *personal*. Nothing can be worshipped but a *Self*. This represents the culmination, in individual experience, of the processes of give and take between society and the individual, by which the thought of ideal personality is developed. *The ideal remains personal to the last.* So with the corresponding racial movement. The ideal and end of social, no less than of individual development, is the Great and Perfect Spirit. However low the development on one hand—the deity being a fetish, an image, a mere lifeless thing; or however high, on the other hand—the divine being defined in logical and ethical terms; everywhere the nucleus of meaning which gives the differentia of *religious* as contrasted with other types of experience is that of personality. Some personal or spiritual value, however low and crude its type, is always found in the object that arouses and satisfies the religious impulse.

II. Certain corollaries follow.

(*a*) It appears that the actual religious object—that which is set up for worship—always has a symbolic meaning. It stands for a personal and social ideal, which arises in the normal movement of the development of self-consciousness. The symbolic personal meaning

is the essential thing; the object merely localizes and symbolizes this meaning, which is one of animation, personification, ejection—in short, of personalization—in all its stages of growth. God is what the worshipper *intends*, an ideal Person, not simply what the object worshipped actually is.

(*b*) Religion thus conceived is an essential thing, the outcome of the profound personal and social movements by which personality is generated. It could not be suppressed except by a mutilation of personality that would destroy the entire body of sentiments in which the higher life of feeling and will manifest themselves. It is also an important factor in the evolution of human culture, since in it the successive stages of evolution of the social self find concrete embodiment.

These conclusions, I conceive, the two genetic methods of investigations alike establish.

6

THE PLACE OF THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY AND THE BUDDHIST TRIRATNA AMONGST HOLY TRIADS

By NATHAN SÖDERBLOM

This paper is intended to show, (1) that the triads most frequently compared to the Christian Trinity, Father, Son, and Spirit, confuse the question of its origin and of its sense rather than elucidate them; (2) that the only illustrative and perfect analogy furnished by the history of religion is the Buddhist triad of Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha; and (3) that these two Trinities belong to a very distinct group of non-polytheistic triads, necessarily connected with historical, i.e. founded religion, but clearly formulated only in these—the two most important religions of the world.

Instances of triads or trinities of gods and of holy things have often been collected and studied, especially in order to corroborate a trinitarian [1] or a unitarian dogmatic view. If we, therefore, in our study of triads should chance upon any curious or immature forms, unobserved hitherto, it is in no wise in order to increase—I do not say complete—this collection, but in order to better understand the groups of triads mentioned above. Further, I do not claim to give any

[1] Macculloch, *Comparative Theology*, 1902, pp. 87 sq., finds that the triads are fulfilled in Christianity.

explanation which can hold good for all the uncounted masses of threefold formulas, which abound in the history of religion and in folklore.

That great scholar, the late Professor Usener, published a most interesting and valuable contribution to our knowledge of the origin and character of holy triads, in a course of three articles on *Dreiheit* in *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 1903, which it is hoped will be republished as a separate volume with illustrations very soon. Prof. Usener there proposes a single solution for the whole problem: the number three was, and still is with some primitive peoples, the highest number in their reckoning. Thence enumerations of three objects are used as expressing a complete set, that is, as an expression of completeness. Any one who has given the least attention to the laws of rhythm in human movements and music, as well as in poetry, in ordinary talk and in rhetoric, must have been struck by the preponderant rôle played by the number three in every moment of human expression and human thought. 'All good things are three,' says a Swedish and German proverb; and the Greeks spoke of 'the three evils'. Indeed, Usener's explanation of triads as originating in the savage conception of three as the final number, or, I would add, in the still-existing rhythmical spell of one, two, three—suffices for a great number of cases, perhaps for the majority. Three is the ready form in which litanies and other formulas are fashioned. But also amongst these there are important distinctions to be drawn; and, further, one key is never able to open all locks.

Three has, indeed, been to a large degree a simple reckoning form; but there are also things that are actually three; as, e.g., father, mother, child; or world, 'overworld' (if I may use this expression), and underworld in world-wide cosmical schemes; past, present, and future; thought, word, and deed, i.e. the 'three doors'—the *Trividha-dvāra* of the Buddhist; the idea is employed also in Brahmanic writings; with the Jainas (the three Guptis); in the Avesta; and is to be found in Plato, &c., &c. Immanuel Kant would have been much astonished to hear that the conception he took from Rousseau, of the three powers in the state, legislative, executive, and judicial, received its number from the fixed holiness of three.

There have really been triads fashioned after such schemes. Here I mention first the *cosmical* triad, in its two aspects of synchronous or successive divine rulers of the world. Of a tripartite universe allotted to three divinities, the most important instances are Anu, Bel, Ea, and the Greek triad, Zeus, Poseidon, Hades (Pluton)—Kronos's three sons. According to Kojiki, Izanagi divides the world among his three most brilliant children: the sun-goddess is to reign over the plains of heaven, the moon-god over the night, and Susanoo over the plains of the sea—the lower regions belonging still to the mother, Izanami. The Nihongi

has a somewhat different division. A synchronous triad results from the Mithraistic cosmogony. The cosmical triad may also be exemplified in the history of Cosmos as Uranos, Kronos, Zeus; or the current triad in Buddhism of the past, the present, and the future Buddha as represented by Śākyamuni, Avalokiteśvara, and Maitreya, or the past Buddhas, the future Buddhas, the present Buddhas, according to the Buddhistic creed heard by J. F. Dickson, in 1874, in Anurādhapura in Ceylon.

In Christianity the well-known mediaeval schemes of the history of the world have been modelled on the Christian Triad, Father, Son, and Spirit. This idea might be supposed to have some foundation already in the New Testament, the Father being identified with Jahveh, the God of the Old Testament, the Christ appearing in history when the time was fulfilled, and the Spirit's era beginning when Christ had died. Such a conception, nevertheless, scarcely gives a correct rendering of the genuine idea of the Christian Trinity, where the first and the third entities depend on the second and receive from him a new meaning.

Amongst the different kinds of triads that the morphology of Comparative Religion must distinguish, in order to grasp their significations and connexions, I wish to mention further four characteristic ones, before arriving at the most essential type of holy triads. These four are: the *mythological* triad, the *hierarchic and intercessional* triad, the *enumerative* triad, and, as a near relation to this, the purely *reiterative* triad of divinities. After these, we shall study the triad of historical or founded religion.

Upon the *mythological* triad there is no need to insist. In the advanced state of religious development, when there exist numbers of personal deities, worshipped by the same body of men, and when the theoretical need is felt of mastering and uniting this manifold material, one set naturally comes to the surface, consisting of father, mother, and child. The best-known non-Christian divine family of that type is Osiris, Isis, and Horus. In the Avesta we do not actually find Ahura-Mazda, his daughter and wife Spenta Armāiti, and their son Gaya Maretan united in a formula. But the myth exists; and Professor Bousset gives good reasons for recognizing an influence from that triad of Father-Creator-Origin, Daughter-Emanation-Mother, and Son, when we find that the Manichaeans and others considered ἄνθρωπος as the third after πατήρ and μήτηρ.

The mythological triad also occupies a great place in the history of Christianity. 'Christian Europe has worshipped the Holy Family for many hundred years' (Crawley). The real Trinity of mediaeval and Catholic worship consists of Father, Son, and Mother. The gem of the Spanish hall in the National Gallery shows us the Father in

the air, the young Mother on earth, with her lovely Child; while the dove between Father and Son symbolizes their connexion. The earthly 'vice-father' is a mere attendant in that company. In a vault of the northern transept of the church which belongs to my prebend—that of the Holy Trinity in Upsala—the Mother is sitting with Father and Son on either side, a regular feature in mediaeval church decoration. The Gnostics, known by Irenaeus, conceived the Trinity as composed of the 'first man', i.e. the Father, 'the second man,' i.e. the Son, and the *Mater viventium*, who is the Holy Ghost. According to Origen, the Ophites had a trinity consisting of Father, Mother, and Son.

Islam in general, and Muhammad in particular, may be taken as excellent examples of the confusion reigning in Eastern Christendom in popular belief with regard to the Holy Trinity. Of the three late passages in the Koran opposed to the trinitarian belief, two expressly mention the mother as the third person: 'The Messiah, the Son of Mary, is only a prophet . . . and his Mother was a confessor; they both ate food' (*Sura* 5. 77); 'and when God shall say, "O Jesus, son of Mary, hast thou said unto mankind: take me and my mother as two Gods besides God?"' (5. 116). Islamic commentaries took the same view.

Usener has shown, by the way, that the triad, Jesus, Mary, Joseph, is also often found in popular Christian art. At the end of one of his *conférences* in the Notre-Dame de Paris, Father Hyacinthe, after having recalled the interpolated Johannine passage about the three that bear record in heaven, exclaimed: 'three are they, that bear witness on earth: the Father, the Mother, the Son.'

But the derivation of the characteristic Christian Trinity—Father, Son, and Spirit—from this mythological triad is a mistake. It has been alleged that the Spirit is most often feminine in the Aramaic language. That fact accounts for the well-known scene in the so-called gospel of the Hebrews, after the baptism, described by Jesus: 'My mother, the Holy Ghost, took me by the hair and carried me to the great mountain Tabor.' In the third century it was ordained in Syria to honour the deaconesses as the Holy Spirit. Aphraates, in the fourth century, speaks in a sermon about the unmarried as one who yet loves and honours God as his father and the Holy Ghost as his mother. The Syriac language, with its feminine *rucha*, has thus facilitated the natural tendency—the tendency of the religion of nature—to identify the Christian Trinity with the mythical one. But it does not give us the origin of the third entity in the Christian triad. One cannot readily believe that the third person ought to have become the mother, and only became the Spirit through an accidental phenomenon in the Syriac language. There has been,

during the whole existence of the Church, a tendency to regard the third person as feminine, owing in part to a tradition derived from the Syriac and from gnostic conceptions, and in part to a subconscious or deliberate wish of pious people and of religious writers with a strong sense of the concrete, to express the mild, gracious, comforting, and consoling character of the Holy Spirit. Professor Usener quotes a German Volksbuch of the present time, where the Holy Ghost is called 'the mother of all spirits'. I have found a striking analogy, without any historical connexion, in one of the strongest and most personal preachers I ever heard, the Norwegian missionary, Johannes Johnsson, who, in an edifying article contributed to a Christmas publication some years ago, tried to show from the Scripture and from Christian experience—without any trace of mythical tendency—that the Holy Ghost might be thought of as being female.

More attention is claimed by the *hierarchical and intercessional* triads. Prof. Heinrich Zimmern, twelve years ago called attention to the triad characteristic of Babylonian incantations: Father and Son, generally Ea with Marduk, and a third intercessional divinity, the god of the fire—Gibil or Nusku. The lofty ruler can be approached only through intermediaries. Human society has its counterpart in the divine society. Feelings of unhappiness, unrest, and guilt are inclined to seek for nearer and more merciful helpers than the mighty distributer of good and evil.

This universal fact of religious psychology is well known also from Christianity as well as from Buddhism. In northern Buddhism the heavenly hierarchy is a most elaborate one. In Christianity Christ is placed between God's wrath and poor, sinful humanity. Here evangelical piety remains stationary, without widening the list of intercession. Roman Catholic piety moves more freely; Christ himself is the great king and judge. I heard a Lent preacher in Brussels, some twelve years ago, emphatically pity Judas before a crowded audience, because he never thought of appealing to Mary. Christ could not forgive the traitor and save him; but a mother's loving heart can forgive all things. She would have pitied him, and saved him. There is no reason why there should be only three persons—God, Christ, and Mary. Popular piety is not confined to these. It is related of St. Francis that he will pity when no one else will; and there are legions of saints to intercede in their proper order before the holy Virgin.

It is a striking fact that such an intercessional hierarchy has not been regularly made up of the triad, Father, Son, and Spirit. The Son intercedes with the Father; the Holy Ghost has been, since the time of Paul, the great intercessor in feelings of helplessness and the deep experiences of a praying mind. 'The Spirit helpeth our

infirmity.' 'The paraklete abideth with you.' But it can scarcely be said that the Holy Ghost has become an intercessor or a hierarchic link between Christ and the faithful. The *Filioque* clause—originating in Western Christianity as an outcome of the historical revelation—has not, as a rule, been used in that way.

In the Pauline conception, and partly in the Acts, the Spirit is practically identified with the risen and living Lord. Popular devotion in other surroundings, less bound by the historical personality of Jesus, has recurred to conceptions other than the Spirit, when it has been seeking for intercessors between itself and Christ.

The *emanative* triads constitute a near relative of the hierarchic type. The idea of emanation occurs, in a very crude and palpable form, among primitive peoples. The refinement of a higher intellectual culture is never able to alter its natural character. Taoism seems to recognize a kind of emanative triad, consisting of Lao Tzu, P'an Ku—the primordial man—and the Ruler of the Universe. According to Prof. Giles, the idea of a Trinity was adopted from Buddhism. In Mahāyānistic mysticism every historic Buddha may be viewed in a triple form of existence, as living on earth, as existing metaphysically in Nirvāna, i.e. as a Dhyāni Buddha, and, as a reflex of himself, a spiritual son is generated in the world of forms for the purpose of propagating the religion established by him during his earthly career. Thus Śākyamuni's Dhyāni Buddha is called Amitābha, and his spiritual reflex Avalokiteśvara.[1]

The emanative triads of Greek Neoplatonic philosophy became of considerable importance in the history of Christianity as well as in that of Islam.

Successive ideas of emanation served partly as arguments and expressions in the discussions and elaboration of dogma, and partly brought about a definite idea of the conception of the Church as being opposed to themselves. But a second fact is quite as evident: that those emanative triads cannot explain the origin of the triad, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

The connexion of emanation with the mythological family is characteristic both of Hellenistic systems and of so-called Gnosticism, and shows that their common essence is found in religions of nature, or heathenism. The Hellenistic, heathen Poimandres derives βουλή from θεός (=νοῦς), and makes her conceive by him λόγος.

The Prodicians stated, according to Clemens, that the one, τὸ ἕν, not willing to be alone, causes the ἐπίνοια to emanate from it; by her it conceived ὁ ἀγαπητός. The same conception is found among the Naassenes and the Ophites. Bardesanes finds the father and the mother symbolized by the sun and the moon. Likewise the

[1] E. J. Eitel, *Three Lectures on Buddhism*, p. 110, 3rd ed., Hongkong, London, 1884.

Manichaeans; also Jewish speculation, in the Sohar, enumerates amongst the Sophiroth, Father, Mother, and Son.

We have already stated the strong tendency apparent in the history of Christianity to identify the Christian Trinity with that conception, in making the Holy Ghost a female emanation from the father, that becomes then mother of the son. But the history of the speculation starting from naturalistic groups, i.e. the historical origin of the Christian triad, prevailed.

Islam owes also, probably, to a certain extent, to Greek philosophy, several speculations about Ali and the following divine manifestations. The Nosairis, who consider Ali as the only God, place him at the head of a trinity, consisting of him as the eternal creative 'Idea', of Muhammad as his 'Name'—the veil under which he reveals himself—and Salman, issued from Muhammad (and the earliest convert and one of the most revered 'Companions' of the prophet) as the 'Gate', the entrance accorded to the believers. These conceptions were borrowed from the Ishmaelites.[1]

The priority of the number three as originator of the formula is much more evident in two classes not yet studied by us: in the *reiterative* and in the *enumerative* triads.

The *reiterative* triads consist simply in a threefold representation of a divinity in image or in formula. To this class belong the Greek representations of three images of the same god together. Usener thinks that all three-headed (or more-headed) divinities are a simplification of three whole bodies (or more). Three-headed supernatural beings are found in India, Iran, Greece, amongst the Kelts, and amongst the Slaves. Popular and artistic imagination in Western Europe applied this reiterative triad to the Christian Trinity—as it seems in a certain harmony with western trinitarian formulas, where Father, Son, and Spirit are treated as three identical entities forming one, *ter unus*, as the Hermes: 'Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spiritus Sanctus.' But the Church, certainly obeying a correct instinct, never acknowledged such a representation, but eagerly combated it, although even to-day the Holy Trinity can be seen in France, Italy, and Spain as three identical bearded heads put together.

The *enumerative* triad gathers three divinities worshipped together; they may be mighty divinities, sometimes the three mightiest divinities, or three divinities taking a rank above all others. Later speculation goes further in taking them as three appearances of the same eternal being. The most important species of this type is the Hindu Trimurti, Brahmā, Vishnu, Śiva, later considered as the three revelations of Prajāpati or of the impersonal Brahman. Or again, two of the

[1] R. Dussaud, *Histoire et Religion des Nosairis*, Bibl. de l'École des Hautes-Études. Browne, *Lit. History of Persia*, i. 203.

names may form an appendix to the chief divinity, whether Vishnu or Śiva. 'With most of the sects the triad is only a formula without any meaning. Brahmā figures in it only to make up a number.'[1] Agni, Vāyu, Sūrya, form another and more orthodox triad, the three being emanations from the one eternal Being.

The triad of the later Achaemenians, Ahura-Mazda, Mithra, and Anahita, has quite a different historical connexion, being not a reduction of the *embarras de richesse* of polytheism, but, on the contrary, a later addition to a semi-monotheistical conception.

I need not insist upon the frequency of such representations as Odin, Thor, Frey, &c.; the most numerous collection is to be found in Usener's brilliant treatise. Nor yet need I insist on the fact that the Christian Trinity is frequently considered, not only by popular devotion, but also in theology, as a set of divinities, gathered together, worshipped together, but where the number three has no necessity in itself.

It may be an unchanging fact that they are three, but the litany can also be larger—Father, Son, Holy Ghost, the Holy Virgin, Archangels, Saints, &c., &c. In this context we naturally think of Roman Catholic popular custom and belief; but analogous phenomena can be observed also in hymns used in Protestant churches, and in other undogmatical expressions of living piety. An old Swedish woman was asked by her vicar, 'How many gods have we?' After a moment's reflection, she answered, 'Seven.' 'What seven?' 'The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob make three; then, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost make six.' 'But you told us of seven; who is the seventh one, then?' 'That's the good old God.' She had some knowledge of the Bible and of the Catechism, but she had also a living religion of her own. As far as theology is concerned, Dr. Moberly's words, 'there is amongst Christians not a little popular thought which, meaning to be orthodox, is, in fact, more or less tritheistic,' may be applied also to certain theological treatments of the Trinity.

It is obvious, then, that in all these triads the number three is not essential, but more or less accidental. We have seen that the hierarchical and intercessional triad has, in its own psychological background, a tendency to augment the links of the chain which binds together earth and heaven: the same is true of emanations. And in these enumerative liturgical triads, why not three, four, or more? In the richest and most complicated mythology of the world—the Buddhist pantheon in Tibet, China, and Japan—and in the monuments of the Gandhāra art in India, we see deities, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas represented in groups of threes, fives, and eights.[2]

[1] A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, 3rd ed., p. 182.

[2] A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*. Translated by A. C. Gibson; revised and enlarged by J. Burgess. London, 1901.

These groups of triads had an important part in the popular and theological interpretation of the Christian Trinity, but without teaching its real and original character.

There yet remains a group of triads to which I would call special attention. One of its characteristics consists in the essential and necessary character of the number three. There is not here a frame into which the holy things are entered *tant bien que mal.* Nor can a fourth entity of a co-ordinate importance be added. These triads spring directly out of *historical, founded religion*, although they have been clearly formulated and fixed only in Buddhism and Christianity.

The three words, Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, existed before in their general meaning of spiritual enlightenment (or perhaps only 'awakening', according to Mr. Rhys Davids), of a doctrine or law for deliverance and salvation, and of a community or brotherhood, a new humanity, a congregation, a church.[1] But in the Buddhist doctrine of the three 'jewels', *ratna*, or the three 'refuges', *śaraṇa*, the perfect analogy to the Christian Trinity is apparent, thence throwing up more conspicuously the fundamental difference between the essentially mystical and supernatural religion, implying a creative synthesis, a keen trust in a divine order of things, which natural observation and calculation must deem incredible and paradoxical; and on the other hand the rational religion of analytic psychology—'die einzige, eigentlich positivistische Religion, die uns die Geschichte zeigt'[2]—the difference between creative and analytical revelation.

I shall not touch upon all the most instructive points of difference between the two formulas, mentioning two alone: in the Buddhist formula the 'revelation' consists of admirable advice concerning the source of suffering and rebirth, and how to be quit of them; while in the Christian triad the 'revelation' means God the Father. Again, in the Buddhist formula we find a congregation, an assembly or order of monks—joined together by numbers of rules and regulations; while the corresponding third entity in the Christian formula is a mystical power, experienced by the great men of God and, at several epochs, by groups of ordinary men and women, producing vehement moral, but also psychical and physiological results amongst those who felt in this overwhelming spirit the might of the risen Lord, a power, the difficulty of controlling which inspired many pages of St. Paul's letters, a power, mysterious and superhuman in its origin and effect, even as the wind that blows.

But if that difference be duly observed, the analogy could not be

[1] According to early Buddhism, Śākyamuni himself was an Arhat. To Mahāyāna it became an important question whether Buddha belonged to the Sangha or not. In early Buddhism 'there is no god but the Dhamma' (Hardy).

[2] Nietzsche.

closer. We might further claim that the stress in both formulas is laid upon the central figures, the Dhamma and the Christ—a fact which was, in both cases, the definite consequence of their preaching, since Buddha summoned to Dhamma and Christ summoned to Himself. The fact that Dhamma follows Buddha in the formula, as well as in history, does not imply any subordination. On the contrary. The Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta makes the Master, who lies sick unto death, say to Ānanda: 'The Tathāgata thinks not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood, or that the order is dependent upon him.' And later in the same document the Master addresses Ānanda in these terms: 'It may be, Ānanda, that in some of you the thought may arise, "The word of the Master is ended, we have no teacher more!" But it is not thus, Ānanda, that you should regard it. The doctrines and the rules of the order which I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them be your teacher after I am gone.' In fact, Buddha is identified with the Doctrine, the Law. To see the Buddha and to see the Law are frequently used in Pāli literature as meaning one and the same thing. One is tempted to compare with it: 'Whosoever sees Me, sees the Father.' And the analogy is right so far, inasmuch as the Father corresponds to the Dhamma in early Buddhism. As the Law is in the Master, so the Father is in the Son of Man. Buddha says: 'It is of no use to see only my body; no, he who sees the Doctrine, sees me, and he who sees me, sees the Doctrine.' Only he who has understood the Doctrine sees what is Buddha's real gift and value for himself. 'The Dhamma is,' according to the Master, 'the first thing in the world.'[1] Further speculation made of Dhamma the real body, the real content of a Buddha, and of the Buddhas. 'The Buddhas ought to be looked upon as equivalent to the Dhamma; the leaders, indeed, are the Dhamma embodied,' says the Vajrachedikā. In the Mahāyānistic doctrine of the Trikāya—the three bodies of a Buddha—analysed by Prof. L. de la Vallée Poussin, the first and principal body of a Buddha is his spiritual enlightenment or his knowledge of the doctrine. The very term dhammakāya means 'the body of the Doctrine,' the 'Doctrine-body' of the Tathāgatas.

On one of the various types of the *triratna* that are to be found in Tibet, China, and Japan, we find in the midst, on the most prominent place, a written table, symbolizing the Dhamma, between two Buddhas or two Bodhisattvas. Haraprasad Sastri, in his treatise on Living Buddhism in Bengal, states that Dhamma is the principal of the three jewels. Both Dhamma and Sangha belong, after Prajñā Pāramitā, to the older personifications of Buddhist cult. In Bengal Dhamma is still worshipped as divine, with images and sacrifices, by the lower castes.

[1] 'The nature of the Tathāgata is the Dhamma . . . he is really Dhamma' (*Aggañña-sutta*, Hardy).

In the most remarkable document that exists concerning Śākyamuni's life, the Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta, Subhadda, the last disciple converted by the Master himself, 'took his refuge in the Holy One, in the doctrine and in the order.'

The second book of the collection of early Buddhistic hymns, known as Sutta-Nipāta, contains, in Ratanasutta, a poetical apotheosis of the three Ratanas, in the original form of the historical Śākyamuni, his doctrine of salvation, and his disciples. By these excellent jewels any one may win salvation. 'The Buddha preached, for the good of all, his glorious law, which leads to Nirvāna.' Therefore these three must be worshipped. The rich Brahmans, the young Māgha, and the other proselytes are there represented as using the fixed formula: 'We take refuge in the Tathāgata Buddha, in the Dhamma, and in the Sangha of the Bhikkhus.' The small treatise, Kuddaka Pātha, begins with the formula of refuge.

The dharma-cakra-pravartana—'the setting in motion onwards of the wheel (sign of universal dominion) of the Law,' i.e. of the truth of salvation [1]—took place, properly speaking, through the sermon at Benares. The Lalitavistara makes a god bring the wheel and give it to Buddha in order that he may move it as his forerunners, the former Buddhas, had done. By this sermon or teaching, the five ascetics were won for the newly-discovered truth—that is to say, the Sangha, the order, was created, and the three jewels, the holy triad of Triratna, were realized in the world. This combination of the turning of the wheel and the triratna is frequently symbolized in sculptures in the North-West of India, in which the Gandhāra artists surmount the original wheel (with the trident) with three other wheels, the whole surrounded by devout and adoring monks.[2]

Later, especially in Mahāyānistic books, speculation took hold of the holy triad and gave it a philosophical sense. A rich variety of other triads supplants the historical trinity. In the Amitāyur-dhyāna Sūtra Buddha Amitāyus—'the reflex spirituality of Amitābha' has on his right hand the Bodhisattva of great strength (Mahāsthāma), and on his left side the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the graciously looking Lord. In the religious art of Nepal, Tibet, China, &c., the figures of the genuine Ratnatrāya, as represented by Dhamma, Buddha, and Sangha, are not very prevalent. But the worship of the three statues of 'what are popularly, though not quite correctly, called the past, present, and future Buddhas,'[3] represented by Śākyamuni, the historic founder of ancient Buddhism, with Avalokiteśvara (or Kwan-yin), the head of actual Buddhism, and Maitreya, the coming Buddha,

[1] Mr. Rhys Davids translates: 'the foundation of a kingdom of righteousness.'

[2] A. Foucher, *L'art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, i. pp. 428 sq., Paris, 1905.

[3] Eitel.

is popular. The three Buddhas or Bodhisattvas are as common in Buddhist art as their interpretation is vague and uncertain.[1]

The three colossal images, perhaps over thirty feet high, in sitting posture, that adorn the background of Chinese Buddhist temples, often represent one of the triads just spoken of, i.e. Amitābha, with Avalokiteśvara on his left, and Mahāsthāmaprāptā on his right hand, or the historic Buddha surrounded by the reigning Bodhisattva and the future Buddha. But they may also represent the old Buddhist trinity. 'You will at once recognize the statue of Śākyamuni Buddha by the curled hair and the curious top-knot on his head. The second statue is conspicuous by its four arms, two of which are folded in prayer, whilst the third holds a rosary and the fourth a book: for this is the second person in the Trinity, called Dharma. The third constituent of the Trinity, called Samgha, is represented by a statue with two arms, of which the one rests on the knee, whilst the other holds a lotus flower.'[2]

But besides the metaphysical conception, the Triad is also worshipped by the Mahāyāna in its genuine sense. De Groot relates two forms of it in China[3]:—

'1. That which is everlasting, that is to say Buddha, whose image is erected or painted in the Tabernacles; the Dharma, in the form of writings or rolls; the Sangha, consisting of monks with their heads shaven, and clothed in rags.

'2. The second is of another form. It consists (*a*) of a multitude of Buddhas who have reached supreme wisdom by perfect conduct; (*b*) the Dharma formed by the 84,000 dharma-pitakas that have been taught in the twelve schools or sects; (*c*) the Sangha of beings who have reached the highest degree of wisdom or perfection, where the three vessels carry them.'

As early as in the dialogues of the Buddha in the Pāli-canon, we find adherence to Buddhism regularly expressed by the Triratna. When a man has been persuaded by the exposition of the Master, he says: 'I betake myself to the Exalted One as my refuge (or guide), to his Doctrine, and to his Order.'

Even to-day, all Buddhist neophytes, in making their vows, have to use the so-called formula of refuge: 'I take my refuge in Buddha, I take my refuge in Dhamma, I take my refuge in Sangha,' that trinity

[1] A. Lloyd, *The Higher Buddhism in the Light of the Nicene Creed*, p. 5, Tokyo, 1893, quotes from an esoteric Life of Nichiren a section of it entitled: 'The Proof of the Trinity' (sam-mei-ittai): 'That the One is Three is the open (or popular) doctrine, that the Three are One is the sacred (esoteric) doctrine. If you ask for the Three, they are Amida, Kwannon, and Shaka; if you ask for the One, it is Amida. Thus the Three are One, and One is Three.'

[2] Eitel, p. 113.

[3] *Code du Mahāyāna en Chine*, pp. 240 sq.

being the safe and peaceful place in this existence of suffering and rebirth in which one can take refuge. And the threefold formula of refuge or protection, the *tun-sarana*, as it is called in Ceylon, is thought to destroy evil.

The best-known rival of the Buddhist Bhikkhus in India, the Jaina order, also has some relation to the triratna. With it is connected a more abstract triad: 'right faith, right understanding, and right living'. The causes giving final deliverance are, however, four; those three and, as the fourth, austerities (Uttarādhyayana Sūtra). But according to A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, xvi. 436, the Jainas should have a tetrad, which corresponds to the Buddhistic triratna, with the difference that the Sangha is divided into two parts, the earlier perfect ones and the actual monks, the *siddhas* and the *sādhus*. In fact a current Jain formula of conversion speaks about life 'in conformity with the Dharma, as received in the presence of the Samaṇa, the blessed Mahāvīra'; and the Siddhas of the past are distinguished from the actual monks. But such a four-headed formula does not seem to exist in the Jaina scriptures, at least so far as they are at present accessible.

It must not be overlooked that this triad of founded religion, this monotheistic triad in its difference from polytheistic triads, may be studied also in other great foundations of religions: in the Zarathushtrian religion, in Mosaism and Judaism, in Manichaeism, and in Islam. Prof. Usener, in his articles on *Dreiheit*, has no difficulty in quoting triads in Iran. The later Achaemenians unite Ahura-Mazda, Anahita, and Mithra. Ahura-Mazda, Mithra, and Verethraghna are found together at Antiochos of Commagene. But he does not expect to find triads in the realm of Zarathushtrian revelation, the Avestan religion being nearer to religious monotheism than any of the old religions except Mosaism. Usener writes: 'Amongst the Iranians one must not expect to find trinities in the Avesta.' Nevertheless Professor Albrecht Weber, in an article in *Deutsche Rundschau* of 1899, referred to by Usener, attempted to derive from the Avesta a non-polytheistic triad. Weber's article corroborates my view as to the historical difference between polytheistic and non-polytheistic triads. Amongst the latter he counts the Christian Trinity and the Buddhist Triratna. For him the most important question concerning the influence of the Avestan religion on the Biblical religions is 'the possible connexion between the Avestan triad, God, the Doctrine, the Souls of the pious believers (the Fravashis)—as it appears in the unifying of the three most holy prayers of the Avesta, Yatha ahū vairyō, Ashem vōhū and Yeṇhé hātaṃ—and the Christian Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and the Buddhist triad, Buddha, the Law, and the Congregation, must also be taken into account.'

Now, in fact, such a trinity scarcely appears in the Avesta, and its

explanation as meaning God, the Law, the Souls of the holy, is an accurate and fine appreciation of the origin and sense of what I am calling the historical or religious triad, rather than a genuine rendering of Avestan teaching and formulas.

Instead of that, we have to turn to the most valuable document, known as *Fravarāne*, in which the Zarathushtrian professes his religion, from the days of earlier—I do not say earliest or Gathic—Avestan literature down to our own times. In its shorter and original form it contains four articles: *Fravarāne Mazda-yasnō, Zarathushtrish Vīdaēvō, Ahura-tkaeshō*; 'I declare myself a Mazda-worshipper, a Zarathushtrian, an anti-devil (enemy of the devils), a follower (or proclaimer) of Ahura's law.' I shall not enter here into a discussion about the meaning of *tkaeshō*, as to whether it signifies in the first place a teacher of the law or a follower of the law. Practically it does not affect the question, and anyhow the two, follower and proclaimer, are indissolubly united in the Avestan conception. Mazda and Ahura being two names of the Highest, the first and fourth articles of that creed may be reduced to one. Thus the Fravarāne proclaims (1) the worship (liturgical) of Ahura-Mazda, (2) the fellowship of his prophet Zarathushtra, (3) the new, peculiar character of life; and membership of that worship and that fellowship cannot be more strikingly and precisely condensed than in this word 'anti-devil', the characteristic of Avestan religion being the strenuous fight for purity against the devils. Its law is *vīdaēvō-dātem*, Vendīdād, a 'law against the devils'. This devil-fighting law being implied in the latter portion of Ahura-tkaeshō, which is the fourth word of the Fravarāne, the obedience to Ahura may be considered as a further explanation of the Vīdaēvō. Anyhow, the three points of the non-polytheistic triad, the Revealer, his revelation (God), and the new life of his followers, are strongly evidenced by the Fravarāne, although they have not resulted in a three-headed formula.

In the complicated theosophic system of the second great teacher 'sent to the country of Iran', Mani, the highest tetrad must have had a predominating place, since the Christian formula of abjuration contains τὸν τετραπρόσωπον Πατέρα τοῦ Μεγέθους. It may be followed through the Gnostic sects back to the Pythagorean τετρακτύς. But it seems to have been borrowed by Mani from Zervanite Mazdeism, which possessed, according to Syrian sources, four principles.[1] These four—God the Father, the King of the paradise of light (in Zervanism, Zervan, the Eternal Time), Light (sun and moon), Power (the five angels), Wisdom—are interpreted in a way that vaguely recalls the fundamental triad of revealed religion; since the fourth principle

[1] F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le Manichéisme*, i. 8, Bruxelles, 1908.

means 'the holy religion', that is to say, all Manichaeans, the church in its five degrees.

In the Old Testament no such formulated creed or confession is to be found. We recognize in the religion of Israel strong tendencies to make of Moses' own personality the centre of religion and revelation, in a way, aiming at the place later vindicated by, and given to, Jesus of Nazareth in Christianity. Several reasons can be alleged for the fact that the person of Moses did not become the mediator between Jahveh and his people, in a more personal, and hence more absolute and universal sense. One of these reasons is the glorious line of creative religious genius, speaking in the name of Jahveh, and known as the prophets of Israel—although Moses is always on a plane above them, not only as the initiator of a religious movement, which they afterwards carried on and developed and modified, according to their individual gifts and historical outlook, but also as a man of God of an essentially higher religious quality than themselves. In no book of the Old Testament does Moses' position as mediator come out so clearly as in Deuteronomy. In no one is the reader the whole time so obsessed by the triad, never fixed in a formula, but ever apparent, of Jahveh, Moses the revealer, and Jahveh's chosen people.

The further development of Israel's religion into Judaism made a double change in that system. In the first place the person of Moses fell short of the Torah, which had come to be considered as a summary of written law and lore. He was the law-giver, personally secondary in importance to the impersonal divine gift carried by him. At the time of Christ the Torah was the sum and centre of religion, at least in Pharisaic circles, and there it occupied the same place as Christ in early Christian communities.[1] If we might speak of a 'second article' in the creed of Judaism, it should contain the Torah rather than Moses, or the Torah with Moses. The second modification was brought on by a series of dramatic events experienced by and reacting upon that intimate connexion between personal mysticism and piety and the living history, which is the eternal and unique glory and strength of Mosaism. The eschatological view predominates, God's realized reign belongs to the future. The 'third article' means hope for the fulfilment.

The Jewish religion has never been officially condensed into a creed. But in Jewish literature there are many attempts to give a short and complete idea of its essence, some of which are collected together in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Articles of Faith'. The ten commandments or the great commandment and the golden rule were often proclaimed by the rabbis as the essence of Jewish piety. Philo's five

[1] Cf. Bugge, *Das Gesetz und Christus im Evangelium*, Christiania, 1903.

articles in *De Mundi Opificio*, lxi, though they claim to embrace the chief tenets of Mosaism—(1) God is and rules, (2) God is one, (3) the world was created, (4) creation is one, (5) God's providence rules creation —do not indicate the characteristics of founded or revealed religion.

More instructive is the passage in Mishna (*Sanh.*, xi. 1) which excludes from the world to come the Epicureans and those that deny belief in resurrection or in the divine origin of the Torah. Here it is expressly stated that belief in the Torah, the holy law, as revelation, and in the eschatology, constitutes two of the three most essential points of Jewish faith.

The three chief tenets, God-creation, revelation in the law, and eschatology with retribution and Messianic expectation, appear clearly from the order in which the great Saadia († 942 in Sura) treated the doctrines of Judaism : (1) the world is created, (2) God is one and incorporeal, (3) belief in revelation (including the divine origin of tradition), (4) man is called to righteousness and endowed with all necessary qualities of mind and soul to avoid sin, (5) belief in reward and punishment, (6) the soul is created pure, and after death it leaves the body, (7) belief in resurrection, (8) Messianic expectation, retribution, and final judgement.

The triad of founded religion comes out still more clearly in the four fundamental articles stated by the African rabbi Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel about 1000 A. D.—(1) belief in God, (2) belief in prophecy, (3) belief in a future state, (4) belief in the advent of the Messiah—because the close connexion of the two last articles shows that they constitute rather two parts of one and the same article of faith.

The best known and the most commonly accepted statement of Jewish faith is due to Maimonides in his 'thirteen articles'. They are not twelve, as the points in the Apostolicum, and their contents too are different, especially in what concerns revelation. Articles 2 and 3, stating the oneness of God, are directed against the Christian Trinity.[1] But the general run of thought reveals a real correspondence. After versification, probably by one of Maimonides' pupils, the thirteen articles—*Jigdal Elohim*, &c.—have found a place amongst the morning prayers in the common Jewish prayer-book. They describe God as : (1) living and eternal, (2) one, (3) above all representation, (4) the origin of all, himself without origin, (5) showing in the creation his greatness and kingdom. Articles 6–9 speak about the revelation through the men of God, amongst whom Moses had a unique dignity as the one that had seen God and that was trusted with the Torah, the eternal Truth. Articles 10–13 confess the faith in God's knowledge

[1] The points 7 and 8 seem to be directed against Islam (Moses is God's *nabi*, he and no one else) according to a private communication from Prof. G. Klein, the learned rabbi of Stockholm.

of all human actions, in just retribution, in the coming of the Messiah and in resurrection.

If there could be any doubt about the triad inherent in that so-called Jewish creed, the Spanish rabbi Joseph Albo († 1444 A.D.) has reduced the thirteen articles to three fundamental principles :—

1. *The existence of God* : comprehension of God's unity, His incorporeality, His eternity, and of the fact of His being the object of man's worship.

2. *The revelation* : comprehension of prophecy, of Moses as supreme authority, of the divine origin and immutability of the Law.

3. *The retribution* : comprehension of the divine judgement and of resurrection.

The historical aspect of Islam and its religious structure seems to indicate, as clearly as could be wished, the triad, Allah, Muhammad, Muslimin. But it does not appear in the creed or *Kalimah*, which states only the two first leading principles : 'There is no deity but Allah, and Muhammad is the prophet of Allah,' because in the genuine Islam neither the personal religious experiences of the faithful nor an independent religious organization can claim importance enough to be co-ordinated with the revealed God and His revealer. It must also be borne in mind that this Kalimah might be in Muhammadanism relatively older than the triads in Buddhism and in Christianity.

In the division of religion into faith and practice, the Islamic creed must be placed on the side of practice rather than of faith, practice being by far the more important of the two. As Al Ghazali stated it, 'the law is daily bread for every believer, while the doctrine and dogma is only medicine for the spiritually sick.'

In the commonly accepted six articles of *Imân* (faith) the triad of historical or founded religion appears in a way which is characteristic of Islam, and which, in its general structure, comes nearer to Judaism than to Christianity. We put the following points in pairs :—

(1) The unity of God, (2) the angels ;

(3) The holy, inspired books, (4) the prophets ;

(5) The day of judgement with the resurrection, (6) the decrees of God, predestination. (It was the vivid conception of God's impending judgement that made Muhammad a prophet.)

It is no accident that, in marked resemblance to Jewish ideas, the books should be named before the prophets. A holy book meant to Muhammad the proof of true religion, as it already appears from Sura 96, generally accepted as rendering Muhammad's first revelation. It is not impossible that Muhammad was led from the beginning by deliberate purpose to give to his people a written revelation. Also Jesus was to Muhammad a receiver of a copy of the divine, heavenly

book, of the Injil, the Gospel. In Sura 19, 31, Jesus says: 'Verily, I am the servant of God. He hath given me the book, and He hath made me a prophet.' The genuine task of the prophet is to receive and communicate the revelation afforded to him from God's holy book in heaven. Amongst the many prophets dogma accords a special place of honour to those trusted with a written revelation. In the development of Islamic religious thought, which, like Christian dogma, was strongly influenced by Greek conceptions, the passionate discussions and the careful formulation concerning the creation or eternity of the Koran occupy a place analogous to the one taken by the person of Christ in the great proceedings that formulated Christian dogma.[1] In an Islamic work, written in the seventeenth century, it is said that *Ibn* 'Son', in the formula: 'In the name of the Father and the Son,' means the Book of God.

We have seen that the triad, (1) Revealer (either man or book, personality or bestower of a doctrine or a law), (2) Revelation (a supernatural reality or an indication to escape and to salvation), (3) its result (a new life, a congregation, a great and decisive future), is inherent in founded or revealed religions, implicitly identifiable in their faith and creeds, or expressly fixed in current formulas as in Buddhism and Christianity.

My highly esteemed friend, the Dean of Lund, Professor Pehr Eklund, expands the application of this triad to every real religion. 'In all religions,' he says, 'there is (1) the conception of a God, or at least of something above us and our world; (2) the conception of a reality, meeting us in this world of ours, a reality in which the Divine with its power of salvation is to be found in some way, as an object of nature, as a human being or otherwise; (3) the conception of a Divinely influenced and therefore holy manner of behaviour, in contrast with the every day worldly life.'

It seems to me, that M. Eklund has put forward in an admirable way the general religious groundwork of the Christian Trinity. He could apply that triad even to a primitive 'religious' state, where the 'three articles' would be (1) the mysterious power of life, movement, skill, for which the late L. Marillier and others have adopted the Melanesian word *mana*; (2) fetishes; (3) keeping of the tabus. But from an historical point of view, that triad is in a peculiar way characteristic of the founded, non-polytheistic religions.

Hence, I do not wish to say that the Christian Trinity has been

[1] Goldziher, in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, xlviii. 265, in opposition to the view held by McDonald and others, states that the Koran was not identified with the Logos, as Christ was identified with the Logos. It is not very flattering either to evangelical or catholic missions when natives in India distinguish them as 'the religion of the book' and 'the religion of the mother'.

formed owing to a Buddhistic influence. It is due, on the contrary, to a general law, which in the case of the Christian communities found the material ready and prepared. With the two first entities, Father and Son, this is self-evident. In the case of the third, the Spirit, a group of unsolved problems attach themselves to its appearance in the New Testament, namely, concerning the Paraklete of the fourth gospel. But there should be no hesitation as to the intrinsically necessary addition, out of Christian experience, of the Spirit to the other two. In the Old Testament God's Spirit is the source of life and of spiritual power. The prophet is the man of the Spirit, and the chief process of inspiration is called, 'the Spirit of God came upon him.' It must not be forgotten that the expression 'Thy Holy Ghost' had already been moulded in Greek by the Septuagint (Psalm li. 11). And the Acts show the important part played by Joel ii. 28 in the interpretation given by the Christian circles of their own experiences. In later uncanonical literature in Palestine the notion of the Holy Spirit was unusual, but not unknown. 'Holy' means, as Dalman points out, simply God's Spirit. In the formula, Father, Son, and Spirit, Christianity expressed itself out of its own resources, obeying the necessity of revealed religion.

In both the great religions the tripartite formula has given rise to speculations which belong to the most earnest and magnificent endeavours of human thought.

In Buddhism any further philosophical interpretation and any further metaphysical development seemed to be excluded by the very distinct and precise metaphysics, implied in the Dhamma itself, as stating the momentaneousness of everything and denying any soul. But the Mahāyānistic movement produced a profound modification of early Buddhism, which brought with it also other lines of thought. Thus Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha acquired a quite new and different meaning, belonging to general philosophical inquiry, not to the fact of a community founded by the Buddha through the means of salvation which he had himself experienced.

Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha meant to Mahāyāna mind, matter, and their union; or the original intelligence with its reflex and with its practical application. Different schools of thought found in the same formula the expression of their different opinions. The atheistic systems placed first of the three, Dhamma, matter or the unconditioned eternal entity, an abstract principle combining in itself the spiritual and material principles of the universe, emanating from itself Buddha, the creative energy, and with Buddha producing Sangha, i.e. the sum of all actual existence.[1]

[1] I find in a modern Christian apologetic writer the Trinity of Science given as ether, matter, energy.

From China, de Groot relates, besides the representations of the three jewels in their historical forms, a spiritual conception of the Ratna Buddha as signifying the principle of wisdom inherent in every man; the purity of this principle being the Ratna Dharma, and its application as giving an indulgent and peaceable character being the Ratna Sangha. Thus nature has placed Triratna in every man.

Prof. de la Vallée Poussin has not found the metaphysical ratnatrāya in any Mahāyānistic books. The 'three bodies' form a different triad. It has resulted in an ontological and cosmical doctrine of (1) the undefined intellect or reality; and of its individualization as (2) Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, and (3) common people.

In Christianity, on the contrary, the invitation to speculative thought lay in the very character of the triad; that is to say, in the essentially mystical and supernatural tenet of the conceptions and experiences underlying the names Father and Spirit, as well as in the extraordinary religious position claimed by the Christ for His own person, and proclaimed in several ways by the New Testament writers, especially in the witness of the working of the risen Lord. These speculations were carried out with philosophical resources, foreign to biblical thought and to founded religion.

In later times a new speculation has applied to Trinitarian theism philosophical conceptions which are in some degree nearer akin to the Christian religion; starting from Lessing, and continued by Schelling and Hegel and the numerous thinkers who have availed themselves in some way of his system. Hence Professor Robert Flint was right in saying, in 1887, that the thought of a triple character in the Godhead has never, since the doctrinal discussions of Nicaea, been so eagerly examined as in the nineteenth century.

But neither the study and appreciation of those metaphysical speculations nor the captivating spectacle of the church of antiquity struggling in a foreign and heavy armour for monotheism, and for the belief in the living personal divinity of revelation, as well as for its threefold formula, constitutes the purpose of the present paper. Here I have only endeavoured to show what the history of religion teaches us concerning the affinities and the distinct character of the non-speculative triad, Father, Son, Spirit.[1]

[1] Cf. my treatise, *Treenighet*. Upsala, 1903.

MYTHOLOGISCHE STUDIEN AUS DER NEUEREN ZEIT

Von RICHARD M. MEYER. (Gekürzt)

Die 'mythologische Epoche' ist selbst ein Mythos. Die mythologische Produktion dauert noch immer fort.

Die Mythologie bewirkt durch eine von keiner Verstandes-Kontrolle beschränkte Hingabe an mächtige Eindrücke.

Die folgenden sind die Haupttypen moderner Mythologie: das Kind kennt Verstandeskontrolle noch nicht, der Fanatiker nicht mehr, der Phantast wirft sie von sich.

Allerdings diese neuere Mythologie ist zum Teil mitbedingt durch die frühere. Aber zwischen primärer und secundärer Mythologie besteht kein principieller Unterschied. Auch innerhalb der alten Mythologie ist die Einwirkung früherer Mythen auf spätere nachzuweisen. Besonders deutlich ist dies Ineinanderwirken primärer mythenbildender Ursachen mit der Nachahmung in der Mythologie der Kinderstube (Analogie der Kindersprache).

Die psychologischen Ursachen der Mythenbildung liegen teils in der Sache, teils in der Form. In der Sache: die unbedingte Hingabe an den Eindruck bringt die 'Übertreibung' hervor: massloser Ausdruck der Freude, Begeisterung, Trauer. Mythen von der Unverwundbarkeit der Heiligen: russische Sektierer. In der Form: wörtliche Auslegung von autoritären Stellen; der Kapuziner in der Kinderwiege, die Skopzen.

Diese mythenbildenden Ursachen bilden ausser den Mythen auch Riten. (Robertson Smith und das Verhältnis zwischen Kult und Mythus; *le culte de la Raison.*) Zumeist entstehen Mythus und Ritus gleichzeitig aus der hingebenden Stimmung, die wir, wenn sie religiös gefärbt ist, Andacht nennen. Sie steigert sich zur Vision, aus der bei mangelnder Kontrolle der Mythus erwachsen kann (Feldmarschall v. Steinmetz), oder zur Verzückung, die als Kulthandlung normalisiert wird; daher kommt die notwendige Übereinstimmung so vieler Riten über die ganze Welt (das Drehen: wilde Völker, Derwische, Skopzen—Heilsarmee).

Ein Beispiel einer solchen Entwickelung aus der Andachtsstimmung zur 'Religion' ist der Pöschlianismus (Mormonenthum).

So entstehen noch täglich Mythologien. Gerade die Nachahmung ist ein wichtiger mythenbildender Faktor, dessen Bedeutung noch nicht genügend gewürdigt ist. Die Heiligen: Versenkung in eine gegebene Persönlichkeit (Nachfolge Christi, Franziskus). Die Conversion: Versenkung in eine gegebene Anschauung (Paulus—Ratisbonne). Die

Wunderheilungen: wechselseitige Einwirkung, indem der Heilende sich in den Kranken einfühlt und dieser sich in den Arzt (Mrs. Eddy, der Prophet Dowie). Äussere Nachahmung; innere Eindichtung: der Typus des falschen Messias. Ausdehnung der Nachahmung: Gottesgebährerin; Nacherleben der ganzen Passion (Chlüsten).

Stufen der sektiererischen Mythologie (deutsche und jüdisch-polnische Sektierer).

Ein anderes Gebiet der modernen Mythenbildung die wissenschaftliche Mythologie (Swedenborg, Nietzsche). Grenzen des Irrtums.

1. Meditations-Mythen: Priester und Gott (Ramakrishna). 2. Schöpfungsmythen deutscher Gelehrter des XIX. Jahrhunderts.

Neben der psychologischen Notwendigkeit fortdauernder Mythologie ist also die logische zu betonen.

8

DAS VERHÄLTNIS VON RELIGIONSGESCHICHTE UND RELIGIONSPSYCHOLOGIE

VON A. TITIUS. (GEKÜRZT)

DER Begriff der Religionspsychologie steht heute vielfach im Vordergrunde der Diskussion; schon der Begriff selbst ist nicht völlig eindeutig. Die Psychologen verstehen darunter nichts als eine Abteilung ihrer allgemeinen Psychologie, in der der psychologischen Forschung selbst unschätzbare Beiträge für das Studium der Phantasievorgänge wie der Gemütsbewegungen zugeführt werden. Dagegen ist den Religionsforschern die Religionspsychologie ein Glied in ihrer Forschung selbst, ein integrierender Teil der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft, etwa in der Mitte stehend zwischen der Religionsgeschichte und der Religionsphilosophie im engern Sinne, d. h. der Untersuchung des Wertes der religiösen Gedanken und Gefühle. Dies doppelte Interesse, dem wir in der Religionspsychologie begegnen, das Interesse der Psychologen von Fach wie der Historiker, ergibt sich direkt aus der Komplexität der Aufgabe. Denn Religionspsychologie ist eben nichts als Psychologie der Religion, Anwendung ihrer allgemeinen Grundsätze und Methoden auf die Vorgänge des religiösen Lebens. Der Psycholog kann sich diese Arbeit nicht entgehen lassen, weil sie eine der interessantesten ist an die er sich machen kann; umgekehrt auch der Historiker nicht anders arbeiten als mit psychologischen Methoden, weil er nur in dem Masse, als es ihm gelingt seinen Stoff zu durchdringen und psychologisch verständlich zu machen, seine Aufgabe als gelöst betrachten kann. Das nie zu erreichende

Ideal aller Religionsgeschichte wird es eben bleiben, die meist so unverständlichen Bräuche und Institutionen, die krausen und verwunderlichen Gedanken, auf die die Forschung so oft trifft, zu deuten, gleichsam die ganze Geschichte in Psychologie aufzulösen. Das Zusammentreffen des psychologischen Interesses mit dem historischen kann hier wie anderwärts nur dazu führen, dass gegenseitige Correktur eintritt, alte Vorurteile und veraltete Methoden beseitigt werden.

Es ist hier nicht am Platze zu untersuchen, welche Rückwirkung die Beschäftigung der Psychologen mit der Religion auf die Berichtigung ihrer Begriffe und Methoden haben muss,—an einigen Hauptpunkten wird das ohnehin deutlich werden,—sondern ich frage nur, welche Methoden die moderne Psychologie der religionsgeschichtlichen Forschung darbietet. Nun sagte ich bereits, dass die Religionspsychologie in der allgemeinen Religionswissenschaft in der Mitte steht zwischen Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie. Hat es letztere mit der Geltung der Religion zu thun, mit ihrer Wahrheit im allgemeinsten Sinne, so steht mit ihr die Religionspsychologie im engsten Zusammenhange, sofern sie durch Analyse und Synthese die wesentlichen und eigenartigen Momente des religiösen Vorganges in ungetrübter Klarheit und ohne alle Beimischung zu ermitteln sucht. Jeder philosophisch Gebildete aber weiss, wie eng die Ermittlung von Wesen und Wahrheit einer Erscheinung zusammenzuhängen pflegt, indem schon das erforderliche Abstraktionsverfahren, wodurch wir das Wesentliche einer Erscheinung herausstellen, durch eine Vorstellung von ihrer innern Natürlichkeit und Wahrheit geleitet wird. Man wird nun in dem, was die moderne Psychologie für die Analyse der Religion und ihres wesentlichen Gehaltes beizutragen vermag, zwei Hauptgesichtspunkte unterscheiden können. Einmal wird es darauf ankommen, das Wesentliche des religiösen Erlebnisses selbst, jenen eigenartigen Faktor der die Religion zur Religion macht, aufzudenken und die typischen Formen, die das religiöse Leben annehmen kann, zu gruppieren und darzustellen. Andrerseits wird der Zusammenhang der religiösen Vorstellungen und ihres Geltungsanspruchs mit jenem eigenartigen Erleben zu untersuchen sein. Ergeben sich diese beiden Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Religionsphilosophie, so sind sie doch auch für die Religionsgeschichte von fundamentaler Bedeutung, sofern die Grundanschauung, die der Forscher vom Wesen der Religion und von dem Verhältnis des intellektuellen Faktors in ihr zum Grunderlebnis selbst (oder zu den verschiedenen Formen, in denen sich das religiöse Erlebnis etwa schon ursprünglich differenziert) gewonnen hat, für die Auswahl die er aus der unübersehbaren Fülle von Einzelbeobachtungen zu treffen hat, um das Typische wie das Charakteristische in das rechte Licht zu stellen, entscheidend sein wird. Damit löst sich ein Problem, das sich

bei dem Religionshistoriker immer wieder einstellt. Auf der einen Seite ist es mit Recht verpönt, in der religionsgeschichtlichen Arbeit absolute Urteile auszusprechen, von einer bestimmten Glaubensüberzeugung aus alle andern zu meistern; andrerseits ist es unmöglich, wahrhaft fruchtbar, ja überhaupt nach wissenschaftlicher Methode religionsgeschichtlich zu arbeiten, wenn es nicht erlaubt sein soll, Unterschiede im Werte und in der Höhenlage der einzelnen religiösen Erscheinungen zu statuieren. Durch die psychologische Analyse des Wesens der Religion und ihrer Hauptformen wird dieser Gegensatz, wenn auch nicht völlig aufgehoben, so doch gemildert, weil in ihr bereits der Versuch einer objektiven und vorurteilslosen Durchdringung des rein prinzipiellen, apriorischen Urteils mit dem Bestande der psychischen und geschichtlichen Thatsachen vorliegt, ein Versuch selbstverständlich, der stets erneuter Controlle an der Empirie zu unterwerfen ist, weil er immer nur einen approximativen, einen Näherungswert repräsentiert. Ein prinzipielles Urteil kann nur in subjektiver Form gegeben werden; trotzdem können wir bei wissenschaftlicher Arbeit auf prinzipielle Urteile nicht verzichten; und die Religionspsychologie — darin besteht ihre Bedeutung — ist der methodische Versuch, eine vom bloss Subjektiven gereinigte prinzipielle Methode herzustellen, die uns ermöglicht aus religiösen Handlungen, Institutionen, Vorstellungen das innere Leben, aus dem sie entstehen, verständlich zu machen.

Den bisher genannten Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie tritt eine weitere zur Seite, die sich unmittelbar aus ihrem Verhältnis zur Religionsgeschichte ergibt. Die Religion hat, wie alle Erzeugnisse des Geistes, ihre soziologische Seite als Sache einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft und ist eben damit (wie aus anderen Gründen) eine historische Grösse. Ohne Zweifel ist es Aufgabe der Religionspsychologie, neben der aufquellenden Frische und Ursprünglichkeit der primären religiösen Erlebnisse auch jene Continuität der Religion als geschichtlicher Grösse zu beachten, welche aus ihrer Gemeinschaftsform und ihrer Fortpflanzung in der Gemeinschaft sich ergibt, und die psychologischen Massstäbe und Gesetze dafür festzustellen. Hier ergibt sich der Psychologie neben der Aufgabe, das Wesen der Religion und ihre bleibenden Typen verständlich zu machen, die weitere, die geschichtliche Entwicklung der Religionen, welche aus ihrer Vergleichung sich uns als unzweifelhafte Thatsache aufdrängt, verständlich zu machen. Es bedarf kaum der Hervorhebung, dass auch diese wie jede psychologische Synthese ihre philosophische, d. h. prinzipielle und axiomatische, Seite hat, wobei ein Auseinandergehen auch der wissenschaftlichen Urteile vorbehalten bleiben muss. Es ergibt sich das schon daraus, dass die Construktion der religiösen Entwicklung das Wesen des religiösen Grundverhältnisses und die Bekanntschaft mit seinen Typen voraussetzt, alles, wie wir sahen, Erkenntnisse, die ohne prinzipielles Urteil nicht zu gewinnen sind. Am deutlichsten

aber tritt der prinzipielle Charakter der psychologischen Analyse der religiösen Entwicklung dort hervor, wo es sich um die Beurteilung der Anfänge der Religion handelt, dort wo die historischen Instanzen entweder ganz versagen oder an sich mehrdeutig sind.

An drei Stellen kann mithin die fundamentale Bedeutung der psychologischen Methode für die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte konstatiert werden:

1. Hat sie die Eigenart des religiösen Erlebnisses sowie seiner Haupttypen in Gefühlsbewegung, Willens- und Denkakten herauszuarbeiten und damit dem Geschichtsforscher eine (stets vorläufige) Leitidee bei seiner Analyse der unübersehbaren Fülle von Thatsachen zu bieten, die ihn unterstützt, die wichtigen Thatsachen nicht zu übersehen und richtig zu gruppieren. Stösst er aber auf Thatsachen, die sich der leitenden Idee nicht fügen wollen, so ergeben sich von hier aus wichtige Winke für eine Modifikation der psychologischen Theorie, womit eine bedeutsame Vertiefung der vorhandenen Erkenntnis sich vollzieht. Hierin ist bereits enthalten, aber bei der besondern Wichtigkeit für sich herauszuheben:

2. Das Verhältnis der religiösen Grundthatsache, des primären religiösen Erlebnisses zu den religiösen Lehren, die mit dem Anspruch auf Geltung als Erkenntnis der objektiven Wirklichkeit auftreten; es ist deutlich, dass die psychologische Theorie über die Bedeutung des intellektuellen Faktors, die ein Forscher befolgt, für seine gesamte Ausnutzung der Quellen und für den Aufbau der Religion, die er erforscht, von entscheidender Bedeutung sein wird; auch hier ist natürlich der Fall vorbehalten, dass gegenüber dem vorhandenen sichern Material die Theorie versagt und einer Ergänzung oder Berichtigung bedarf.

3. Hat die psychologische Theorie über den Ablauf und die Entwicklung der psychischen Phänomene Anwendung zu finden auf die Erkenntnis des natürlichen Verlaufs der religiösen Bildungen, und hat in Synthese mit der positiven Kenntnis der religiösen Anschauungen und Lebensformen eine wahrhafte Vergleichung der verschiedenen Formen in ihren Entwicklungsstudien und damit schliesslich eine Eingliederung der einzelnen Religionen in den Gesamtverlauf der religiösen Entwicklung, ja letztlich der gesamten geistig-geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Menschheit zu vollziehen.

Die genannten drei Hauptgesichtspunkte, unter denen sich eine Anwendung der psychologischen Methode auf die Religionsgeschichte als erforderlich ergibt, lassen sich des Nähern erläutern und in ihrer ganzen Fruchtbarkeit vorführen an drei bedeutenden Werken der Religionspsychologie, auf die der Vortragende des Nähern eingeht, an James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Maier's *Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens*, und Wundt's *Psychologie des Mythus und der Religion*.

9

ON SOME RECENT MOVEMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB

The mutual relations between the higher religions of the world and the philosophical tendencies and systems which arise among the nations professing those religions form an important part of their history. On the one hand the form of these systems and the direction of these tendencies are always to some extent and sometimes largely determined by the character of the religions prevalent in the circles from which they spring; on the other hand the doctrine and practice of the religions themselves are continually being affected, directly or indirectly, by the criticism of philosophy. Moreover, there is perhaps no better test of a general philosophical position than an inquiry into its bearing on the problems of religion. The reason for this is not far to seek. In his religion a man expresses his view, or the view in which he is prepared to acquiesce, of the ultimate reality and of his own relation thereto. An inconsistency between a philosophical position and the facts of experience may therefore be expected to come to light most readily and convincingly when we consider religious experience, because in this sphere it will be most difficult alike for the philosopher and the 'plain man' to tolerate such an inconsistency. The philosopher cannot in his religion, which is nothing if not the expression of his attitude to what is ultimately real, lay aside his speculations on that very subject with the same complacency or unconsciousness which he may show in passing (to recall a celebrated saying of Hume) from his study to his dinner, his game of backgammon, or the conversation of his friends. The 'plain man', on the other hand, cares little what philosophy, which seems to him something quite remote from the affairs of workaday life, may say about those affairs, in carrying on which he feels himself in no need of her guidance; but, if either philosophy or religion are concerned with anything real and important at all, they must, he thinks, be concerned with the same sort of things. Hence, it is natural that philosophy should be regarded by the mass of men either as an apology or as a substitute for religion. If philosophy and religion disagree, one or the other, he thinks, must give way. This conviction, although the consequences to which it sometimes leads may be unfortunate alike from the point of view

of science and from that of religion, yet has a truth at its heart. This truth is that which was stated above: that a philosophy is specially bound to justify itself to the religious consciousness, which may be described as the ordinary consciousness of the ultimate nature and significance of life and of the world.

I propose to limit myself in this paper to dealing with certain philosophical movements of recent times, in the special form in which they have manifested themselves in the University of Oxford, and often without reference to the influences from the world without, apart from which these movements would not have originated or developed themselves in this University. There can be few seats of learning in which so much attention is paid to philosophy by teachers and by students as in the University of Oxford; but few also in which there is proportionately so small an output of philosophical literature. The very number of our students of philosophy, combined with the requirements of our characteristic tutorial system, has much to do with this phenomenon. But, the fact being so, it may be not uninteresting to some members of this Congress, which Oxford so gladly welcomes this year, to know something of the state of philosophical opinion among us, concerning which probably few outside our own borders possess much information.

The philosophical controversy which above all others now occupies the forefront of our discussions, is that between Idealism and Realism. By Idealism in this connexion I mean any view which places the reality of what we commonly call external things in the apprehension of them by a mind or consciousness, whether particular or universal, human or divine; by Realism any view which ascribes to things, other than a knowing or perceiving mind or consciousness, a being independent of apprehension by such a knowing or perceiving mind or consciousness. For a number of years Idealism has been decidedly in the ascendant among us at Oxford. The special form in which it first acquired this ascendency was that given to it in the teaching of Thomas Hill Green of Balliol College, whose influence was, twenty to twenty-five years ago, the strongest in our philosophical school. This is not the place in which to enter upon an appreciation of the work of this remarkable man, much of which was, owing to his premature death, first put before the world only after he had ceased to live and could not amplify or explain what was left obscure or undeveloped in his writings. My paper will be concerned rather with certain later forms of Idealism, namely Personal Idealism and Pragmatism, two allied but by no means identical types of opinion. But I shall, before dealing with these, call attention to certain features of Green's speculation, which impressed themselves upon the teaching of this University and so became the point of departure for later developments. In doing this,

however, I would guard myself against being understood to suggest that the impression of which I speak did justice in all respects to Green's own thought, even as it can be gathered from a careful study of his published work.

It was Green's main contention that the British empirical school, to which, in spite of mutual divergences, the English thinkers most influential when he began to write—Mill, Spencer, Huxley—all alike belonged, and which believed itself to be carrying on the work of Locke and Hume, had in fact never learned Hume's lesson. For, had they done so, they would never have believed that a sensationalist philosophy, which Hume had shown once for all to be destructive of the possibility of any science whatsoever, could render any support to the natural sciences, whose interests these thinkers had so much at heart. A mind which is no more than a succession of mutually independent sensations, a world in which only what is given in sensation can rank as fact, is not a mind which can know, a world which can be known, as the scientific man knows, as the world with which he deals is known. Relations, such as that of cause and effect, cannot be treated by natural science as something added by the mind to the facts; they enter into the constitution of the 'facts'; yet they are undoubtedly, as Hume had shown, not given as sensations. Thus Green claimed for the mind that it is more than a passive sensibility, that it involves principles of synthesis, whereby it constitutes out of sensations an experience, and eventually a science, of nature.

But not only did Green thus assert that in the consciousness of nature, which in its full development becomes science of nature, there is implied a 'spiritual principle' which cannot be explained as a mere part of the nature of which it is conscious; he went on to contend further that as 'relations' are the essence of nature, and they, in the language of Locke (which he accepted) are 'the work of the mind', nature itself depends upon a 'spiritual principle' such as we find involved in our knowledge of nature. And he used language which suggested that the existence of nature depended upon a mind to which it was related as the known to the knower, that its *esse* was not indeed, as Berkeley had held, *percipi* but certainly *intellegi*.

Yet Green made it plain that the mind to which nature was thus related was not any individual mind or the sum of individual minds. You or I find nature there, before we, as individuals, come to know it. But it is, Green holds, inexplicable except as the object of a 'self-distinguishing consciousness', and so of an 'eternal consciousness' or divine mind, whereof individual minds are 'vehicles', and wherein are eternally realized all the capacities gradually realized in time by human minds—a mind which is eternally all that the human spirit is capable of becoming.

Now to turn from Green to the newer views of which I set out to speak. Pragmatism may be considered from one point of view as an extreme Idealism. That constitutive power which Green seems to ascribe to the eternal or divine mind is transferred to finite human minds, which are now said to *make*, rather than to *know* or *recognize* truth. It is not uninteresting to observe that in the historical derivation of modern or subjective Idealism from the very different Idealism of antiquity, there was one stage in which language, originally used of Mind at its highest, was interpreted as an account of the psychology of a 'personal' and 'transcendent' God; and another in which what was thus said of the divine mind was extended to the human. The history of the word Idea itself illustrates this process; for it passed from its Platonic sense to its Lockean through a sense, which may conveniently be called Augustinian, in which it was used to denote the eternal designs in the mind of God, in accordance with which He created the things in the visible world. In its later psychological meaning, the word is simply extended from the psychology of God to the psychology of man. In like manner, with Pragmatism the creation of truth has ceased to be a prerogative of the divine, it has become an attribute of the finite human mind. This has probably given much encouragement to the reaction from all Idealism which has taken place in this University and elsewhere, although this reaction is in its origin an independent, if complementary, movement of thought. For when the difficult conception of truth as dependent on the finite knower, as 'made' by him for his own purposes, is brought forward, the question naturally suggests itself whether even the older language which asserted the dependence of the object upon an eternal consciousness of it, is really tenable; whether, on the other hand, the presupposition of knowledge as such is not the independence of its object.

Pragmatism originally appeared at Oxford in alliance with another type of philosophical opinion, which may conveniently be called by a name used for their joint work by a number of essayists, one of whom was the most conspicuous of English pragmatists, the name of Personal Idealism. But the two tendencies called Pragmatism and Personal Idealism are not really at one. They are united in rejecting the conception of an absolute experience, inclusive of the experience of finite individuals, whether in the form of Green's 'eternal consciousness' or in that of the 'Absolute' of Mr. Herbert Bradley, the most influential of Oxford philosophical thinkers since Green. But they reject this conception on different grounds. The stress of Personal Idealism is laid on the ultimate and absolute independence and value of the finite person. God can be conceived only as another finite person, even if He be the creator of the rest. The phrases which speak of union with Him, life in Him, and so forth, can only bear a

metaphorical significance. The criticism which shows all other forms of existence to be in their nature relative to one another and to a consciousness for which they may be objects, while confirmed elsewhere, is held to be inapplicable to conscious mind. The impenetrability of individual finite personality is thus the keynote of Personal Idealism; it claims to secure to religion the personality of God and of man, both of which Absolute Idealism had seemed to threaten; and, in criticizing Green, it presses the undeniable obscurity of his statements with regard to the relation of the 'eternal consciousness' to its temporally conditioned 'vehicles' against the whole conception of a mind inclusive of other minds. The standpoint of Pragmatism is essentially different. For Pragmatism the 'static' or permanent personality of you or me is an interpretation of a number of successive self-affirmations, which has no more than a tentative and provisional value. The 'Absolute' is rejected not because the notion of a mind inclusive of other minds is in itself inadmissible; the most celebrated champion of Pragmatism, Professor James, has no fear of speculations as to a common 'reservoir of consciousness' which may be 'tapped' by all dwellers on the same planet. The 'Absolute' is rejected by Pragmatism merely because it is absolute. There can be no Absolute in a world where all experience is essentially in flux and incomplete.

I turn now to the inquiry how far the idealistic tendency, which we see so differently exhibited in Green and in the two schools of opinion which I have just described, which preserve the idealistic side of his teaching while rejecting certain of its elements, is in harmony with religious experience. Within the limits prescribed to me, I can only very shortly indicate the difficulties which seem to encounter it when we pass into that sphere.

The idealistic position that the very existence of what is apprehended may lie in the apprehension of it, appears in its most plausible form when we have in view sensible material objects: especially when we regard these not as parts of the world studied by the natural sciences, but rather as things entering into our practical daily life. Here nothing seems gained by supposing them to have any existence over and above their being perceived, for any such further existence could neither itself be perceived nor make any difference to the perceptions which we have. As I have said, the Berkeleian idealism is less in harmony with the attitude of natural science toward material things than with that of ordinary unscientific experience; and there is observable even in Berkeley himself a tendency to take a view of natural science as merely subsidiary to the purposes of practical daily life, not unlike that taken by the 'pragmatist' of to-day. But we may at any rate say that, although in the language which we commonly use of the perception of material objects we certainly

seem to imply that the existence of what is perceived is independent of its perception by us, and, if we thought it were not so, we should more naturally speak of 'imagination' than of 'perception', yet we certainly attribute the predominant rôle in the commerce of perception to the perceiver and not to the thing perceived. The case is, however, very different when we pass from the perception of material objects by means of the senses to knowledge by one person of another, not of his external form merely, but of his mind and character. Here, as we have seen, the Personal Idealists—and in this they follow Berkeley—abandon the notion that the existence of the object apprehended can lie in its being apprehended. No doubt there is possible a measure of knowledge of a person, in which the object is as indifferent to the observation of him by another person as a table or a stone would be; but we should readily allow that such knowledge as is possible under these circumstances would fall very far short of what we should generally mean by knowing a person or being acquainted with him. That would certainly seem to imply a reciprocal knowledge or acquaintance on the part of the person known. Here the knower and the known are, so to speak, on a level. The being of the thing known cannot be thought of as exhausted in being known, for it must also know. But, when we pass from the knowledge by one person of another to the knowledge of God, which we call religion, we find that it is the instinct of the religious man—and that most obviously on the highest levels of religion—to ascribe the preponderant part in the intercourse involved in this kind of knowledge to the object of his knowledge, that is to God. He cannot suppose that he can know God without, still less against, the will of God; he is sure that he is himself, from the beginning, wholly known to God, even though he himself knew it not; when St. Paul speaks of others having known God, he adds at once in correction 'or rather are known of Him'. Here we more naturally speak not of 'perception' or 'discovery' (as where the subject is the predominant partner); nor even of 'acquaintance' (as where the subject and object stand on the same level), but of 'revelation'; it is God, who is known, that in this knowledge reveals Himself; He it is that is active throughout; the activity which we attribute to ourselves in the matter we recognize as due to the operation or grace of God Himself. To this form of experience the idealistic attitude which takes the object, at least primarily, for no more than an object, for something in respect to which we could be content with denial or even with doubt of its independence upon the subject's activity of apprehension, would manifestly be inadequate. Nor would this be less true, I take it, with those forms of higher religion in which the object of religion is not described as a 'personal God'. There also the reality and substantiality will belong not to the

individual subject of religious knowledge, but to the eternal object to which the individual's religious knowledge is itself to be referred—'I am the hymn the Brahmin sings.' Personal Idealism, while it stops short at individual persons in its application of the principle that *esse* is *percipi*, will not any the more for that be able to accommodate itself to religion, if, as seems to me to be beyond question, our knowledge of the divine must always be thought of as the activity of the divine itself in us. The attitude of Pragmatism will be no more easy to reconcile with the needs of religion. The gods, to quote an incidental remark of Aristotle, are placed in a ridiculous light if they be regarded as referred to us, as means to our ends. It is not indeed to be denied that there is a close connexion between Pragmatism and some of the most influential theological and religious thought of our day. But it seems to be true that the success of such a tendency in the sphere of religion is merely relative to a special situation. A great service is done to the philosophy of religion when it is pointed out that a religious proposition cannot be treated as taking its place side by side with the propositions which are found in a treatise of natural science or of history. A religious dogma can no more be understood from without, apart from participation in the peculiar type of experience which gives it meaning, than can an aesthetic judgement. Any one, musical or unmusical, can fully understand what is meant by the statement that Beethoven was born in 1770, but the statement that he was a great composer can mean no more to an unmusical person than that many other people so esteem him. It means something far different where musical admiration is present in the man who utters it. The like is true of religious dogmas. The schools of theology which have pointed this out, which have claimed for religious dogmas that they are to be regarded as 'judgements of value', have rightly used the language of Pragmatism. They have said, 'What do you *want* from religion? Surely not historical or scientific information.' But this association of Pragmatism with a fruitful line of theological thought is not sufficient to enable it to give a satisfactory form to religious conviction. The question why religious dogma naturally assumes a form of expression more like that appropriate to a scientific assertion than that which we use in our moral and aesthetic judgements still demands an answer. The strength of the scholasticism against which the schools of religious thought to which I have referred have raised an important protest, always lay and still lies in its stress upon the independent nature of the object of knowledge.

But I am far from supposing that the new realistic tendency which has lately been showing itself in philosophy, and is the natural counterpoise of the pragmatist exaggeration of idealism, will itself without difficulty stand the test of application to the problems of religion.

As it has appeared in Oxford, this tendency retains that side of the philosophy of Green which allows the mind to apprehend real universals; but it abandons the language which suggests that these universals are 'the work of the mind' that knows them. It returns to the position of the ancients, who recognized a νοητόν an *intelligibile*, of which νοῦς is cognizant in νόησις, no less than a *sensibile*, an αἰσθητόν, of which the sensitive faculty is cognizant in αἴσθησις; the former being no more than the latter to be regarded as a psychical fact rather than as an independent reality.

For the very same reason that, as we saw above, it was possible to regard sensible material objects from an idealistic point of view, to hold that their *esse* is *percipi*, because it is hard to say what we want of them beside what we perceive or what we gain from the supposition that they exist independently of our perception; it is also possible to regard them from the apparently opposite point of view of an abstract realism. What difference, we may ask, does it make to the chair or the stone whether any one perceives it or no? But there are aspects even of material things in which this attitude is less easy of adoption. I do not now refer to the so-called secondary qualities of material bodies, colours, scent and so forth, which physico-mathematical science itself does not regard as belonging to matter independently of its relation to a sensitive organism. I am thinking rather of the beauty of material things. Even here in our common way of speaking, and in spite of the obvious considerations which point to the subjectivity of beauty, we incline to speak of the flower which 'blushes unseen' as wasting its beauty rather than as not beautiful; and where the appreciation of beauty is most profound, in the great poet or artist, the less is there likely to be acquiescence in a view which regards the beauty as lying in the sense that apprehends it, the greater the disposition to think of it as the manifestation or revelation of an independent reality. Yet the poet or artist would not readily say, 'What difference does it make to the beauty of nature whether it be recognized or no?' Just because he regards its recognition as a revelation, he regards it as something which would miss its mark, were it unrecognized; he thinks of it as spirit, which to realize itself must pass beyond itself, communicate itself. And plainly we think in this way of persons. Without the society of their fellows, without being known, understood, loved, they cannot realize themselves at all. Again, if we think of genius, on the one hand no doubt we feel that Shakespeare is not a great poet *because* he is admired; that if his works were lost, they would not be less excellent: yet we feel also that it is hard to understand what we should mean by a great poet who waked no feelings of admiration. We do not think of our admiration of a poet as something accidental to his genius in the

same way as our happening to see a certain mountain seems to be accidental to the mountain. And when here again we come to religion, while we cannot think that God is God because of our worship, yet a God unworshipped, a God who cannot or does not reveal Himself would be something less than we mean by God. If it is intolerable to the religious man to think that his God can be the creature of his own worship, the shadow of his own desire, it is equally so to think that his worship is nothing to God, or indeed, that it is less than (as we saw from the other side it must be regarded as being) the activity of God Himself in him. The highest thought of God must be that of an essentially self-communicative being; the highest thought of religion that of something not accidental but essential to the nature of that in which the religious man, so far as he is religious, finds himself to 'live and move and have his being' and knows that his own religious life is nothing less than the divine life in him.

It would no doubt be possible to hold that the object of religious knowledge was not independent or indifferent to knowledge in the same way as other objects of knowledge; just as 'personal idealists' do not apply their idealistic criticism to persons. But I have all along been concerned rather with the tendencies of certain ways of thinking than with the opinions of any particular thinkers, and I have tried to show that, when brought to the test proposed at the beginning of my paper, neither a one-sided Idealism nor a one-sided Realism will be found adequate to the demands of religion upon a general philosophical position. This consideration may well make one cautious when taking sides in such a controversy as has broken out between the exaggerated idealism of Pragmatism and the new Realism with which it is confronted.

10

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

By ALFRED E. GARVIE. (Abstract)

Many views are held regarding the origin of religion. It is not the intention of this paper to discuss any of these in detail; but after a brief statement of some of the opinions held, to discover, if possible, the method of inquiry to be pursued, and by application of that method, when found, to fix as accurately as can be what may, with some degree of probability, be regarded as the beginning of religious thought.

I. Fetishism, Animism, Spiritism, Naturism, Totemism, have all been advocated as the form of religion of 'primitive man'. It is evident that when such differences of opinion in explaining the origin of religion exist, it is necessary for us not so much to discuss whether this or that theory is the more plausible, but whether the method of inquiry has been determined with sufficient care; in the hope that the right method may not only put an end to this confusion, but assign to each of these forms of the religious consciousness, regarded as primitive, its proper place in the development.

II. The method of inquiry should be threefold. (1) It may seem an unwarranted assumption that the savage of to-day represents primitive man, since he too has evolved, though his evolution has been retrograde and not progressive. Nevertheless characteristic features of the religion of the savage do survive in the superstitions of the civilized man, and justify the conclusion that the savage has preserved forms of religious thought and life common to the race at its beginning. (2) As the child physically recapitulates the history of the race, so he may be assumed to do also mentally, morally, and religiously. The study of the development of the child may be used by us to retrace the steps of the evolution of the race. Emotion, Imagination, Intellect, Conscience, appear as successive stages in that development; and this is the order in which we may expect these to be prominent in the evolution of religion in mankind. (3) As, however, the child develops in a rational, moral, and religious environment, is quickened in his growth by it, and borrows much from it, he cannot, without qualification be regarded as exactly similar to the primitive man. Hence the adult religious consciousness, which can see in the child's development a meaning hidden from the child himself, must subject itself to a process of self-analysis, to resolve its complex features into the simplest elements conceivable. It is to be hoped that by a combination, of these methods, each applied with its necessary limitations, and each supplementing and, where necessary, correcting the others, we may be able to restore the religious consciousness in its earliest phases.

III. The belief in nature as animated is probably earlier than the belief in spirits; as the child is aware of himself living before he has any conception of 'self' or soul as distinct from body. The 'selective interest' would fix the attention on some parts of the living whole rather than on others, and so things would be recognized as separate, and desired or dreaded, as pleasure or pain was connected with them. When the sense of self was gained—the development of this was probably assisted by the experience in dreams of the separation of soul and body—then only arose the belief in spirits dwelling in and moving things in the world around, and *animatism* gave place to *animism*. The rela-

tion of these spirits to things might be conceived in two different ways. *Fetishism* conceived the spirit as taking up its abode in the object, and so necessarily confined to that, that its activities could not be detached therefrom. In fetishism, as it now survives, the object selected is usually some trifle which has been invested casually with significance; it is, therefore, to be regarded as a bypath, and not on the main road of development. *Spiritism* conceives the spirit as controlling the object, without being necessarily confined to it. As this term may, however, suggest ancestor-worship, it is perhaps better to call this phase of religious thought *daemonism*. As there is no conception of the unity of nature, but an impression of the multiplicity of things, the spirits are many, and this stage of religious development may be described as *polydaemonism*.

As power is the distinctive attribute which is assigned to the spirits, we must ask how that power is conceived. While it may seem an anachronism to assign to primitive man the distinction of natural and supernatural, yet it is probable that his curiosity was more challenged by what occurred suddenly or seldom, and therefore more awakened his surprise and wonder, and that in the unusual he was more ready to recognize the activity of spirits. Likely, too, it is that as he discovered what he could and what he could not do, he came to think of the spirits as stronger than himself. *Magic* originally may not have been a substitute for religion, or an attempt to get power over the spirits so as to compel them to do man's will, but an experiment to do what a man believed himself to be quite capable of doing before he found out the limits of his power. But this discovery led him to seek friendly alliance with the more powerful spirits by prayer and sacrifice. As the distinction of soul and body was slowly acquired, so was the difference of animal and human. Before polydaemonism became *anthropomorphic* it was *therianthropic*; the spirits were represented in animal as well as in human forms. In the Egyptian religion we can follow the change step by step. *Totemism* probably belongs to this stage; it is not primitive, nor is there proof that it was universal. As it implies some power of generalization and the sense of tribal unity, it presupposes a considerable mental and social development. As on the one hand the family became conscious of itself as a separate unity within the tribe, and as on the other hand man distinguished himself more thoroughly from the animal, *ancestor-worship* may be supposed to have appeared. As the spirits were conceived as human, and the greatness of these powers was more realized, *polydaemonism* became *polytheism*. The worship of a tribal deity, whether totem or not, introduced a crude monotheism; but the combination of tribes in nations led either to fusion of the tribal deities, *syncretism*, or to a national *pantheon*, in which 'the predominant partner' in the

alliance secured a supremacy for his tribal deity, as Marduk in Babylon, Ashur in Assyria. Two other tendencies to monotheism are to be noted; *henotheism*, the concentration of the piety of the worshipper on one object more or less permanently, and *pantheism*, the conception of the world and the gods as a necessary unity due to speculation. The belief and worship of the tribal deity of the Hebrew nation alone developed into an 'ethical monotheism', now common to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The issue of the future seems to be between the pantheistic and monotheistic conception of the divine unity.

11

THE RELATION OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

By LOUIS H. JORDAN. (Abstract)

The natural result of employing different methods in the study of religion has been the gradual development, within the Science of Religion, of a series of distinct departments, bearing such names as The History of Religions, The Psychology of Religion, Comparative Religion, and so on.

At the outset, these various methods of research were called into service contemporaneously. Nay, more: they were employed by the same investigators. The scholar who collected the facts of religion proceeded, as he found opportunity, to compare those facts one with another. But this exacting task has not usually been achieved with any large measure of success.

As a consequence, the various departments of the Science of Religion have tended, more and more, to drift asunder. Each has become ambitious to pursue its own particular quest, and to enlist the guidance of trained workers who would be in a position to devote to it their undivided strength.

Touching the relation of Comparative Religion to the History of Religions, there are two main theories that hold the field to-day.

1. The older view—and, for the present, the predominant view—is that Comparative Religion is plainly subordinate to the History of Religions. For, it is alleged, all the material with which Comparative Religion busies itself is derived from the History of Religions. All its prominent representatives are obtained from the same source. In a word, Comparative Religion would never have been heard of, were

it not for that other department of inquiry from which now it aspires to be separated.

2. The second school of opinion is constituted by those who hold that Comparative Religion stands upon a platform of perfect equality with its older and stronger colleague. It maintains that the History of Religions—although it appeared first in the order of time, and although the fundamental character of its work must ensure its outstanding prominence—has certainly no warrant to claim unquestioned pre-eminence. That is to say, priority of advent and control does not suffice to create a monopoly.

By those who accept the former of these theories, Comparative Religion is regarded as a mere adjunct to the History of Religions. Thus, in various colleges and universities, it has been taught in connexion with Church History or with Oriental Literature or with Oriental Philosophy or with the Philosophy of Religion, &c., &c. In Theological Colleges, it is usually dealt with to-day under the head of Apologetics—a procedure which, while commendable in certain respects, is open to serious objection.

The diversity of sentiment which exists touching the special subject to which Comparative Religion ought to be annexed, and the practical difficulties which have arisen in connexion with every such experiment, have led many to conclude that Comparative Religion may fairly be recognized and developed as a separate academic discipline. It was quite natural and legitimate that, for a time, Comparative Religion should have been studied as a by-product of the History of Religions. But this relationship—convenient, happy, and even essential, at the outset—ought not to be unduly prolonged. It would seem better that these two domains of inquiry should now be deliberately separated. Such a step, moreover, is not only reasonable, but timely. Comparative Religion has begun to organize a special equipment of its own. It can point already to a small band of competent and devoted workers. It has made a beginning, likewise, in the direction of providing for students a special and distinctive literature.

The time for initiating and promoting definitely constructive work in the field of Comparative Religion has at length fully arrived.

1. A more definite connotation must be given to the name 'Comparative Religion'.

At the present moment, the descriptive phrase 'Comparative Religion' is constantly used in a most vague and general way. Not only does the dilettante student employ the words with a characteristically careless *abandon*; but, in the absence of a deliberate discrimination between contiguous spheres of inquiry, even reputable scholars are almost equally to blame. No general agreement has yet been reached touching the boundary lines respectively of the History of Religions

and Comparative Religion. Accordingly, some authorities of the first rank frequently use the titles as if they were synonymous: other authorities of equal standing set the two disciplines apart, but fail to assign to each exactly the same constituents. A brief definition of Comparative Religion, accepted and adhered to by all responsible teachers, would do much to differentiate two departments of research, each of which is answerable for an express and distinctive task. The frequent employment of the title 'The Comparative History of Religions' shows that, in all countries, the domain of the History of Religions has already been overstepped. That science which has to do with the products of the application of the comparative method to the verified facts of religion is surely old enough already to claim a sphere of its own. Be that as it may, the present fluidity of meaning commonly associated with the designation 'Comparative Religion' is most confusing: this babel of diverse tongues ought to cease. On the other hand, the department of the History of Religions, standing by itself, is no longer adequate: the employment of the factor of comparison, already widely in use, must now be officially provided for.

2. The too rapid popularizing of the study of religion emphasizes the necessity that the History of Religions and Comparative Religion should in future be dealt with separately.

When students of religion first entered upon this quest, their conclusions were communicated for the most part to the members of learned societies. By and by, a few of the more ambitious leaders ventured formally to publish the results they had severally reached. Perhaps it was better that these portly and unattractive tomes did not secure many readers: for their contents were often incomplete, inexact, and misleading. But the persistent inquiry went on. More worthy treatises superseded these earlier ones, imperfect records were in due course revised and amplified, and errors were gradually eliminated. Thus the world has come into possession of its numerous standard Histories of Religion, in which each Faith is expounded by various competent interpreters, and in harmony with the requirements of the highest type of scholarship.

But, within the last few years, the study of religion has entered upon an entirely new phase: for the printing press has been invoked to awaken a distinctly popular interest in the subject. One can purchase now in London an exposition of any of the religions of the world, even though written by an authority of outstanding eminence, for the trifling cost of a shilling. The same method has been followed by publishers in Germany, as is illustrated by the well-known series, the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*. What has been the result? As the outcome of this new campaign on the part of the press, the leading facts concerning all the great world-religions have now been

scattered broadcast. And, as is most natural, everybody is now comparing these facts. Persons who are wholly unburdened by the discipline and enlightenment of collecting the material in question, who possess no special qualification for sifting it, who—in some cases at least—have utterly failed to understand it, are nevertheless the most conspicuous students of Comparative Religion to-day.

In view of the deliberate effort now being made to popularize the History of Religions, and of the disastrous results which this project has even already effected in the outlook of Comparative Religion, the latter department of research ought to be placed without delay under the supervision of competent and responsible persons. This plea is made, not in the interests of any alleged vested rights, but with the view of stemming abuses which have become perilously rife of late.

3. The modern demand for specialization suggests that the spheres of the History of Religions and Comparative Religion should be more sharply distinguished.

It is often said that the historian of religion is the man best equipped for dealing with the problems of Comparative Religion, seeing that he has all the necessary facts at his finger-ends. But this statement errs greatly in the way of exaggeration. The material awaiting the historian's examination is still multiplying much more rapidly than it is being disposed of. The historian's work, in truth, seems much less near its completion now than it was five years ago!

Suppose, however, that the historian of religion were able to keep fully abreast of his own line of investigation, what guarantee is furnished that Comparative Religion shall receive at his hands that consideration which plainly is due to it? The valid comparison of the Faiths of mankind—not through drawing attention to their superficial features of likeness or unlikeness, but as executed in a far deeper and more penetrative way—is not a task which every scholar is competent to attempt. Comparison, in so far as the historian is concerned, is a mere incident, a detail, a side issue. With the student of Comparative Religion, on the other hand, it is his one and supreme business. It happens to be, moreover, an undertaking of extreme difficulty and subtlety, calling for skilled and careful treatment.

Accordingly, it is at last coming to be recognized that the equipment of a leader in Comparative Religion needs to be materially different from that demanded of an expert in the History of Religions. He must possess, indeed, the same endowments of comprehensive knowledge, catholicity of temper, exhaustless patience, and dauntless courage; but he must also be highly proficient in the use of the comparative method. And dexterity of this sort can be acquired only by careful training under competent masters. In the hands of scholars thus fitted for their work, Comparative Religion would soon become

a highly specialized branch of human knowledge: it would quickly demonstrate its right to occupy a distinct field of its own: and it would indicate clearly the boundaries which separate it from those other sciences with which it is now so frequently confounded.

As regards the provision of facilities for the proper training of men who aspire to devote themselves to the tasks of Comparative Religion, three expedients have been adopted. Some have thought that the establishment of one or more professorships, in a number of selected universities, sufficiently met the needs of the case. This course has been widely followed, and with excellent results: but, in the great majority of cases, the Chairs thus created have been assigned to the History of Religions, and Comparative Religion has been practically ignored. As time has passed, a second expedient has greatly increased in favour, viz. the inauguration of a separate University 'Department', within which a group of professors judiciously subdivide among themselves the leading branches of inquiry proper to the critical study of religion. In the United States this procedure has been initiated in quite a number of instances: but it is attended with considerable cost, and it is not likely to be generally adopted.

A third expedient remains to be mentioned; and to it express attention will be drawn in the closing paragraphs of this paper. Instead of increasing the number of single Chairs in selected universities, why not seek to establish—in each of the world's capitals—a central and well-endowed institution, in which the work of scientific research in religion (in all its departments) could be prosecuted in a thoroughly scholarly manner? A corps of specialists—say ten or fifteen, devoting themselves (with genuine ardour and without dogmatic restraint) to the solution of all questions affecting in any way the development of the world's religions—could then give their whole time and thought to the advancement of this single line of inquiry. In such an institution, Comparative Religion would not fail to receive a duly proportionate measure of attention. Moreover, all work of this character, now being attempted in a necessarily intermittent and casual sort of way, would quickly become systematized, consolidated, and rendered more than doubly productive.

Such a central School of Religion would duplicate no college at present in existence. On the contrary, it would occupy towards existing professorships, lectureships, and departments, the relation which Comparative Religion properly holds to the History of Religions: it would carry contemporary investigations a step further forward. With a fullness of equipment for its special work which no purely local college could even pretend to rival, with a reference library and museum as complete as money could make them, it would indeed be a College of Specialists; and it would discharge a further function in its training

of additional specialists. Attended by a small number of picked graduate students—not necessarily or mainly theological students, but men whose alertness and openness of mind had singled them out for this distinction—the school would devote its whole strength to the furtherance of original research.

If but one such institution could be established and thoroughly equipped, it would not long stand alone. A sort of Clearing House for all the universities, fuller and more fruitful inquiry could be undertaken —and at considerably less outlay—than if twice its staff of professors were distributed at different points. All especially difficult problems could be investigated by it, multifarious facts (touching the whole range of the field) authoritatively interpreted, a reliable Bureau of Information established, and an official Journal (besides other occasional periodicals) skilfully edited and published. All recent intelligence concerning the progress of the Science of Religion—in all its branches, and in all lands—could be promptly registered, and as promptly made known: and, as a consequence, the greatest present drawback affecting students in this field would disappear, viz. the lack of easy co-operation. In particular, the interrelated 'Departments' of the Science of Religion would gradually become differentiated, their respective limits being confidently and sharply defined.

But the cost! Is not the scheme, however admirable, hopelessly Utopian?

By no means. The item of cost has never permanently blocked the advance of any really essential project. And a special school for the study of religion is essential. It is not enough that facilities for the training of students in Comparative Religion should exist in various quarters. These forces must be made visible: they must be combined: they must be effectively marshalled. Nay, more: they must be magnified as well as multiplied: they must be made so prominent that many who to-day are *not* thinking of making Comparative Religion their life work will nevertheless be attracted and secured.

This comprehensive proposal can be supported by an effective array of arguments. Its advocates are quite aware, however, that good causes are won, not entirely upon their merits, but depend very largely for their success upon the earnestness, energy, and patience of those who believe in them, and who are determined to compass their ultimate attainment.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AND SOCIOLOGY

By L. T. HOBHOUSE

The rise of Comparative Religion as a distinct science does not involve its isolation as a new specialism from all other branches of learning. On the contrary, its separation from Dogmatics opens the way to a fruitful union with other inquiries into social phenomena. Regarded in the light of historical and comparative science, Religion is a sociological function. That is to say, the religious conceptions of any nation at any period stand in vital relation to other elements of social life. The comparative study of religion goes together with that of jurisprudence, of ethics, of politics, and of economics, to make up the whole body of truth which forms the subject-matter of Sociology. The necessary economy of thought compels each inquirer to mark out his own portion of the field. Yet, if he would do his work thoroughly, he must never forget that the division which he makes corresponds to no absolute fissure in the scheme of things. The religious life of a community does not grow, mature, or decay in isolation. If it did it would stand condemned for its futility by the religious consciousness itself. But in reality, whether for good or for evil, it stands in intimate relation on the one hand with the science and philosophy, the literature and art, on the other with the legal, political, and economic structure of its time. The relation is, of course, of varying kinds. At one point it is intimate and direct, at another it is more subtle and circuitous. But on the whole the vital functions of society form a consensus so bound together by innumerable lines of permeating influence that no single organ could be gravely affected without setting up a derangement which would be felt to the furthest limits.

In such relationships as these it is seldom possible to distinguish accurately between cause and effect. The influence is reciprocal, and it is seldom possible to say with precision which department takes the lead. The religion of a people will often provide the framework for its recognized ethical conceptions, and through ethics will affect its law and government, and the whole body of custom written or unwritten which governs public and private life. At the same time the religious creed is itself affected by the whole outlook upon the world. It incorporates the prevailing conceptions of the order of nature and the purposes of life. Not only is its development conditioned by the level of clearness and consistency reached by thought

in relation to the physical order, but it takes its tone no less from the ethical elements to which in all its highest forms it seeks to give coherent meaning. We can judge the ethical development of a people by its conception of the spiritual world at least as well as by considering its working code of custom. In the resentful ghost of certain forms of animism, we may fairly see a reflection of the spirit of the blood-feud, just as in the impartial judgement of Osiris we may recognize the impersonal tribunal of public justice, and in the hecatombs of costly sacrifice to appease the angry deity the religious analogue of the corruptibility of the judge. The workings of human justice and the idea of the divine move on parallel lines. The reciprocal action is clearest in the very cases which might be expected to provide an exception. Every one is familiar with the modifications which a higher religion must undergo to accommodate itself to a relatively backward race—how a saint will be found to take over the functions of a god, how magical forms persist in a mystical interpretation, how conversely metaphysical theories receive mythical expression, and how the desires of an individual, a party, or a nation, search the Scriptures for a text to justify them. As long as a religion is far removed from the working life of a people, there is a condition of unstable equilibrium, and the balance must be restored, whether by the education of the people or the practical modification of its creed. Much that appears as religious deterioration in history must be ascribed to this cause. It is not a sign of true retrogression, but is comparable to the descent of a thin column of water which, as it is accomplished, raises the level in a wider basin. The pure and intense religion of a tiny group loses much of its meaning as it spreads through the world, but yet brings the world as a whole a point nearer to its own level.[1]

The work of the sociologist, then, in relation to comparative religion is to study the reciprocal actions of religion and the rest of social life. The developments to which it stands closest are those of science and philosophy on the one hand, and those of ethics on the other. The relation to ethics is of peculiar interest, since it is here that the social function of religion is most apparent. It is the business of Sociology, then, to trace the ethical bearings of the main forms of

[1] The history of the mediaeval Church is the *locus classicus* for this sort of interaction. It is well to remember that, taken as a whole, the story often tells both ways. Thus, as the representative of a more civilized tradition, the Church first opposed the barbaric ordeals. Then for a period it sanctioned them, but finally, especially in the thirteenth century, took a leading part in the revival of a higher justice which suppressed them. The relation of the Churches to slavery and the slave trade, both in mediaeval and modern times, presents interesting analogies.

religious thought with the same 'positivity' and detachment with which comparative religion traces the growth of religion itself.

Now the ethics of a people is by no means wholly dependent on its religion. At times the relation is very close. At others the two lines of movement seem to fall far apart. It is nowhere more difficult to formulate with precision than in the lowest forms of society. Here we find definite rules of conduct handed on by tradition and enforced by custom. Now at a low grade of reflection there is little room for doubting that at bottom custom is held sacred because it is custom. It is that which is handed on by tradition and forms the mould into which each new mind is cast as it grows up. Thus, while for society it is custom, for the individual it has something of the force of habit and more than habit. It has the strength of a mass or cluster of connected ideas, feelings, and modes of action. Such a mass once built up or built into the mind has a force and permanence of its own apart from any reasons that may be given for it, and this psychological foundation always underlies old custom. But the psychological weight behind a rule is wont to express itself in some conscious shape. And this in two ways. In the first place, there is in the breach of a rule so incorporated in our minds a feeling of uneasiness and unrest rising to acute anguish and remorse. Conversely there is a sense of satisfaction in acting along the accustomed lines. I do not suggest that this is the whole account of the origin and nature of remorse, I only say that it is one of the elements to be taken into account. It is not the whole; for departure from the well-worn ways of the mind remains painful and unrestful even if reason or conscience from some higher point of view ordain it. But it is to be taken into account; for the feeling of a breach within ourselves is attendant upon conscious wrong-doing all along the line. It is the great conservative force in the psychology of mankind which permanently resists deterioration, though on occasion, in times of transition, it is also resistant to higher points of view.

So far the permanent elements of feeling in connexion with the breach of custom. But observe that this feeling entering in turn into the intercourse of men engenders a tradition, or at lowest, is at hand ready to receive and give its own colour to tradition arising from other sources. In a word, men, generally speaking, have their own theory about the basis of custom, and in terms of this theory the permanent element of feeling expresses itself. Men are not content to act and feel, but they render to themselves some account of the reason for their actions. They have a theory of custom, and in the different forms which this theory takes are expressed the views which at different grades of development are taken of the meaning and purpose of conduct.

In the lowest stages of thought we find two forms of such theory. First of all we find rules of conduct resting very frequently on magical conceptions. Property, for example, is frequently secured by taboo, the violation of which will bring disease, death or other misfortune upon the transgressor. The boundary stone, as in ancient Babylon, is impregnated as it were with a curse which will fall automatically on him who moves it. The authority of a parent is fortified by the power of the parental curse, and even the unwitting Oedipus suffers in Hades all that the Erinnyes of a mother accomplish. The curse of the beggar or stranger helps to secure regard for those who are unprotected by the rules of the blood-feud. The oath automatically punishes the perjurer and so forth. In all these cases there is an influence set in motion by the transgression that returns, by a mechanical fatality as it were, upon the head of the transgressor. At best it may be averted by specific magical prescriptions. Evil influences may be brushed or washed away. They may be removed by incantations, or the guilt which incurred them may be cancelled by a ceremonial formula repudiating the transgression.

But in some of these cases the evil influence is of a specific kind. The man-slayer, for example, is haunted by the ghost of his victim, and it is the ghost which follows him to the camp,[1] and has to be driven away before others will consort with him. The danger does not necessarily depend upon the moral character of the homicide's act. It may have been perfectly justifiable in accordance with the custom of the community, but will none the less arouse the resentment of the ghost, who naturally cannot be expected to take an impartial view of the proceeding. Hence the man who has lawfully avenged his kinsman may have to undergo a purification, just as the instrument which he has used or the clothes which he has worn.[2] We are touching here on the second of the two forms in which the lowest ethical consciousness conceives the consequences of action. An act, that is, may awake the resentment of a spirit who will punish it to the extent of his power. The ghost of a neglected wife may haunt a man. The spirit of a father may avenge those breaches of family life which the father himself would have punished in his lifetime. The creditor who cannot get paid may starve himself at the debtor's door with a view to the vengeance which his ghost will afterwards take. Here then is a sanction for conduct which may be called supernatural, or as connecting itself with the primitive theory of spirits, animistic. But it is not a very discriminating one, since it depends not on the justice of the case but on the power of the injured spirit.

[1] Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 493–506, and Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, p. 221.

[2] Frazer, *Golden Bough*, i. 339, 340, &c.

This much, indeed, seems to be common to the animistic and the magical ways of regarding conduct at least in their lowest stages. The spirit acts as a revengeful being, the curse or taboo as a mechanical agency. Both retaliate on a man without regard to the motive or intention, and both may be set in motion by legitimate and even by unavoidable acts—such as contact with the dead—as well as by breaches of custom. Thus, as a theory of the grounds of conduct, they have the minimum of ethical value. They form a suitable framework for the blood-feud, with its limited circle of moral conceptions and its disregard of personal responsibility, and as such we frequently find them functioning.

A higher stage of religion is reached when the spirit of animism is replaced by the anthropomorphic god, whether of polytheism or of some more exclusive national religion. We are not here tracing religious development on its own account, and must not, therefore, enter into the steps of this transition. We are concerned only with the ethical side of the matter. Now ethically we know that the character of anthropomorphic gods often leaves much to be desired. But among them, and perhaps at the head of them, we often find a Zeus or an Osiris, acting as a protector of the moral law as a whole, and perhaps as a judge of men in the after life. Whether in association with such a god, or as an independent development from magico-animistic conceptions we sometimes find a spirit especially appointed to preside over certain departments of conduct. It may, like the Homeric Erinnys be a development of the primitive curse which has now become a terrible goddess, herself wielding the curse and implanting it in the minds of men. It may be the personified abstraction of the virtue itself, like the Roman Fides, Pudor, or Concordia. It may be an independent deity, or it may sink into an attribute of some greater deity. It may even be both at once. Thus Faith is an attribute of Jupiter who as Deus Fidius protects the oath, and Faith also has her own temple near by that of the god to whom she ministers. These ambiguous identifications are characteristic of the indefinite phase of thought with which we are dealing. But ethically the essential point is to distinguish between the revengeful spirit and the just God, and again between the magical efficacy of the curse and the retribution executed by a spirit which exists to incarnate the sanctity of a specific social relation. A corresponding development may be seen in conceptions of the future life. In the least ethical form of the doctrine the fortunes of the soul after death depend perhaps upon its rank in life, perhaps on the manner of the death, above all, on the funeral rites and on the diligence of descendants in supplying gifts of food. In its higher stage the future life becomes the scene of a judgement. Great offenders are cast into Tartarus. The Egyptian soul appears

before Osiris in the Halls of Double Maati and purges itself by solemn denials of the forty-two deadly sins. There is justice and an impartial judge of the soul, comparable to the justice which is arising or has arisen in human courts.

The anthropomorphic gods are not perfect. Like human chiefs, they are too often open to influence by a consideration. Costly hecatombs appease them, sometimes they demand a human sacrifice. They may be hoodwinked and possibly even constrained by magic, and it is a great step in advance to an ethical religion when God demands mercy and not sacrifice, when the only method of securing His favour is to act according to His word. A just God dispensing reward and punishment in accordance with His perfect knowledge of the heart is the highest point of this line of ethical development.

It is indeed in this conception of a sanction for moral rules that popular thought finds the permanent nexus between morality and religion. Yet it is a conception satisfactory neither to ethics nor to religion. Any reflective moral code demands a motive free from prudential considerations. Any spiritual religion demands a closer and more human relation to the divine than that of subject to sovereign, or of prisoner to judge. The higher growths of religion have, in fact, a far more complex relationship to ethics. It is perhaps impossible to speak in general terms of developments so diverse as the higher forms of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. But two points occur which seem to mark these out generically from the more naïve creeds. They turn on a more developed conception of the spiritual order, and in connexion therewith they teach a form of ethical idealism in which certain features are common to doctrines otherwise highly divergent. (1) In the lowest form of animism the spiritual is imperfectly distinguished from the material. In the gods of Olympus or in the national deities of the early Semites the divine personality is merely the human writ large. In the higher religions there is an effort in the utmost variety of form to conceive what the spiritual truly is, regarded as a category of unique import. Take, for example, the definition of the Upanishads :

'The intelligent, whose body is Spirit, . . . He is myself, within the heart ; smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley, smaller than a mustard-seed, smaller than a canary-seed or the kernel of a canary-seed. He also is myself within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds. He from whom all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes proceed, who embraces all this, who never speaks, and who is never surprised, he, myself within the heart, is that Brahman.' (*Upanishads*, i, p. 48, E.T.).

The definition is mystical. It asserts the ultimate identity of the human and the divine, the conception from which mysticism starts

and to which it returns. As mysticism it is only one of the forms in which the higher religious thought expresses itself. But the passage contains a doctrine lying deeper than mysticism, and of more universal significance. It teaches in the quaint language of a dawning thought the antithesis between the spiritual and the physical, and the finding of the spiritual in the contemplative yet creative Mind which every man knows as the innermost self 'within the heart'—the

> God within my breast
> Almighty, ever present Deity,
> Life that in me has rest
> As I, undying life, have power in thee.

Any one who turns from a description of the anthropomorphic gods to such a passage as that quoted above is conscious of passing to a new phase of thought to a point, as some metaphysicians might put it, where Mind has become conscious of itself, and where at least the meaning of the spiritual order underlying the ordinary world of sense has been fully seized. On this plane the higher religions move. This is equally true whether they express themselves in the mystical identification of the individual and the universe, or conceive the Infinite Mind as creating and sustaining a world of finite beings whom it endows with an independent existence, or even if they find the kernel of the ethico-religious life in a sense of the unreality of self and the impermanence of individual being. Such differences go far, yet I would suggest that they do not destroy the fundamental root of religious idealism—the conception of a deeper truth, reached by cutting through the crust of ordinary experience, teaching man that he has a defined place in a spiritual order.

(2) This conception has important ethical consequences. The spiritual order is a whole or a harmony, and the relation between its elements is what we experience as Love. All the qualities that belong to Love and serve it are therefore exalted as spiritual, while all others belong to the outer husk which merely hinders men from the true life. Conversely selfhood, all that isolates the individual and shuts him up within his own personality, is the barrier which it is the work of religion to break down. Man must abate his passions, overcome his arrogance, rid himself of the very will to live before he can enter into the kingdom of the spirit. Both sides of the doctrine are expressed in their extreme form in the Buddhist teaching, which relies on the final impermanence or unsubstantiality of the individual self, and finds the cause of suffering in the desire that maintains individual life and causes its renewal. By the annihilation of these elements of individualism men can here, within the limits of this existence, attain the conditions of the Arhat. Negatively, this condition is one of freedom from illusion and selfish emotion.

Positively, it is one of a perfect all-pervading love, which experiences the oneness of the liberated soul with all that lives and feels.

'And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world above, below, around, and everywhere does he continue to pervade with heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure. Just, Vasettha, as a mighty trumpeter maketh himself heard—and that without difficulty—in all the four directions; even so of all things that have shape or life there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free and deep-felt love.'[1]

Christianity, which is at the opposite pole from Buddhism in its doctrine of the self, is close to it in its view of selfhood. He who will save his life must lose it. Pride is the deadliest sin, Love the supreme virtue, and not only the supreme virtue, but the very expression of the divine nature.

It would not, I think, be difficult—though it would take too much space on this occasion—to trace these principles throughout the details of the ethical codes that have grown up under the aegis of the great religions. It is easy, for example, to recognize in the condemnation of selfhood the root of asceticism,[2] and to see that the more the negative side of this principle is accentuated, the more value will be attached to every proof of the utter indifference of the saint to all the ordinary objects of desire, without regard to its effect on his relations to other men. It is not difficult to see that a contempt for mundane existence may be extended to the affairs of others as well as to our own, and that withdrawal from the world, rather than the attempt to regenerate the world, may be the practical conclusion drawn from the exaltation of another mode of existence. Again, it is quite intelligible that a doctrine of universal love should be held incompatible with those intense but narrower affections of which most of us are alone capable, and that instead of being treated as elements in a higher order, they should be held in contempt if not in actual reprobation as pertaining to the flesh. It is not surprising that where all the outer life is held cheap, comparatively little should be said of the social organization, that, saving conscience, passive obedience to the powers that be should at times be recommended as a duty, that with much stress on duties very little should be said about human rights, and that in a word, the socially fundamental virtue of justice should occupy but a small space. It is one thing to conceive a spiritual order, and another thing to find the elements

[1] Buddhist Suttas, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi, p. 201.

[2] At least of the higher asceticism. The cult of pain has at least two other psychological sources—the idealization of fortitude, which is the basis of heroism, and a kind of inverted sensualism, which is the basis of cruelty.

of the spiritual life in the social relations of men, in human love and political equity and social co-operation. Nor is it surprising that in becoming a State religion, Christian doctrine has to put off its immortality by methods of exegesis in which its distinctive spirit evaporates.[1] As a State deity the God of love becomes once again the God of battles, and the change is symbolic of the whole process of accommodation whereby a religion founded not on a philosophy of social relations, but on the antithesis between the spirit and the world, adjusts itself to the task of legislation and government.

There is, however, another form of idealism which addresses itself more directly to practical problems and plays an important part in any general view of the relation between religion and ethics. The attempt has been made more than once in the world's history to work out the higher ethical conceptions on a basis independent of religion, and to seek the ideal of conduct through the practical experience of life. Thus the great teachers of China, faced with an immature religion and confronted with the practical difficulties and the moral problems of administration, found guidance and inspiration in an ideal of personal life and public order. The first principle of any such ethical idealism is independence of all extraneous considerations. The good life is good not as a means but as an end. Thus the Confucian sage requires no rewards: 'With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow, I still have joy in the midst of these things.' For the individual his rectitude is a higher consideration than happiness or life. 'He who loved virtue would esteem nothing above it,' and the consciousness of virtue as the gift of heaven—on this side Confucius allows a religious reference—places a man above all ordinary prudential considerations. 'Heaven has produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan-T'uy, what can he do to me?' But virtue is not an end alone, it is also a means to the social order. All rules of conduct may be summed up in the general principle of reciprocity. 'What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others.' The function of the sage is to learn and to teach. He is to guide the prince who is to order society well, principally by setting a good example himself. The people are by nature disposed to virtue. 'If you, sir, were not covetous,' is the reply to the prince who complained of the number of thieves, 'although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal.' The people should be led with gentleness and not oppressed by taxation nor coerced with heavy punishments. The traditional customs are good and are to be maintained, but those who practise them merely because they are customs are the thieves of virtue. Moral philosophy does not proclaim

[1] Cf. Decretum Gratiani, *Corpus Iuris*, pp. 896, 936, 939, &c., and the Fathers there cited.

a new code but interprets the traditions as rules of justice, filial obedience, mutual aid, compassion and benevolence.

The divergences of ethical theory are as numerous as those of religion, but here again, the few examples that I have drawn from a single thinker may suffice to suggest a certain common ground. We recognize with ease some of the distinctive conceptions of ethical idealism. We recognize the self-dependence of morality as something grounded not on religious dogma, but upon the requirements of man in society. We recognize the interpretation of morality in terms of social duty, the emphasis on justice, and the tendency to reach the goal of universalism by another road. The fundamental conception of a rationalistic ethics is, I suppose, that rational grounds of conduct are to be found in the nature of man and society as revealed in experience. Hence, in the first place, the tendency to treat morality as natural rather than as supernatural, as educed from the very constitution of the personality so far as that personality attains its normal development, rather than implanted in it by divine grace. Hence, further, the stress on the common human nature, which leads as a logical consequence to the universality of the elementary obligations, and hence, ultimately, the necessity for an ideal standard whereby social customs and State law may be freely criticized. Hence, equally, a preference for ideals of self-mastery and self-development over those of self-negation. Such conceptions as these group themselves naturally around the central idea of the human personality as the spring of the moral law. On the other hand, the sphere of conduct is the social sphere. The relations of the individual to society come into the focus of interest. The problem of self-sacrifice is restated in terms of social duty, the ordering of social relations becomes an ethical problem in which rights have a place co-ordinate with duties, and in which the last word is spoken by ideal justice as a principle of social organization—not by benevolence or self-negation as ideals of personal perfection. Such elements as these are prominent among the contributions of independent ethical thinking to the development of the Social Purpose. In large measure they coincide with the higher ethics of religion, and the coincidence is, of course, attributable not merely to the convergence of different lines of advance, but equally to the effect of complex historical interactions. One of the most important chapters in the study of comparative religion, a chapter which has still, in the main, to be written, is the study of that interaction. Something has been done by historians towards determining the influence of Greek ethical thought on Christian teaching, and the relation of Christian to modern ethics has necessarily occupied attention, though from the nature of the case it raises questions that are difficult to treat in the impartial spirit of scientific history. The

determination of the historic function of religion in social life must depend mainly on the progress of investigation in this department.

What is the permanent relation of religion to ethics, is a question which must depend partly on the definition of religion, nor could it be discussed here without carrying us beyond the terms of our reference. But looking at the modern developments of religion itself, perhaps it would not be too much to say, that at present, what may broadly be called the ethical element, tends to take the primary place in the interests of men. What religion has to say about life, how far it can inspire or guide the efforts of men, how far it can purify and regenerate the social organization, are the questions which men now ask of its professors. Here there appears to be a certain inversion of the old relations between ethics and theology. Formerly dogma occupied the first place and ethical teaching followed as a corollary. At that stage no one hesitated to correct an ethical judgement by a religious text. In the thought of our own day, the relation, if I am right, is very nearly reversed, and religion itself is weighed in the balance of the ethical judgement. To prove an incompatibility between a religious creed and the higher demands of human justice, would, I think, be to destroy not the morality but the religion. It does not, of course, follow that ethics is independent of any religion whatever, or that the ethical and religious spirit are fundamentally separate. Both the history of their development and the final unity of sociological factors are opposed to any such conclusion. It may even be that the religious life is at bottom the ethical, understood in its widest and deepest meaning. All that is necessarily involved in the primacy of ethics is that there is a rational principle of action verifiable in human experience, and that conduct should in the last resort be determined, and social relations regulated, by this principle and no other.

If there be such a principle it must, to provide a coherent end of action, be social in character, and it is in fact by its social implications that conduct comes to be tested. To define the social end is not necessary here. The laws of conduct and the relations of men are held to be subservient to some purpose for the sake of which society exists—a Social Purpose as it may be shortly called—and ethically the same test will apply to the practical teachings of religion as to any other rule of conduct.

If this rough statement be allowed to pass as a provisional account of the relation of religion to ethics in the modern world, and if, which again is open to dispute, this relation is deeply rooted in the modern mind, we are brought, as we look back over the different phases of the relation, to some results necessarily provisional in character, yet of no small interest to Sociology. We have been following in rough

outline a process whereby the full social implications of conduct come more and more clearly into consciousness as containing in themselves the full rational justification for moral preferences. In the lower stages of intelligence the account given of customary rules is that their breach is attended by some mysterious misfortune, or awakes the resentment of an injured spirit. In such a theory we can indeed trace the workings of a moral element, but we cannot say that morality has arrived at any conscious expression. A higher stage is reached where reward and punishment are impartially awarded by a just God. Here the Deity is clothed with moral attributes, but the basis of conduct is still something external and unethical. Religious idealism seeks a more intimate union. It reconstitutes the ethical code on the basis of greatly heightened spiritual requirements, and finds its value more in the personal life which it renders possible, than in the mechanical sanctions of retribution. Yet it still finds the ultimate meaning of ethics in the sphere of the divine rather than the human, a relation which independent ethical inquiry tends to reverse. Thus the full consciousness of ethical meanings arises by successive steps in which the relation to religion is at every point the pivot on which the movement turns.

I have spoken here only of the account which men give to themselves of the basis of conduct, but I believe it to be possible to show that the content of the ethical judgement, that is to say, the standard of conduct, has on the whole passed through a parallel development in which once more the relation of the religious to the ethical factor is over and over again of critical importance. The total result of this development is the growth of what has been briefly referred to as the Social Purpose. The process by which this purpose comes to maturity is, I think, the central object of study for the sociologist. At all stages of its development human thought is swayed by larger forces than those of which it is aware. The conception of good and evil which it forms are related by countless invisible strands of connexion with underlying conditions of physical and social existence. As we look back on any stage and analyse the meanings and implications of custom or belief, we can trace these strands a little way. We can thus see something of the real conditions determining a belief or a practice, and how indirect, and often how slender, is the relation between them and the reasons which men render to themselves. But at every stage of real development in social psychology the sphere of consciousness enlarges, so that bit by bit it brings within its light the forces that were working in the dark. It apprehends more explicitly the full meaning and implication of its own ideas, and begins to understand the general condition of its own growth. At the same time its valuations undergo a change. What may have

been necessary for the bare existence of society at one stage may become useless or obstructive to further development at a higher remove. This widening of the sphere of consciousness not merely involves a fuller knowledge of the conditions of mental life, but is itself a new condition, introducing the ideal of the development of the human mind to its highest powers of achievement as the goal of action and consequently the basis for the determination of values. The emergence of this conception, if rightly appreciated, seems to mark a turning-point in social psychology not unfairly comparable with the appearance of self-consciousness in the psychology of the individual, and the stages in the development of ethico-religious thought here roughly indicated appear when considered together as the successive steps by which it is approached.

13

THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF RELIGION

By A. E. CRAWLEY. (Abstract)

Perhaps the most important chapter in the history of religion is that which will treat of its social action, its function in the evolution of the State. The subject is a wide one, and has not been comprehensively studied in the light of modern anthropological science. The present sketch is an attempt to suggest a point of view from which the true features of the picture may be worked out.

The study of the social and political action of religion may best be commenced from the history of uncivilized and semi-civilized societies. In such communities society is in the making, while religion pervades all, and, equally with the culture of the people, is concerned with elemental interests.

Any society, however socialistic, is made up of individuals, and its life story is the result of the process by which these individuals adapt themselves to each other and to their general environment. The relation of religion to this process of adaptation has its psychological aspect. The evolution of religion is part of the evolution of mind; every development of religious thought is a result of a development of consciousness.

But from whatever side this relation is viewed, it is all-important to bear in mind the fact that there is only one foundation of human society, and that is economic. In the process of adaptation to environment each individual in the social organism, has one primary need—self-preservation and self-continuance.

What has religion to do with this? As Seeley pointed out, it is a profound error to draw a distinction between secular and ecclesiastical history. Even when the two departments have become independent, they remain correlative, and perhaps always will, as we shall see. If secular activity is the warp, religious activity is the woof of the historical fabric. In modern Europe even, the State was the Church until the eighteenth century; in England the English Church was the English State until the time of Queen Anne. In the Ottoman empire to-day the religion of the citizen is his nationality. In the Middle Ages, in the old civilizations, and in the societies of barbarism and savagery the two were indissolubly one. Generally speaking, indeed, in early culture, any subject of human interest may be, and usually is, religious in character. Man's philosophy, his science, his politics and sociology, his medical practice, his morality, his everyday thought and action, behaviour and etiquette, even the processes of sense, emotion, and intellection, bear a religious stamp.

It is very difficult for man, except in the highest stages of intellectual development, to know the ultimate motives of his acts. It is still more difficult for a society to realize the basis of their corporate energy. This fact must qualify all general statements as to the influence of religion. When, for instance, a people fights for its faith, or a martyr dies for his, the ultimate motive may be different. This will apply particularly to the great religious wars and to the great missionary movements. The Spanish conquest of America was regarded as a war for the faith. 'They,' we might put it, 'extend their territory by the sword or by education, and call it religion.'

We must first have some account of religion as a working hypothesis for the purposes of our subject. Religious feeling, as I have tried to show elsewhere,[1] is rather a tone of psychic activity than a department. Religious feeling is a reflex of physical action, an emotional tone of the imagination, a form of mental exaltation, and it is addressed, as a rule, to serious and elemental concerns of life. In other words, it is an emotional reflex from the effort at adaptation to the environment. To this it is applied in turn, and so becomes a cause, a secondary or accessory cause. A good example is found in those remarkable revivals of religion which took place recently among the aboriginal North American Indians. Here together with the Messianic idea, and the hope of a future regeneration of aboriginal society, there was an ethic which forbade war and violence. 'Tell no lies; do harm to nobody.' The Sioux revolt of 1890 was due to famine and misery. The revival showed all the phenomena usual in conversion. An observer remarks that this new religion was one 'which will bring them into better accord with their white neighbours'.

[1] *The Tree of Life: a Study of Religion.*

The religious tone might be also described by the metaphor of radiation. Itself a form of radiant energy, it surrounds the objects of its attention with a radiant aura; it regards them as sacred. Thus an admired hero has to the worshipper a double personality, a radiant form surrounds his real self. Later, both in imagination and in fact, the two personalities may be made independent; and so we have the distinction, for instance, between the King and the God.

There is a remarkable biological coincidence or identification, which has hitherto, I think, escaped notice. This is the very curious similarity between the religion of a man and the play of a child. The true religious diathesis, I submit, is only an adult phenomenon; it does not occur before puberty. The child has no religion, it has play instead. The adult very rarely has play, but he has religion; and it might be shown in those geniuses to whom the remark applies that man is only complete when he plays, that their play is their religion. By play I mean not organized games, but that unconscious serious creation of another set of realities, which is one of the chief characteristics of childhood. Play is a free activity of the organism, guided by the imagination, in a world which it creates above or around the world of sense. The process of play is characterized by a mental exaltation, a profound seriousness and a power of consecration. Mental exaltation, it has been shown, is a regular recurrent state in childhood. Very similar is the mental exaltation of religion. In both cases the mind is at play, the material for the imagination is supplied by objective reality. Watch a group of savages performing their religious rites, they are just like children at play. The Central Australian occupied with his magical religious ceremonial (which fills most of his leisure time) moves with a solemn gravity and high seriousness only equalled by that of a child.

Thus the spirit-world is a shadowy counterpart of this, ritual is a dramatic counterpart of important physical processes, the ethical ideal is a reflex or irradiation of human give-and-take.

Now when this emotional irradiation of the religious spirit is combined with secular activity at the same moment, the result is an increase of power. The Brahman by performing elevatory ceremonies becomes divine. The religion of the Australians is a process by which things become secret and sacred; so in detail, every meal may be a Eucharist, every marriage a divine union, every mother a Madonna, every babe a Son of God.

This, I take it, in varying forms and with varying applications, is the real nature of the process by which religion acts in the individual and the social life of man.

We have seen that in early culture everything is coloured or informed by religion, but we must avoid the error of ascribing the origin of

institutions or of civilization generally to religion. Thus, it is not the case that agriculture is due to totemism, or that caste is religious in its origin.

The question of agriculture serves to introduce our main line of illustration of the working of religion in society. I may preface it by some general remarks.

It has long been accepted, and rightly so, that the identity of the religious and the secular produces solidarity in a state, and is essential at a certain period of the making of a nation.

Payne begins his account of social evolution with the position that the food-quest is anterior to all social activities. He shows that the step from savagery is taken when a method of artificial food-production has been found. Nothing worthy the name of civilization has ever been founded on any other alimentary basis than the cereals.

All foods become sacred because they are of such supreme importance. The first meaning of words denoting good and evil is good for food and bad for food. The first moral law is the food tabu.

In the food-quest, as in other departments of life, the savage makes in his own image, or in that of animals or in some vague invisible but material shape, beings of higher powers, some good and some evil. The good will help him in the food-quest as elsewhere, but they need food and drink no less than he does. All this is sometimes later, and sometimes contemporaneous with magical-religious methods of helping the growth of food. Add to this the emotion of exalted seriousness, which gives to important elemental things a sacred quality, and we can trace the growth of the main components of the reflex action which is expressed as religion.

These vaguely envisaged spirits become gods of the corn or other food; they become stationary, when agriculture has developed. The next step is a house for the god.

When the savage asks the question, what makes corn to grow, his vitalistic theory tells him it is a spirit in the plant—so we have the familiar maize-mother, rice-mother, corn-mother.

These and other issues of primitive religion are combined and organized in what Payne calls the Covenant of the Gods and Man. This covenant imports mutual services—*do ut des, facio ut facias.* Hence coherence and stability is given to human society. It establishes a partnership; and by the irradiating force of religious emotion, or by faith, as well as by the economic necessity of providing food for the gods as well as for himself, man is forced *to double his work.* The produce of his industry is increased manifold. The gods receive their share. They also need houses, clothes and fields. 'It is easy to see how large are the drafts which are thus made upon the great bank of civilization, the labour of man.'

The way in which an aristocracy, developed to protect the means of subsistence, controls religion for the real purpose of securing the proper organization of the food-supply, is a subject in itself.

The rise of a religion of the industrial class is an interesting and important result, and well shows the connexion between economics and religion. Christianity itself is such in origin. The Herakles of the Greeks was a labour-god and Central America had similar deities.

Religion in history has its rhythm, its ebb and flow, its revivals and its inertia. Great national excitement, such as war, may produce religious energy, long peace may produce stagnation.

The vitality of religion depends on individual and egoistic interests: as soon as it is organized and made a department of life, individual or social, it shifts its true centre of gravity and tends in time to lose its hold on the people, because it has no relation to facts.

Throughout history it may be well seen how religion conserves elemental institutions such as the family and marriage, by making them sacred. The chief function of religion, we repeat, is to consecrate the elemental matters of life. It is significant that the most enduring rite of Christianity is the sacred meal, the Eucharist, which, among other things, certainly stands for a consecration of the means of life.

LAST GENERAL MEETING

A General Meeting of the Congress was held on September 18th in the Examination Schools at 5.45 p.m., the President in the Chair.

Prof. Gardner moved the first resolution, which was seconded by Prof. F. C. Burkitt (Cambridge) and carried unanimously: 'That the best thanks of the Congress be given to the President, the Right Hon. Sir A. C. Lyall, and to the several Presidents of Sections, for their very valuable addresses, and for their conduct of the business at the General and Sectional Meetings.'

Moved by the President from the Chair, and seconded by Prof. Dr. A. Hillebrandt (Bonn), and resolved: 'That this Congress gratefully acknowledges the kindness of the Council of the University in placing the Examination Schools at the service of the Congress for its various meetings, and expresses its sincere thanks to the Curators of the Schools for the various facilities thus enjoyed.'

Moved by the President from the Chair, and seconded by Count Goblet d'Alviella, and resolved: 'That this Congress offers its heartiest thanks to the Worshipful the Mayor of Oxford and the Mayoress, for their generous reception of the Congress at the Town Hall on Tuesday, September 15th; and to the numerous hosts and hostesses who have received Delegates to the Congress and invited Readers of Papers into their homes.'

Moved by Prof. Rhys Davids (Manchester), and seconded by Prof. Morris Jastrow Jun. (Philadelphia) and resolved: 'That the best thanks of the Congress be given to the local Committee for their labour in preparing the work of the Congress.'

Dr. Paul Deussen (Kiel) presented to the Congress the volumes of his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, with the following words:

'Meine Damen und Herren! Es freut mich, dem Congresse für Geschichte der Religionen ein Werk überreichen zu können, welches nach vieljähriger Arbeit soeben vollendet worden ist, eine Geschichte der indischen Philosophie nebst einem Anhang über die Philosophie der Chinesen und Japaner. Das Werk könnte auch heissen: Geschichte der indischen Theologie, denn Philosophie und Theologie sind in Indien wie auch in China und Japan nicht unterschieden und nicht unterscheidbar; und wenn beide bei uns auseinander gehalten werden, so ist dies nur ein Symptom der krankhaften Entwickelung, welche unsere abendländische Kultur durchgemacht hat. Es giebt nur eine allgemeine ewige Wahrheit, und alle Denker auf philosophischem wie auf theologischem Gebiete sind Sucher nach dieser Wahrheit und

haben dazu beigetragen, sie zu finden. Beide Bestrebungen haben sich von jeher gegenseitig unterstützt; unsere Theologie hat vieles gelernt und hat noch vieles zu lernen von Platon, Kant und Schopenhauer, und unsere Philosophie steht mindestens ebenso sehr, wenn nicht noch mehr, unter dem Einflusse eines Jesus und Paulus wie unter dem eines Platon und Aristoteles. Zwei Quellen und nicht mehr sind es, aus denen alle philosophischen wie theologischen Erkenntnisse entspringen: die äussere Erfahrung, welche uns die Körperwelt in Raum und Zeit kennen lehrt, und die innere Erfahrung, welche uns die psychischen Verhältnisse enthüllt und zugleich einen Einblick in die letzten metaphysischen Tiefen unseres eigenen Selbstes, da wo es mit der Gottheit zusammenfällt, gestattet. Aus diesen Tiefen schöpften Propheten und Psalmen, Jesus, Paulus und der vierte Evangelist; das ist ihre Offenbarung, die sie den Menschen gebracht haben. Aber dieselben Quellen, aus denen sie diese Offenbarungen schöpften, stehen auch heute noch offen; und eine Philosophie, welche die Augen vor ihnen verschliessen wollte, würde sich des Besten berauben was sie zu geben im Stande ist. Wenn aber behauptet wird, dass Philosophie die Sache des Kopfes und Verstandes, Religion eine solche des Herzens und Gefühls sei, so müssen wir erwidern, dass es schlecht um eine Religion steht, welche nicht mit allen sichern Resultaten der Naturwissenschaft und Geschichte in Einklang steht, und schlecht um eine Philosophie, welche nur Sache des Kopfes ist und nicht vielmehr Kopf und Herz und den ganzen Menschen ergreift und auf das tiefste erschüttert.

'Diese Einheit des theologischen und philosophischen Denkens, welche bei uns noch fehlt, hat im ferneren Orient von jeher bestanden; Vedānta, Sāṅkhyam und Yoga, Tainismus und Buddhismus in Indien, Taoismus und Confucianismus in China, sind ebenso sehr Religionen wie Philosophien; und wenn der Chinese das schöne Sprichwort hat, *san kiao i kia*, 'drei Lehren eine Familie,' so versteht er unter den drei Lehren den Taoismus, Confucianismus und Buddhismus, sowohl im religiösen wie im philosophischen Sinne.

'Das vorliegende Werk zerfällt in drei Teile. Der erste verfolgt das erste kindliche Lallen, die ersten Flügelschläge des philosophisch-religiösen Genius in den Hymnen und Brahmanas des Veda; der zweite Teil bringt den hohen Flug dieses Genius aus der Literatur der Upanishads zur Darstellung; und der dritte Teil zeigt wie die Gedanken der Upanishads sich zu sechzehn philosophisch-religiösen Systemen fortentwickelt haben, unter denen Tainismus und Buddhismus, Sāṅkhyam, Yoga und Vedānta die erste Stelle einnehmen. Eine kurze Übersicht über die Literatur und die Gedankenschätze der chinesischen und japanischen Welt bildet den Abschluss des vorliegenden Werkes, als dessen Fortsetzung drei weitere Abteilungen: die

griechische, biblische, mittelalterliche und neuere Philosophie, erscheinen sollen, so weit Leben, Zeit und Kräfte es gestatten.'

Prof. Macdonell (Oxford) announced the approaching issue of an Index to the *Sacred Books of the East* by the University Press.

Moved by Dr. J. E. Carpenter (Oxford), seconded by Prof. A. Moret (Paris), and resolved: 'That the following Members of the Congress and of the original International Committee be appointed an International Committee to arrange for the Meeting of the Congress four years hence:—Prof. A. Alphandéry (Paris); Count Goblet d'Alviella (Brussels); Prof. A. Bertholet (Basel); Dr. J. E. Carpenter (Oxford); Prof. F. von Duhn (Heidelberg); Prof. Percy Gardner (Oxford); Prof. Ignatz Goldziher (Buda-Pest); Prof. J. J. M. de Groot (Leiden); Prof. de Gubernatis (Rome); Prof. Morris Jastrow Jun. (Philadelphia); Prof. Dr. A. Loofs (Halle); Prof. George Moore (Harvard); Prof. Edouard Naville (Geneva); Prof. Dr. C. von Orelli (Basel); Prof. Dr. Söderblom (Upsala); Prof. Toutain (Paris); and that Prof. Bertholet be requested to act as Secretary, and correspond with the Members of the Committee.

I. INDEX OF AUTHORS

II. INDEX OF PAPERS

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